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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I demonstrate that the political views and use of natural 
philosophy by deists—heretics who denied revelation, active providence, and the 
authority of priests—in early-modern England were not as subversive as past 
scholarship suggests.  Like other erudite endeavours in the period, a deist 
conception of God was the foundation for their interpretation of contemporary 
natural philosophy and political writings.  Though many scholars have noted that 
deists employed contemporary natural philosophy in many of their works, the way 
deists actually used these writings has not been explored in a comprehensive 
manner.  Moreover, when many historians engage deism, they frequently stop at one 
deist in particular, John Toland.  My dissertation reveals how theology informed 
deist natural philosophy which in turn was inseparably joined to their political 
works.  The two goals of this study are to remove deists from the sidelines of 
intellectual debates in early-modern England and place them squarely in the centre 
alongside other political and natural philosophical authors and to demonstrate that 
deism cannot be reduced to or encapsulated in the person of John Toland. 
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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction: 
William Whiston’s Worries  
 
 
 
 
 
 During his Presidency of the Royal Society, Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) 
visited a “Club of Unbelievers, at the Grecian Coffee-house.”  He advised the 
company that the Christian religion was a demonstrable fact and could not be 
refuted or defeated by their books and pamphlets.1  Newton, thus, confronted some 
deists—those heretics who denied contemporary active providence and the authority 
of priests—who frequented the Grecian.2  This gathering underscores the close 
connection between theology and natural philosophy in early-modern England.  As 
one late seventeenth-century commentator put it in a letter concerning the Royal 
Society, “two of the most glorious subjects Since the Reformation is one for 
Learning, the other for Religion….”3  The Scottish mathematician Colin Maclaurin 
(1698-1746) agreed in his An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical 
Discoveries, in Four Books (1748): “natural philosophy is subservient to purposes 
of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural 
religion and moral philosophy; by leading us, in a satisfactory manner, to the 
knowledge of the Author and Governor of the universe.”  However, he warned that 
“False schemes of natural philosophy may lead to atheism, or suggest false 
opinions, concerning the Deity and the universe….”4  
Modern scholarship confirms that natural philosophy was as much about 
images of God as it was about facts of nature.  Edward B. Davis concludes that 
“[h]ow God had made the world, how he continued to uphold it, and how the human 
mind was related to the divine all had implications for natural philosophy.”5  The 
strongest advocate, among many, of this position is currently Andrew Cunningham 
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 who, in several books and articles, convincingly demonstrates that we cannot speak 
of natural philosophy without at least a tacit nod to the conception of God which 
supported it.  Different confessional allegiances held different pictures of God and 
hence produced unique natural philosophies.6   
Early-modern English coffeehouses like the Grecian were the sites of more 
than warm drink; they also specialised in conversation, debate, and dispute.  The 
informal atmosphere and large open tables with benches, rather than private booths, 
encouraged discussion of the day’s most pressing issues be they political, 
theological, or natural philosophical.7  Certain houses were amiable to specific types 
of conversation, associations or professions.  Beginning in the mid-1660s fellows of 
the Royal Society frequented the Grecian where they might surround themselves 
with those who shared an interest in the natural world.8  Coffeehouses were also the 
sites of public lectures on, and demonstrations of, natural philosophical theories.  
Public science, as the phenomenon of disseminating natural philosophy is known, 
involved both presenters and authors who created a commodity for witnesses and 
readers.9  Regarding this symbiotic relationship, Steven Shapin argues that science 
“always bears a relation to the culture of which it is part, and culture demands for its 
understanding careful attention to the social context.  As the audience for science is 
part of its cultural definition, … the nature of the audience arises from the particular 
social context…” in which both exist.10   
Those who held an interest in, or sought to understand, natural philosophy 
often did so within profound assumptions about the natural world and God.  While 
much attention has been focused on philosophers and those who distributed 
accounts of natural philosophy the same cannot be said of those who purchased 
these efforts.  On this Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey conclude that we know 
very little about how these audiences used the knowledge gained from participation 
in the phenomena of public science.  As they put it, our ignorance in this matter is 
“staggering” and “still cause for widespread concern.”11  If a defined audience could 
be found, then we would be better positioned to comment upon the reception and 
use of natural philosophy in eighteenth-century England.  To find this group, we 
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 return to the Grecian where its nexus of public science, theology, and political 
debate imprinted itself on one group in particular: the deists. 
“When I wrote my treatise about our Systeme I had an eye upon such 
Principles as might work with considering men for the beliefe of a Deity & nothing 
can rejoyce me more then to find it usefull for that purpose.”12  Newton wrote these 
words in 1692 to Richard Bentley (1662-1742), classical scholar and future Master 
of Trinity College, Cambridge.  That someone had found the apologetic purpose 
which was encoded within his Principia Mathematica (1687) pleased Newton 
greatly.  As Margaret C. Jacob, John Gascoigne, among others, have demonstrated, 
the discovery that Newton’s dense mathematical writings might aid the cause of 
religion provided an impetus for many contemporary sermons and theological 
writings.13  However, as his visit to the Grecian demonstrated, not all those who saw 
theology lurking among the geometrical diagrams and formulas were as friendly to 
religion as Newton might have wished.  The natural philosopher, and ousted 
successor to the Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge, William Whiston 
(1667-1752) believed Newton’s writings could be dangerous in the wrong hands 
suggesting that deists had unfortunately found much support in these “wonderful 
Discoveries.”14  In a later work, Whiston named the specific deists he found to be 
most troubling in this regard.  These “unlearned Writers” were “Collins, Tindal, 
Toland, Morgan, and Chubb.”15  The deists identified by a disciple of Newton as 
misusing natural philosophy to serve their seemingly irreligious purposes were: 
John Toland (1670-1722), Anthony Collins (1676-1729), Matthew Tindal (1656-
1733), Thomas Morgan (d. 1743), and Thomas Chubb (1679-1747).  Before 
outlining my argument, I will briefly sketch the biographies of the deists about 
whom Whiston worried and whom we will investigate. 
The Cast of Characters: 
John Toland 
John Toland was born in Ireland in 1670, likely to an Irish priest and his 
mistress.  When he was seventeen Toland entered the University of Glasgow 
remaining there two years before taking an MA from the University of Edinburgh 
on 30 June 1690.  During his schooling, Toland associated with various Dissenters.  
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 His religious activism continued when he went to London where it impressed Dr 
Daniel Williams, a leading and wealthy Nonconformist.  Williams arranged a 
stipend of £8 for Toland’s travel to Leiden so that he might study with the Protestant 
scholar Friedrich Spandeim, the younger, with the goal of training Toland as a 
Dissenting minister.  Toland returned to England in 1693 when he lost the desire to 
become a minister.  But, he also carried letters of recommendation from Philippus 
van Limborch and Benjamin Furly, men with whom John Locke was associated 
during his self-imposed exile after attempts to exclude James II from the crown had 
failed.  After turning his back on Williams, Toland journeyed to Oxford to compose 
an Irish dictionary.  During his time in Oxford (1694-5) Toland became “eminent 
for railing in coffee houses against all communities in religion, and monarch.”16  He 
also was known as a “man of fine parts, great learning and little religion,” who was 
writing a book “to show, that there is no such thing as Mystery in our Religion.”17  
The result was his most famous book Christianity not Mysterious (1696), written 
when Toland was twenty-five years old.  The book argued that no mysteries existed 
in Christianity and that any person who claimed otherwise did so for personal gain.  
Toland spent the next few years defending the book from the many attacks it 
generated.  He also attempted to secure political patrons, namely Robert Harley and 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury.  Shaftesbury took pity on Toland 
providing him “an annual stipend, tho’ he never had any great opinion of him….”18  
Political events captured Toland’s attention and he wrote in support of the Act of 
Settlement (1701) which secured a Protestant succession to the English Crown by 
passing the line to the House of Hanover.  Toland’s support earned him a place—
likely at the request of Harley—in the mission led by Lord Macclesfield, to present 
the Act in person to Sophia, Electress of Hanover and mother of the future George I.  
While in Hanover, Toland attempted to endear himself to Sophia and her daughter 
Sophia Charlotte, Queen of Prussia.  Through the royal family, Toland met and 
began a philosophical correspondence with Newton’s greatest rival, the natural 
philosopher and privy counsellor Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716).  Between 
1701 and 1707 Toland would travel at least three more times to the Continent and 
Hanover.  Upon his return to England in 1702, Toland started work on his Letters to 
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 Serena (1704) which resulted from the discussions with the Queen and her 
philosopher.  Letters contained Toland’s account of matter and motion among other 
topics.  Also in 1704 Harley, now Secretary of State, briefly employed Toland’s 
skill as a writer, but refused his request for permanent patronage.  Toland remained 
in Holland through 1708, during Harley’s fall.  He returned after the election of 
1710 when Harley regained his position, though Harley continued to ignore Toland.  
The death of Queen Anne in 1714 temporarily buoyed Toland’s hope for political 
appointment when the Electress Sophia was poised to become Queen of England.  
Toland believed that his frequent praise for the Hanoverians would be rewarded by 
the Electress.  However, Sophia’s death, also in 1714, dashed Toland’s dream.  
After 1715 his literary output declined, though he still commented upon the day’s 
politics in an assortment of pamphlets.  By 1720 Toland’s most unique work 
Pantheisticon circulated in manuscript.  It contained an account of Creation, and the 
operation of the world.  Toland’s final years were spent in poverty, resulting from 
his losses in the South Sea Company Bubble, although he was partially supported by 
his fellow Irishman Robert Molesworth (1656-1725).19   
Anthony Collins 
Anthony Collins was born outside of London on 21 June 1676 into a family 
of lawyers.  His namesake grandfather was a Bencher and Treasurer of Middle 
Temple and his father, Henry Collins, was called to the bar in 1667 but never 
practiced.  Collins’ early schooling took place at Eton before he advanced to King’s 
College, Cambridge in 1693.  He moved to Middle Temple in 1694, but never 
practiced as a lawyer.  In 1698 Collins married Martha Child, daughter of Sir 
Francis Child, Lord Mayor of London and Member of Parliament.  That same year 
Collins came to control some of his father’s land, an estate producing £1800 per 
year.  The couple’s first child, Henry, died in infancy.  In 1701 their second son, 
Anthony, was born.  Before Martha died in April 1703, she and Collins had two 
daughters: Elizabeth and Martha.  After his wife’s death, Collins spent much time in 
the Essex countryside.  He moved there permanently in 1715 and held the post of 
Justice of the Peace until his death in 1729.  He also entertained England’s elite; 
Richard Dighton, Collins’ former servant, recalled that Collins “was visited several 
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 times by Queen Ann[e’s] Noblemen and Ladies of Quality who took delight in 
walking in his fine gardens….”20  While in Essex, Collins befriended the famed 
philosopher John Locke (1632-1704).  Around 1704 Collins began a friendship and 
correspondence with Tindal and with Toland who stayed at Collins’ estate on at 
least two occasions.  Collins entered the literary and theological scene of his age in 
1706 in a pamphlet war with the Newtonian and theologian Samuel Clarke (1675-
1729) after Henry Dodwell (1641-1711) suggested in print that the soul was 
naturally mortal.  Confrontations with Newton’s disciples continued throughout 
Collins’ life.  He and Whiston would have a dozen personal meetings in 
coffeehouses and would challenge one another in print during the 1720s over the 
meaning of prophecy.  In 1711 Collins and Tindal met Whiston and Clarke to 
discuss theology at the home of Lady Caverly and her common-law husband Sir 
John Hubern.  According to Whiston the four had “friendly debates about the truth 
of the Bible and the Christian Religion.”21 Although he would continue to publish, 
Collins produced his most famous book in 1713: A Discourse of Free-Thinking.22   
Matthew Tindal 
Mathew Tindal was possibly born in 1653, or even as late as 1657.  His 
parents were both wealthy, and his father, John Tindal, was a minister.  Though we 
know little of his early life, he entered Oxford in the 1670s and studied with George 
Hickes, who became a Nonjuror when he refused to swear allegiance to William and 
Mary after 1689.  Tindal received a law Fellowship to All Souls College in 1678 
(which he held until his death in 1733) earning a BCL in 1679 before proceeding 
DCL in 1685.  The same year as his doctorate, James II sent emissaries to Oxford in 
an attempt to convert the fellows to Catholicism.  Tindal was convinced by the 
arguments, though critics suspected that his conversion was a matter of convenience 
and a means to become Warden of the college.  However, Tindal failed in his bid to 
become Warden of All Souls in 1687.  He also seems to have lost his Catholic 
enthusiasm as he converted to Anglicanism in 1688 taking the sacrament on 15 
April 1688, the earliest occasion.  In addition to his legal responsibilities in Oxford, 
Tindal had a civil law practice in London.  On 7 November 1685 he was “admitted 
One of the Advocates of yor Grace’s Arches Court of Canterbury,”23 a society for 
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 civil lawyers.  Tindal served the new Protestant government acting as Deputy Judge 
Advocate of their Majesties’ Fleet from 30 May to 8 November 1689.  His 
performance on this and other duties earned him a yearly pension of £200.  Tindal’s 
initial publications were political and described the duties of both government and 
citizens.  He entered the day’s theological debates in 1706 with his The Rights of the 
Christian Church Asserted, which was an attack on rights and privileges enjoyed in 
the English Church.  Tindal’s writings on religion culminated in his Christianity as 
Old as the Creation (1730), a work often described as the deists’ bible.  Tindal died 
on 16 August 1733, after an attack of gallstones.24  An epitaph which appeared in 
The Bee claimed that despite Tindal’s seemingly irreligious writings “he was 
possessed in the highest degree of the most valuable virtues—namely, The Love of 
his Country, the Love of Merit, and the Hatred of Oppression.”25   
Thomas Morgan 
Of all our deists, we know the least about Thomas Morgan who was born in 
Wales and educated at the Dissenting Bridgewater Academy.  He was ordained a 
Dissenting minister (Presbyterian) on 6 September 1716 and would later take a post 
with a congregation in Marlborough.  During the debates over the Trinity among 
Dissenters held in 1719 at Salter’s Hall, initiated by enthusiasm for the Arian 
writings of Samuel Clarke, Morgan sided with those who advocated a unitarian 
view.26  Sometime around 1720, and perhaps earlier, he studied medicine and served 
as provincial physician, which accounts for the MD designation on many of his 
publications.  He contributed to contemporary debates over medical theory in two 
publications: Philosophical Principles of Medicine (1725) and Mechanical Practice 
of Physick (1735).  Both works employed Newtonian mechanics.  Around 1726 or 
1727 Morgan lost his congregation due to his publications in favour of Arianism.  
He then moved to Bristol before settling in London.  Morgan’s solidified his 
position as a deist with a three volume work entitled The Moral Philosopher, which 
appeared in 1737, 1738, and 1740.27   
Thomas Chubb 
Thomas Chubb was born to a family of artisans in Salisbury.  According to a 
contemporary, “Mr. Chubb’s Person was not stately, he was both short and fat.”  
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 Through his father Henry, Chubb received basic instruction in mathematics.  The 
necessities of money meant that Chubb had no other formal education before 
starting an apprenticeship with a glover in 1694 at age fifteen.  After completing his 
training, Chubb remained with his master, until his diminishing eyesight provoked a 
change of profession.  In 1705 Chubb worked as a tallow-chandler with John 
Lawrence, a family friend.  Around 1711 the debating society, which Chubb 
initiated in 1705 among his friends, discussed Whiston’s Primitive Christianity 
Revived.  The Arianism presented in the book held a great attraction for Chubb who 
then wrote The Supremacy of the Father Asserted, in support of Arianism in 1714.  
Whiston himself was impressed with the work and ensured it saw publication over 
the winter of 1714/15.  Based on the reception of the work, Whiston brought Chubb 
to London and introduced him to Clarke (perhaps Newton’s greatest disciple).  
Whiston also secured a place for Chubb with his patron Sir Joseph Jekyll (1663-
1738), MP and Master of the Rolls, who “allow’d him an annual Salary.”  As Chubb 
became more deistical in his thought and writings, Whiston withdrew from him and 
advised Jekyll to do the same.  Whiston cautioned Jekyll “against procuring himself 
a Blot, by openly supporting [Chubb]; (tho’ I never desired him to diminish his 
Assistance to him in private:) He was not willing to believe my Representation; 
which yet Time has too certainly verified.”  Chubb had, Whiston feared, gone from 
“one of the most judicious Christians, without a learned Education, that I had then 
met with, … [and] seems to have degenerated in the directly opposite Character of 
one of the most foolish and injudicious of our modern Unbelievers….”  When Jekyll 
died in 1738, Whiston wrote with approval that “Mr. Chubbe is not in the will 
which I am not sorry for.”28  After two years in London, Chubb longed for the 
slower pace of Salisbury and returned to the place of his birth.  He continued to 
write theological tracts, which became more deistical as he aged.  Chubb never 
married because he believed that his sparse financial situation could not support a 
family.  When he died Chubb was buried in the “Church-yard in St. Edmond’s” next 
to his friend Lawrence.  Chubb did have supporters.  Upon his death, one 
contemporary commented that “So died Mr. Thomas Chubb, in the Sixty-eighth 
Year of his Age.  A Man of profound Judgement, of uncommon Perspicuity, of 
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 unblemished Honesty and Simplicity of Life, of courteous Manners and benevolent 
Dispositions to his Fellow-Creatures.”29
Recent Deism Historiography 
As a topic of historical inquiry, deism has attracted substantial attention.  
The heresy has been explored recently in theatre performance, literary influences, 
and in natural law theories among other topics.30  The few works that have 
attempted to deal with deists collectively have addressed rhetoric, natural religion, 
and historical argument.31  These works have increased our understanding of deists, 
yet no comprehensive examination of their use of, and in some cases contributions 
to, contemporary natural philosophy exists.  Through a detailed examination of how 
this specific group in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England read and 
wrote natural philosophy, we can begin to fill the historical void that Cooter and 
Pumfrey demonstrate exists.  What is more, we are able to paint a more complete 
picture of deists and deism.  Aside from a nod in the direction of Newton, scholars 
have paid little attention to the extent deists actually used natural philosophy in their 
writings.  Moreover, when historians of science engage deism, they frequently stop 
at one deist in particular, John Toland.32  This is a trend that transcends histories of 
science.  Toland is the most studied of all deists having four recent biographies in 
English and numerous articles dedicated to his massive corpus of writings.33  
 Modern historians concur with Whiston’s assessment; it has become 
accepted by many scholars that natural philosophy, Newtonian philosophy 
specifically, is linked to deism in England.34  This is undoubtedly due to the 
association of Newton (at the apex of the so-called Scientific Revolution) and deism 
(traditionally defined as the religion of reason) as the twin pillars of the 
Enlightenment and the modern world.  Peter Gay suggested that “for most of his 
recorded history man has been a religious animal.  After deism, and partly because 
of it, he was no longer.”  This secular revolt had a scientific basis: “The 
philosophical and the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century were one and 
the same, and it was essentially this great revolution, though not led by deists, that 
gave rise to modern deism.”35  Richard S. Westfall agreed that deism was the 
inevitable outcome of Newtonian philosophy and the Scientific Revolution, which 
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 “prepared the ground for the deists of the Enlightenment.”  Others suggest that we 
may draw a straight “line of connection from Newton … through the Enlightenment 
and the evolution of deism….”36   
We may trace the foundation of most current approaches taken towards 
deists and natural philosophy to Margaret C. Jacob and her path-breaking articles 
and, more explicitly, to her books The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 
1689-1720 (1976) and The Radical Enlightenment (1981, 2003).  Jacob argues that 
English deists (she calls them Freethinkers)37 were hostile to the established 
political order supported by Latitudinarian Churchmen and Newtonian philosophy.  
In order subvert this system deists constructed alternative schemes of nature to 
dismantle Newton’s philosophy and the society upon which it rested.38  The key 
figure in her account is Toland.  Jacob’s thesis has gained such widespread 
acceptance that it has become orthodoxy.39  John H. Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor 
repeat that Toland and Collins used Newton’s work in a manner that “appeared 
subversive.”  Moreover, Peter N. Miller supports Jacob’s claim that “the antagonism 
between the freethinkers and the Newtonians stands as one of the main themes in 
the intellectual history of the early eighteenth century.”  The clearest articulation of 
this position is offered by Paul Russell who concludes that “the members of this 
circle were very active and hostile critics of Newtonian philosophy and theology in 
general….”40  However, when we read the writings of the deists, both published and 
unpublished, rather than relying solely on Jacob as our guide, many of the assumed 
truisms of deism, politics, and natural philosophy do not withstand close scrutiny.  
This is not to suggest we disregard Jacob’s work.  She is to be commended for first 
bringing to light many of the topics in this present study.  
The Importance of Deist Theology 
Since natural philosophy was intimately linked to conceptions of God and 
assumptions regarding His providence, I will emphasise theology to a greater extent 
than has been the case in previous studies of deists.  A deist conception of God and 
His relationship to humanity may seem counterintuitive for a group of people who, 
as we will see, are frequently described as Godless.  This should not be so, however.  
The age of deism in England was saturated with views of God that informed the 
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 day-to-day lives of all people, including deists.  As J. C. D. Clark argues, early-
modern English society was a confessional state and remained so until the mid-
1800s.  Justin Champion likewise urges historians to be sensitive to the importance 
of theology as a “destabilising factor” in the political and social lives of Britons 
because politics and religion “were inherently intertwined projects.”  Linda Colley 
further suggests that religion—specifically a shared sense of Protestantism—was 
critical in forming early-modern British identities.41   
 Recently, James A. Herrick has proposed that the view of deism “as 
theological rationalism centred on a God who set the universe in motion and then 
stepped away—though persistent, is no longer tenable.”  Yet it remains a common 
assessment that deists believed God had abandoned the world.42  What is more, 
historians have often presented deists as at best indifferent to religion, or at worst 
atheists.  As Caroline Roberts succinctly put it, deists “certainly paid nothing but lip 
service to any religious belief.”43  Moreover, David Berman contends that Anthony 
Collins, John Toland, and other deists were really atheists.44  Michael Hunter, and 
most recently S. J. Barnett, wisely remind us that any discussion of “atheism” is 
problematic because contemporary theologians agreed neither on the meaning nor 
characteristics of atheism and as a result early-modern atheists were more shadow 
than substance.45   
Commencing with Edward Stillingfleet’s A Letter to a Deist in 1677, and 
perhaps even earlier, competing conceptions of God lay at the heart of disputes 
between deists and their critics, even if some modern scholars do not always 
recognise this.  Stillingfleet (1635-1699), the future Bishop of Worchester, outlined 
points of agreement between himself and deists concerning God.  The divine being 
was perfect, the creator of all, and worthy of our prayers.  Where Stillingfleet parted 
ways with deists was that he accepted the New Testament as coming from God via 
the Apostles and that it was predicted in the Old Testament.46  Deists accepted 
neither prophecy, nor the active God who imparted it.  Two decades later Matthias 
Earbery (ca.1688-1740), Nonjuror and Jacobite, agreed that deists denied God the 
ability to intervene in the Creation.47  By the early eighteenth century, Charles 
Gildon (1665-1724), himself a reformed deist, claimed that “if the true Notion of 
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 GOD, and his Attributes were spread, and fix’d, this Bane of Humane Society 
wou’d Vanish….”48  Thus, correct conceptions of God would apparently halt the 
heresy.  In the Rehearsal for 12 February 1707 the editor Charles Leslie (1650-
1722), a Nonjuror minister whose anti-deist work Gildon claimed had converted 
him from the heresy, commented that deists evaluated God’s power in terms of 
human reason and in so doing constrained God’s omnipotence.49  After the deist 
controversy had peaked in the mid-1740s, writers who looked back upon it 
concurred with their predecessors.  The anonymous author of A Letter to the Deists 
(1751) told deists their heresy “obviously results from the relation you stand in to 
God” that separated them from the rest of religion.50  John Leland, DD (1691-1766), 
a nonconformist minister in Dublin, who produced a history of deism, also 
identified conflicting notions of God as one of deism’s key elements.51  
The Argument 
When challenges to deism are stripped of their rhetoric, only incompatible 
notions of God remain.52  Because it lay at the root of all aspects of English society, 
and formed the basis of many intellectual endeavours, including natural philosophy, 
I place great emphasis on the theology held by each of our deists.  In so doing I 
draw on their respective images of God, notions of human understanding, divine 
communication via miracles and prophecy, and the role played by priests in religion.   
We may usefully describe the forum of public science, political debate, and 
deism as Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere.  That is, these discourses took place 
within an open domain composed of books and pamphlets.53  Though it was in 
theory an egalitarian arena, in practice some contributions were more praised than 
others.  Because the public sphere in eighteenth-century England contained politics, 
theology, and natural philosophy, a contribution to any area would have some 
bearing for the other two.  Any faithful account of deists’ comments on natural 
philosophy, therefore, must be sensitive to their observations on politics and 
theology.  Our deists certainly acted in these realms as Edmund Burke’s much later 
account of the French Revolution confirms.  He repeated Whiston’s list of deists 
when he happily wrote that they were relegated to “lasting oblivion” but had once 
been politically troublesome.54
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 The first part (Chapters 2-5) of this dissertation follows a chronological 
account of our deists within English politics during the period which defines the 
deist controversy, roughly from 1696 and the appearance of Christianity not 
Mysterious to 1742, with the fall of Robert Walpole’s ministry.  Each chapter is 
proceeded by a brief account of that era’s political issues as a means of introduction 
and as a reminder that deists lived within these events.  Indeed, like others of their 
age our deists addressed problems of contemporary importance: Jacobites, 
Whig/Tory divisions, succession of the Crown, the Sacheverell affair, War of the 
Spanish Succession, split of Whigs in 1718, the Bangorian Controversy, and the 
South Sea Bubble.  Amid these events I consider our deists’ theologies and political 
theories.  Further context for our consideration of deists will be taken from the 
popular depiction of politics and theology found in newspapers, periodicals, and 
polemics.  We will see that deists did not exist solely in a radical subculture, as 
Jacob argues; nor can their writings be dismissed as mere political ridicule as John 
Redwood contends.55  None of our deists wished to overthrow the institutions of 
government.  Rather, they urged the nation to operate within the tenets of deism.   
In the second part (Chapters 6-8) I demonstrate how our five deists 
understood and incorporated natural philosophy as part of their larger programme of 
reform based on the theological and political outlook we built in the first part.  As in 
part one, our context will be the public understanding of contemporary natural 
philosophy.  Deists lived within an age fascinated with Newtonian natural 
philosophy.  Like others in eighteenth-century England, deists attempted to 
understand what Newton had written.  To this end, we focus on the products of 
public science, books, lectures, and sermons, as the yardstick against which to 
consider deists’ writings on this topic.  When considering Newton directly, we will 
be concerned with the contents of the Opticks, especially the queries, which had a 
much greater impact on the learned discourse of the age, due to its English prose 
composition, than did the more famed Principia.  We will see that deists did not 
differ greatly from what their contemporaries had to say about matter, motion, and 
Newton. 
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 While it is not my intention to provide a comprehensive study of deism, its 
roots, influence, or fate, I will challenge several assumptions in the historiography 
of English deism.  My aim is to remove deists from the sidelines of intellectual 
debates in early-modern England and place them where they belong: squarely in the 
centre alongside other political and natural philosophical authors.  While Justin 
Champion has recently done this for Toland with regard to politics, he did not 
address natural philosophy.  Moreover, by confining scholarly study of deism solely 
to the writings of Toland, historians are ignoring other figures whom their 
contemporaries found just as troublesome.  An accurate account of deism cannot be 
found within the writings of one man.  It is with these two goals in mind—a desire 
to set deists in the midst of, not beside, their culture and to demonstrate that deism 
cannot be reduced to or encapsulated in Toland—that I proceed. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
Deist Politics and Theology, 1694-1700 
 
 
 
 
 
 England in the 1690s was a nation recovering from the struggle of the 
Restoration and the turbulent political events of 1688-1689.  When James II was 
deemed by Parliament to have abdicated the crown and William Prince of Orange 
and his wife Mary Stuart, daughter of James, were installed as King and Queen, 
many issues regarding the governance of England remained at best unsettled and at 
worst divisive.  The immediate concern related to what form the new government 
would take: constitutional or divine right monarchy, Low or High Church.  
Moreover, James did not fade away quietly.  He made a last stab to hold his throne 
in 1690 with the support of the French King Louis XIV to whose court James had 
fled.  The Battle of Boyne, in late August, was a decisive victory for William and 
marked the end of James’ best chances to retain the English crown.  Religion was 
perhaps an even more pressing issue.  James’ steadfast Catholicism had thrown the 
nation into revolution, but the securing of Protestantism under William and Mary 
did not end the debate.   It is against this backdrop of religious uncertainty that our 
deists wrote and in their own way attempted to help England chart a new course in 
politics and theology.  Because many of their critics took issue with the theology 
held by our deists and since theology was intimately related to politics, we will 
examine the theological views of our deists in some depth as we proceed to outline 
their political views against those of their contemporaries.   
The Act of Toleration (1689) secured some rights for Dissenters but these 
were few because the Test and Corporation Acts, banning them for any public 
office, remained enforced.  Those Tories who reluctantly had turned their backs on 
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 the Stuarts remained firm in their demands that England enforce the terms of the 
Coronation Oath Act especially that portion describing the confession of England as 
“the protestant religion established by law.”  Toleration meant that Dissenters were 
granted “relief from the penalties imposed” upon them, which exempted them from 
the punishments of the Clarendon Code even though, legally, the Code was still in 
effect.  For Dissenters and moderate Churchmen alike, though in strong opposition 
to High Churchmen, the Church of England ought to include all Protestants and not 
be used as a tool of separation and exclusion in society.  Some refused to participate 
in the new religious arrangement and would not swear allegiance to William and 
Mary claiming that while James lived the oaths given to him could not be abrogated.  
These nonjurors, though relatively small in number, will frequently appear in this 
history of deism.1  The fear of High Churchmen who believed that too much 
religious tolerance posed both political and religious threats to England was 
confirmed in 1693 when a young John Toland sailed for England. 
Toland Attracts Interest in Oxford 
Before Toland returned from his studies at Leiden in August 1693, he had 
solicited letters of introduction to the philosopher John Locke from Philippus van 
Limborch (1633-1712), theologian at the Remonstrant Seminary in Amsterdam, and 
Benjamin Furly (1636-1714), a Quaker who conducted a learned salon at his home.2  
These were men with whom Locke had associated during his self-imposed exile 
(1683-88) after attempts to exclude James II from the crown had failed.  Toland also 
spent time with these two, though perhaps not with the closeness he claimed, as 
Limborch remembered in a letter to Locke sent years later.  Toland had “boast[ed] 
of an intimate friendship contracted with me.  I wonder what moves a man whom I 
have never seen, and about whom I know nothing, to boast falsely of having had 
familiar conversations with me.”3  Toland also declared a friendship with Jean 
LeClerc (1657-1736), theologian and literary critic at the Remonstrant Seminary 
and editor of the literary journal, Bibliothèque universelle et historique.4  Limborch 
revealed to Locke that Toland had met LeClerc only twice and at one of those 
meetings Toland had been rebuffed in attempts at conversation.  Despite his 
misgivings, Limborch obliged Toland and wrote, with a touch of irony, to Locke in 
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 1693 that “If perchance you meet him you will find him, frank, gentlemanly, and 
not at all a servile Character.”5  Furly too recommended Toland to Locke: 
I find him to be a free spirited ingenious man; that quitted the Papacy in 
Jameses time when al men, of no principles were looking towards it, and 
having once cast off the yoak of Spiritual Authority, that great bugbear, and 
bane of ingenuity, he could never be perswaded to bow his neck to that yoak 
again, by whom soever claymed; this has rendred it somewhat difficult to 
him, to find a way of subsistence in the world, and made him ask my 
counsell in the case: I told him I know no way for him, but to find out some 
free ingenious English Gentleman that might have occasion for a Tutor in his 
family.…6
 
Locke did not act on Furly’s request to find employment for Toland who, with the 
intent of composing an Irish dictionary, then left for Oxford where he would spend 
much time in the Bodleian and surrounding coffeehouses.  To his contemporaries 
Toland seemed a promising young scholar, though he exhibited some unorthodox 
views.  However, this promise went unfulfilled because impolite behaviour coloured 
many of Toland’s interactions.7
 Edmund Gibson (1669-1748), the future Bishop of London (1720-1748), 
kept a close eye on Toland in Oxford in early 1694 sending frequent assessments to 
Arthur Charlett (1665-1722), Master of University College, Oxford and soon to be 
chaplain to William III (1697).  Gibson was a constant critic of deism during his life 
and his correspondence acts as a lens through which to assess the perceived threat 
deists posed in England.8  Persistent accounts of Toland’s irreligious actions 
troubled Gibson: how “Toland was arraign’d and convicted, in the Coffee-House for 
burning a Common-Prayer-book, you must have heard.”9  A few weeks later in late 
May or early June, Gibson sent Charlett some biographical details on Toland: while 
he lived in Scotland, in 1688-9 during his studies for an MA, Toland “was very 
liberal in his abuses not only of the Arch. Bp but of the Whole Order.  He got a 
rable together, and at the Head of them in the Market place burn’t the Pope; upon 
wch occasion he made a formal Speech against the then Magistrates o’ the Town for 
being Episcopal.”10  Toland thus appeared anti-bishop, if not anti-priest.  More 
curiously perhaps, Toland had reportedly “pretended to work Wonders by some 
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 Secret arts, and so seduced a number of Young Students.”  Gibson stated he would 
“Enquire further into” this unsubstantiated claim of Toland’s magic.   
Gibson continued his epistolary narrative to Charlett by outlining how 
Toland, as a young man, had travelled from Edinburgh to London and endeared 
himself to the wealthy Dissenter Dr. Daniel Williams (c.1643-1716), who arranged 
for Toland to study in Leiden to train as a Presbyterian minister.  Gibson suggested 
that the reason why Toland returned to England shortly after arriving in Leiden was 
that it had been “too long for him to continue in one place, so at the end of the year, 
he fairly return’d….”11  Toland so intrigued Gibson that he dispatched several 
persons to collected information to supplement what he already knew.  He advised 
Charlett, “What you have at present is only,” the result of “sudden recollection: I am 
encouraged to expect Several other particulars from second thoughts and a little 
enquiry.”  Whatever Charlett felt best to do with the information and what action 
might be taken against Toland, Gibson was confident would be for the best: “I leave 
this whole matter to you to make what use of it and in what manner you please.”12
 Charlett, in turn, described Toland’s conduct in Oxford to Archbishop of 
Canterbury Tenison (1636-1715) in October 1695.  As Gibson had hoped, action 
was taken against Toland whose behaviour had become “so publick and notorious 
here, that the late Vice-Chancellor ordered him to depart this place, wch he 
accordingly promised to do, and did for some time, but afterwards in ye V-Cr’s 
absence returned.”  During his second stay in Oxford, Toland retained his past 
positions.  Witnesses described “upon Oath, of [his] Trampling on ye Common 
prayer book, talking against the Scriptures, commending Commonwealths, 
justifying the murder of K[ing] C[harles] 1st, railing against Priests in general, with 
a Thousand other Extravagancys….”  What was worse, Toland claimed friendships 
with “great men” and “pretended to great Intrigues and correspondencys, and by 
that means abused the names of some very great Men.”  This “insolent carriage” left 
Toland “contemptible, both to ye Scholars and Townsmen.”  Moreover, Toland 
reportedly prophesied that “he should be a member of Parliament, and then he 
should have an opportunity of being revenged on Priests….”13  Thus, even before he 
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 began a career as polemic author, Toland was well-known, though perhaps not in a 
manner he would have wished.   
 Others, in and outside of Oxford, also attempted to trace the origins of 
Toland whose presence in that city was the source of much speculation.  One 
correspondent, identified only as Mr Anderson, provided the following account to 
George Ashe, Bishop of Derry (1658-1718) in September 1694.  Anderson had been 
in the company of one Coll Hamill who had heard Toland called Bryan Tolan.  
Moreover, Toland was possibly the “Bastard sone of Knoughton Tolan’d a priest in 
the Parish of Devagh [and] Left this County about ten years agoe” who had a light 
complexion, dark hair, and spoke fluent French.  Regarding Toland’s religion, 
Anderson claimed that “he was a great Searcher after Religion and that he said he 
tried all Sorts….”14  Within days of receiving this letter, Ashe passed the 
information to the Nonjuror Henry Dodwell whose future writings on the soul 
would cause great controversy: “I have inquired about our Countryman you 
mentioned, & Received ye following history.”  Toland’s first name purportedly was 
“Bryan, alias John, alias Tool Tolan, bastard son to Cornelius Tolan a Popish Priest 
of Enishowen near Dury,…”  He goes on to describe him as “black, tall, slender … 
with full black eyes, he was sent to Glasgow, has been in Rome & Leyden & 
Esteamed a very airy talkative man; I can procure you several other particulars 
relating to him, if there be occasion.”15  Dodwell seemed satisfied with this account 
and Ashe sent him no more letters regarding Toland. 
Tindal’s Belief in God 
 In 1694, while Toland was causing concern and frustration in Oxford, 
Mathew Tindal, another Oxford resident and future deist, described the conditions 
he believed necessary for holding any truth.  As part of his anti-Trinitarian writings, 
Tindal argued that one cannot believe anything which is beyond one’s intellect.  As 
he put it, any person “obliged to believe a thing, must first know what it is before he 
can believe it, otherwise he may be obliged to believe he knows not what.”  This 
condition of belief extended to God about whom we cannot believe more than “we 
can conceive of him … because Belief is nothing else but the supposing the Idea’s 
we have of any thing are true; and where we have no Idea’s there is no Subject for 
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 us to exercise our Belief upon.”16  We are, Tindal noted, able to form an idea of God 
as a perfect and eternal being.  However, to suggest this notion of God applied 
simultaneously to three beings was something Tindal viewed as blasphemous.  
Despite outlining these rules of belief, Tindal revealed that many orthodox 
theologians “thunder it from their Pulpits, that Matters of Faith are above Reason, 
and that God has a Right to require of us to believe on his Word what we do not 
apprehend or understand; that is we must believe those Idea’s we have of a Mystery 
to be true,…”  Stephen Nye (c.1648-1719), a notorious Socinian in Oxford, reacted 
to Tindal’s assertions in 1695.  While Nye supported Tindal’s unitarian leanings, he 
rejected Tindal’s apparent reliance on human reason: “for there are some things 
which will never be explain’d while the World stands….”17  This view confirmed 
the opinion of Jonas Proast, High-Churchman, former chaplain of All Souls College, 
Oxford, and companion of Nonjurors, who claimed to have overheard Tindal once 
say “that there neither is, nor can be, any revealed religion,” indicating that reason 
was all one needed in matters of religion.18
Tindal maintained that people cannot believe what they do not understand.  
“The Ideas’ we have,” he wrote, “of God’s Eternity, Infinity, Omnipresence, 
Omniscience, and all that we are required to believe concerning them, … [God] has 
made us capable of having a clear and distinct Idea’s of….”19  This stance was 
continued in his characterisation of God’s nature. 
For God, who is infinitely happy in himself, could have no other motive in 
creating man, but to make him happy in this Life, as well as that which is to 
come; and accordingly if mankind would follow those Rules that are 
prescribed by God in order to their behaviour towards one another, in what 
happy, blessed, and flourishing State would they be in? 
 
Thus, God did not demand anything for Himself.20  As we will see this view had 
strong political and religious implications. 
Tindal on the Rights of Political Subjects and the Jacobite Threat 
 In addition to the theological tracts of 1694, Tindal wrote two books which 
outlined his political theory while articulating the duties citizens bore to one 
another.21  With An Essay Concerning the Laws of Nations, and the Rights of 
Soveraigns, Tindal characterised the general laws of nations as the rules “observed 
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 by Nations in the entercourse with one another.”  These rules allowed for the mutual 
prosperity of nations; it was the spirit of co-operation codified.22  The laws had their 
origins in a more basic relationship: “the Law of Nations and Nature, is in effect the 
same.”  As Tindal explained, “[t]he Law of Nature (I mean that part of it which 
concerns the Duty of Man to Man) is nothing else but that mutual Aid and 
Assistance, which by reason of their common Necessities one Man owes to another, 
without the observance of which Mankind could not well subsist.”  The welfare of 
individuals brought forth the advancement of nations.  When one spoke of these 
individuals collectively, Tindal suggested the term “Bodies Politick” and their 
relations as the “Law of Nations.”23   
 While in the book Tindal discussed political obligations in the abstract, its 
origins lay in a concern which was very real.  Ever since the Revolution of 1688-89, 
the nation had an exiled king in James II.  The threat of his return remained a 
constant fear during the reign of William and Mary.  It was no idle worry.  In the 
winter of 1691-2 (Ailesbury Plot) and again in 1694 (Lancashire Plot) two schemes 
to restore James II were discovered and thwarted.24  To loyal Jacobites who refused 
to accept the legitimacy of another ruler of England while a Stuart monarch lived, 
James II still held authority.  Tindal attempted to undermine this position by 
explaining that there was no “instance, where a deposed Prince was allowed to erect 
a Court of Judication in another King’s Dominion….”  Once a ruler had been 
deposed by the inhabitants of a nation who acted for the collective good that ruler 
ceased to wield any power in his former kingdom.  Monarchs ruled by consent of 
those over whom they ruled.25  He “that loseth his Empire, and can no longer protect 
People, or administer Justice, dwindles into a Robber or Pirate, if he grants 
Commission to take the Goods or Ships or any Nation; and they that accept 
Commission from him, … cannot be reckon’d as Members of a Civil Society….”26  
This statement was particularly relevant because in late 1692 James II had 
commissioned ships to attack English vessels in a failed attempt to undermine the 
nation’s commerce.  Tindal spoke with authority on the subject of maritime law.  In 
addition to holding a DCL from All Souls, he had served as Deputy Judge Advocate 
of their Majesties’ Fleet from 30 May to 8 November 1689.  Siding with other civil 
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 lawyers who argued in favour of prosecuting the crews of these Jacobite ships as 
pirates, Tindal concluded that any actions taken in support of the former ruler were 
illegal and contrary to the law of nature.27   
 The second political work Tindal produced in 1694 continued his arguments 
in favour of William III and the religious settlement.  An Essay Concerning 
Obedience to the Supreme Powers, and the Duty of Subjects in all Revolutions 
attempted to “persuade People to act for the Good and Prosperity of the Community 
they are Members of, and in which their own is included.”28  Collective good was to 
take priority over personal prejudice.  The role of government, like the providence 
of God, was “The Care of other Peoples Safety.”29  In so doing governments were to 
bind the individuals into a kind of commonwealth composed of the “Body Politick” 
made up of “Members of a Civil Society” who act for the best interest of that 
society.  In Tindal’s phrase “Governments will have all the Power which is 
necessary for the Ends of Government, by the Peoples giving them that Power 
which by the Law of Nature they had over the lives of one another….”30  Those who 
are governed hold the real power in society; they are active participants in the 
nation.   
 In his political writings Tindal was indebted to John Locke.  Indeed, in early 
1697 Tindal would send Locke a copy of An Essay Concerning Obedience to the 
Supreme Powers along with a letter advising the famed philosopher that “I have got 
more tru[e] and useful knowledge by your writings than all the books I ever read.”31  
Of particular interests for Tindal, who sought a precedent for supporting William III 
while shunning James II, was Locke’s position that government by consent of the 
people was a natural consequence of the law of nature.32  To conduct one’s self in 
compliance with this regulation, Locke argued, meant acting in a manner which best 
preserved the common good.  As he put it, the “Law, teaches all Mankind, who will 
but consult it, that being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his 
Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”33  Moreover, Tindal agreed with Locke that 
lingering support for James II and support for passive obedience threatened the 
stability of England after 1689.  To not accept the present state of government, 
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 which came into being by the collective will of those who are governed, was, Tindal 
argued, to be at war with the monarch.34   
Tindal specifically set his position against alternative forms of governance, 
such as Tory-promoted passive obedience.  It was “very evident, That whatever 
Rights or Liberties men did not part with to their Governors, those they have still 
retained in themselves; and no person can have a right to their Obedience in those 
things wherein they have given him no right to command….”35  What was more, 
“Had the Doctrine of Passive-Obedience been all-along practised, Mankind would 
have been in a more slavish condition than any now are, that live under the most 
Tyranical Governments.”  Subjects may only acquiesce their rights where it 
improved the public good, and not for the benefit of one particular group (or 
political party), or the monarch.36   
The Jacobites were Tindal’s target.  It was they who wished to install a 
deposed monarch who threatened to enslave the nation in Catholicism.  The return 
of the Stuarts would bring a return of Popish religion and the destruction of 
Protestant freedom.  Since, the restoration of Charles II in 1660, which had brought 
with it the Clarendon Code of religious legislation, was Tindal explained “(as I think 
no Protestant can doubt it) to the disadvantage, and against the good and interest of 
the Nation, it must be a sin.”37  As Jacobites acted against the law of nature and had 
to be fought at every opportunity, so too did any doctrine that threatened the public 
good.  Timely political events like the fear of Jacobite rising and actual Jacobite 
plots were often the impetus for deists’ writings.   
Politics and Mystery in Religion 
 As Tindal challenged Jacobites, Toland too was writing in Oxford.  Aside 
from cultivating a reputation as a braggart, Toland became known to some around 
the university as a “man of fine parts, great learning and little religion,” who was 
composing a book “to show, that there is no such thing as Mystery in our 
Religion.”38  Others too knew of the forthcoming work.  Shortly after returning to 
England Toland sent some papers to an unknown correspondent, whom Toland 
desired to pass them to John Freke (c.1652-c.1714), lawyer, Whig pamphleteer, 
friend to both Locke and the late first Earl of Shaftesbury.  Perhaps Toland was 
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 attempting to secure Whig party employment by alerting Freke to his talent with the 
pen.  Freke, however, was not impressed with what he read and in late March 1695 
brought Toland’s papers to the attention of Locke.39  After considering the 
manuscript pages, Locke replied: “I thank you for the packet you sent me and the 
character in it of the gentleman I enquired after.”  Locke then discussed Toland’s 
apparent involvement, while Toland was on the Continent, in an abridged version of 
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  He ended with resignation over 
Toland’s use of his philosophy in the forthcoming work: “he that buys it, and when 
he has it may do with it as he pleases.”40  Freke had anticipated a more detailed 
critique and penned another letter to Locke in an attempt to draw this out of him.   
Accept my thanks for yours of the 8th which I received together with Mr 
T[oland]’s Papers but give me leave to tell you that I hoped you would have 
said something to me of your opinion both of his Tract (I mean as much as 
you have seen of it) and of the man with respect to the Resolutions he seems 
by his Letters to have taken for my own part I confess I have noe great 
satisfaction in either.41
 
Locke, it seems, thought silence the best answer concerning Toland. 
There is much to consider in Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious, or a 
Treatise Shewing That There is Nothing in the Gospel Contrary to Reason, Nor 
above it that no Christian Doctrine can be Properly Call’d A Mystery (1696).  The 
following focuses on theology and natural philosophy with an eye to Justin 
Champion’s recent characterisation of Toland as a politician “first and foremost.”42  
Toland first released the work anonymously in late 1695.  However, wishing to 
capitalise on the notoriety generated by the book, which anonymity prevented, 
Toland affixed his name on the title page and in advertisements, for the second 
edition, which appeared in June 1696.43
Toland began by describing the atmosphere of religious tolerance as he saw 
it.  Such was “the deplorable Condition of our Age, that a Man dares not openly and 
directly own what he thinks of Divine Matters, tho it never so true and beneficial, if 
it but very slightly differs from what is receiv’d by any party, or that is estabish’d by 
Law.”  Despite the promises of religious peace following the Revolution of 1689, 
Toland believed that things had not improved in spite of the fact the Toleration Act 
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 should have signalled a Protestant victory over the tyranny of Catholicism and 
ushered in an era of individual rights versus collective obedience.44  It was 
unfortunate, wrote Toland, that official doctrine and party allegiances coloured the 
religious canvas of the nation and prevented the spirit of the Act from flourishing.  
These forces of conformity were so restricting that, Toland claimed, all Dissenters 
must “keep perpetual Silence” regarding their beliefs.45  This was nowhere more 
evident than in the question of mysteries in religion, which Toland charged had been 
created by priests in an attempt to secure their privileged position in society as the 
sole interpreters of God’s words.  In order to protect their status, priests opposed all 
honest inquiry into religion, branding all those who attempted to do so as atheists.  
Toland identified such clerical actions as priestcraft and assured his readers that it 
was this that he combated and not Christianity itself.46  Indeed, like our other deists 
Toland would frequently identify himself as a Protestant Dissenter.  In turn priests 
were supported by a certain political element which viewed deviation from 
orthodoxy as dangerous to the welfare of the nation, which secured only through 
conformity.   
Toland hoped to reveal that mysteries had no rightful place in religion and in 
so doing allow people to think for themselves and become, in Tindal’s phrase, the 
body politic.47  Religious and political divisions harmed the country and hindered 
individual freedom: “If you be Orthodox to those, you are a Heretick to these.  He 
that sides with a Party is adjudg’d to Hell by the Rest; and if he declares for none, 
he receives no milder Sentence from all.”48  This atmosphere of conformity had 
forced Britons to accept mysteries in religion for fear of being an outcast.  Forced 
belief, however, was not true belief.   
 The God described in Christianity not Mysterious and indeed the God that 
underlies Toland’s entire corpus reveals Himself and His plan, in a manner which is 
reasonable to humanity.  Such a conception of God was likely a reaction against 
opinions expressed to the contrary by the Anglican apologist, and canon of Christ 
Church, Oxford, Robert South (1634-1716).  Prior to the composition of 
Christianity not Mysterious, South had preached a sermon entitled “Christianity 
Mysterious, and the Wisdom of God in Making it so,” which argued that God 
 30
 delivered “to mankind a religion so full of mysteries as the Christian religion 
certainly is, and was ever accounted to be.”49  For South, God and Christianity are 
mysterious; there are things that people must believe even if they do not understand 
them.  It was a matter of faith over reason; it was also a matter of priestly assistance 
versus personal, private experience in religion.  
Conversely, Toland claimed that God “who has enabled us to perceive Things, 
and form judgments of them, has also endu’d us with the power of suspending our 
judgment about whatever is uncertain, and of never assenting but to clear 
Perceptions.”50  What cannot be known with certainty need not be known; it is 
unimportant.  God does not trick or lie He is bound by His goodness not to 
deceive.51  Thus, “Whoever reveals anything, that is, whoever tells us something we 
did not know before, his words must be intelligible, and the Matter possible.  This 
rule holds good, let God or Man be the revealer.”  This constraint does not diminish 
God’s power; it is an acknowledgement of divine righteousness.  God may indeed 
act in a contrary manner, but His love for humanity prevents it.  As Toland phrased 
it, “I demand to what end should God require us to believe what we cannot 
understand?”52  This epistemology extended to knowledge of God: “what I don’t 
conceive,” wrote Toland, could not provide “right Notions of God….”53   
Lockean Epistemology in Toland’s Theology 
 Toland differentiated between important and unimportant knowledge in 
religion, politics, and as we will see natural philosophy, by borrowing terms from 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which he lauded as “the most 
useful Book towards attaining universal Knowledge….”54  He claimed to have 
distinguished in the model of “an excellent modern Philosopher, the Nominal from 
the Real Essence of a thing.”55  The unnamed philosopher was indeed Locke 
according to whom real essences made a thing what it was by virtue of its internal 
structure.  Real essences, however, could never be known; neither human senses nor 
microscopes were powerful enough to penetrate into the microstructure of things 
and reveal real essences.56  As Locke put it: our knowledge comes “short of the 
reality of things.”  He hypothesised, and Toland accepted, that ideas, and hence our 
knowledge, comes from sensation and reflection upon it.  One’s reason was the 
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 mental contemplation of the agreement or disagreement of ideas.57  All that could be 
studied therefore were nominal essences, names representing observed properties; 
concepts used to group things, not necessarily corresponding to the unknown real 
essences.58  Toland concurred that God provided humanity the capacity to know 
only nominal essences (necessary knowledge); God did not command the 
understanding of real essences (needless knowledge).  An adequate idea of 
anything, therefore, was knowledge of nominal essences.  “[N]othing can be said to 
be a mystery,” Toland claimed, “because we are ignorant of its Real Essence, 
because, since it is no more knowable in one thing than in the other, and it is never 
conceiv’d or included in the ideas we have of things.”59  Thus, all necessary 
knowledge communicated by God through the Bible or the book of nature would be 
in plain language.  Mysteries were unknowable real essences and therefore needless 
knowledge. 
The same reasoning extended to natural philosophical investigations.  As 
Toland explained: “I understand nothing better than this Table upon which I am 
now writing: I conceive it divisible into Parts beyond all imagination; but shall I say 
it is above my Reason because I cannot count these parts not distinctly perceive 
their Quantity and Figures?”60  Toland believed that his table was composed of tiny 
particles of matter in spite the fact he had never seen them.  “The reason,” he 
clarified, “is because knowing nothing of Bodies but their properties, God has 
wisely provided we should understand no more of these than are useful and 
necessary for us; which is all our present condition needs.”  In the same way that he 
had never seen God, Toland was confident he knew some divine attributes because 
God never deceived him: “As for God, we comprehend nothing better than his 
attributes.  We know not, it’s true, the Nature of that eternal Subject or Essence 
wherein infinite Goodness, love, knowledge, power and Wisdom coexist; but we are 
not better acquainted with the real Essence of any of his creatures.”61  People knew 
as much about the structure of tables as they did about God who ensured that all 
necessary knowledge of Himself and of nature would be within the intellectual 
capacity of those who sought it.  This picture of God contrasts sharply with that 
offered by theologians such as South and other High Churchmen who characterised 
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 God “as an infinite being, … inconceivable in his purposes, and inexpressible in his 
attributes; … He is another world in himself, too high for our speculations, and too 
great for our descriptions.”62  Their God was not bound to aid humanity in learned 
endeavours in the way that Toland and our other deists believed. 
For Toland, whenever God provided a revelation, it conformed to human 
understanding.  Regarding the Bible Toland wrote that the New Testament is 
thought to contain many things which we cannot know without revelation.  
Moreover, even if things were revealed, they might exceed the limits of our 
faculties.  Toland replied that the Bible contained nothing “but what is fully 
discovered to us, and what we fully comprehend.”63  We know God by our reason, 
so too do we know His revelation.  In cases where the meaning of revelation was 
obscure, Toland believed it must be dismissed because “all matters reveal’d by god 
or man, must be equally intelligible and possible….”  God was immutable and His 
words self-consistent.64  This axiom included miracles, which, as Toland explained, 
must not be contrary to reason, which was a bright light dispelling “all Darkness,” 
and exploding “forged Miracles, [and] unreasonable Mysteries.”  God only did 
miraculous things that benefited humanity.65
Toland’s Suspected Socinianism 
Toland’s views drew many refutations.  Critics, such as Daniel Defoe (1660-
1731), Peter Browne (d. 1735), Francis Atterbury (1663-1732), Edward Stillingfleet, 
and others, believed he was guilty of Socinianism, a heresy founded in Poland 
during the Radical Reformation by Laelius Socinus (1525-1562) and his nephew 
Faustus Socinus (1538-1604).66  It was a unitarian religion that proposed nothing in 
the Bible contradicted reason, though aspects of it may be above reason.  What is 
more, the Bible contained no real mysteries.  Difficult and obscure passages were 
tests of the reader’s faith, only a true believer would be able to penetrate the dense 
text.  Socinians also denied the doctrine of predestination, arguing that it made God 
the author of sin.  Rather, they believed that God offered salvation to all people.  
The heresy established itself in England during the 1640s quickly becoming a feared 
spectre among the orthodox.  Denials of predestination threatened the Calvinist 
theology of the English Church.  Moreover, their depiction of Christ as originally a 
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 human and not a divine being denied the doctrine of the Trinity.67  Opponents were 
not, however, consistent in their use of the term.  There were at least seven different 
meanings of “Socinian” in England.  In the case of the deists, critics seemed most 
concerned with the application of reason to religion and the denial of biblical 
mysteries as deism’s key Socinian traits.68  Considering the words of John Biddle 
(1615-1662), one of the earliest Socinians in England, we see the similarity between 
Toland’s and the Socinian position on mysteries: 
God, who has all Men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of His 
Truths, has made his Revelations so intelligible, as to make it plain and easy 
to all Men, as well to idiots, as to the most subtle Philosophers.  Therefore it 
is, God never uses any Term to teach us his Mysteries, but what we have a 
clear and distinct idea of.69
 
Critics could also point to Toland’s associations during his time in Oxford as further 
evidence of his Socinian sympathies.  It is likely that around 1694 Toland had met 
with Stephen Nye, the most notorious Socinian in Oxford.  However, Nye’s 
criticism of Toland’s later works, and those of Tindal, makes it unlikely that the two 
were close.70   
 The Bishop of Worcester, Edward Stillingfleet, also coloured Toland as a 
Socinian.  He asserted that Toland had demonstrated how Locke’s philosophy led to 
a denial of belief where one could not form clear ideas.  Stillingfleet further argued 
that Toland and Locke were allies in this endeavour.  Toland did agree with Locke 
that ideas came from sensation and the reflection upon it, and that we cannot know 
real essences.  In the case of substance, it was “we know not what,” which caused 
our sensations of nominal essences.  In denying certain knowledge of substance, 
Stillingfleet believed that Toland, and hence Locke, were denying the Trinity.  Peter 
Browne, the future Bishop of Cork and Ross (1710), who first came to notice for his 
answer to Christianity not Mysterious, agreed with Stillingfleet when he noted that 
we know God is spirit and not material.  If one accepted the outcome of Toland’s 
work and denied an ability to know substances, then this assertion would not hold 
true.71  Alternatively, Stillingfleet retorted that we must be able to form some ideas 
that do not come from the senses.  As he put it: 
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 I desire it may be consider’d that this Doctrine supposes, that we must have 
clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our 
Minds, and that the only Way to attain this certainty, is by comparing these 
Ideas together.  Which excludes all certainty of Faith and Reason, where we 
cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas.  But if there are many things of 
which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and distinct Ideas of 
them … then this cannot be the Means of Certainty….72
 
Locke’s method, Stillingfleet stated, led only to knowledge of appearances, not of 
reality.  The Bishop and Locke exchanged several pamphlets on the issue as Locke 
attempted to distance himself from Toland.73   
 Toland’s use of Locke would, in later years, bring him into conflict with the 
reverend Francis Hare (1671-1740), DD, Whig, and future Bishop of Chichester 
(1731-1740).  Despite his past actions, which expressed some sympathy for 
deviation in orthodoxy—namely Hare’s attempts to shelter the Arian Samuel Clarke 
from Convocation in 1714—Hare believed that Toland’s writings were dangerous.  
In 1720 Hare challenged Toland in the postscript to the fourth edition of his Church 
Authority Vindicated by claiming that “Mr. Toland … has some resemblance to … 
Mr. Locke, (who … is often quoted to support Notions he never dreamed of).”74  
Toland answered the accusation in a letter published in the Post Man on 2 February 
1720.  There he responded that “I have never named Mr. Locke in any Edition of 
that Book; and that far from often quoting him. I have not as much brought one 
Quotation out of him to support notions he never dream’d of.”  Toland also hoped 
that Locke’s own denials of partnership with him would be sufficient to dispel any 
thoughts to the contrary.75   
The platonist, John Norris (1657-1711) stated that Toland was a Socinian 
and that Christianity not Mysterious demonstrated the slippery slope from 
Socinianism to deism ending in atheism.  Indeed, in 1698 Norris explicitly identified 
those who denied religious mysteries as “practical atheists.”76  According to Norris, 
people like Toland either “Humanize God, or Deify themselves and their own 
Rational Abilities.”  As a way to cure his errors, Norris suggested that Toland read 
and reflect upon Robert Boyle’s Things Above Reason (1681).77   
Though now known mainly for his natural and experimental philosophy, in 
his day Boyle (1627-1691) was an admired lay-theologian.  As Stillingfleet wrote to 
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 Boyle, “Your greate Name is deservedly placed, not onely for Your deepe search 
into nature, but your successful pains in vindicating the Honour of Religion.”78  
Boyle’s apologetic reputation continued to increase after his death through his 
bequeathing money to “Preach Eight Sermons in the yeare for proveing the 
Christian Religion agt notorious infidels (viz) Atheists, Theists…,” known as the 
Boyle Lectures.79  Among his many religiously-minded books were Of the High 
Veneration Man’s Intellect Owes to God (1685) and Some Physico-Theological 
Consideration About the Possibility of the Resurrection (1675).  In these works 
Boyle repeatedly described human understanding as severely limited and totally 
unable to comprehend God.  Foretelling some of Norris’ arguments against Toland, 
Boyle claimed that “how great an effect and mark of ignorance, as well as 
presumption, it is, for us Mortals to talk to God’s Nature and the Extent of His 
Knowledge, as of other things we are able to look through, and to Measure.”80  In an 
unpublished work, Boyle commented specifically on deists stating that they must 
“swallow greater improbabilities, than Christians … they must think it fitter to 
believe, that chance, or nature, or superstitions, should perform wonderful and 
hardly credible things, than that the great author of nature, God, should be able to do 
so.”81  Boyle had composed Things Above Reason to challenge Socinians by 
demonstrating the many things that are above human reason, which must be 
accepted entirely on faith.  Humanity’s inability to understand the entirety of 
Scripture, and indeed the entirety of nature, Boyle argued, emphasised our absolute 
dependence on divine revelation.82  If we cannot understand what God has revealed, 
the fault lies with us and not with God.  Norris agreed with Boyle’s position by 
claiming that opponents of Christianity placed their intellectual limitation upon God 
and “go about to comprehend and determine what God can, and ought to do.”83   
Jean Gailhard, author of The Complete Gentleman (1678), agreed that 
Toland was Socinian in his thinking and mistaken in his conclusions.  Gailhard too 
emphasised the weakness of human reason: “We do not destroy our Reason when 
we submit and make it subordinate to Scripture, for humans must depend upon 
divine reason, or else ‘tis blasphemously to deny there is more of and better Reason 
in God than in Man.”  The limits of human reason, Gailhard proposed, invariably 
 36
 made some thing mysteries and Toland’s conclusions false.  “Certainly the finite 
cannot know the infinite,” Gailhard wrote in frustration, “but as much, and in such a 
degree, and the Infinite is pleased to communicate himself; … so in a Spiritual Light 
and Life ‘tis only as God is pleased to reveal, and as Man is capable to receive….”84  
For Gailhard the question was one of limitations.  As a finite being in his thinking 
and understanding, Toland could not possibly know anything about the infinite mind 
of God.85   
Not everyone approved of Gailhard’s approach with Toland.  The country 
parson and Whig propagandist, William Stephens (c.1647-1718) rebuffed what he 
viewed as “a Flourish of wild Rhetoric ungovernably sallying into sundry 
Metaphors.”  In Stephens’ opinion, Gailhard had greatly exaggerated the dangers of 
Socinianism because “[n]o one of a hundred … knows any thing of Socinus.”  He 
also found the link between Socinianism and deism highly dubious.86  While 
Stephens was no friend of deism, he and Toland had a relationship.  In 1717 
Stephens trusted Toland to ensure that his book was published.  While there is no 
record of Stephens publishing any work around this date, we may glean a hint of its 
contents from the letter of inquiry he sent to Toland.  The work was a political one, 
which addressed the rights of Protestants at the hands of Parliament.  Perhaps 
Toland had, Stephens surmised, waited to print the work until Parliament was ready 
to deal with the issue.  If Toland felt it appropriate to deliver the manuscript to the 
printer, Stephens requested “two dozen copies to give to my acquaintances.”87  That 
Stephens entrusted Toland with the publication of his work suggests that the two 
were at least acquaintances, though the extent of their friendship remains 
speculative. 
In 1696 Stephens composed his own anti-deist tract, An Account of the 
Growth of Deism in England, in which he linked the growth of deism in England to 
foreign travel among young men such as Toland.  It was, however, the prevalence of 
prejudice in religion which prevented toleration of Protestant sects under the banner 
of an English Church, that allowed deism to gain a foothold in the nation.  Rigid 
definitions of Church and doctrine encouraged radical dissenters, like deists.  
Writers like Gailhard who would not allow difference of opinion to exist in religion, 
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 were a particular target.  Stephens submitted that an elimination of prejudice within 
the Church of England would halt deism.88   
Non-Socinian Criticisms and Toland’s Responses 
Critics who did not identify Toland as Socinian nevertheless wrote critiques 
similar to those who did.  Thomas Beverley (fl. 1670-1701) in Christianity the 
Great Mystery (1696) countered Toland’s suggestion that whenever God reveals 
anything it must be entirely comprehensible.  He maintained that “Revelation is a 
Manifestation of God to his Intellectual Creatures from the Secret of his own 
Purpose, and Deeps of his Council towards them, or any of them, above what was 
made known to them….”89  Ironically, Beverley’s admonishments to Toland came 
during his own explorations (from 1689 to 1700) into the mysteries of prophecy in 
which Beverley had repeatedly tried and failed to determine the coming of Christ.90  
Edmund Elys (fl. 1707), a Nonjuror, who had formerly been imprisoned in 1659 
under suspicion of being an enemy to the Commonwealth, attacked Toland’s 
assumption that we know God’s attributes.  He alleged that Toland’s views were 
created in conceit: “[A] due Reflexion upon the true IDEA OF GOD in his 
[Toland’s] own Soul, and in the Soul of all Men, in the Contemplation whereof we 
may easily discern this Truth, that the several divine Attributes are several 
Significations or Manifestations of the one Being absolutely Infinite and 
incomprehensible.”91   
Beginning in early November 1697, Toland responded to his critics.92  
Where God’s demands on humanity were concerned, Toland remained unrepentant.  
Any person, he argued, who “employs his Reason to the best of his Ability to find 
out Religious Truth, in order to practise it, does all that God desires: for God, … 
will not command Impossibilities….”93  This was true because God provided human 
reason as the only means to “distinguish Truth from Falshood, that alone must be 
the way to find the one, and avoid the other.”  The use of reason—and reason 
without priestly guidance—must lead to truth in religion.   
Against charges of Socinianism, Toland made specific answers.  Referring to 
himself in the third person, he claimed “I cannot forbear admiring how Mr. Toland 
should be deem’d … Socinian,” because Christianity not Mysterious contained a 
 38
 refutation of Socinian Christology.  Moreover, Toland denied the existence of actual 
Socinians in England arguing that those who call themselves such are “Unitarians, 
who vulgarly pass under that name,” and that their theology is “very different from 
that of Socinus.”94  As final proof of his innocence, Toland quoted a paragraph from 
The Agreement of the Unitarians with the Catholick Church, a recent unitarian 
work, which referred specifically to Stillingfleet’s characterisation of Toland.   
I know not what it was to his Lordship’s purpose to fall upon Mr. Toland’s 
Book … if he would needs attack the Book, he should have dealt fairly’. … I 
dare to affirm Mr. Toland does not know his own Book in the Bishop’s 
Representation of it’. … Do we offer this Book against the Trinity of the 
Realists?  Was it written with Intention to serve us?  Does it contain any of 
our Allegations from Reason, against the Trinity … We desire him to answer 
to the Reason in our own Books against the Trinity of the Tritheists.  But to 
these he says not a word, but only falls upon Mr. Toland’s Book; in which, 
or for which we are not in the least concern’d.95
 
We know that Toland found some measure of satisfaction in this passage because he 
included it in two more publications in an attempt to refute charges of 
Socinianism.96  When persistent denials did not satisfy his opponents, Toland 
belittled their definition of Socinianism suggesting it was an empty 
characterisation.97  While he still denied being one, Toland noted the irony that 
suspected Socinians “have been juster to me than my pretended Orthodox apeasers 
[sic].”  It was perhaps this treatment that prompted Toland to write a tract 
advocating toleration towards and fair treatment of Socinians.98  Despite Toland’s 
best efforts, he would be plagued by charges of Socinianism throughout his life. 
In Vindicius Liberius (1702), written in response to the Lower House of 
Convocation proceeding (unsuccessfully) against Christianity not Mysterious, 
Toland defended his argument that we know as much about God as we do about any 
other part of the Creation.  He repeated that his purpose was merely in  
showing that we knew not the real Essence of anything in the World, let 
alone of GOD: that Things were only known to us by their Properties, yet 
that we had not a distinct View even of all the Properties of any Thing at 
once: that every Pebble and Spire of Glass being in many of their Properties, 
and altogether in their Essence, above our Understanding, nothing ought to 
be peculiarly call’d a Mystery on this Account, since every Thing was so: 
and that therefore when we knew as many of the Properties of any Thing as 
made us understand the Name of it, and as were useful and necessary for us, 
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 this was enough for our present Condition, and we might be reasonably said 
to comprehend it. 
 
Moreover,  
 
I conclude that nothing is a Mystery because we know not its Essence, since 
it appears that it is neither knowable in it self, nor ever thought by us.  In a 
word that it was too general a Notion, making all Things Mysteries alike; 
whereas something more particular was intended by the Word, since one 
Thing was a Mystery and not another.  So I declar’d my self fixt in the 
Opinion that what infinite Goodness has not bin pleas’d to reveal to us, we 
are sufficiently capable to discover our selves, or need not understand it 
all.99
 
Toland maintained that everything being equally mysterious, we have the same level 
of knowledge concerning God as we have of the Creation.  This was not a defect in 
human reason; rather, it is what God intended.  People must recognise that those 
things God wishes known (nominal essences) will be known and that some things 
will remain unknowable (real essences).  What is more, things that seem above 
human reason are neither important nor necessary for this life or a proper Christian 
existence. 
Unfulfilled Expectations of Christianity not Mysterious 
 Toland returned to Ireland in early March 1697 eager to capitalise on the 
fame (or infamy) which Christianity not Mysterious brought him.  His aim was to 
become secretary to John Methuen (c.1650-1706), the new Whig Lord 
Chancellor.100  Not waiting to be offered a job from Methuen, Toland boasted of his 
expected position.  He chose a volatile time in which to insert himself into the midst 
of Anglo-Irish politics.  In 1697 the Irish Parliament would ratify the Treaty of 
Limerick which had ended William III’s campaigns in the nation.  What is more, 
cheaper woollen exports, which competed with those from England were soon to 
cause political tensions as the English Parliament raised the spectre of punitive 
duties.101  A month after Toland’s arrival, William Simpson, a baron of the 
Exchequer, advising him that  
Mr. Methien as well as all your other Friends agree in censuring your 
Conduct Since you come to Dublin.  They say you have acted a part very 
different from what was given you to be & that it was no way fit for a 
private man who tho no public employment, … to pretend to any at present, 
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 nor to own any hopes or Expectation of any, to make visible in form, as you 
have done, to all the Ministers & persons in any considerable pay. 
 
Toland’s claims to political employment, Simpson scolded him, drew “Censure 
upon your self,” but more importantly cast suspicion upon all Whigs.102  In this case 
discretion would be the better part of valour.  According to Simpson, several people 
had complained directly to Methuen regarding Toland.103  An anonymous letter sent 
in June 1697 also warned Toland that his actions bore on both him and those with 
whom he wished to become associated.  Toland’s boastful behaviour and unfounded 
claims of political favour ensured Methuen provided him nothing.104   
In 1697, the Dublin philosopher and Member of the Irish Parliament, 
William Molyneux (1656-1698) advised Locke that Toland had been in that city for 
a short while.105  However, it was unclear as to Toland’s reason for being in Ireland: 
“all here are mightily at a Losse in Guessing what might be the Occasion of Mr. 
T[oland] coming at this time into Ireland.  He is know[n] to be of no fortune or 
[employment]….”106  While Methuen, Simpson, and others were dismayed by 
Toland’s public actions, they may have been partially supporting him.  Their letters 
allude to some debt repayment on Toland’s behalf.  Molyneux’s comments, 
however, demonstrate that this was kept tightly under wraps.  Soon after dispatching 
his initial letter, Molyneux enjoyed a visit from Toland who spoke at great length of 
his intimate friendship with Locke.  “I propose a great Deal of Satisfaction,” 
Molyneux wrote Locke, “in [Toland’s] Conversation; I take him to be a Candid Free 
Thinker, and a Good Scholar.”  Others did not appreciate Toland’s scholarship.  
Molyneux noted that he was “Harangued against out of the Pulpit by a Prelate of 
this Country.”107   
 Locke replied with thanks for Molyneux’s account of Toland and the news 
of Toland’s goodwill towards him replying that he had done nothing to expect 
otherwise.  There was reason for caution, however.  Toland, Locke feared, had an 
“exceeding great value of himself,” which the philosopher hoped did not prevent 
Toland’s scholarship from becoming useful.  In detail, he advised prudence when 
dealing with this young man who held either great promise or great danger.   
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 [I]f vanity increased with age, I always fear whither it will lead a man.  I say 
this to you because you are my friend for whom I have no reserves, and 
think I ought to talk freely where you enquire, and possibly may be 
concerned; but I say it to you alone, and desire it may go no further.  For the 
man [Toland] I wish very well, and could give you, if it needed, proofs that I 
do so.  And therefore I desire you to be kind to him; but I must leave it to 
your prudence, in what way, and how far.  If his carriage with you give you 
the promises of a steady useful man, I know you will be forward enough of 
your self, and I shall be very glad of it.  For it will be his fault alone, if he 
proves not a very valuable man, and have you not for his friend.108
 
 After receiving this assessment from Locke and having spent more time with 
Toland, Molyneux concurred with Locke: “I do not think His management since he 
came this Citty has been so prudent; He has raised against the Clamours of all 
Partys; and this not so much by his Difference of Opinions, as by his Unreasonable 
Way of Discoursing, propagating, and Maintaining it.”  Toland’s views were only 
part of the issue; it was also his manner.  Partly, Toland’s problem lay in his choice 
of venue to pontificate his ideas.  Molyneux explained that “Coffee-house and 
Publick Tables are not proper Places for serious Discourse relating to the Most 
Important Truths.”  Moreover, Toland had shown the tendency about which Locke 
warned.  When “a Tincture of Vanity appear in the Whole Course of a Mans 
Conversations, it disgusts many that many otherwise have a due Value for his Parts 
and Learning.”  What was worse, Toland “takes here great Liberty on all occasions 
to vouch your Patronage and Friendship, which makes many that rail at him, rail 
also at You.  I believe you will not approve of this.”109   
 Despite Molyneux’s request that Locke correct Toland’s impudent behaviour 
in Dublin, the aged philosopher refused and opined that Toland would ignore “my 
friendly admonishments.”  He continued that “I must tell you, that he is a man to 
whom I have never writ in my life, and, I think, I shall not now begin.  And, as to 
his conduct, ‘tis what I never so much as spoke to him of.  This is a liberty to be 
only taken with friends….”  Moreover, if Molyneux believed that he owed some 
kindness to Toland based on a perceived obligation to Locke, he was mistaken.  
“For, if I did recommend him, ” Locke told Molyneux, “you will find it was only as 
a man of parts and learning for his age, but without any intention that that should be 
of any other consequence … And therefore, whatsoever you shall, or shall not do for 
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 him, I shall no way interest my self in.”110  Thus, Locke washed his hands of Toland 
and urged his compatriot to do the same.   
The Irish authorities were also keenly interested in Toland.  Rumours 
concerning the contents of his book raised the suspicions of the Committee of 
Religion.  An investigation soon followed.  Toland recounted the events in a later 
publication referring to himself in the third person.  The title alone of Christianity 
not Mysterious was enough in many cases, Toland argued, to convict him of heresy.  
He was surprised at this treatment because, as he repeated, the Revolution of 1689 
had guaranteed the freedom to inquire into religion.  As Toland explained in a brief 
history lesson:  
James the Second was justly abdicated according to this Saying, because he 
was an Enemy to the People for whom he was made a King; and our most 
Glorious Hero William the Third, the Restorer of Universal Peace and 
Liberty, was invested with the Supreme Power by the honest People of 
Great Britain, for whose good he has indefatigably employ’d it ever since, in 
vindicating, settling, and enlarging their Civil and Religious Rights.111
 
These arguments, however, did not halt the investigation. 
On 14 August 1697 “it was mov’d in the Committee of Religion, that the 
Book entitl’d Christianity not Mysterious, should be brought before them, and 
accordingly it was order’d that the said Book should the Saturday following be 
brought into the Committee.”  After deliberating for three weeks, the Committee 
ruled that the book contained “Several Heretical Doctrines contrary to the Christian 
Religion and the establish’d Church of Ireland, [and will] be publickly burnt by the 
hands of the Common Hangman.”  This sentence was carried out on 11 September 
in two locations: “the Parliament-House Gate, and also in the open Street before the 
Town-hose.”  Moreover, it was ruled that Toland himself be taken into custody and 
prosecuted by “for Writing and publishing the Said Book.”  Toland noted that he 
“took care to prevent” capture and fled to England.112  Others on the Committee 
urged more drastic punishments.  One moved that “Mr. Toland himself should be 
burnt, as by another that he should be made to burn his Book with his own hands; 
and third desir’d it should be done before the Door of the House, that he might have 
the pleasure of treading the Ashes under his feet.”113  On 14 September politicians 
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 in England were alerted to Toland’s flight from Ireland.  The Irish peer Sir Richard 
Coxe outlined Toland’s Dublin experiences in a letter sent to the Whig MP Robert 
Harley (1661-1724) and advised him that “Toland made his escape to England, 
where he had best stay.”114  While Toland would travel much during his remaining 
days, he never returned to his native land. 
Atterbury on Political Control of Religion 
 Defenders of a strong English church were much troubled by the 
implications of Toland’s and Tindal’s description of government and religion.  One 
of these authors was Francis Atterbury, High-Church Tory, Jacobite, future Bishop 
of Rochester, and mastermind behind the Atterbury Plot (1720-2) to return the 
Stuart monarchy.115  In 1697 he argued that at no time since the beginning of 
Christianity had there been greater need for Convocation, the ecclesiastical court of 
England.  The reason was the perceived growth of heresy in the nation especially 
the denial of mysteries in religion.116  Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious revealed 
the need for corrective action in religion because it embodied all the heresies about 
which Atterbury worried.   
An Author [Toland] I have, lately mention’d, had not else in publick 
Conversations dispers’d his pernicious Notions of one of ‘em so long as he 
did, unpublish’d; nor chosen to leave it at last rather tir’d with the 
successlesness of his Endeavours, than scar’d with any ill Consequence that 
might attend them.  It is so far from that, that I am told, he has entertain’d 
new Resolutions of returning thither, and of entring the Town in Triumph, 
upon his late fancied Defeat of Mysteries.117   
 
Just as those in Oxford found Toland’s actions unacceptable, so too did Atterbury.  
Irreligious words were bad enough to bring discord to England, but irreligious 
behaviour required immediate action.  
For too long, Atterbury suggested, heresies had existed under the mistaken 
“Cover of unbounded Toleration…,” which succeeded only in diluting the Church 
of England.  Convocation, meeting at regular intervals, would halt the foreboding 
spread of unbelief by acting as a “great fence against these Mischeifs.”  What was 
more, legislative elimination of deism would save the souls of the laity and restore 
belief in revelation which Atterbury believed to be in decline.118  The Revolution of 
1689 had, Atterbury advised readers, brought a mistaken notion of the role of the 
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 king in matters of religion.  There were some who were “pleas’d in all Companies to 
admire and celebrate a Prince of no Religion, as the best of Governours….”  This 
was especially critical because the Church of England and its religion took priority 
over that of the nation’s rulers.  While monarchs came and went, the religion of 
England must remain uncorrupted.  Atterbury noted further that the Church of 
England contained the men of best quality even if a heretical sect might boast larger 
numbers.119  Therefore, William III must call Convocation, as often as Parliament, 
to defend the Church from its enemies.   
Despite Atterbury’s best hopes, Convocation failed when it attempted to 
bring charges against Toland in 1701.  Edmund Gibson related the events in another 
letter to Dr Charlett.  On 9 April the Lower House had asked the Bishops in the 
Upper House to consider their request to censure Toland for composing Christianity 
not Mysterious.  A disappointed Gibson, mimicking the mood of the Lower House, 
related the response to the query.  “As to Mr. Toland’s Book,” the Bishops’, 
“Answer was, that they had consulted Learned Council about ye power of Convocn. 
to censure Books in particulars general and that in particulars, without ye Kg’s 
Licence first obtain’d; and were told that if ye Cg attempted it, ‘twould put ym in 
danger of ye Penalties.”  Since the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1695, authors, 
printers, and booksellers no longer needed permission to sell books.  The Upper 
House concluded that no legal precedent existed to censure Toland or his book.120   
Tindal on the Power of Magistrates 
 The same year as Atterbury wrote his defence of religious unity enforced by 
governmental law Tindal composed An Essay Concerning the Power of 
Magistrates, and the Rights of Mankind, in Matters of Religion.  This likely only 
served to confirm Atterbury’s fear.  Tindal submitted that “Government is from the 
People, who had a Right to invest the Magistrate with a Power in those Matters of 
Religion which have an Influence on Humane Societies, but not in others that are 
meerly Religious, or have no such Influence.”  The right to implement religious 
legislation must be granted from the people of the nation and not imposed from the 
rulers.  As Tindal explained, “a Power in the Magistrate to use Force in Matters of 
meer Religion, tends to Mens Eternal Ruin.”  Members of a nation must be free to 
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 choose the form of worship which seems best to them and their conscience because 
“the Doctrine of Compulsion is directly contrary to the Honour of God.”121  Since 
the welfare of society is built upon the welfare of its individuals, no one person may 
impose views on another, be they religious or political.  The only true law of nations 
was the protection of individual happiness.   
 Only God was a legitimate dispenser of laws.  This was the God Tindal had 
described in his past works: a God happy in himself wishing only to impart this 
happiness to humanity.  What was more, God “has not given the Magistrate a Right 
to interpret for others his Law, or to impose on them in what sense they must 
understand it.”  Like Toland, Tindal submitted that reason was the only yardstick 
with which to judge the merits of any particular belief or position.  To do otherwise 
and blindly submit to authority “highly offends God.”122  This ran directly counter 
to Atterbury’s Tory sensibilities. 
 Based on the above conditions of natural law and the providence of God, 
Tindal concluded that no Dissenter should be forced to take a Sacramental Test, by 
occasionally conforming to Church of England, in order to maintain an office.123  
He explained that if Dissenters held “no Opinions destructive to the Government, 
disown all Foreign Power, acknowledge the King to be Rightful and Lawful, and 
contribute equally to the support of the Government” then what right did any 
government have to “deprive them of the Privileges of their Country” because “their 
Consciences will not permit them to receive the Sacrament after the manner of the 
Established Church…?”124  So long as Dissenters, including our deists, observed the 
laws of the nation and acted in the best interest of their fellow countrymen, it did not 
matter what their heart held true regarding religion.  He also reminded readers that 
in the eyes of Parliament, Dissenting Churches were legal and ought to have the 
same rights as the Church of England.  To restrict or regulate one’s relationship with 
God, Tindal stated was to act tyrannically.125  Just as God does not impose His will 
on the Creation, so too must rulers or governments not impose beliefs on political 
subjects.   
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 The Liberty of Nations Through Liberty of the Press  
 During the late 1690s Toland composed many defences of his Christianity 
not Mysterious.  He held fast to his belief that reason was the only guide in 
intellectual matters, including those of religion.  People come to a religion by use of 
their reason which compared ideas about it gained by reading.  Therefore, Toland 
noted that absolute freedom of the press was the only way to allow for differing 
opinions about religion to circulate.  In the model offered by theologians such as 
Atterbury, such variety of religious thought would be halted by legislation.  
Alternatively, Toland submitted, that it was, “wholly owing to Printing, that 
Knowledge is become, not only much more diffusive, but that a great deal of more 
useful Knowledge has been discovered in a short time since that Invention, than in 
many Ages before.”126  Toland illustrated this position by means of historical 
example.  Martin Luther, and subsequent Protestant leaders, effectively employed 
the printed word to advance their calls for religious reform.  Indeed, “The 
Reformation is wholly owing to the Press.”  A free press, Toland continued, 
“depends on this single Question, Whether we ought to be free, or Slaves in our 
Understandings?”127
A restrained press created only passive recipients of doctrine not users of 
reason as God wished.  This was the case “Because it tends to make Men blindly 
submit to the Religion they chance to be educated in: for if ‘tis once suppos’d 
unlawful to publish any Arguments against that Religion, it cannot be denied but 
that ‘tis as unlawful to read and examine those Arguments….”128  Political subjects 
were not passive before religion.  Toland continued, “It’s not only in Popish, but in 
Protestant Countries too, that according to the Restraint Men lay under, Ignorance, 
Superstition, and Bigotry does more or less abound.”  People must realise that God 
desired them to use reason to determine truth in religion.129  Those who opposed an 
unrestricted press, Toland believed, erroneously concluded that it encouraged 
“Atheism, Profaneness, and Immorality, as well as Sedition and Treason.”  
However, as we saw earlier, Toland dismissed these labels as the accusations of 
priests who wished to maintain their illegitimate hold on religion.  In contrast, 
Toland claimed that printing was “design’d by Providence to free Men from that 
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 Tyranny of the Clergy they then groan’d under.”130  Freedom of the press also 
improved knowledge in natural philosophy.  For example, “an excellent Discovery 
in Nature may be hindred from being publish’d, on pretence that ‘tis inconsistent 
with Religion.”  Such a case was found in the example of Galileo and the Earth’s 
motion, a favourite episode recounted by our five deists.131   
Proposals for complete liberty of publishing proved worrisome for critics of 
deism.  In late 1728 William Wake (1657-1737), then Archbishop of Canterbury, in 
his only recorded criticism of deism, commented to Jean-Alphonse Turrettini (1671-
1737), professor at the Academy in Geneva, on the most efficient way to halt the 
heresy.  Wake suggested the reason why deism had seemingly gained such a 
foothold in England was due to the manner of composition employed by deists.  
Their “way of writing is exceedingly pleasing to the younger sort of Atheists, who 
have neither piety, nor judgement to restrain them….”  Books therefore lay at the 
root of the controversy.  More exactly, it was books written to inflame prejudices 
rather than to persuade with sound arguments.  The solution was obvious and Wake 
concluded that polemical replies were not a proper response.  More effective would 
be action taken against authors “some which are legally prosecuted, their books 
suppressed, and who privately disperse them in such a manner that it is hard to 
discover it, or make a legal proof against either the printers or sellers of them.”132  
No doubt Wake had in mind the fate suffered in Ireland by Toland’s Christianity not 
Mysterious. 
Toland on Parliaments and Standing Armies 
 In July 1698 Parliament was dissolved in accordance with the Triennial Act 
(1694).  During the ensuing election, and prior to the resumption of Parliament in 
December of the same year, Toland composed a pamphlet urging voters to choose 
“fit and proper” representatives.  Chief among Toland’s worries was the danger of 
re-electing “Members that are in Places.”133  The election of 1698 came on the heels 
of the Treaty of Ryswick which ended the Nine Years’ War (1689-1697) and the 
recognition of William III as the rightful King of England by Louis XIV thereby 
temporarily easing worries over Jacobites.  Questions of financing the war had 
dominated sessions of Parliament and allowed those who voted to support William’s 
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 war effort to hold favour with the monarch.  Among these politicians were the Whig 
MPs of the so-called Junto—John Somers, Edward Russell, Thomas Wharton, and 
Charles Montagu—who controlled the purse strings of the nation by controlling the 
Commons and the Lords.134  As J. H. Plumb has argued, these Whigs left behind 
their former collective experience of the Exclusion Crisis and replaced Lockean 
style republican theories of governance with methods to consolidate their hold on 
power.135   
Opposed to the Junto Whigs was a coalition led by the MP Robert Harley, 
himself a Whig (now part of the “Old Whigs” and soon to be Tory) who wished to 
limit the discretionary power of government and make it accountable to taxpayers.  
Joined in this cause of opposition were Tories and some radical Whigs who hung 
true to the republican political philosophies of their predecessors including Locke, 
James Harrington (1611-1677), and Algernon Sidney (1622-1683).  Thus, when 
Toland composed Dangers of Mercenary Parliaments (1698), he did so to challenge 
the Junto Whigs while assisting Harley who was undoubtedly supporting Toland 
under the table.136
Toland proposed that restoring place-men (MPs who held Crown offices or 
“places”) to the House of Commons would undermine the original intent of the 
institution.  Parliament had been historically “the best Security imaginable to his 
Majesty’s Honour and Royal Dignities, and the Subjects Liberties, Estates, and 
Lives.  This being the nature and true design of a Parliament, let us now see whether 
a House of Commons, full of Officers and Court-Pensioners, will answer those 
noble and laudable Ends….”137  Members of Parliament were to be faithful to the 
interests of those who elected them, not to the crown, nor their party leaders.  What 
was more, Toland asked “Whether a House of Commons” filled with place-men 
“can vote freely…?”138  Independence of elected officials was the only way to 
defend the liberty of the English people.   
As proof of the dangers involved in a Commons filled with place-men, 
Toland turned to the nation’s history.  First, he cited the example of King Charles II 
who, with Parliamentary support, tied England to French interests in the Third 
Anglo-Dutch War (1672-4) against Continental Protestants.  “By this means the 
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 Honour of England was prostituted,” Toland asserted, “and our Natural and Naval 
Strength betray’d with which, like Samson, we should easily have broken all the 
Cords that Europe, or the whole World could have made to bind and enslave us, had 
not this Parliament made a Sacrifice of all to the Charms of a French Dalilah.”  
Why did this happen?  Toland argued that it was the “slavish Doctrine of Passive 
Obedience and Nonresistance,” which superseded the reason and consciences of 
men who knew better than to support a popish king in a popish cause.  Men must be 
free to vote and act in the best interest of Protestant England.139
 In the following year (1699) Toland contributed to the standing army 
controversy with The Militia Reform’d: or, an Easy Scheme of Furnishing England 
with a Constant Land-Force, capable of prevent or to subdue any Forein Power.  
William III’s desire for halting French ambitions from the Continent had turned 
England into a military nation with all the necessities this entailed.140  While the 
need for an army during the Nine Years War was obvious, the usefulness of 
maintaining it in the post-1698 era raised concerns.  Further complications arose 
from the Declaration of Rights to which William agreed in 1689.  By the terms of 
the document, an English monarch could not raise a standing army without 
Parliamentary support.  The Whig Junto stood shoulder to shoulder with William 
who believed that any decrease in a peacetime army would encourage French 
aggression.141  The opposition of financially conservative MPs was again led by 
Harley who argued that standing armies raised the power of the King at the expense 
of Parliament and threatened the liberty of the people who would be forced to live 
alongside soldiers on active duty.  Following Harley’s lead, Parliament reduced the 
army to 10,000 in 1697 and then to 7,000 in 1698.  And, in 1699 William’s own 
Dutch Guard was sent home.  Opponents suggested that for an island nation, the 
Royal Navy and a militia of Englishmen, rather than foreigners, was a more than 
sufficient safeguard.  This too was the line adopted by Toland.142
Toland entered this latest political debate by noting the advantages of living 
in England: “To employ one’s Thoughts on what he pleases, and to speak as freely 
as he thinks….”143  This freedom stood in sharp relief against conditions in 
Continental kingdoms such as France.  There, Toland suggested, one dares not 
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 confide even in “his dearest Friend” for fear of official retribution.  However, in 
England where the “Laws secure the Rights of the Subject, with the same Care as 
the Privileges of the Magistrate,” one has the duty to decry oppression.144  Within 
this context, Toland felt duty bound to publish his thoughts regarding a standing 
army.  In spite of this promise of total freedom, the political scene in England was 
perpetually polarised.  As he had commented in Christianity not Mysterious, party 
divisions harmed the nation: “he’s a Whig whom you love, and he that you hate’s a 
Tory; and so on the contrary, as you happen to be engag’d in either Party.”145  
Toland countered that “a true Patriot can be of no Faction, nor consequently for 
excluding any from sharing the Blessings of that Liberty they are willing to 
support.”146  It was under this guise that Toland composed his political works 
generally and his assessment of standing armies specifically.   
 To make a national militia a useful body, Toland proposed a scheme from 
antiquity.147  He agreed with Harley that a properly maintained fleet provided much 
of the nation’s security.  Nevertheless, English ambitions necessitated a more 
complicated system of defence: “a Government for Encrease, such as ours, its 
Situation naturally leading it to Trade and planting of Colonies; and if it has the 
noble Ambition of holding the Balance steddy between other Governments, of 
succording the Distress’d, and grudging Liberty to none, then it must be always 
provided with a considerable Land-force.”148  Participation in international relations 
required a kind of standing army.  Toland advocated a model based on his reading 
of Cicero’s outline of the Roman militia: a body composed of citizen landowners.149  
With this scheme Toland hoped to empower the English people in their defence of 
Protestant sensibilities against the aggressive French and their Catholicism.  The 
literary support for Harley’s position earned Toland his further, but covert, 
patronage.150
The Harrington Edition and Advancement Unfulfilled 
 In late March 1700 readers of the Post Man were alerted to a forthcoming 
publication by Toland which again concerned the political climate: 
The OCEANA of James Harrington and his other works, some whereof are 
now first published from his own Manuscripts.  The whole collected, 
methodiz’d, and review’d, with an exact account of his life prefix’d.  By 
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 John Toland.  Printed on extra-ordinary Paper, and adorn’d with useful cuts.  
Sold by the Booksellers of London and Westminster.151
 
The finished book lived up to the advanced billing.  It was, however, personally 
expensive for Toland, who paid £30 to have it published.  This was hardly a trifling 
sum, if £1 in 1700 is worth roughly £100 today.152  Toland covered this amount 
through the sale of the publication rights from his other political works.  For 
example, the bookseller Bernard Lintott paid Toland the following amounts for the 
right to print several books: Art of governing by Parties (£20), Anglia Libera 
(£10.15), Vindicus Liberius (£5.5) all appeared in 1701 or early 1702.153  Despite 
the cost of the Harrington edition, Toland hoped to use the book to advance his 
political career by dedicating it to London’s government.154  Toland was willing to 
mortgage his present for potential future political gain.  As we will see, this strategy 
failed.155   
James Harrington had come to prominence in 1656, during Oliver 
Cromwell’s rule, with a depiction of the ideal commonwealth of Oceana in the book 
of the same name.  The intent of the work was to demonstrate that in a true 
republic—where the power is held by the people or their elected representatives—
military power belonged to the citizens.  A militia of citizens, argued Harrington, 
created, in the phrase of J. G. A. Pocock, a “commonwealth of participatory virtue” 
in the nation.  This ideal had found a home in Toland’s arguments for a standing 
militia.156  Clearly articulating support for views held by Harley, who was in a 
position to enact them, Toland advanced his desire for the commonwealth described 
by Harrington.   
Toland’s dedication to “The Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Sherifs, and Common 
Council of London” reminded them that “every Society is in a languishing or 
flourishing condition, answerable to the particular Constitution of its Government.”  
The happiness of any society, in this case of Londoners, was a direct reflection of 
the goodness of the laws which govern them.  That the inhabitants of this great city 
express satisfaction in their present condition, Toland asserted, was proof of the 
righteousness of London’s government.157  The key to all this was the propagation 
of liberty, which was “the true Spring of [London’s] prodigious Trade and 
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 Commerce with all the known parts of the Universe….”158  Total freedom, like the 
kind advocated in his other works, led to economic prosperity.  Thus, any 
philosopher who promotes such a stance must promote the good of the nation.  Here 
Toland attempts to advance his own usefulness to the Aldermen and Mayor.  He 
praised the climate of religious freedom in London.  Toleration in the city allowed 
people to follow their reason in religion and worship God as they thought fit.  By 
not enforcing conformity, Toland believed that London encouraged its citizens to 
focus their attentions on wealth and commerce, rather than issues of doctrine.  
Religious freedom, such as Toland advocated in his political works, had financial 
benefits.159   
 At least one Alderman was impressed with Toland’s praise.  The episode is 
preserved in a letter sent by Thomas Tanner to Dr. Charlett.  Sir Robert Clayton 
(1629-1707), Director of the Bank of England, and former Mayor of London, 
entered a motion in May 1700 to reward Toland for the kindness shown the “Mayor 
& Alderman in dedicating Harrington’s Works to them.”  Toland had corresponded 
previously with Clayton over the death of Clayton’s nephew, whom Toland knew 
during his days in Oxford.160  Another Alderman retorted that similar motions in the 
past had come to nought because “the City was poor, and had no money for such 
uses.”  Furthermore, it was objected that why should Toland a man who “had 
printed a very bad book” be rewarded when other authors, who had written “a good 
sermon,” received nothing.  The sticking point seemed to be Christianity not 
Mysterious, which continued to plague Toland’s efforts at overt political reward.  
The Alderman did, however, note that Clayton himself “had enough of his own, and 
he was willing to join in recommending Mr T case to Sir R. own generousity.”  Not 
surprisingly, “the Matter was dropped, and Mr. T has got nothing for his 
dedication.”161  Toland would now have to seek other avenues of advancing his 
desires for a political career, which he hoped Christianity not Mysterious would 
spark.162  Alternatively, Tindal’s Fellowship and pension ensured that he was not as 
dependent on the sale of his works or the generosity of patrons to continue his 
writings on politics and theology. 
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 Conclusion 
 There were concerns of greater national interest when Toland attempted to 
gain the favour of London’s government.  Princess Anne, daughter of James II, and 
successor to the English throne buried her last child in July 1700.  That Anne 
suffered another loss was not surprising, but the premature passing of her only 
living offspring set questions of succession into the foreground of political 
discussions.  While William now had to determine the line of succession which 
would follow the death of Anne, he also was worried over the health of another 
monarch: Carlos II of Spain.  Carlos was childless and had willed his kingdom to 
the Duke of Anjou, grandson to Louis XIV.  War with France over their ambitions 
in Spain seemed certain when Carlos died on 21 October.  Once again, deists would 
insert themselves into these impending political events. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
Deist Politics and Theology, 1701-1709 
 
 
 
 
 
Though William III had been seen as a providential gift from God to secure 
Protestantism in England upon his arrival in 1688, he was never a much loved 
monarch.  His death in 1702, though tragic at age fifty-one, did not stir the nation 
into a collective outpouring of grief.  William’s final years had been marked by 
anticipating war with France—over the succession in Spain—and determining a 
method to finance it.  As per the Act of Settlement (1701) Queen Anne, daughter of 
James II, came to the throne after a lifetime as a princess who harboured no 
expectation of the crown.  Events had propelled her to a position which had seemed 
entirely out of reach.  Her marriage to Prince George of Denmark, though resulting 
in many pregnancies, failed to produce a surviving heir.  Thus, the question of 
succession had occupied William’s last months and would be a constant worry for 
many during Anne’s reign.  It was this uncertainty, during the rage of party 
characteristic of the period 1702-1714, which provided John Toland his best 
opportunity for political advancement.1  Our other deists too commented on and 
attempted to find a place within the fast moving events of the day through their 
political works. 
Political Parties and Succession of the English Crown 
 February 1701 saw yet another tract from Toland.2  The Art of Governing by 
Parties took up themes which had permeated his previous works, specifically the 
division in the political landscape caused by Whig and Tory allegiances.  Such a 
perpetual separation of persons was, Toland asserted, the first step towards the 
establishment of a tyrannical government in England.  He noted that William III had 
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attempted to create a kingdom of political cohesion with one party not promoted at 
the expense of the other, but, nevertheless, “a Spirit of Faction too much 
prevailed.”3  This divisiveness ran counter to the true duties of the English subject, 
who was to assist the nation by “Advice, as well as his Purse, or the use of his 
Arm.”4   
 Toland stated that this combined effort of citizens working towards the 
betterment of the nation had existed in England until the Stuart monarchy.  Under 
Charles II, however, the political division and “Names or Distinction, Parties, 
Factions, Clubs, and Cabals, which have ever since distracted, torn, and very nigh 
consumed us” fully entrenched themselves in England.5  Toland further suggested 
that political parties were based upon religious exclusivity and the maintenance of 
fear and prejudice.  However, this arrangement contradicted the natural constitution 
of people who “desire a Liberty of Worshipping in a Way which they believe to be 
the most acceptable to the Deity.”  Consequently, to overcome the nature of 
humanity, political parties depicted themselves as guardians of the true religion, the 
one most pleasing to God.6  
 When naked theological differences did not work for the Stuarts to create 
fear and intolerance in the nation, Toland continued, they had linked supposed 
heretical theology to supposedly subversive political ideologies such as those of 
commonwealthism.  Thus, all those who deviated in their worship of God, even 
slightly, from the Church of England were made into commonwealthmen with all 
the implied negative connotations which went with the characterisation: regicides 
and limiters of monarchical power.7  Despite the irony that Parliament existed to 
secure English rights, Toland noted that in this body, one finds the same “political 
Factions” which divide the nation.  To remedy the situation where sitting ministers 
were susceptible to coercion from the other members of their party, Toland 
proposed annual Parliaments.  As a result, there would be no incentive to act in 
party interests, rather than those of their constituents, because every year MPs 
would have to return to the electorate and account for their votes in the Commons.8  
He ended the book with a call to abolish “those fatal Distinctions of Whig and 
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Tory” and for tolerating “one another in Religion, where we cannot agree.”9  This 
was the ideal condition in which to live and be governed.   
 Later the same year, in the third week of June, Toland published a book 
which would change his life and redirect the focus of his political ambitions.10  In 
Anglia Libera: or the Limitation and Succession of the Crown of England Explain’d 
and Asserted, Toland articulated his support for the Act of Settlement (1701) and for 
the House of Hanover as the heirs to the English crown.  He began by briefly 
defining the ideal of society: all persons abided by the “Rules and Laws, which are 
the Measure and Standard of every Man’s Actions.”  Without this arrangement, a 
ruler would have no checks on their actions because the monarch “can abolish 
tomorrow what has bin solemnly establisht to day.”11  There could be no rules of 
behaviour in a nation where the ruler could not only “change his own Decrees, but 
also dispense with the very Laws of God, and oppose the clearest Dictates of 
Nature.”12  Conversely, predictable government, acting in accordance with the 
common good, in the model of Toland’s God, was the best way to ensure the 
nation’s health. 
 Toland then described the events by which England ceased to be the free 
nation he advocated and had drifted dangerously close to the alternative he feared.  
He placed the blame at the feet of James II who had “forfeited his Right to the regal 
Government of these Nations by a notorious Neglect of his Declaration when he 
ascended the Throne, … of the natural Relation or original Compact between all 
Kings and their Subjects….”13  Chief among James II’s crimes had been the 
impending imposition of Catholicism.  In so doing, James had not acted in the best 
interest of those whom he governed and thus had forfeited his claim to the throne.  
To prevent a repeat of this unfortunate episode in England’s past, Toland pointed to 
the importance of the Act of Succession, which would “prevent all Possibility of 
introducing the Roman Idolatry” by stating that “all who were … reconcil’d to, or 
hold Communion with the See or Church or Rome, or marry a Papist, shall be for 
ever excluded and made incapable to hold, posses, or enjoy the Crown and 
Government of these Kingdoms….”14  Toland further wrote that those who opposed 
the succession were agents of popery even if they did not recognise themselves as 
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such.  The Act was the logical continuation of the Revolution of 1689 in which 
William and Mary had brought peace to England by securing Protestantism and 
which would be continued by the Hanoverians.15   
 Political theory too supported the implication of the Act.  This was 
confirmed by the action of many English nobles in 1689 who were, Toland stated, 
“hearty Friends to the Liberty of the People, so zealous for preserving the Protestant 
Religion on both Home and Abroad….”16  Such behaviour had been described a 
generation earlier by James Harrington who, Toland reminded readers, had outlined 
in Oceana how a force might be raised to defend the rights of citizens: “An Army, 
says He, may as well consist of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers without 
Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (especially such a one as is capable of Greatness) 
consists of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry without a People.”17  This was 
also the model advocated by Toland a few years earlier: a militia of free Englishmen 
united in the common defence of their liberty.  This, he contended, was the only 
desire of those who call themselves republicans.  A successful succession settlement 
secured this hope.  Toland concluded by urging goodwill towards the House of 
Hanover: “I think is highly necessary that the Names of the Princess Sophia and her 
Issue be inserted in our public Prayers, with the rest of the Royal Family.”18  
Passing the governance of England to Protestants from Hanover, Toland suggested, 
“restor[ed] and preserv[ed] to England her ancient Privileg’d Greatness of holding 
the Balance of Europe…” by acting as a buffer against France and the Pope.19  
Therefore, Toland submitted that the Act of Succession did more than secure 
Protestantism in England; it secured the safety of all Europe.   
Toland’s Trip to Hanover and the Death of William III 
 Based on the contents of Anglia Libera and at the urging of his secret 
benefactor Robert Harley, Toland accompanied the mission in July 1701, led by 
Lord Macclesfield (1660-1732), to present the Act of Settlement to the Electress 
Sophia.20  Before arriving on the Continent, Toland’s reputation had preceded him.  
The famed natural philosopher and privy counsellor at Hanover, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716) received a warning from Baron Schütz, envoy to Queen Anne, 
that English bishops hated Toland as did many ministers of state.  Furthermore, 
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Schütz hoped Leibniz would encourage Sophia to keep her distance from this 
controversial figure.21  Despite this caution, Toland was able to gain access to 
Sophia, her family, and to Leibniz himself.   
Prior to arriving in Hanover Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713) feared that Toland might display the same impolite 
behaviour shown in Oxford.  Shaftesbury was grandson to the famed first Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1621-1683) who had taken a lead role during the unsuccessful attempt 
to exclude James II from the throne.  The new earl too had a predilection for politics 
and served as an MP from 1695 until ill health forced his retirement in 1698.  He 
frequently supported young men with promise and did so for Toland even though, 
according to Thomas Birch’s later recollections, Shaftesbury “never had any great 
opinion of him….”22  It was through Shaftesbury that Toland had originally met 
Harley.23  Any friendship between Toland and Shaftesbury became strained in 1699 
when Toland published a draft of his patron’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue without 
permission.  Shaftesbury reacted by buying all copies and temporarily withdrawing 
himself from Toland.  As Birch described the incident, Toland had “treated him so 
thou unhandsomly” and “made this ungrateful Return for the many favours, which 
he had need.”24  Though the two would eventually break, Shaftesbury had not yet 
abandoned Toland.25  He reminded the impetuous young man that “You are now in 
a great Scene of Affaires and Providence has assign’d you a great Part in them.”  
Now that Toland was participating in national politics, Shaftesbury advised him to 
abandon the conduct which had ended his ambitions with Methuen in Ireland.  
Indeed, more than Toland’s personal reputation depended on his actions. 
I hope you will remember that as you are the more rais’d, you are the more 
bound to preserve a Character such as becomes a Man who supports the 
Cause of Religion, Liberty and Vertue, and that it is not only your own and a 
few Friends’ Reputation that is hazzarded but that your Native Country and 
the Lovers of it as well as all those of right Principles whome you represent 
to persons abroad, all these are engag’d with you and their Fame and 
Reputation in the Protestant World and amongst that Free People where you 
are known, does in a great manner depend on your Behaviour.26
 
The advice went unheeded. 
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Toland used the opportunity in Hanover to discuss his philosophy and 
politics with the royal family.  Such matters received notice in England.  Sophia 
herself related to the Duke of Newcastle that Toland had “made me a faithful 
representation” of the role Newcastle had played in securing the Act.27  Newcastle, a 
close friend to Shaftesbury, was a Whig and great land magnate; he would become 
Lord Privy Seal under Queen Anne.  This mention of Newcastle to Sophia was 
likely an attempt to gain the Duke’s favour as was the dedication to him in Anglia 
Libera.  Both attempts failed.  Prior to leaving Hanover, Toland provided a copy of 
that book to Sophia who enjoyed Toland’s conversations and thanked him with 
some paintings of the Hanoverian family and other items.28
 Toland returned to England with great admiration for the Hanoverianians 
and a new target for his political ambitions.  After the Lower House of Convocation 
failed in their attempt to bring action against Christianity not Mysterious in 1701, 
Toland responded to his depiction by that body in Vindicius Liberius.  The book was 
also a platform from which Toland praised the Hanoverian court.  He began by 
decrying the accusations that he was the “Atheist and detestable Person,” which 
critics had made him out to be.  Furthermore, he readily acknowledged that he was a 
commonwealthman, but not in the subversively negative manner alleged by the 
clergy.  Rather, Toland claimed that as a defender of commonwealth ideals, he was 
“wholly devoted to the self-evident Principle of Liberty, and a profest Enemy to 
Slavery and arbitrary Power.”29  What was more, Toland stated, in the manner of 
Matthew Tindal, that the power of government truly comes from society and, 
therefore, governments must earn the trust of those whom they govern.  To those 
who accused Toland of advocating a democracy in England, he was unambiguous in 
his reply: “in every Thing I ever wrote, having never bin for a Democracy, which I 
think to be the worst Form of a Common-wealth, tho a thousand Times better than 
any Sort of a Tyranny.”30  Toland portrayed himself as a Whig and a 
commonwealthman.  Indeed, he claimed that all true Whigs shared his beliefs.  Both 
he and Whigs supported Sophia and the House of Hanover because she and her kin 
would enact the descriptions of government Toland desired.  As a companion piece, 
Toland had also issued a brief pamphlet urging William to invite the Hanoverians to 
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England so that they might become acclimatised to the nation they would potentially 
rule.31  This was especially important should some unfortunate accident befall the 
sitting monarch.  When a riding accident claimed the life of William III, Queen 
Anne, the last Stuart monarch, ascended the English throne in March 1702. 
 On 10 March 1702, two days after William’s death, Toland dispatched a 
letter to Shaftesbury requesting an introduction to Lord Halifax (Charles Montagu) 
(1661-1715) who had recently been acquitted by the Lords for his part in the 
Partition Treaties with France over the fate of Spain following the immanent death 
of Carlos II.  Halifax had been a member of the Whig Junto under William and 
served as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1697-1699; he would repeat this duty under 
George I during October 1714-May 1715.32  Despite siding against the Junto during 
the 1698 election and the debates over the standing army, Toland desired that 
Shaftesbury recommend him to Halifax and that Shaftesbury present the peer a copy 
of an unnamed book, perhaps Anglia Libera or Vindicus Liberius.  Anticipating a 
prompt reply to his request, Toland advised Shaftesbury that he would wait for 
Halifax outside of his Lordship’s home or at the Grecian Coffeehouse.33  The 
turbulent events of the day caused Shaftesbury to delay acting upon Toland’s 
request.  As he put it in an undated, but belated letter to Halifax: “I promised the 
person who sent this enclos’d to me, that I would present his Book to your Lordship 
and afterwards himself: but in this confusion of affaires I forgot both: so chose to 
send you this, as a less trouble to you than a visit on this account.”34  Once again 
Toland’s attempts at advancement met with little success and failed to secure any 
permanent position.  Toland then left for the Continent where he would spent much 
of the next decade.   
The Whig Observator and The First Challenge of Sacheverell 
 Deists were not the only critics of High-Church politics.  On the first day of 
April 1702 and less than one week into the reign of Queen Anne, Whig supporters 
launched a political periodical in the form of a twice-weekly newspaper, the 
Observator.  While the day’s news occasionally found a place in the Observator, it 
was mainly concerned with advancing a Whig programme and attacking Tory 
positions like those held by Henry Sacheverell.35   
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 The High-Church Tory and political sparkplug in 1709-10, Henry 
Sacheverell, DD (1674-1724) worried about Whigs and their seemingly too lenient 
stance toward Dissenters such as Toland and Tindal.  In a speech given at Oxford in 
1702 and subsequently published as True Character of the Low-Churchman, 
Sacheverell argued that Low-Churchmen, particularly the Whig Latitudinarian 
variety, might claim “to be of the Communion of the Church of England,” but they 
have “tender regard to weak Brethren….”36  Such brethren include the deists, who 
held their reason in high regard at the expense of pious behaviour.  What was more, 
Sacheverell submitted that such men believed “very Little or no Revelation, and had 
rather lay [their] Faith upon the Substantial Evidence of [their] Own Reason, then 
the precarious Authority of Divine Testimony.”37  Passive-obedience toward God 
and monarchs was, Sacheverell suggested, the best way to ensure the peace of 
England.  Otherwise, people would see themselves as “Judges of the Legality of 
Princes Actions, and every slip or misconduct a Forfeiture of their Crowns….”  
Monarchs ruled by the desire of God, not by the whim of those over whom they 
govern.38  The divine right of kings and passive obedience found a powerful 
advocate in Sacheverell as did those who wished to end what they saw as the 
widespread heresy of deism.  By rejecting obedience towards authority and 
replacing it with belief measured against reason, Sacheverell urged readers to see 
deists, and all those who did not explicitly challenge them, as a destabilising force in 
England.39
 In late September, the Observator considered the supposed threat and 
dangers of allowing the continuation of religious diversity in England.  “The 
Religious Differences of the People of England, are so small,” the editor concluded 
that, “Pride on one hand and stubbornness on the other are the chief causes or our 
Religious Feuds and Animosities….”  Failure to permit freedom of conscience and 
force one’s beliefs upon another lay at the heart of the matter.  Even in the case of 
Catholics, their confession was not the real issue.  Rather, the reason why they were 
excluded from government positions was that their “Opinions were contrary to the 
well Being of Humane Societies.”40  The Catholic disposition to religious exclusion, 
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suggested the paper, threatened the religious freedom upon which England’s 
constitution was supposed to rest. 
Turning to the mind’s operation, the Observator argued that  
Persecution is a forcing the Mind to a Consent, to what the mind has an utter 
Aversion to comply withal: Now who ever considers the nature of Mans 
Mind, as also of a Rational Soul, must conclude, that it cannot be forc’d by 
External Instruments: Spiritual Intellectual Beings, as they subsist without 
the Accidents peculiar to Corporeal Substances, cannot be affected by 
Material Objects.  How vain then is it for Men to endeavour to force the 
Mind by punishments of the Body.41
The nature of the mind rendered any means to cajole people into a certain belief 
ineffective.  Just as Toland and Tindal had asserted, one cannot force belief upon 
another person.  Like our deists, the paper claimed that the blame for such attempts 
to undermine religious freedom in England lay in the practise of priestcraft.  In a 
mock dialogue, an analysis of priestcraft began by noting its “Mischiefs” which had 
done more damage to England “than the Powers of France and Rome.”  However, 
unlike the “Oafs” who inhabited popish countries and permitted themselves to be 
led by scheming priests, Englanders employed their reason and would not believe 
priestly lies.42  Reason, therefore, was the best defence against the imposition of 
priestcraft.  To readers acquainted with deist writings, all this sounded familiar.  It is 
also evidence of deists not being out of step with contemporary political debates. 
 Referring specifically to Sacheverell, the paper’s editors addressed the 
conception of passive-obedience that seemed to be all the rage in Tory 
coffeehouses.  After debating the issue for several paragraphs, the Observator 
concluded that “Passive-Obedience and Non-resistance are Synonymous Terms, and 
are quaint Expressions of Slavery, introduc’d by the Priests of the Order of Tyranny, 
in order to introduce Popery into the Church, and Slavery into the State.”  The 
ambition of devious priests lay behind this political doctrine.  What was more, the 
paper suggested that if any person were to accept passive obedience as a way of life, 
that person would have the same rights before the king that animals have on the 
estates of country gentlemen.  Certainly, as Tindal had argued, English subjects 
wished more for themselves than existing as voiceless possessions of a monarch.43   
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The Dangers of Political Favours 
 After his attempts to secure government patronage had failed, Toland sailed 
to the Continent.  His timing was certainly influenced by the potential for changes in 
England’s attitude towards Dissent that occurred in 1702: the coronation of Queen 
Anne ushered in a new political and religious climate, and the future Archbishop of 
Canterbury William Wake urged England’s divines to “write and preach” until the 
waters of religion were “calm again.”44  Toland eventually turned up in Utrecht in 
mid-August of 1703 and his claims of association with important men travelled with 
him.  This came to a head soon after his arrival.  Toland’s alliance with Harley and 
the positions he supported, raised the suspicions of the latter’s political rivals such 
as the Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722) and Sidney Godolphin (1645-1712).  
Marlborough dispatched agents to Utrecht to assault Toland who described the 
attack as occurring after a prolonged “Sickness, and passing over the brutal violence 
that was us’d against me in Such a Condition, either shows their gross partiality, or 
that I need not apprehend any Blemish to my Reputation from their Judgements.”  
The beating did not have the intended effect of keeping Toland out of English 
politics.  Indeed, Toland viewed his bruises as badges of honour and proof that his 
work was worrying those who would limit personal freedom and institute 
governments based on religious exclusion.   
What happen’d to me might befall the greatest Man on Earth, tho in Perfect 
Health; and I have done nothing but what had bin often practis’d by men of 
unquestionable worth and Courage: for such attempts not being on the 
Square, as in ordinary quarrels, have bin always treated after a very different 
manner; and I believe none was ever heard to be challenged a man fairly yt 
wou’d assassinate him, attack him unaware, or take any other Advantage.45
 
True to his words of defiance, Toland returned to England when the Tory ministry 
of Nottingham and Rochester failed in 1704, and a Whig triumvirate, composed of 
Harley, Godolphin, and Marlborough, took its place.  He arrived expecting Harley’s 
patronage, only to be dismayed when he found Harley employing Daniel Defoe’s 
literary skills.46  Harley, who was then Secretary of State, learned of Toland’s 
arrival from an anonymous informant.  What troubled the author of the letter was 
the rumour that “John Toland is in England and hard at work at his pen.”47  William 
 72
  
Nicolson (1655-1727), Bishop of Carlisle (1702-1718), learned of Toland’s return 
during a supper conversation with Edmund Gibson.  Afterwards Nicolson met with 
the Archbishop of Canterbury who “assured [him] of Mr Toland’s being out of 
Countenance at Hanover” due mainly to “his Knavery.”48  The news eased the three 
men’s worries over Toland’s potential political influence, albeit only temporarily.  
Collins’ Fortune and Tindal’s Freedom of the Press 
 While Toland was a political irritant and covert champion of Harley, 
Anthony Collins lived above such squabbles.  In 1704, the same year as Toland 
returned to England, Collins purchased Hunters’ Comb, a country estate.  During 
the three years he lived there, Richard Dighton a onetime servant, recalled that 
Collins “was visited several times by Queen Ann[e’s] Noblemen and Ladies of 
Quality who took delight in walking in his fine gardens.”  What was more, several 
“Gentlemen of the County” urged Collins “to represent them in Parliament as the 
Knight of the Shire (but would not be prevailed on).”49  Where Toland coveted 
government patronage, Collins declined it.  However, Collins still took interest in 
the political issues of the day. 
 Also in 1704, Tindal re-entered the public sphere with a treatise encouraging 
freedom of the press.  Restraint on publishing, Tindal argued, had been mistakenly 
defended on religious grounds.  It had been argued, by those who supported controls 
on the press, that people needed to be protected from heretical publications which 
might lead them astray.  Against this claim, Tindal reminded readers that God 
desired Christians to use their reason to arrive at the truth of religion: God does not 
demand impossibilities and is perfectly happy in Himself.  Restriction on the 
publication of theological works was based on the view that humanity was unable to 
find its own way to God.50  “What can be more inconsistent with this Duty of 
Examination,” Tindal questioned, “than a Restraint on the Press, since there can be 
no other Cause assigned why ‘tis unlawful to publish Arguments against the State 
Religion, but because ‘tis unlawful to read them, that being the sole reason of 
forbidding the publishing of them?”51  Reason, not regulations, would allow readers 
to determine truth and reject falsehood.  Moreover, he asserted that any religion 
which feared honest investigation cannot be the true faith because the foundation of 
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Protestantism itself “is built on the natural Right every one has of judging for 
himself in matters of Religion,” and demands total freedom of the press.52  The 
reason control existed in England, Tindal submitted, was due to the persistence of 
such doctrines as passive obedience, which seemed to have convinced many that 
they have no right to question “what relates to Religion and Government, to see 
what can be said on all sides, in order to form his Judgement aright.”53  Even if one 
accepted such a principle in matters of religion, it had to be rejected when matters 
turned to government actions because the “liberty of the Press must keep a Ministry 
within some tolerable Bounds, by exposing their ill Designs to the People, with 
whom if they once lose their credit, they will be very unfit Tools for a Court to work 
with.”  Tindal concluded by noting that in England, unlike other nations where it 
was a “Crime to talk, much more to write about State-Matters,” people had the 
right—perhaps even the duty—if they did not deny it, not to be enslaved by 
government.54  
Toland, Praise of Hanover, and Repairs to a Reputation 
 Having failed to find government patronage—covert or otherwise—Toland 
turned his attention to England’s potential future rulers in the Hanoverian court.  His 
Letters to Serena contained, as we will see, a natural philosophy based on self-
moving matter—derived in part from Isaac Newton—which was also tied to a 
political goal.55  By composing the work for Sophia Charlotte, Queen of Prussia, 
whose intellect received constant praise in his accounts of Hanover, Toland 
attempted to establish a position next to persons of inevitable political importance 
by presenting himself as an authority in the natural philosophy of the nation Sophia 
and her family would rule.  Indeed, when the Electress Sophia died in 1714 Toland 
lamented that his chance for a life of ease at court died with her.56   
In the preface to Letters to Serena, Toland urged people of all political 
stripes to read the book: “Whig or Torys, Latitudinarian … Occasional Conformists 
or Nonjurants Schismatics: for there is nothing in this Pacquet relating to the 
Disputes which divide ‘em at present either in Religion or politics….”57  Toland 
then waded into disputes in both these arenas by confronting Sacheverell’s recent 
characterisation of Low Churchmen.  He cautioned Serena, (Sophia Charlotte) “As 
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for the Reflections you may be willing to hear against me from any of your Angry 
Friends, I have often advis’d you not to trouble your self about such Trifles no more 
than I do.”  Until all members of Church and government can “secure themselves 
from the Slander and Calumny of those” who spread bigotry among people, she 
ought to ignore their accusations against him.58  Toland then turned his attentions to 
Sacheverell’s book which Sophia Charlotte had sent him.  He decried the attempts 
to draw him into religious disputes and referred the Queen to “the Satisfaction I 
gave in Vindicus Liberius concerning the Exceptions taken at Christianity not 
Mysterious ….”  Toland here attempts to rescue his reputation from its English 
characterisation, specifically that found in Sacheverell’s and similar Tory writings, 
and to present himself to Sophia Charlotte as one who has suffered at the hands of 
others.59   
Toland’s zeal to act as a kind of English spokesperson for the Hanoverians 
led him to publish a further account of the potential benefits their Protestant rule 
would bring to Britain.  Though it was published in 1705, An Account of the Courts 
of Prussia and Hanover contained letters composed in late 1702 which described 
Toland’s impressions of Hanoverian governance.60  He began by describing the laws 
by which a king ought to preside over the nation.  Monarchs guide their subjects the 
same way that “God himself preserves the World by the Oppositions of Heat and 
Cold, of Gravity and Levity, of Hard and fluid Bodys, whence proceeds the 
admirable Harmony of all things.”  Just as Tindal had argued a decade earlier, 
Toland agreed that God’s immutable laws of nature applied to governments and the 
motion of planets.61  God established order and did not arbitrarily interfere; rather 
He guided and directed the world to achieve the goal of human happiness—so too 
should earthly monarchs.  In Europe there was no more ideal place than Hanover 
and the same condition could also exist in England should Hanoverians succeed to 
the crown.62  Key to their enviable management was “the intire Liberty of 
Conscience which all good Christians enjoy in this place, and throout … all 
Territorys….”  There was, Toland believed, no forced religious conformity in 
Prussia: people were permitted the use of their reason to find their own way to God 
and the form of religion which seemed best to them.63  Prussia, therefore, promoted 
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the religion advocated in Christianity not Mysterious.  This commitment to religious 
freedom was personified in “Sophia Charlotte, the most beautiful Princess of her 
Time, and who is second to no Person in the Justness of her Thoughts….”64  Toland 
then went on at some length lauding Sophia Charlotte’s erudition.  Her desire for 
learning influenced Sophia’s choice of political advisors, a practise Toland admired.  
“I need but name Monsieur Leibniz for an Example, who is here a Privy 
Counsellor…,” although, Toland conceded “I cannot agree to his Metaphysical 
Notions….”65  This subtle challenge to the advice provided Sophia Charlotte by 
Leibniz is perhaps another attempt by Toland to obtain a court position for himself.  
Through the claimed association between his work and Newton, who was then 
engaged in the priority dispute with Leibniz over the calculus, Toland may have 
been attempting to drive a wedge between Leibniz and the Hanoverian court by 
asserting that he was a philosopher at home in English learned circles and not the 
divisive force Leibniz would be. 
Not entirely certain of Hanoverian favour, Toland’s desire to find 
employment forced him to consider alternatives.  This is evidenced by two notes he 
sent the third Earl Shaftesbury in late October 1705.  Toland opened the first by 
referring to the letter Shaftesbury had sent prior to Toland’s trip to Hanover with the 
Act of Settlement delegation in 1701.  He assured the Earl that “your Lordship’s 
frank manner for chideing me for real or imaginary faults, has not diminisht, but 
rather increast that Confidence.”  Attempting to distance himself from his past 
reputation, Toland alerted Shaftesbury to the fact that he was “not sauntering any 
longer in Coffeehouses….”  Alluding to his tenuous connection with Harley, Toland 
noted with amusement that he had been characterised as a Tory by some observers.  
He hoped that Shaftesbury would consider the source of the accusations.  These 
coffeehouse politicians “who (as I am inform’d by no mean person) report that I am 
become a Tory; when it is impossible for ‘em to know any thing of a man that w[as] 
perfectly retir’d in the Country, and frequents no publick places in the Town.”66  As 
he had done with past critics, Toland dismissed them with the claim that they did 
not know the real Toland. 
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Following this letter, Toland dispatched another to Shaftesbury.  He boasted 
that “I am now in some manner altering my Circumstances: for what my Lord 
Somer’s Ministry, wou’d not give me, and what I wou’d not ask my Lord 
Nottingham’s Ministry, the present Ministry unsought has offer’d, and I am willing 
to accept.”  As to the exact nature of the appointment with Harley,67 Toland would 
not reveal it, but he promised Shaftesbury a complete account if he agreed to a 
meeting.  At the very least Toland hoped that this new status would allow him to 
“begin on clear ground” in the opinions of others.68   
There was some truth in Toland’s boasts to Shaftesbury.  In early January 
1707, the Jacobite and frequent correspondent to St. Germain, John Netterville 
wrote Harley to advise him that Toland’s claims of service to the minister were a 
frequent topic of discussion in political circles.  Netterville related a meeting he had 
with a Nonjuror who “asked me if I had an interest in serving Toland.”  The 
Nonjuror continued that to serve Harley was to serve Toland who “is Secretary 
Harley’s champion or penman to write as he desires as to the subject matter.”69  
Later that month, Harley admitted to Lord Raby, English Ambassador in Berlin, that 
he had indeed employed Toland on various occasions because Toland seemed to 
have “read much.”70
Toland’s acquaintances further attempted to repair his damaged reputation.  
One Elisha Smith wrote to Thomas Hearne (1678-1735), antiquarian, Nonjuror, and 
at this time Assistant Keeper of the Bodleian, in early 1706 with just such a goal.  
After relating the many conversations he had with Toland, Smith advised Hearne 
that perhaps the public had been too harsh in condemning Toland as a heretic.   
I think myself oblig’d to vindicate him from ye mistaken prejudicies ye 
[world] has received concerning his Religion Since ye Publication of his first 
Book Xtianity not Mysterious he is very sensible of it & has confessed to me 
that those were only his Juvenile Thots at 25 & waits only for an opportunity 
to Convince Ye world how much they have mistaken him from that Book. 
 
What was more, Smith assured Hearne that “I firmly believe him to be a man of Rel. 
& of ye Faith of Ye Church of Engl.”71  Hearne was unmoved and described Smith 
in later correspondence as “a Clergyman and an acquaintance of Toland,” and 
characterised Toland as a “Sorry Wretch.”72  First impressions of Toland remained 
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lasting impressions.  Indeed, in his recollections Hearne described him as a man of 
“vile principles, which he took all opportunities of instilling into young 
Gentlemen…”73   
Newspapers and Further Whig / Tory Conflict 
 As might be expected, the Tories did not reply with silence to the Whig 
Observator or to the growth of apparent irreligious literature such as that authored 
by Toland and Tindal.  They answered one newspaper with another and the 
Rehearsal was launched on 5 August 1704, edited by the High-Church Nonjuror 
Charles Leslie.  The paper conducted its political polemic as a dialogue frequently 
pitting the Tory “Countryman” character against the Whig “Observator” character.74  
In an early February 1705 issue, “Countryman” lobbied for legal action against 
those who advanced heresy, both secular and sacred: “no Christian Government 
ought to suffer CHRIST our LORD, to be Ridicul’d or Blashem’d.”  Both God and 
monarchs demanded loyalty from their subjects.  When irreligious thinkers or 
Whigs refused this expectation, the government was right to enact punishment.  The 
paper noted that “even in Scotland, since this Revolution, one Mr. Aikinhead was 
put to Death for Blasphemy.”  England too ought to follow this example with 
heretics who seemed to threaten the established political and religious order.75  
Tories were clear in stating which group of heretics they found most troubling.  In 
the guise of the “Observator” character, the paper characterised the position of their 
opponents: “We Whiggs, who are Deists, must have a care how We let the 
Presbyterians into the Saddle.  Tho, at present, We agree, as to our Common 
Designs against the Church and Crown.”  The Tory view was that deists were 
Whigs and Whigs were deists; both groups threatened the nation and religion Tories 
sought to cultivate.  The Observator figure encouraged the presentation of deists and 
Whigs as a danger by provocatively stating that if they could not find a place in the 
existing order “Then we’ll have a Government all of Deists, and have no Religion at 
all.”76   
 Whig authors replied to these Tory accusations in a like manner with 
rebuttals in the Observator.  The editor asked his adversaries “pray, Gentlemen, 
when has the Church been in Danger since Her Majesties Happy Accession to the 
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Throne?”  If Tories continued to point in the direction of Dissenters generally or 
deists specifically as a danger, they must, the Observator demanded, provided more 
than empty rhetoric as proof.  The English Church was, since 1689, the paper 
reminded its readers, “the Church of Christ, and then it is a Church of Peace, of 
Love, of Union and Moderation….”77  It was not the Church of the Tories: exclusive 
and intolerant.   
Later that same year, the Observator drew a comparison which many 
readers, not to mention the editor of the Rehearsal, would have found distasteful.  
Was there, the paper asked, any difference between Dissenters and members of the 
English Church?  The only difference, the paper responded, “betwixt the Church 
and Dissenters, in Point of Religion, was concerning some Rituals and Modes of 
Worship, which they esteem’d as Humane Ceremonies, and which the Church 
impos’d as Terms of Communion.”  Therefore, Whigs seemed to argue that no 
important doctrinal issues separated Dissenters from communicants in the Church of 
England.  Only in acceptance of some ceremonial practices did the two confessions 
deviate.  This outward expression of faith ought not to be used as a weapon to 
divide the nation.  It then inquired about differences between Nonjurors and 
Dissenters: “Now, the Case of the Dissenters and that of the nonjurors is as different 
as any two contraries can be.  The Dissenters disagree only in a Religious capacity; 
the Nonjurors deny both the Civil and Religious Authority of the Kingdom; they are 
Enemies both to Church and State.”78  Whereas Dissenters were true English 
subjects who accepted the legitimacy of the current monarch and the future 
succession, Nonjurors accepted neither the religious settlement nor the current 
monarch.  This point received further support in a later edition of the Observator, 
which copied the dialogue style of its rival by using the Countryman name to refer 
to Tories.  “Master, what you say is true,” Countryman confessed to Observator, 
“The Nonjuors are all of ‘em Papists, and [Charles] Lesley in his last Rehearsal has 
declar’d himself to be so.”79  Despite their pleas to the contrary, it was Nonjurors 
rather than Dissenters, who posed the real threat to English religious and political 
stability.  Attacks on Dissenters and deists, it seemed, were merely a diversionary 
tactic.   
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Higgins and Increasing Fear of Deist Politics 
 During the early eighteenth century, Tories and High-churchmen formed a 
chorus cry of “Church in Danger” to alert the nation to their belief that Dissenters, 
and especially deists, were irrevocably damaging the English Church with their calls 
for tolerance and comprehension.  Francis Higgins (1669-1728), an Irish preacher, 
was a particularly strong supporter of halting the writings of deists and other 
heretics.80  On 26 February 1707 Higgins preached a sermon at White-Hall 
addressing this issue.  He began by attacking the deist doctrine of following one’s 
conscience in matters of religion and not accepting anything by virtue of tradition.  
Against this proposition, Higgins replied “a great many Actions, flowing from the 
Dictates of an erroneous Conscience, tho’ performed with the warmest Zeal, and 
heartiest Sincerity, will be found not perfect before God.”81  Taking a common line 
of response, Higgins cautioned readers that God’s demands upon them were not 
open to interpretation, only compliance.  Fearful of heretics further propagating 
irreligion in England, Higgins hoped to warn the unwary to be suspicious of certain 
books which promoted atheism under the guise of sincere inquiry into religion.   
Chief among such books were Henry Dodwell’s work on the soul, which we 
will examine shortly, and Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious.82  Indeed, Higgins 
noted that Toland’s book was so heretical that it was burned in Ireland.  If England 
failed to take similar actions with such blasphemy the nation risked divine 
retribution.  He cautioned: “Don’t let us foolishly imagine because God is pleas’d to 
give us Glorious Success against our Enemies Abroad; and to Bless us with a Pious 
Queen at Home … that therefore he is at Peace with us….”  The same providence 
which secured Protestantism in England would, Higgins suggested, exact a hard 
lesson upon people who did nothing to stop deism.83  A simple reason existed as to 
why deism went unpunished in England.  Higgins revealed, and Sacheverell would 
repeat in 1709, that deists hid behind “Great Men, who may be thought … Abettors 
of Such Doctrines and Practices.”  These unnamed politicians “can easily be 
imagined the Reason why Her Majesty, the Parliament, the Judges, the Magistrates 
of the Land are not zealous … to put a full, speedy and effectual stop to such 
thriving, and fatal Mischiefs.”84  Though he mentioned no one by name, this 
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accusation may be a reference to Toland’s relationship with Harley and was 
certainly against the stance Whigs were believed to be taking with Dissenters in 
such publications as the Observator.  Thus, deists were fully integrated in 
contemporary political discourse. 
The reaction against Higgins’ polemic was swift.  S. White replied that “Mr. 
Higgins, and the Party he expouses, would make the World believe they are the only 
Respecters of Majesty.”  He continued that Tories’ desired passive obedience not 
only to the monarch and church, but also to any doctrine their party holds as truth.85  
While White did not defend the present state of the English Church, he refused to 
believe it was as rife with unbelief as Higgins had claimed.  He did, however, agree 
that Toland was one of the “Contagious Plagues of the Church of England….”86  In 
spite of their shared hatred of Toland, White and Higgins parted company over the 
influence they believed Toland and other deists had in matters of religion in 
England.  Toland, as White characterised him, frequently dispensed blasphemy but 
was “not own’d by our Church as a Member, and I believe lays claim to none.”  
Toland was an non-associated polemical writer who spoke for himself; and, “upon 
Examination, I believe it would be found, that not one in a Thousand every heard of 
[his] Name, [or] saw [his] books.”  Thus, White submitted that Toland was more 
ghost than substance and ought to be ignored with silence, not used to fan the flames 
of division in English politics or religion.87
Another reply to Higgins, issued anonymously, had a similar thesis.  The 
author wrote that Queen Anne’s design “has been to render all her People Easy, 
Safe, and Happy, as well as in their Religious as Temporal concerns.”  In this 
atmosphere of official tolerance, it was “no less amazing than horrible, to think 
there should be any such vile and ungrateful Men found among us….”  Higgins and 
his fellow Tories were, the author claimed, a prime example of this group.88  Under 
the seemingly benign task of “instilling into the people’s minds, the true Principles 
of Religion,” Higgins instead was among the “Promoters of Scandal, Sedition and 
Discord.”89  This was most true in the characterisation of Toland.   
How industrious Mr. Higgins is, to rake up other Mens Faults, and lay them 
at the Government’s Door; … What does Toland’s Crime Committed in 
Ireland, relate to the Preacher’s Design, or is it another Argument of the 
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churches being in Danger, because he is caress’d by Men of Quality here.  If 
Mr. Higgins knows that Toland has offended since he came to England, he 
would do well to prosecute him, for I hope he does not expect that the 
Government should punish Men for faults it was never appriz’d of….90
 
Unsubstantiated accusations carried no weight even among those who did not 
support deism.   
As we saw with William Stephens, attempts to drive a religious wedge 
among the English people were met with same strong replies that Tories used to tie 
deism to a Whig platform.  At least a few nonjurors and Tories saw the partial 
failure of this approach.  The 12 February 1707 edition of the Rehearsal changed 
tactics and focussed its agenda on refuting “The Men of Rights” who argued for 
government by consent rather than divine right.  “They are,” the paper continued, 
“such Dissenters as the Atheists.  Not so Good as the Deists or Heathen, as I have 
before shew’d.  For no Deist or Heathen ever had so Contemptible a Notion of God, 
as to set the People above Him, and make him Govern by an Authority DERIV’D 
from Them.  The Men of the Rights are Dissenters from God, and all Reveal’d 
Religion.”  While deists were bad, republicans were worse and Tories now sought to 
identify Whigs with these political extremists.91  Whigs were equally skilled at 
political mudslinging.  The headline of a mid-April edition of the Observator 
claimed that “The High-Churchmen are Papists.”92   
 While England’s newspapers debated deism, Toland had travelled to the 
Continent in early 1707 with the intent of meeting again with Sophia and her family.  
While abroad, he wrote Harley to express his disappointment at having not obtained 
a permanent position within the English government: “this time two years I made 
sure of some preferment before now, not only because my Lord Treasurer was 
pleased to promise I should be taken care of….”  What was more, as Toland 
attempted to persuade Harley, “I think I may without fearing the least imputation of 
vanity, look on myself as much more deserving … and great deal more capable in 
all respects, than several in the long list of such as have been employed in that space 
of time.”93  As to the rumours of his planned actions during his trip, Toland assured 
Harley that “I am not going nor shall go either to Berlin or Hanover, nor upon any 
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account or errand whatsoever relating to these Courts, as some foolish people might 
insinuate to you after my departure….”94   
 Not one to let a promise stand in the way of his personal political 
advancement, Toland did not keep his word.  After spending a few weeks in 
September in Dusseldorf at the court of John William (r. 1690-1716), Elector 
Palatine, Toland requested a letter of recommendation to Sophia, Electress of 
Hanover so that he might be welcomed again at her court.  William asked his cousin 
“without any delay, to receive the said Toland into your mighty protection and 
powerful patronage.”  If she did this service, William predicted Sophia would not 
regret it because “in return of all the distinction and kindness at any time show’d 
him, [he] will imploy all, possible care and zeal to render your Dilection and to your 
Electoral family such valuable Services as may most amply deserve your Favour.”95   
 Harley soon learned that Toland was indeed in Berlin and, what was worse, 
claimed to be acting on behalf of the English government and Secretary Harley 
specifically.  Erasmus Lewis (1670-1754), MP and under Secretary of State, 
dispatched a brief account in October 1707 of Toland’s latest actions.  An 
acquaintance related to Lewis, who passed it along to Harley, that “Toland has come 
here from the Court at Dusseldorf, where the Elector made him considerable 
presents.  He went yesterday to Herrenhausen … when he paid his respects to the 
Electress.”96  Sophia herself was suspicious of Toland’s unexpected arrival and 
requested further information.  The Bishop of Spiga (1655-1728) obliged her and 
related “in what way the person who calls himself Toland succeeded in getting from 
his E. H. my master the letter which he has present[ed] to you on his part.”97  At 
some length, the Bishop detailed how Toland 
went and looked out this friend of his, and told him that, having been in 
England the greatest and the first promoter of the succession, and the man 
who drew out the deduction of the rights of your E. H., he had since been at 
the Court of Hanover, where he had been regaled with I do not know how 
many medals of high price; but that, being extremely well received by your 
E. H. (as one might well believe), he had had long and secret conferences 
with your Highness, and had taken long walks with you.  This had made him 
a great many enemies, as well in Hanover as in England, where they had 
taken him for a Hanoverian spy, on account of his attachment to the Serene 
House; so that in fact he would not dare to return again to Hanover without 
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some pretext … and that the said pretext might be given him by a letter from 
his E. H. to your Serene Highness,--a letter of simple civility, and which 
should mean no more than that his E. H. is well satisfied with him, and has 
received good service from him.98
 
It seems Toland’s claims of favour with politically great persons were as boastful 
now as they had been thirteenth years earlier in Oxford and were bringing him the 
same results.   
 Leibniz too composed a description of Toland’s arrival in Hanover and why 
the Elector of Palatine might wish to support Toland, which Leibniz dispatched to 
Ambassador Raby at the end of December.  The philosopher opined that the 
“Elector had an object of his own to serve, which was to get something published 
that might help to disabuse the English who have looked upon him as a persecutor 
of the Protestants.”  William belonged to the Catholic House of Palatinate-Neuburg 
and under his rule and that of his brother Charles III Philip (r. 1716-1742) Calvinists 
were increasingly being exiled and barred from participating in government.99  By 
sponsoring Toland to the potential future ruler of England, Leibniz believed that the 
Elector of Palatine was attempting to appear friendly to Protestants.  This hypothesis 
was seconded from Berlin in a letter written by William Ayerst, D.D. (1683-1765) 
who held various diplomatic positions on the Continent, to Arthur Charlett in 
Oxford which advised him that “Mr. Toland I moan has lately been here coming 
from ye Palatine Court whose proceedings against ye Protestants we hear Mr. Toland 
has … defended & receiv’d great gifts for his pains.”100  For Toland and William it 
was a mutually beneficial relationship of patron and penman, a simple business 
agreement.  Like others, Leibniz related that Toland asserted a close relationship 
with Harley and had “insinuated to us here that since the change of Ministry in 
England he is in favour at Court, that he is employed by the Ministers, and that he 
has relations with even the Duke of Marlborough; but as he has given us no proofs 
of this credit of his….”  The one positive item which Leibniz found during his latest 
conversation with Toland was the claim “that he has made it up with the 
Theologians: all the better for him.  This is what I advised him to do the first time I 
saw him, on occasion of my Lord Macclesfield’s embassy.”101  However, Leibniz 
believed it to be unlikely. 
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Tindal and the Rights of the Church 
 While Ayerst related his dismay over Toland’s actions in Berlin, he also 
lamented the work of another deist telling Charlett that “The noise [of] Mr. Tyndal’s 
Book has reach’d hither & one of the King’s chaplains has been talking to me about 
it.”  He continued that Oxford seemed to do little to curtail Tindal, whom Ayerst 
described as “Another of ye Same race” as Toland.102  The book in question, The 
Rights of the Christian Church Asserted, was perhaps Tindal’s most infamous, at 
least until 1730 and the release of Christianity as Old as the Creation.  His decision 
to publish The Rights anonymously did little to prevent him being identified as the 
author.  Bernard Gardiner (1668-1726), Warden of All Souls College, Oxford (since 
1702) was particularly irritated with the contents of the work.  He wrote to 
Archbishop Tenison on 3 November 1708 to advise him “I hear there is proof 
offer’d by a person who transcrib’d ym, yt many pages of ye Rights of ye Church 
were written by Dr. Tindal: if my power will reach to take [it] upon Oath I will hear 
it.”103  Moreover, in a letter of 1709 the third Earl Shaftesbury agreed that Tindal 
was the most likely author and that despite reservations about some of its contents, 
claimed it “gave me great satisfaction.”104
Gardiner was as good as his word.  During the composition of the book, 
Tindal had employed John Silke as a copyist.  Under examination on 28 October 
1710, Silke painted a more sinister picture and related the main arguments of the 
book.  Silke advised his examiners in part that Tindal argued that the church ought 
to have no more power than that wielded by “other Private Companys, and Clubs.”  
Moreover, “all Ecclesiastical Power has no other foundation than the Consent of the 
Society” and “Among Christians no one more than another can be reckon’d a Priest 
from Scripture.”  The ambition of priests was limitless “which cou’d only be 
Satisfied with an Absolute Power….”105  The process of transcription encompassed 
the years 1699-1702 when Silke was “then Servitor of All Souls College Oxon.”  He 
hinted at having little choice in the matter.   
He did several times Inscribe every chapter together with the Preface & 
contents of Each Chapter of a Book now publish’d & Entitl’d The Rights of 
the Christian Asserted; except some few Additions /and Alterations/ wch as 
he believes were made since that time: and this Deponent further saith that 
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he transcribed it by the order of Dr. Matthew Tindal Fellow of the sd 
College. 
 
Before the book appeared in print, Silke “did Copy the Whole Book as the prepar’d 
for the Press; particularly the Propositions above written by the Order of the Doctor, 
part of Which were dictated to the s[ai]d deponent from the Doctor’s own mouth; 
and part was transcrib’d from original Papers which the s[ai]d Deponent well knows 
to be written by the hand of the s[ai]d Doctor Matthew Tindal.”106  This accusation 
confirmed what opponents of deists believed: these heretics were bent on corrupting 
those around them, through their books.  In the present case, Tindal appeared to use 
his position as Fellow of All Souls to nurse heresy in a servitor, a student who 
depended upon the funds provided by his social superiors.107  Silke published his 
own account of the episode in 1735—two years after Tindal’s death—as The 
Religious, Rational and Moral Conduct of Matthew Tindal.  In the book Silke 
attempted to distance himself from a man whom he described as “that great 
Apostate and Corrupter of the Principles and Morals of the Youth of the present 
Age” and an atheist.108  This episode may have been what reverend Thomas Tanner 
(1674-1735), former chaplain of All Souls and future Bishop of St. Asaph, had in 
mind when he complained in 1717 about All Souls’ sullied reputation.  The college 
had, he lamented, “furnish’d” the nation with “all sorts of Freethinking.”  
Nevertheless he hoped that people would realise “that we are not all quite 
corrupted—.”109  Despite Gardiner’s dismay over All Souls having provided the 
location in which Tindal composed his book, no official action was taken against 
him.  Tindal’s former tutor at Oxford, the Nonjuror George Hickes, no doubt spoke 
for many when he wrote “I am sorry to understand … there is no disposition at 
Oxford to prosecute the Deist scribe Dr Tindal … to convict him of being the author 
of the Rights.”110
 Rights of the Christian Church began by taking up the debates over the 
safety of the English Church.  Tindal went over the well-worn ground of who were 
the best churchmen: High or Low.  His conclusion, which he would elaborate in the 
body of the work, was that “they who raise the greatest Noise about the Danger of 
the Church, are the greatest Enemies to it, … and are in direct opposition to the 
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Principles of the Reformation….”  Authority over the church, Tindal argued, began 
with “her Majesty’s Goodness and Tenderness” and not with doctrines which 
confronted this authority.  In other words, he characterised the constitution of the 
Church as that enshrined by the monarch and not an independent document guided 
by the bigotry and intolerance of High-Churchmen.111   
 The monarch’s duty to provide an atmosphere free of prosecution for his 
subjects was a frequent theme in Tindal’s past works on government and continued 
here.  In exchange for this promise of protection, the ruler received the consent of 
those over whom he or she governed.  This was certainly the case in 1689.  With the 
same Lockean language he employed previously, Tindal explained that “the only 
Right a Conqueror has, is built on the Consent of those, who by their former 
Governor’s being no longer able to protect ‘em, were reduc’d to a State of Nature, 
and consequently at liberty to pay Obedience to the Conqueror, upon his taking ‘em 
into his Protection….”112  Thus, when James II’s Catholicism abrogated his duty to 
safeguard Protestantism in England, his right to rule was forfeit.  William and 
Mary’s promise to allow Protestantism to flourish provided them the consent of the 
body politic.   
Jacobites threatened the stability of England because “never did any Men 
more grossly and notoriously sacrifice the Ends of Both Civil and Ecclesiastical 
Government to very Unfit, rather No Means, than those Protestants who were in the 
Interest of the Abdicated King; and are now in that of his Pretended Son, nurs’d up 
in Popery, French Tyranny, and a settled Hated to the English Nation….”113  
Support for James II was the same as support for Louis XIV, the Pope, and 
encouraged the cloud of Catholicism to increase its shadow of darkness over 
Europe.  Any true lover of England, Tindal stated, must support the Protestant 
succession and religious settlement.  Moreover, the clergy ought not “to pretend to 
any Privileges or Powers they receive not from the People or their 
Representatives.”114  Nonjurors and Jacobites were therefore one and the same; both 
groups refused to accept the legacy of 1689.  Turning further back in history for 
support, Tindal related that “In Queen Elizabeth’s Reign there was no Notion of 
Passive Obedience” to hinder the nation from viewing itself at the head of, and 
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protector for, a European Protestant community.  In this same tradition was Queen 
Anne who extended “her Favour to all her People [and was] … happy in her 
Government at home….”  This was also the model found in Tindal’s notion of God.  
What was more, Anne “can distinguish True Religion from Priestcraft, and will not 
suffer her Power to be made subservient to the ill Purposes of a Party [The Tories], 
whose restless Malice is never to be satisfy’d, without treading on the Necks of all 
who are not as bigotted as themselves.”115   
 Defences of this work continued along the same lines.  Tindal replied to 
critics like the reverend William Law (1686-1761), himself a High-Church Tory, 
who had refused to swear allegiance to George I, and who had stated that “we can 
have no notions of God, but such that are mysterious and inconceivable.”116  Tindal 
countered that he believed it was very near to atheism to worship a God whom one 
did not understand and about whom one could not form a clear idea.  People must 
be free to worship God as they saw fit.117  Since God created humanity with the 
power to know Him, Tindal expected all people would come to hold the correct 
view of God if given the chance to explore their beliefs.  What prevented the 
propagation of correct views was precisely those who depicted God as mysterious 
and unknowable.  As proof of his thesis that God would not impose Himself on 
humanity, Tindal noted the experiences of early Jewish governments: “God, after he 
had accepted the Political Government of the Jews, wou’d reign no longer over ‘em 
than they were willing….”118  Humanity was free to find their way to God because 
“God wou’d not reign over the Jews, till they had agreed to the Covenant … 
because, by his Law of Nature having allow’d Mankind a Right of chusing their 
own Governors, he wou’d not as King deprive ‘em of a Right which he had before 
as God given ‘em in common with the rest of the World….”119   
Daniel Waterland, DD (1683-1740), was Master of Magdalene College, 
Cambridge, Anglican theologian and champion of Trinitarianism.  He disputed 
Tindal’s assertion by arguing that “God does not want our leave for the making of a 
law, neither needs he to wait for our acceptance, to render it valid.  For though he 
enacts laws for the good only of his subjects, yet he will be the judge of what is for 
their good: and I presume, his infinite wisdom, and his superiority over us, are 
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sufficient to support his title.”120  For Waterland it was not up to humanity to accept 
or reject God’s laws.  People have an unwavering obligation to obey God, not to 
enter into a contractual relationship with the creator of the universe.  To do as 
Tindal advocated would “bring down the laws of God to the lusts and passion of 
corrupt man, and to find some pretext or other for taking off religious restraints, that 
they may be at liberty to follow their pleasures, and to do only what is right in their 
own eyes, instead of attending to the voice of God.”121   
Tindal’s book received many further refutations and challenges.  Even 
Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) considered a response but it never came to fruition.122  
Tindal replied to numerous rebuttals with A Defence of the Rights of the Christian 
Church.  The chief target of the apology was William Wotton, FRS (1666-1727), 
spokesperson for the “moderns” in the famed Battle of the Books, who had 
composed The Rights of the Clergy in the Christian Church to persuade readers that 
Tindal’s notions were empty words composed by a deist.  In response Tindal mostly 
repeated his arguments and further revealed his indebtedness to Locke.  
Governments as Tindal described them, were encouraged by their subjects to oppose 
tyranny and arbitrary power in all its forms.  Just as God does not act arbitrarily and 
outside the bounds of established laws of nature, earthly rulers may not act outside 
the laws of nations.123  Turning to the Second Treatise on Government (sec. 240), 
Tindal wrote that there are two Laws which ought to govern humanity: “the Honour 
of God and the Good of Mankind, which are in effect the same: and the last Rule 
must guide us in all our Actions with relation to those intrusted by their Fellows 
with Power to act for their good, as well as to others.”124  Once consent has been 
removed, any person who clings to the dictates of a past government becomes a 
barrier to the current happiness of a nation.  Such was the plight of Jacobites, 
Nonjurors, and those High-Churchmen who refused to permit any diversity of 
religion in England.  Tindal argued that the events of 1689 had made their views 
obsolete. 
Twenty-two years after the fact Francis Fox, Vicar of St. Mary’s, Reading, 
wrote to Edmund Gibson in 1730 detailing the recollections of Jonas Proast, a 
fellow Oxford resident and opponent of deism.  Fox reported that Tindal’s book had 
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been criticised by some who feared its potential subversive nature but “others had 
not so bad an opinion of them.”  What was more, Fox recalled that “I believe there 
are but few in these Parts, who have been hurt by the late endeavours to promote 
Infidelity.  I do not know of any one.”125  While it might seem, by reading Wotton’s 
account, that deism was a rampant and immediate danger, perhaps it was not 
perceived so by all contemporaries. 
Irreligion at All Souls  
 In early 1708 Bernard Gardiner, still Warden of All Souls College, Oxford 
had written to Edmund Gibson about the disruptive activities of one of the Law 
Fellows, namely Tindal.126  After apologising to Gibson for troubling him with a 
matter, which was, at this time, of little importance outside of Oxford, Gardiner 
proceeded.  There were, he explained, “new attempts wch are daily made upon ye 
Statutes” of the university.  The chief worry over this movement by some of the 
younger faculty was the proposition to remove the holy order requirement for the 
Fellows.  The Warden advised Gibson that “Dr. Tindal shelters himself in ye Band.”  
Gardiner then sought advice on how best to deal with the problem and requested 
that Gibson keep this matter close to his chest because he did “not desire it may goe 
farther.  You wd be very kind in giving me some [hints?] sometimes of wch comes to 
yr knowledge.”127   
 The issue of Fellows’ regarding the Oxford residency and order 
requirements at All Souls lasted from 1702 to 1720.  It became more than a local 
concern in 1709 when Gardiner attempted to compel William Blencowe, (All Souls 
Fellow, 1703, d. 1711) decipherer to the Queen who was living in London, to take 
orders.  Blencowe, who was the grandson of famed mathematician and statesman 
John Wallis, asked for assistance from Lord Sunderland (1674-1722) who then 
interceded with Gardiner.  Archbishop of Canterbury Tenison also worked on behalf 
of Blencowe in Sunderland’s name.  The correspondences of Archbishop William 
Wake and of Tenison hold many letters from Gardiner who lamented governmental 
interference with his operation of All Souls.  What is more, these letters also contain 
accounts of other Fellows who refused to take orders following Blencowe’s 
example.  Gardiner stood firm in his demands.  That same year the Fellows who 
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wished the statues changed had a bill introduced in the House of Commons which 
would eliminate orders for the Fellows at All Souls.  There was outcry and fear, 
even from moderate Churchmen, that the removal of such a requirement would 
undermine theology at Oxford.  Queen Anne herself became involved when she 
stated that Blencowe’s duties as a decipherer did not prevent him from taking 
orders.  The bill failed in the Commons and Blencowe committed suicide in 1711 
when it seemed that he would never be exempt from the statutes following the Tory 
resurgence in 1710.128   
 By March 1709 Warden Gardiner’s frustration over Tindal’s participation in 
the movement reached a new level.  He received a letter from William Bromley 
(1664-1732), former Tory MP for Oxford, who advised the Warden that the “design 
has been in agitation this 3 years, for about that time, Dr. Tindal came to me with 
those fallacious arguments, which are now urged as reasons.”  Bromley’s reaction is 
hardly surprising from the man who had introduced all three Occasional Conformity 
Bills into Parliament.129  Shortly after this letter, Tindal, like other Fellows who 
wished to protest the residency requirement, applied for and was granted a 
temporary leave of absence from the college.  We know Tindal continued his work 
with the Fellows in their mission because his name is included in a surviving role 
call taken at one of their meetings.  Indeed, both he and Blencowe took leaves from 
All Souls on the same day on at least two occasions.130  
Toland’s Continuing Political Boasting 
 At the same time as All Souls faced the Fellows’ challenge, Lord Raby 
wrote Leibniz.  The subject remained Toland’s behaviour.  Raby related to Leibniz 
that Toland claimed to be in possession of a “letter from Madame the Electress” and 
that he used it to give “himself no small airs.”  Toland also continued to claim “that 
he was employed by the English Ministry.”  Frustrated by this perpetual boasting, 
Raby advised Leibniz that he had initiated an end to it by dispatching a report to 
Harley.  Erasmus Lewis passed the letter to Harley and related that Raby had 
strongly urged Lewis to “acquaint [Harley] with the great injustice done you by Mr. 
Toland.”131  In reply to Raby’s reports, Harley had  
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written to me that so far from having any commission from him, he made 
difficulties in giving him a passport to leave England, not knowing what 
business he could possibly have abroad; that it is true that for some time he 
suffered him in his company, as a man reputed to have a good deal of 
reading, but that he was far from ever having had any friendship for or 
confidence in him.132
 
Raby hoped, no doubt with Leibniz’s support, that Harley’s disavowal of Toland 
would finally halt his vanity and self-promotion.  Better still, perhaps Toland would 
return to England.  As Raby wrote to Leibniz, their adversary had “more impudence 
than all his countrymen put together….”133
 Toland’s manners also placed him in further ill standing.  In another letter to 
Charlett, Ayerst described Toland’s brief stop in Berlin at the end of March.  Toland 
arrived with the “thought to have got some medals for a Book he intends to write in 
praise of this court,” however his service to the Elector Palatine cast him in a 
suspicious light.  The Hanoverian court “despis’d so mercinary a Pen yt cou’d write 
in favour of ye Elector Palatin’s Persecuting ye Protestants, & put him off….”134  
Toland’s practise of supporting himself as a quill-for-hire had cost him seriously in 
this case.  Despite Margaret C. Jacob’s characterisation of John William, Elector 
Palatine, as a “powerful Protestant leader,” and Toland’s service to him as 
signifying an involvement in a pan-Protestant movement, the Ayerst letter suggests 
a different interpretation.135  Toland, it seems, was motivated by self-gain and 
willing to compose tracts for the highest bidder, rather than Protestant altruism.  
This episode also marked the end of his association, limited though it was, with the 
Hanoverians.  Indeed, when George I succeeded to the English throne in 1714, he 
and his advisors explicitly prohibited Toland from attending court.136   
 Toland’s perpetual statements about Harley’s patronage and political favour 
raised the suspicions of other English politicians especially those who sparred with 
Harley for position.  During August 1708, when Toland was in Holland, 
Marlborough and Godolphin kept close tabs on him because if he was indeed in 
Harley’s service, it behoved them to keep abreast of their rival’s overseas activities.  
Marlborough reported that “Mr. Toland, you know who supports him, [Robert 
Harley] is so very free in all his discourses against [Godolphin] and [Marlborough], 
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that some of the honest men in [Holland] have a mind to send him out of their 
country.”  He continued that should the information prove accurate, it was a “very 
unreasonable and ungentlemanlike proceeding of” Harley to take against them.137  
By November 1708 Godolphin was worried over rumours that Toland was coming 
home and had been amassing material for another book.  Purportedly the incomplete 
manuscript attacked Marlborough, but nothing substantive could be obtained on this 
account.  Should it be true, Godolphin pressed Marlborough “to judg whether you 
could not take some measures … for watching him, and for seizing his book, and 
papers, or finding out his printer, so as that you may bee master of what villany he is 
doing there.”138  In the last letter between the two politicians regarding Toland, 
Marlborough wrote “Mr. Toland does no ways surprise me, for I know him to be a 
villian, and governed by a very mallicious man, [Robert Harley] and is maintained 
by him in Holand as a spye.  I have had an account of his behaviour in the courts of 
Jarmany [Germany] this last winter….”139  It seems that some took Toland’s 
asserted political connections at face value. 
 Back in England, during March and April, the Observator began describing 
party allegiances in the same language Toland had used years earlier.  “The 
Denominations of Whig and Tory, … have quite,” the paper noted, “lost the original 
idea which gave rise to them,…” Whereas during the Exclusion Crisis and the 
formation of party loyalty, the Whigs and Tories had explicit goals and positions, 
which one might use to characterise the members, current party labels had lost their 
original definitions.  This blurring made it impossible to “know who are real friends 
to the Protestant Religion, British Liberties, and the Protestant Succession, but to 
observe Mens Actions….”140  The position was carried further in a later edition 
which stated “Good Christians and Patriots not to be known now by the names of 
Whig and Tory.”141  The strongest admonishment carried by the paper was directed 
at the Whigs many of whom had abandoned their founding ideals.  Too “many of 
those who call themselves Whigs, [have] gone off from those honest Principles, and 
yet they are very angry with us for saying they are Whigs of a modern Stamp, and 
they are guilty of the same Practices for which they justly accus’d the Tories.”142   
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Conclusion 
 The fragile religious peace in England would not last another year.  We now 
turn to the tumultuous events following 1709 and locate our deists in these disputes. 
As one witness to the events of that year recalled, decades after the fact: “in 1709 
we looked forward with Pleasure; Peace; … and in Safety from the Disturbers of 
Europe, were what we thought ours: lives probably secured of, and what we might 
certainly have depended upon, had we been worth those Blessings; but how Sudden 
was that bright scene changed.”143  Like others who found themselves awash in 
these happenings, our deists sought to help England chart a course into smoother 
political and theological waters which avoided the waves caused by High-Church 
policies.   
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Chapter Four: 
 
Deist Politics and Theology, 1709-1719 
 
 
 
 
 
 Queen Anne’s husband Prince George of Denmark died in October 1708.  
For the Queen, whose health had never been robust, the added strain left her 
susceptible to manoeuvring on the part of her ministers—Whigs temporarily 
regained the royal ear.  Whig resurgence, however, was short-lived as the 
continuing expense of participating in the War of the Spanish Succession frustrated 
both Anne and tax-hating Tories such as Robert Harley.  Tories saw encouragement 
for the Whig-supported war and the financing of it as tied to support for Dissenters 
because the Whigs seemed to embrace a Latitudinarian stance towards religion that 
sought a wide comprehension within the Church of England.  Many High-Church 
Tories feared that such a religious policy would mean encouragement for more 
radical heresies like deism.  As an example of this political changing of the guard, 
Harley, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, replaced the Whig Lord Treasurer Sidney 
Godolphin in early 1710.  The elections following the upsurge of Tory sentiments 
after the Sacheverell affair secured Harley’s position until Anne’s last days in 1714.  
It is amid these events that our deists wrote and in some cases attempted to advance 
themselves.1
Sacheverell and the Sermon of 1709 
 Without question the most important and dramatic event of 1709 for both 
politics and religion in England was Henry Sacheverell’s sermon delivered on 5 
November before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London.2  The Perils of False 
Brethren, both in Church, and State was a venomous attack on Whigs and those 
whom Sacheverell believed allowed too great toleration in religion.  Fear was 
 101
 sparked by rumours throughout 1709 that the Whigs planned to revoke the Test Act 
and allow Dissenters, perhaps even deists, to hold government and university 
positions.3  This fear was no doubt fuelled by the recent events at All Souls College.  
As had Francis Higgins two years earlier, Sacheverell hoped to halt “Dangerous, 
and Encroaching Mischief, that now with Impunity walks up and down thro’ this 
Distracted Kingdom,” by opening “the Eyes of the Deluded People, in this Our 
Great Metropolis…” to the danger caused by appeasing heresy rather than crushing 
it.  Sacheverell chose his venue as a direct challenge to those who claimed the 
“Pulpit is not a Place for Politicks.”  Such persons, he argued, were attempting to 
deceive the pious into thinking that religion had no place in the governance of 
England.4  A prayer scribbled by Sacheverell around this same time reveals the 
importance that he placed on removing deviance from the Church.  Christians, he 
wrote, lived inside the being of God and as such owed Him correct worship.5
 Sacheverell sensed conspiracies against the Church of England and warned 
against the “FALSE BRETHREN, from whom we must always expect the utmost 
perils….”6  These persons, he proclaimed, will “Believe, Maintain, or Propagate 
any False, or Heterodox Tenet, or Doctrine, Repugnant to the Express Declarations 
of Scripture, and the Decress, or Sense of the Church….”  Not only did this include 
deists and their calls for a “Neutrality in Religion” but also proponents of natural 
philosophy, whom Sacheverell believed “explain the Great Credendi of Our Faith 
in New-fangl’d Terms of Modern Philosophy….”7  What was more, false brethren 
destroyed the integrity of the Church of England by eroding its exclusive 
membership and doctrine.  It was, he suggested “evident that this Latitudinarian, 
Heterogenous Mixture of all Persons of what different Faith soever, Uniting in 
Protestancy … would render it the most Absurd, Contradictory, and self-
inconsistent Body in the World.”  Sacheverell feared that the Church of England 
would become a “heterogeneous mixture” of communicants united only by their 
asserted Protestantism.8  Only High-Churchmen and those who refused differences 
of worship in the Church were true brethren, as were many in the Tory party who 
supported them.   
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  Not surprisingly the Whig Aldermen refused to offer Sacheverell the 
traditional thanks for the performance.  Despite not receiving the endorsement of the 
London city council, Sacheverell published his sermon and it was ready for sale on 
25 November.  Within one month some 50,000 copies had been printed and the 
historian Geoffrey Holmes estimates that nearly 250,000 people had read it.  
Sacheverell himself became a religious celebrity.  With the clamour from the 
sermon increasing and Tories feeling heightened support from Sacheverell’s 
followers, Whig politicians spent the winter of 1709-10 deciding on a plan to 
contain the groundswell of Tory enthusiasm.  They concluded that legal action 
against both the sermon and its author was warranted.  The impeachment 
proceedings began in March 1710 but led to a riot on the first day with the crowd 
shouting “High Church and Sacheverell” and threatening anyone who did not wish 
“God bless you” to their champion.  The following morning, and lasting for the next 
three weeks, a patrol of guards maintained order on London’s streets.  The measure 
was ultimately successful, but the £10,000 cost of peace was widely resented.9
Deism and the Reaction to Sacheverell of 1710 
 Though reaction to the sermon was fast and furious generating scores of 
polemics on both sides of the debate, we are concerned with those publications 
bearing most directly on deism.  At least one anonymous author suggested that 
Sacheverell had overplayed the threat posed by deists as a way to generate discord 
in the nation and set the stage for a Tory resurgence.  “The Doctor’s Pupil and 
young Clergymen,” the author suggested, “who have neither Learning nor Merit 
Sufficient to advance them, seek to distinguish themselves by Ill-nature and 
Railing…” needed to create a smokescreen of deception in order to manufacture the 
conditions of their promotion.10  Similarly, the calls of the “Church’s Danger from 
Atheists, Deists, and Socinians; this seems design’d to screen their Champion 
Doctor from the just Censures of the People, for his most undutiful and unmannerly 
flying in the face of majesty, her Ministry and Parliament….”11  While the 
anonymous author agreed that deism was deplorable, he questioned why there was 
such an uproar over the “comparatively, few among us chargeable with” deism, 
when a greater threat existed in the proliferation of “Vice, Immorality, and 
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 Prophaness, which have ruined many Flourishing Empires….”12  The question 
regarding the exact threat posed by deism, and atheism more generally, was debated 
at the highest levels of the English Church—though behind closed doors rather than 
in Sacheverell’s public forum.  In early January 1710 William Wake, Bishop of 
Lincoln (Archbishop of Canterbury 1716) had “a long Conference upon the present 
state of Atheism” at Lambeth with the Bishops of Norwich and Leicester.  The exact 
nature of the discussion, however, is not known.13   
In his response to Sacheverell, John Toland both challenged the issues raised 
in the sermon and defended the potential Hanoverian succession.  As he explained 
in a letter to Leibniz, perhaps written in an attempt to smooth over the ill-feelings he 
had created during his previous visit to the continent, “I no where stretched 
[Sacheverell’s] meaning, and that his principle view has been the defeating of the 
Succession in the House of Hanover….”14  As he had done in earlier works, Toland 
noted the political divisions of Whig and Tory in England.  Whigs were “zealous 
Sticklers for Civil Liberty, and Sworn Enemies to Ecclesiastical Tyrany.”  On the 
other hand, Tories “do not willingly admit of any Toleration in matters of Religion; 
or of any checks upon the will of the Sovereign.”15   
 It was into this last group which Toland placed Sacheverell.  Toland 
suspected that the real goal of the sermon was to “create jealousies, and make 
Divisions between the Subjects of the United Kingdom,” through false claims.  
Whigs offered peace through personal liberty and religious toleration, while Tories 
offered forced conformity.  Sacheverell’s sedition brought discord to England and, 
as such, Toland stated his life ought to be forfeit.  However, the same liberty and 
toleration that Toland found so commendable in the present and future government 
ensured that Sacheverell was in no real danger.  Toland concluded by pledging “I 
shall ever be a good Whig in England” and a constant opponent of passive 
obedience.16  To men like Sacheverell, Charles Leslie, and readers of the Rehearsal, 
such a statement only confirmed what they already believed to be true: deists were 
Whigs and Whigs encouraged heresy. 
 In his contribution to the Sacheverell controversy, Matthew Tindal argued 
that High-Churchmen were becoming Presbyterian in their principles and 
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 arguments.  That is, the same High-Churchmen who had previously preached 
passive obedience to the monarch were now seemingly advocates of an 
ecclesiastical government based on a system of presbyteries.  Tindal was amazed 
that this seemed to be the case, because if “any thing had been fix’d, one would 
have thought it had been the Aversion of High-Church to Presbyterian Principles, 
both with relation to Church and State….”17  Following the Revolution of 1689, 
“the Clergy have sworn to defend and assist; and consequently without direct 
Perjury, can’t claim any Power but what is deriv’d from the Crown.”  However, in 
what was likely only the first sortie in the form of Sacheverell’s sermon, this 
promise had been abandoned by many High-Churchmen who wished a government 
in which “the Magistrates as well as the People were as much subject in all Church 
Matters to the Jurisdiction of the Clergy, as they were to him in all Temporal 
Things.”18  Thus, Tindal asserted that High-Churchmen—among those he included 
his former Oxford tutor George Hickes (1642-1715)—were traitors to the peace 
delivered by William and Mary.19   
 Sacheverell himself responded to both the clamour his sermon had caused 
and his impeachment by the House of Lords in March 1710.  He called himself “an 
Insignificant Tool of a Party…,” specifically of the Whigs who had used his words 
for their own gain against the Tories.  Moreover, Sacheverell defended his sermon 
by claiming that it was no different than those spoken by “Our First Reformers” 
who wished to correct what they viewed as a Church that had lost its way.20  His 
apology also replied to critics, like the anonymous writer mentioned earlier.  No 
sincere Christian, Sacheverell wrote, could have taken offence at what he directed 
“against Hypocrites, Socinians, Deists, and such as, under the Umbrage of That Act, 
which permits Protestant Dissenters, and those Only to serve God, every Man in his 
Own way, think themselves at Liberty to be of no Protestant Congregation, of no 
Religion at all.”21  The spectre of deism was indeed troubling to men like 
Sacheverell.   
Anthony Collins’ Freethinking God 
 Anthony Collins likewise entered into the political and religious debates 
during this year of controversy.  In A Vindication of Divine Attributes (1710) 
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 Collins—no doubt one of the authors Sacheverell had in mind when he composed 
his sermon—claimed the nature of God and providence was “one of the most 
difficult Questions in all Philosophy.”  Nevertheless, he believed that a “clear and 
distinct Method of Reasoning introduc’d by the new Philosophy, has quite alter’d 
the face of things….”  God was known through his attributes from which Collins 
derived the following description: “an Eternal, Immaterial, infinitely Perfect Being; 
and more particularly that he is infinitely Wise, Powerful, Just and Good.”  One 
knew that this was the nature of God not from Scripture but from observing “the 
Parts of the Universe.”22  For Collins, the Creation demonstrated the being of God 
through an argument from design: our idea of God must be agreeable with the 
“Truth of things, and conformable to the real Nature of the Being whose Existence 
is propos’d to be prov’d.”23  Deists and their critics referred to this version of natural 
theology taken to the extreme as Natural Religion.  Through Natural Religion one 
knew all the dictates of Christianity and the demands of God from reason and the 
operation of nature.  If we have an idea of God as just and good, as Collins believed 
is evident from Creation, God must actually be just and good.  Because the 
predictable natural order of things reveals a consistent God, there is no need of 
priests, or divine revelation.24   
Critics of Collins like the philosopher and future Bishop of Cloyne, George 
Berkeley (1685-1753) challenged Collins’ picture of a benevolent God by arguing 
that it belittled “the being of God,” and denied “Him to be an observer, Judge, and 
rewarder of human actions….”25  For Berkeley, God as a dispenser of rewards or 
punishments, was the foundation of correct Christian behaviour because one would 
not live a moral life without fear of divine retribution.  An anonymous review of 
Collins’ work in later years appearing in the Grub Street Journal, a weekly paper of 
political satire, described Collins as “a man of incredible self-love, and proneness to 
write; and full of petulance, which somewhat enlivens his writings, and many 
mistake for wit….”  What is more, the author saw Collins’ purpose as none other 
than “a means to settle infidelity upon a sure and lasting basis.”26   
 Though not precisely connected to the Sacheverell affair, Collins’ Priestcraft 
in Perfection and its subsequent defence, both composed in 1710, must be seen as 
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 part of the reaction to it.  Indeed, the tone of the two works closely parallels that 
taken by Toland and Tindal.  Collins used Priestcraft in Perfection to attack those 
who claimed that the Church of England and its priests held the final say in 
controversies of faith.  Against this position, Collins accused them of following the 
dubious pattern set by Continental papists.27  Restriction of faith and enforcement of 
official doctrine was, Collins asserted, something one expected in Catholic countries 
and not Protestant ones, certainly not in a nation which saw itself at the head of 
Protestantism.   
This Catholic behaviour had, Collins suggested, crept into the Church 
through deliberate forgery and subterfuge by inserting a false article into the Thirty-
nine Articles of the English Church.28  Exposing this ill-founded article, Collins 
proudly stated, “cannot be a nobeler Service to our most excellent and pure Church 
… nor a greater honour done to the memory of our glorious Reformers….”29  He 
then proceeded to remind readers that the Articles were established during 
Convocation in 1562 and subsequently revised at Convocation held in London in 
1571.  After relating the content of the true Articles, Collins questioned the 
legitimacy of the Twentieth Article: “the Church hath a power to decree Rites and 
Ceremonys, and Authority in Controversys of Faith.”  In spite of the fact that it had 
been included in all printed editions of the Articles since 1617, Collins called it “a 
perfect Forgery,” which had “never pas’d either the Convocation of 1562 or the 
Convocation of 1571 nor was it … ratify’d by Parliament.”30  For Collins who 
argued the necessity of government by the consent of those who were governed, the 
insertion of an arbitrary article which was not accepted by the people of England, 
through their elected representatives, was a sure sign of a design to limit freedom in 
the nation.   
As proof of his accusations, Collins claimed to be in possession of two 
different editions of the Articles from the sixteenth-century neither of which 
contained the infamous Twentieth Article.  Supported by these documents, which 
likely were copies of the articles actually passed by Convocation, Collins 
concluded: “how uncertain Tradition is…” in matters of religion.  Any appeal to 
tradition alone was the refuge of those who wished to control the belief of another: 
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 “If Priests are capable of venturing to forge an Article or Religion, and mankind are 
so stupid as to let them have success, how can we receive Books of Bulk (such as 
the Fathers and Councils) that have gone thro their hands…?”  Reason and free-
thinking, as Collins would later argue, were thus the only rightful tools one ought to 
use to determine the truth of a religious doctrine; anything else must be discarded.31  
As he explained, “Let Religion (which signifys Man’s Duty to God) stand on those 
Reasons which must of Course occur to every body, without the assistance of 
Forgery from the Priests….”  There was only one theologian from England’s past 
whom Collins believed had advanced a true notion of religion: William 
Chillingworth (1602-1644).32  In 1638 Chillingworth had published The Religion of 
Protestants, a Safe Way to Salvation, in which he anticipated an approach to faith 
which our deists embraced some seventy years later: God communicated all 
doctrines needed for salvation in clear terms, which are understandable by 
everyone.33  Collins believed his work followed this same path. 
The backlash against Priestcraft in Perfection was severe.  Many refutations 
asserted that Collins’ goal was to demonstrate that the Church of England was 
founded on neither recorded tradition nor God’s providence.  In the face of this 
reaction, Collins composed Reflections on a Late Pamphlet, Intitled Priestcraft in 
Perfection (in the third person) to silence his critics.  As he explained “The Author 
… has taken a great deal of pains to prove that the clause of the Churches Power 
was not contained in the imprinted Books of Articles….”  What was more, English 
law recognised only those Articles which were “agreed by the Archbishops, and 
Bishops … in the year of our Lord God 1562….”34  The only doctrines contained in 
the legitimate Articles were those addressing “the true Christian Faith and the 
Doctrine of the Sacraments,” and no “Articles relation to such Doctrines as were not 
Fundamental or the Essence of Christian Faith….”35  Nothing in the Articles 
sanctioned by Parliament, submitted Collins, contained any statements regarding the 
supposed authority of the Church over the faith held by individuals in England and 
their consciences.   
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 Atterbury and the Nonjuror Response to Collins 
Following the release of these two works by Collins there was an 
orchestrated Nonjuror and High-Church response.36  The architect of the challenge 
was Francis Atterbury who had dedicated many hours to a reply.  Also involved 
were a circle of Nonjurors associated with Sir Thomas Thynne, First Viscount of 
Weymouth (d. 1714).  Though the work was never published, the events 
surrounding it remain important because they are closely associated with the 
aftermath of the Sacheverell affair and reveal the eagerness of Nonjurors to answer 
deists.  After the trial in which Sacheverell was found guilty but given a lenient 
punishment, he toured England and encouraged many addresses which asserted 
Tory passive obedience.37  Fresh from his frustration with Tindal’s actions in 
Oxford, William Bromley wrote enthusiastically to Atterbury on the resurgence of 
High-Church sentiment around the University: “Our ringing of bells in this 
neighbourhood, and particularly at Coventry, began yesterday, and has continued all 
this day and evening.  Lord Leigh has fired his guns three times … as part of Dr. 
Sacheverell’s entertainment.”  Bromley himself benefited from the change of 
political climate.  He would be elected again to Commons and subsequently (on 23 
November 1710) to the post of Speaker.38
During the autumn of 1710 Atterbury wrote to George Harbin (fl. 1713), 
author of several pro-jacobite tracts, in addition to being chaplain and librarian to 
Viscount Weymouth,39 to make initial plans for the reply to Collins: “If you shall be 
within, Saturday in ye Even, about 7 a Clock, or if You will be so kind as to call  … 
Ill either wayt upon you at my Ld Weymouth’s, or meet … as You shall Appoint; 
being very desirous of a quarter of an hour Conversation with You.”40  After the 
meeting, Harbin wrote to Atterbury relating his support for the project.  Atterbury 
replied with thanks and continued, “There is no good man I believe in ye Kingdom 
that has not a feeling sense of my Lord Weymouth’s Afflictions.”41  Weymouth, 
who owned an estate at Longleat, Wiltshire, had sworn an oath to William and 
Mary, but nevertheless supported many Nonjurors.  Upon the accession of Anne he 
was made a privy Councillor and on 12 June 1702 appointed joint Commissioner of 
the Board of Trade and Plantations.  He retired from the Board in 1707, but 
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 continued in politics behind the scenes by supporting High-Church Tories.42  
Though not explicitly involved in the work, Weymouth provided a location for 
several of the planning sessions.  In the letter, Atterbury requested that Harbin 
contact Mr Walton, Rector of Polster in Wiltshire, for “ye printed book of ye Articles 
in Latin A.D. 1571 as he supposes.  It may [be] of great use towards clearing 
matters” brought about by “ye Reflections on Priestcraft &c.”  The challenge issued 
by Collins would require “The Helps from all Hands … & shall be then fully 
acknowledg’d.”  To wit Atterbury advised Harbin that he was waiting “upon Dr. 
Jenkins for yr Books.”43  Robert Jenkin, DD (1656-1727), Fellow of St. John’s 
Cambridge, was a nonjuror who received a DD around 1709 and shortly thereafter, 
was living in the home of Weymouth.44   
The reply continued to take shape, though not always smoothly.  Atterbury 
wrote in frustration to Harbin, “I intend to wayt upon my Lord on Thursday at 
Noon.  If that Time should happen to be improper, ye Fault will be Yours & not 
mine.  Wch all there have ye pleasure of seeing You & till then shall add no 
more….”45  A short time later, Atterbury related that advertisements for the 
forthcoming refutation were composed and ready for the press: “After wch no Delay 
shall be used, but ye Work immediately set about.”  Eager to finish the book, 
Atterbury told Harbin that “Any Saturday, or Monday (except ye next.) I will meet 
You….”46  Unfortunately for Atterbury, life interrupted his zeal for retribution: his 
wife and other family members had “been dangerously ill.”47
The end of the project came due to lethargy and with the appearance of 
Hilkiah Bedford’s The Hereditary Right of the British Crown (1710) which 
defended the Nonjuror position.  Atterbury was keen to see Bedford’s book and 
requested Harbin determine when it “will certainly come out.”  Harbin seemed to 
have lost his initial enthusiasm for the reply to Collins.  Atterbury wrote him to 
question why “I have called more than once at Lord Weymouth’s without finding 
You.  I should be glad to learn from you, or Dr. Jenkyns, how long tis expected the 
Books” detailing the sixteenth-century Convocations will arrive and “when I may be 
allowed to take them into my hands.”  Until this occurred, the reply to Collins 
would be stalled.  Moreover, should Harbin perchance meet Bedford, Atterbury 
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 would be pleased to enjoy a visit from him and to see “an old Book or two wch he 
cites….”48  Harbin did obliged Atterbury with a visit.  However, the design had not 
proceeded and was to end shortly.49  In the last letter concerning the matter, 
Atterbury related to Harbin that he had shown Bedford all the material gathered thus 
far.  After a discussion with Bedford, who was about to be tried and ultimately 
imprisoned for The Hereditary Right,50 and noting some similarities in argument 
between that book and his forthcoming one, Atterbury had second thoughts about 
proceeding.  Though he did advise Harbin that he still would like to see the “ye 2 
Books of 1571” and, hoped after his trip to Cambridge to “find You in S. James’s 
Square at my Return towards ye Close of next Week.  If not, I could wish for a few 
hours with you some time in Saturday, or Sunday; & perhaps on yt former of those 
days I may call upon you.  I will, if I can.”51  Thus, the reply to Collins simply faded 
away. 
Toland’s Attempt to Restore His Relationship with Harley 
 The election of 1710, which followed the Sacheverell affair, returned a Tory 
majority.  Harley’s star was again on the rise: Queen Anne made him Chancellor of 
the Exchequer and later Lord Treasurer after creating him Earl of Oxford.  He had 
gained the Queen’s ear through his new-found belief that government had to be 
above the party divides which had caused the Sacheverell affair.  This stance, 
however, did not prevent the removal of Whigs from the government.52  While he 
had publicly lamented the Sacheverell affair, Toland seized the opportunity these 
events provided and wrote a letter of support to his former patron.  From Leiden, 
Toland sent “Congratulations on Harley’s happy return to the management of affairs 
and the disgrace of his enemies, confidently predicted and wished for by the 
writer.…”53  After waiting a little less than a year with no improvement in his 
situation, Toland reminded Harley, now Earl of Oxford, that “It were strange if a 
person of my liberal education and experience in foreign Courts (to mention no 
other qualifications) should not be found useful in some things to so learned as well 
as so politic a Minister, to whom I have been gaining all the credit abroad that was 
possible.”54   
 111
 By December 1711 Toland wrote with a stronger tone of urgency and worry 
that Harley believed reports of his supposed misconduct on the Continent.  Toland 
worried that he had been “abandoned as it were in my greatest need, makes me fear 
that either your Lordship has received some sinister impression against me in a town 
so abounding with scandal, or that you are under a necessity from some quarter or 
other to throw me quite off.”  If this was not the case, Toland urged Harley to “rid 
me of these doubts this evening.”55  Harley replied with concern over reports of 
Toland’s actions and associations on the Continent; specifically, the rumours that 
Toland was making statements against the proposed peace with France which would 
end the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13).56   
In spite of Toland’s belief that Harley shared his view that government 
without party distraction was most desirable, events and rivalry forced Harley’s 
hand in another direction.  From at least 1708 Tories grew tired of Marlborough’s 
land war and encouraged a naval policy.  They also wished to scale back, if not end 
outright, England’s participation in the war effort even if it meant abandoning the 
Grand Alliance against France.  Conversely, Whig politicians cried for “no peace 
with Spain,” meaning there should be no treaty until French troops were driven out 
of Spain.  In addition to this pressure, Harley battled for government leadership with 
Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751), who was supported by the High-
Church Tories and who pressed Harley into a more conservative platform.57  As a 
consequence of these factors, Harley opened secret negotiations with Louis XIV in 
late 1711 designed to end England’s participation in the war.  When details of the 
negotiations broke, perhaps leaked by Bolingbroke, the Duke of Marlborough 
became furious.  The motion to support the peace without securing Spain barely 
passed the House of Lords.  In January 1712 Anne created twelve new peers who 
would vote for the Treaty of Utrecht when the time came in 1713.58   
Against this background, Toland wrote to Harley on 7 December 1711.  
After claiming not to know who had revealed his distaste for the government’s plans 
with France, Toland conceded to Harley that “I am sure that all my acquaintances 
are unanimous in their sentiments” against the proposed peace “and much less any 
peace that gives up Spain and the Indies to a Prince of the house of Bourbon, or to 
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 any French Prince whatsoever.”  Toland continued that his only true friend in this 
matter was “the house of Hanover.”  Careful not to specifically scold Harley, 
Toland asked him to “consider whether it be advisable in any ministry to carry on a 
thing so perfectly disgusting to the next successor?”59  Among the potential 
members of the Grand Alliance who would be left to battle the French alone were 
the German allies, led by Prince George of Hanover.  The prince feared that a 
separate peace between England and France meant an end to the Hanoverian 
Succession and the proclamation of James III as King of England.60  To dissuade 
these fears, Toland suggested that Harley “ought to dispatch me privately this 
minute to Hanover; where you’ll find me as secret, as I hope to be successful … to 
clear up some things there … inseparable from that family….”61  Much to Toland’s 
chagrin Harley ignored his volunteer role in international diplomacy. 
Reaction to Ending the War of Spanish Succession 
 Toland was not the only member of his circle dissatisfied with the measures 
the government undertook to end the War of the Spanish Succession.  His fellow 
Irishman and part-time benefactor Robert Molesworth thought England’s actions 
reprehensible.  Molesworth confided to his wife that “our peace, I doubt, is a bad 
one, as I look upon any to be, which leaves Spain and the Indies in French hands, so 
that I am upon all accounts very disconsolate.”  To ease his melancholy, 
Molesworth had “invited and [was] promised the company of Dr. Tindal for 2 
months.”  Little less than two months later Molesworth’s expectation was fulfilled.62 
Molesworth was, according to Caroline Robbins, “the most widely quoted and 
probably the most influential of the liberal Whigs, in his lifetime and for a 
considerable time thereafter.”  He had come to notice after 1688 when he and his 
associates worked to ensure the promises of the Revolution came to fruition.  On the 
request of William III, Molesworth travelled to Copenhagen to secure Danish troops 
for the Seven Years War against France.  Political appointments continued to find 
Molesworth: he served in Anne’s Privy Council and with the Board of Trade and 
Plantations under George I.  Upon his return from Denmark, Molesworth was 
dismayed with the lack of public engagement in political matters in England.  He 
composed Account of Denmark (1694) to outline what he saw as the correct form of 
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 a commonwealth.  The similarity of his politics to that of Toland and Tindal ensured 
that the three men associated.  Molesworth met Toland through Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, third Earl Shaftesbury and knew Tindal by reputation by at least 1697, 
though the letter to his wife indicates a closer relationship.63
 While he was in Naples to ease the strain asthma placed on his constitution, 
the third Earl Shaftesbury kept a close eye on events in England.  He also continued 
his association with our deists, especially Anthony Collins.  Writing on 12 January 
1712 to Pierre Coste (1668-1747), Huguenot refugee and tutor of his son, Milford 
Ashley Cooper, Shaftesbury told Coste that the visit paid to Milford was 
appreciated.  Shaftesbury further thanked Coste for introducing Milford to Collins: 
“I return him in my own and Lord Ashley’s name many kind acknowledgements 
and have no better wish for Lord Ashley than that he may hereafter gain him for a 
friend, and imitate his Vertue, Worth, and public Spirit, &c.”64  Despite Collins’ 
reputation, which was soon to explode with his Discourse of Free-Thinking, 
Shaftesbury viewed him as a suitable companion for his son.  Indeed, in another 
letter also sent in 1712, Shaftesbury referred to Collins as “my worthy friend.”65   
 Toland began 1712 the same way he had ended 1711, with repeated requests 
for Harley’s patronage.  He asserted that Harley’s reputation as a supporter of the 
Hanoverian succession was being eroded by enemies.  After suggesting a model for 
the composition of board members for Harley’s recently commissioned South Sea 
Company (an equal division of Whigs and Tories to “silence all clamours”), Toland 
offered to secure Harley’s character abroad. 
Yet there are a thousand ways, to which I am no stranger, whereby you may 
provide for me, and make me not a little useful to your Lordship, as well as 
easy to myself.  Two hundred pounds a year, quarterly paid, is the utmost I 
expect, and for which I want nothing but your commands to do acceptable 
service.  Besides anything of this nature by my tongue or pen at home, I 
observe you are in many things very ill served abroad.  Do but order me, and 
I shall soon convince you what I can draw from the Hague, from Hanover, 
from Berlin, Dusseldorf, and Vienna; and what in all those places I can 
diffuse.66
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 Also volunteering to spy in his name, Toland hoped that this would finally secure 
the position from Harley he coveted.  The outcome was predictable: Harley ignored 
Toland and ended whatever relationship still existed between them. 
 Toland’s political posturing attracted Jonathan Swift’s satirical pen.  T—l—
nd’s Invitation to DISMAL, to Dine with the Calves-Head Club was a single sheet 
polemical poem composed on 29 January 1712.  It began, “If, dearest Dismal, you 
for once can Dine / Upon a single Dish, and Tavern Wine, / T—l—nd to you 
Invitation sends, / To eat the Calves-Head with your trusty Friends.”  Swift 
continued with a communion metaphor “The Meat shall represent the TYRANT’s 
Head, / The Wine, his Blood, our Predecessors shed: / Whilst an alluding Hymn 
some Artist sings, / We toast Confusion to the Race of Kings: / At Monarchy we 
nobly shew our Spight, / And talk what Fools call Treason all the Night.”  Included 
among the members of this club were famous Whigs, whom Swift presented as 
Toland-like republicans in an attempt to colour the entire party as radicals.67  As the 
poem makes clear, Whigs were to be seen as deists and the Tories for whom Swift 
wrote were the only party devoted to England’s best interest both religious and 
secular.   
The Discourse of Free-Thinking 
 In 1713, England signed the Treaty of Utrecht, William Wake hoped for 
peace in the Church of England, and Anthony Collins released his most famous 
book, A Discourse of Free-Thinking.68  This was likely no coincidence with the 
Tories feeling confident and Sacheverell having escaped with a slap on the wrist.  
To a thinker like Collins it seemed the religious climate in England was about to 
become very cool indeed to notions of toleration and freedom of thought.  He 
reminded readers of the dangers that resulted from repressive control of religion; the 
cure for which was free thinking: “Free-Thinking is upon experience the only proper 
means to destroy the Devil’s Kingdom among Men; whose Dominion and Power is 
ever more or less extensive, as Free-Thinking is discourag’d or allow’d….”69  
Collins argued that the perception of Satan’s activity in the world increased 
proportionally to the decline in freethinking.  He then turned to history to encourage 
readers to bear in mind that during the reign of Charles I it was common to think 
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 “that many People … were obsess’d and posses’d by the Devil….”  This acceptance 
of supernatural corruption in England could be proven since “great numbers of 
Witches have been almost annually executed in England … when upon the Liberty 
given and taken to think freely, the Devil’s Power visibly declin’d….”70  The rise in 
reason and the decline in superstition had lasted in the nation until very recently.  
Collins thought political events conspired to bring demons, witches, and Satan back 
into the collective mind of Britons in order to fortify the declining position of 
bigoted priests.  Since “the Reign of Dr. Sacheverel, when the Clamour against 
Free-Thinking began to be loudest, the Devil has again resum’d his Empire, and 
appears in the shape of Cats, and enters into confederacy with old Women….”71  
Collins also noted that, in Sacheverell’s speech delivered at his trial, he stated that 
passive obedience to authority was the only way to remain consistent and in good 
standing with the Church of England.72  Such a view was the very antithesis of the 
deist position. 
 The Discourse of Free-Thinking further articulated Collins’ thoughts on God 
and divine nature.  Like Toland, he believed that if “the Knowledge of some Truths 
be requir’d of us by God; … then we have a right to know, or may lawfully know 
any Truth.”73  Divine goodness, according to Collins, ensured that people would 
have access to these things.  This was the case because “God being incapable of 
having any addition made either to his Power or Happiness, and wanting nothing, 
can require nothing of Men for his own sake, but only for Man’s sake….”74  God 
acted only for the benefit of humanity though not everyone accepted or 
acknowledged this.  Some, whom Collins identified as “Superstitious men,” were 
not content with this description of God preferring instead to believe in “God as 
demanding.”75  Free-Thinking sought to correct this view.  In his criticism of 
Collins, William Whiston took issue with this characterisation.  Whiston claimed 
that “We have here Superstition and Religion perpetually confounded; nay, Timor 
Deorum is rendered The Fear of God, and is made the Definition of Superstition.”76  
Like Berkeley, Whiston countered that fear of God led to morality because where no 
fear existed, one had no motive for morality.  What is more, Whiston argued that 
Collins’ broad label of Superstitious believers coloured in a poor light “Embracers 
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 of true Religion, which consists in the Love and Fear of God, the Dependence on his 
Providence, the Hopes of his Rewards, and the Dread of his Punishments in this and 
the other World.…”77
God asked only that people sought truth, which He did not cloak in mystery.  
That people did not know this to be the case was the fault of priests, whom Collins, 
like Toland, accused of creating confusion and mystery in religion.  Priests could 
not, Collins claimed, lead people to truth in religion because it would undermine 
their authority.  As further defence of their place in institutional religion, priests 
decried as heretics and atheists those who attempted to determined for themselves a 
true path in religion.78 Robert Wodrow (d. 1734), Scottish minister and Kirk 
historian, though he did not endorse Collins’ philosophy, partially approved of 
Discourse of Free-Thinking arguing that it exposed those who sought to impose 
religious conformity.79  Conversely, Richard Steele, Whig propagandist, used his 
own political newspaper, the Guardian, to take Collins to task.  Steele argued that 
Collins had “the most apparent Prejudice against a Body of Men, Whom of all other 
a good man would have been most careful not to violate, I mean Men in Holy 
Orders.  Persons who have devoted themselves to the Service of God….”80  It was 
just this sort of admiration that Collins sought to eliminate. 
Free-Thinking and Natural Philosophy 
In his Discourse of Free-thinking, Collins suggested that new philosophical 
methods and discoveries heralded the beginning of an age in which the true nature 
of God as good, just, and a dispenser of knowledge, would be accepted.  The 
“Restoration of Learning” encouraged Collins’ optimism.  Before this instauration 
when  
Men were subject to the Impositions of Priests, a prodigious Ignorance 
prevail’d.  And when they began to think, their first Notions were rude and 
imperfect, and Time and Pains were necessary to bring them to that degree 
of Justness they are at Present.  It was by gradual Progress in Thinking, that 
Men got so much knowledge in Astronomy, as to know that the Earth was of 
an ordicular Figure, and that it moves about the Sun.  It was by that means, 
that we arriv’d at a Demonstration of the Existence of but one God, and at 
that strict and Philosophical Notion of him, as a Being destitute of all Parts 
and Passions.  And thus it has been with respect to all our other 
Discoveries.81
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The true nature of the universe became known when people were able to cast aside 
superstition; the true nature of God would similarly be known.  Natural philosophy 
served as an example of what a freethinking mind might accomplish.  Collins asked 
what “Absurditys prevail’d in Morality, Astronomy, Natural Philosophy, and every 
other Science,” prior to the advance of freethinking?  In one of the earliest 
articulations of conflict between science and religion, Collins considered the case of 
Galileo who “in the last Age, was imprison’d for asserting the Motion of the Earth.  
In short, for a Picture of antient Absurditys, a Man need but examine any one now-
a-days who has never thought freely of things, and he will ever find him unable to 
advance one word of Truth in any matter of Science whatsoever….”82  For asserting 
something that Collins and his contemporaries knew to be a fact, namely the orbit of 
the Earth, the Italian mathematician was placed under house arrest.  The fate of 
Galileo was a prime example of freethought restricted by priests. 
At least one critic, however, saw Collins’s linking of freethinking to natural 
philosophy as “a most dangerous piece” which had much in common with alchemy.  
A generation earlier alchemy had once informed the natural philosophies of Boyle 
and Newton.  By the eighteenth century alchemy was something to ridicule.  A 
correspondent wrote to Robert Wodrow to suggest that freethinking was “nothing 
better than the delusions of the pretenders to seek the philosopher’s-stone….”83   
 Richard Bentley, the classical scholar, chaplain to Stillingfleet, and promoter 
of an apologetic purpose in Newton’s work, strongly refuted Collins’ description of 
freethinking and its supposed benefits.  Bentley argued that the “free” in 
freethinking was thinly veiled cover for what Collins had really meant: “Which in 
fact will be found to carry much the same Notion as Bold, Rash, Arrogant, 
Presumptions, together with a strong Propension to the Paradox and the Perverse.”  
Like critics of Toland, Bentley believed that Collins had equated the human mind 
with God’s.  As Bentley put it, Collins was attempting to “decide about Matters 
beyond the reach of [his] Studies, in opposition to the rest of Mankind.”84  What 
was more, Bentley defined what he viewed as the true dictates of freethinking: 
“Christianity an imposture, the Scripture a forgery, the Worship of God superstition, 
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 Hell a fable, and Heaven a dream, our Life without providence….”85  For his efforts, 
Bentley received several letters of thanks and a special Grace from the University of 
Cambridge.  In part the certificate stated that he performed as “eminent service to 
the Christian Religion, and the Clergy of England, by refuting the objections and 
exposing the ignorance of an impious set of writers, that call themselves 
Freethinkers—May it please you that the said Dr. Bentley, for his good service 
already done, have the public thanks of the University.”86
 Despite the charges of theologians like William Carroll, rabid critic of 
Locke’s philosophy, who argued that Collins’ view of God undermined divine 
power and choice,87 Collins continued to explore God’s nature.  Collins also 
identified the ability to obtain knowledge of God as analogous to gaining knowledge 
in natural philosophy.  The key in both enterprises was distinct ideas, a position no 
doubt gained from his frequent contact and correspondence with his friend Locke.88  
“When we use the term GOD,” Collins wrote, “the Idea signify’d thereby, ought to 
be as distinct and determinate in us, as the Idea of a triangle or a square is, when we 
discourse of either of them; otherwise, the term GOD is an empty sound.”89  This 
was not easy.  Collins conceded, “I would not hereby be thought to suppose, that the 
Idea of GOD is an adequate Idea, and exhausts the subject it refers to … or that it is 
easy to form in our Minds … or that it does not require a great comprehension of 
Mind to bring together the various Idea’s that relate to GOD … All these I grant.”90  
Despite the difficulty, a correct notion of God was possible; one achieved this 
notion by thinking freely.  Collins asked why thinkers who depicted God as a 
mystery even bothered to write about Him: “For why did he write before he had a 
meaning; or before he was able to express to others what he meant?”91  As he had 
done before, Collins turned to natural philosophy:  
When such great men as GASENDUS, CARTESIUS, CUDWORTH, 
LOCKE … Sir ISAAC NEWTON … treat of the most profound questions in 
metaphysicks, mathematicks, and other parts of philosophy; they by 
handling them as far as their clear and distinct ideas reach’d, have written 
with no less perspicuity to their proper readers, than other authors have done 
about historical matters….92
 
 119
 Each of the philosophers was able to make their respective advancements by first 
obtaining “clear and distinct” ideas of their subjects.  In the same way, the nature of 
God remained unknowable to those who refused to accept that distinct ideas of God 
were possible: God never hid from those who sought Him.93   
The Dangers of Publishing Discourse of Free-Thinking 
Collins was abroad prior to, and immediately after, the publication of A 
Discourse of Free-Thinking.  Some contemporaries suggested that Collins feared the 
reception of the book and made himself scarce as result.  In an anonymous 
manuscript life of Collins it is claimed that he “went into Holland [at] ye beginning 
of ye year 1712 … because of his enemies” who would be angered by the impending 
publication.94  This story must have gained much currency in England because after 
Collins died his friend of twenty-six years, the Huguenot refugee Pierre 
Desmaizeaux (c.1673-1745), sent a corrective account to Thomas Birch in an 
attempt to defend his late friend’s reputation.  Having recently come across a 
“Memorandum among my papers” which explained Collins’ travel motives, 
Desmaizeaux sent this account to Birch.  Collins had been to Holland twice, once in 
“March 1711, and became acquainted with Mr. Le Clerc, and other learned men.—
He returned to London in November following … with a promise to his friends in 
Holland, that he would pay them a second visit in a short time.”  This promise and 
the fulfilment of it on “Jan. 2d, 1712” “shews how incredulous is the story that he 
went into Holland for fear, &c.”95
Though it turned out that Collins had nothing to fear from publishing his 
book, the same could not be said for some others who were involved in the printing 
and selling of the work.  The philosopher George Berkeley noted in a letter of 26 
January 1713 that “There is lately published a very bold and pernicious book 
entitled a Discourse of Free Thinking.  I hear the printer of it is put into 
Newgate….”96  The fallout from the book reached a bookseller on 10 April 1713 
when one John Baker was questioned among others “as to their knowledge of the 
authorship of certain pamphlets.”  A Discourse of Free Thinking figured 
prominently in the inquiry.97  Proceedings began on 4 June 1713 against Baker who 
claimed to have received the “Copy of the Book Intituled a discourse of ffree 
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 Thinking” after it was “left at this Deponents house by a strange Porter.”  Baker 
believed “Mr. Collins is the Author of the same” and therefore sought a second 
opinion on the book and its contents.  After receiving a favourable review of the 
book, Baker proceeded as he would with any other work.98  Despite Baker’s plea of 
ignorance as to the inflammatory nature of the Discourse of Free-Thinking, he lost 
the case.  A bid for clemency failed but the exact punishment Baker received is 
unknown.99
 Collins’ acknowledged the trouble his book might cause to those who sold it.  
In early 1717 he sent Desmaizeaux to London with some 130 copies of Discourse of 
Free-thinking to be sold by a bookseller whom he identified as Mr. Robinson.  
Desmaizeaux was to agree upon a price with Robinson and then what percentage 
would be reserved for Collins.  However, the author had an idea of what his book 
was worth.  “I think,” Collins counselled Desmaizeaux, that the bookseller, “ought 
to give me a shilling a piece for all he sells; and he may sell them for 15 pence a 
piece.  If you think both prices too dear for a book of ten sheets, you may set them 
lower.”100  Baker’s fate did not escape Collins’ notice because he cautioned 
Robinson “never to have above 3 or 4 of my Books of Freethinking to lye in his 
Shop at a time, and not to publish them in any publick manner.”101
Freethinking and Party Politics 
 When he did return to England in October 1713, Collins found himself 
attacked for his work and satirised by Swift.  As he had done with Toland, Swift 
presented Collins as spokesperson for the Whigs and the Discourse of Free-
Thinking as piece of Whig propaganda.102  Swift wrote in the persona of Collins and 
claimed to have simplified the original text so that it might be easily understood by 
all readers.  The result was a biting satirical account of both deism and politics.  
“Our party,” wrote Swift wrapped in his Whig guise, “having failed, by all their 
political arguments, to re-establish their power; the wise leaders have determined,” 
that the best strategy for gaining political power was through an attack on the 
established religion defended by the Tories.103   
Swift continued that “clergy, who are so impudent to teach the people the 
doctrines of faith, are all either cunning knaves or mad fools; for none but artificial, 
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 designing men, and crack-brained enthusiasts, presume to be guides to others in 
matters of speculation, which all the doctrines of Christianity are….”104  
Emphasising the extremity of Collins’ position, Swift noted that in opposition to 
knowing religion through the assistance of priests, “there ought to be no restraint at 
all on thinking freely upon any proposition, however impious or absurd.”  What was 
more, restricting any thought created the devil: “If you are apt to be afraid of the 
devil, think freely of him, and you destroy him and his kingdom.”  In the same way 
that free-thinking destroyed the prince of darkness and his armies, Sacheverell “has 
given him commission to appear in the shape of a cat, and carry old women about 
on broomsticks….”105  The devil was, therefore, a Tory creation and the tool by 
which they instilled fear and reliance upon priests in the English populace.  This 
was a particular sticking point for Swift who wished to defend the clergy from such 
perceived sedition.  He was also mindful of the charge Archbishop King had given 
him in 1711 that it was Swift’s duty as a DD to make useful contributions to his 
profession.106  Swift ended the book by claiming that the best freethinker, and by 
implication Whig, was he who denied the greatest number of these doctrines; thus, 
Swift painted Collins and Whigs as atheists.107
Start of the Hanoverian Age 
 The year 1714 witnessed the start of the Hanoverian age in England and also 
the end of whatever relationship still existed between Toland and Harley.  In The 
Grand Mystery Laid Open (1714), Toland wrote that the Protestant Succession was 
secured through the efforts of the entire nation.  The biggest threat to preserving 
Protestantism in England was the potential return of the Stuarts at the hands of the 
Jacobites.  Queen Anne’s promise to reward anyone who brought the “Pretender to 
Justice” demonstrated the seriousness of the risk.  The MPs in Commons and the 
peers in the House of Lords offered similar incentives to prevent a Stuart 
resurrection.108  Related to this worry were the efforts of High-Churchmen to divide 
Protestants and prevent them from offering a united front against the popish 
ambitions of the Pretender and a French Crown who wished to see England 
subsumed under a Papal see.  The only remedy to this current situation was an 
English Church that did not exclude any Protestants regardless of minor 
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 confessional differences.  This Church would be the “Bulwark of the Reformation,” 
and as such could resist “All the Emissaries of Rome, and the Tools of France, or 
the Pretender (chuse which you will)” who encourage the creation of tensions in the 
nation as prelude to invasion.109  Toland also stated that a real danger lay in 
allowing one MP, who had “the purse and the prerogative at his disposal,” to control 
the fate of the nation for the benefit of his party.110  Here Toland certainly meant 
Harley who had championed the peace with France in 1711-1712. 
 That same year (1714) Toland also published The Art of Restoring. Or, the 
Piety and Probity of General Monk In bringing about the Last Restoration in which 
he compared the end of the Cromwellian commonwealth with the present political 
situation with Harley standing in for George Monck (1608-1670).  So corrupt had 
government become that Toland claimed only one’s attitude towards the French 
identified him or her as a friend or enemy of England and of the Hanoverian 
succession: “Whig and Tory, High and Low Church, will often deceive you; Some of 
these being worse, as others are better, than the Maxims of their Party wou’d make 
them: but the now-mentioned Rule is ever infallible, and therefore he’s no Whig (let 
him call himself what he pleases) who any way consents to argue the Power or 
Riches of France….”111  The Jacobites lurked behind all current attempts to cast 
doubt upon the succession, Toland suggested.  Indeed, they were the only party in 
England who stood to benefit if James III ascended the throne.  For Toland the 
Treaty of Utrecht proved that Jacobite agents sat in the government.  He certainly 
had in mind Harley who had been in contact with the Pretender and who had been 
rumoured to agreed to reverse the Act of Settlement in Parliament if only the Stuart 
claimant would renounce Catholicism.112  Harley was showing his true Jacobite 
colours.  To Toland the Hanoverians were true defenders of Protestantism.  He 
further claimed the only support that Harley had for his platform was from “Irish 
Papists and Scottish Jacobites….”  Against this impending Catholic usurpation, 
Toland urged “every wise and generous Briton,” to “lay aside their insignificant 
Piques, and all unite for the Preservation of their RELIGION and LIBERTY, which 
entirely depend (under God) upon maintaining the SUCCESSION, as is establishe’d 
by so many Laws in the serene Electoral House of HANOVER.”113  While Toland 
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 abandoned Harley, his loyalty to Hanover remained strong, though ultimately 
without reward. 
 In contrast to observers like Toland, who saw the accession of the 
Hanoverians as desirable, others viewed George I as the end of the English Church.  
One Jacobite composed a poetic epitaph: “[U]nder this marble Stone Lyes Burried 
Mother Church / A mother truly venerable / … Stab’d by her own Children … She 
fel sick 1641 / Recover’d 1660 / Relaps’d 1688 / Expir’d 1714 Augst  ye 1st / May 
she Lye in peace waiting / for a joyful Resurrection.”114  In another work the same 
author described the conditions by which the Church continued in its death and by 
which it might be saved: “How Long O ye God is’t Decreed / You’l be Deaf to my 
pittyful moan / That my Church and my children shall Bleed / And a fforeigner sit 
on my Throne.”  The solution was pure Jacobitism.  “The Only way to save us / And 
Keep our Church with Steeple / Is to Call in / our Rightful King / The father of his 
people / Let him come / Let him come / Let him Let him Let him come / here’s his 
health / here’s his health / Heaven send him quickly home.”115   
 These hopes appeared realised and then just as quickly crushed in 1715 
when the Earl of Mar had raised the Royal Standard in Scotland.  The English 
government was caught by surprise by this audacity, but then so too were English 
Jacobites who failed to organise into an effective rebellion.  More important, 
perhaps, to the impotence of the ’15 was the disinterestedness of the French regency 
established after the death of Louis XIV that same year.  Despite the military failure 
of the aborted attempt to secure James III on the British throne, the affair did ensure 
that fear of future Jacobite remained a powerful political tool for Whigs who could 
tar all their opponents as Jacobites.116
Toland’s State Anatomy 
 In the wake of the failed Jacobite coup, readers of the Postman in mid-
January 1717 learned that Toland had produced yet another work addressing 
contemporary politics.117  The State Anatomy of Great Britain. Containing a 
particular account of its several interests and parties, their bent and genius was a 
description of the political landscape in England; it offered unsolicited advice to 
George I on which of the two parties were likely to support his reign.  Remaining 
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 true to past descriptions of Hanoverian monarchs as best embodying the 
characteristics of an ideal government, Toland believed that, for George I, ensuring 
“the Happiness, Ease, and Prosperity of his people, shall be the chief care of his 
life.”118  To fulfil this potential, George needed to choose advisors and ministers 
who shared this vision.  The best candidates were Whigs who were “asserters of 
Liberty,” while the Tories were “abetors of Tyranny.”119  Toland then characterised 
the feelings that Nonjurors and many Tories held for foreigners including, of course, 
George I himself: “The Tories, … are bred with such antipathy to foreigners, that 
they know very little of them.”120
In explicit contrast to the Tory High-Churchmen, whom Toland argued 
brought divisions into the nation, he assured the new king that all variety of 
Dissenters, including deists, were faithful to him.  In spite of this, the Test Act still 
prohibited all but communicant Anglicans from any civil office.  Toland urged 
George I to consider that the Act was, in effect, “a Political Monopoly” designed to 
ban Dissenters from political office.  Those who supported the Act also cried 
“Church in Danger,” even though Dissenters were no religious threat, if even a 
political one.  Dissenters were Whigs and, by preventing their holding of major 
positions, the Tories and High-Churchmen ensured these positions for 
themselves.121  Ironically, Toland asked readers to consider that the real threat to 
England came from the very people who claimed to safeguard its religion: “Of all 
dangers to the Church of England, much the greatest arises from Forswearers and 
the Nonswearers [Nonjurors].”122  How could the monarch trust any who refused to 
swear allegiance to him while at the same time holding fast to oaths given to the 
Stuarts who would make England a Catholic state if given the chance?  Toland’s 
arguments attracted many readers, both supporters and critics; within a month of its 
initial release advertisements alerted potential buyers that the eighth edition was 
ready for sale.123   
Toland’s fear over Nonjurors, Tories, and the potential spread of 
Catholicism was a timely one.  During early 1717 government ministers received 
several reports concerning potential subversives.  Robert Walpole (1676-1745), 
First Lord Treasury, heard from one correspondent that “there is mischief a working 
 125
 within this Kingdom….”  Walpole needed to be alerted that a group of English 
papists actively encouraged a Catholic government: “I humbly pray that all such 
wicked attempts may prove abortive and that our King and Constitution, may ever 
Remain in lastly under the Divine Protection.”124  James Stanhope (c.1673-1721) 
too received letters in late March and early April detailing Jacobite conspiracies.  
An anonymous author warned him that “many Jacobites … dayly Resort to Confere 
together about ye Pretender whom they call their Lawful King, I think it my Duty to 
inform your Honour….”125
Critics of Toland’s State Anatomy included Daniel Defoe who announced 
that his rebuttal had “anatomiz’d” Toland’s book.  Defoe, a constant opponent of 
deism, characterised Toland “as heterodox in Politicks, as he is in Religion.”126  
Among the dangers posed by Toland’s book, Defoe suggested the greatest was the 
call to open England to foreign Protestants who certainly would bring their various 
religions with them.  Defoe also doubted Toland’s claim to be a Christian.  Rather, 
he depicted Toland as a religious relativist who would have England allow “a 
Turkish Mosque in the City of London….”127  While Dissenters wished toleration 
for all Christians, Defoe believed, Toland exceeded this goal and “desire[d] 
Toleration for all Religions.”  This generosity, Defoe noted, did not extend to 
Catholics since Toland urged “we should root out Popery with all imaginable 
Diligence.”128  In addition to this contradiction, Defoe feared what a “Monster of 
Cruelty and Injustice would this Man make the Church of England!  The Truth is, 
the Differences are the greatest Moment that Differences not Doctrinal can be; and 
such as of which it must be said, they CANNOT be accommodated; no never.”  
Thus, the only purpose that Toland could have with this book, Defoe suggested, was 
to initiate “a treasonable Conspiracy against the Liberty, Safety, and Peace of the 
People of Great Britain.”  Until he died, Defoe continued to oppose the writings of 
men like Toland and Collins.129
 Toland replied to Defoe and his other critics with a second volume of The 
State Anatomy of Great Britain, which was ready for sale in early April 1717 along 
with the ninth edition of volume one.130  He claimed that the only purpose contained 
in the first volume was the following demonstration: “from what fallacies and 
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 mistakes, from what wrong principles and pestilent projects, proceeded all the 
opposition to his Majesty and his illustrious family….”  Those who challenged this 
goal, Toland labelled as nothing more than “Coffee-house-Politicians.”131  
Ironically, this had been a frequent assessment of Toland during his early years.  
Against his critics’ description of him, Toland assured readers that “none is more 
persuaded of RELIGION.  But I hate PREIESTCRAFT, and that is my crime.”  
While refusing to claim any denomination, and stating that everyone ought to 
“Safely enjoy his own,” Toland promised that a published description of his religion 
“what ever mine be” would appear in the near future.  Despite this elusiveness, 
Toland maintained that he was a “member of the National Church.”132  When he 
finally declared a confessional allegiance in 1720, the result was hardly 
enlightening: “Religion pure and perfect, as it was originally taught, without the 
corrupt additions and alterations of ignorant or interested persons, I both profess and 
recommend….”133  Even in moments of proclaimed clarity, Toland remained a 
mystery. 
Toland’s desire to appear congenial to George I and his new ministry is also 
revealed in his unpublished scheme to regulate English newspapers.  Though Toland 
had championed an unrestricted press in 1698, when it suited his purposes, 
defending George I—as the first Hanoverian king—was now more important.  It 
was, he suggested, time to “put the public Newspapers under some better 
regulation” especially after their attacks on the government and the king’s person.  
As many papers seemed to conceive themselves having a “special privilege, to the 
damage of the King and Subject,” Toland believed that guidelines must be 
established, not to end freedom of press but to halt seditious journalism.  To this 
end, he proposed an Act restricting periodical publishers to the use of licensed 
paper.  This Act, Toland proposed, would cease the “distracting plague of those 
Journals, which are the Scandal of this King George’s reign, in which they all had 
their rise to disturb, and to the best of their powers, to destroy it.”  Throughout the 
manuscript Toland repeated that he remained a defender of the free press, but the 
protection of the Protestant monarch had to come first.134
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Chubb and Newton’s Theology 
 The early reign of George I also saw Thomas Chubb emerge as a proponent 
of the views advanced by Toland, Tindal, and Collins.  Like Toland, Chubb too 
initially identified himself as “A Lay-Member of the CHURCH of England.”  The 
Supremacy of the Father Asserted (1715), Chubb’s first publication was designed to 
illuminate the Scriptural foundations of a unitarian theology.  The book was 
supported by Chubb’s then friend William Whiston who saw the manuscript 
through publication.  Chubb began by citing John 3.16 (For God so loved the world, 
that he gave his only begotten Son….) and from this passage concluded “The Son 
received his Being and Existence from the Father, as the first Supreme free Cause of 
that Being and Existence; consequently He is inferior and Subordinate to the 
Father….”135  He discussed various other biblical passages such as John 5.26 (For 
as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to hath life in himself.) 
leading readers to the same conclusion that the “Son is Inferior and Subordinate to 
the Father.”136
In later years Chubb found support for his unitarian views in the posthumous 
theological publications of Isaac Newton, particularly the works on chronology.  In 
his esteem of Newton’s effort in writing history, Chubb was not alone.  A 
contemporary review praised Newton’s work, stating that “the same judgement, 
accuracy and penetration, which distinguish all his other performances, are no less 
conspicuous in this.”137  Although much has been written on Newton’s theology, 
Chubb’s use of it (and as we will see, Thomas Morgan’s too) has been 
overlooked.138  After noting with admiration Newton’s “greatly superior skill in 
history, chronology, &c.,” Chubb briefly discussed Newton’s work on the context 
surrounding the prophecies in Daniel and concluded that nothing in the events 
described can support the notion of Jesus being the Messiah.139  Such a conclusion 
confirmed the fears of orthodox theologians who saw in Newton’s work sympathies 
towards Arianism and similar heresies.  As Arthur Young (1693-1759), future 
Prebendary of Canterbury (1746) and Vicar of Exning in Suffolk (1748) wrote of 
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 Newton’s theology: “I am so sorry to see Principles so favouring the Schemes of the 
Deists, with so great a name affix’d to them.”140
Chubb and Human Understanding 
 In a separate work published in 1718 Chubb described the state of human 
knowledge and God’s demands upon it: God did not leave people in a state of debt 
where salvation is concerned; humanity does not have to work off divine bonds.  
Rather, Chubb argued, God provided that “Justification is wholly of Grace, arising 
from the merciful Goodness of God, the Lawgiver; so this Favour is vouchsafed to 
obedient Believers….”141  Those who believed in the one true God did all that He 
required.  For Chubb, God would never make an impossible belief, or mysterious 
knowledge, necessary to religion or salvation.  He also described this image of God 
in his private correspondence.  In a letter to Dr Cox Macro, DD (1692-1752), future 
chaplain to George II, dated 6 October 1718, Chubb discussed this very issue.  
Referring to the authors of the New Testament, Chubb argued that they did not write  
by Divine Inspiration, according to the Vulgar Use of that Expression, that 
is, that the Minds and Pens of the Writers were not under such a Divine 
Movements in the Writings those Histories, and Epistloary Discourses, as 
that God immediately reveal’d to, and impress’d upon their Minds the 
Subject Matter contain’d in them, but only that they were written by honest 
and faithful Men, who were under a firm Belief and Expectation of a future 
Judgement and Retribution, and had that Divine Assistance which God 
affords to every honest Mind, and accordingly they did to the best of their 
Ability give an honest and faithful Account of Matters of Fact….142
 
The Apostles did not compose their histories with any special gift from God, rather 
they wrote with the same abilities granted everyone.143  Chubb addressed this again 
writing that the “Particulars of this good News were few and short, plain and easie 
to be understood, and which a man of Honesty and ordinary Capacity could not 
easily mistake.”144  Chubb knew that some might take offence at his picture of an 
open religion.  Mindful of this concern, and especially worried about what his 
acquaintance, the Newtonian Samuel Clarke, might think, he wrote again to Macro 
advising him that “if I am in any error in relation to that Subject of it I shall gladly 
receive information and retract it, when it appears to me.  If Dr. Clark has been 
misinformed be pleased to do me the favour to set him right.”145  We do not know if 
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 Macro pointed out any errors to Chubb, who published the letters virtually unaltered 
in 1734.146  Whereas Toland would antagonise Clarke, Chubb was friendly with the 
Anglican theologian.  This is yet another example of the diversity of deists. 
Collins’ Political Life in the Countryside 
 While Chubb was writing about the being of God in 1718, Collins had 
settled into life as a country gentleman in the County of Essex where he held the 
post of Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenant.  His decision to accept the 
further position of Treasurer of the County was greeted by the “great joy of Several 
Tradesmen,” who had been swindled by the previous Treasurer.  When Collins 
could not secure immediate repayment, he supported the most destitute of them 
“with his own private cash, others he promised interest for their money, till it cou’d 
be raised to pay them.  In the year 1722 the debts were all discharged … by his care 
and management in that affair….”147  The demands of public service prevented 
Collins from devoting more time to his public writings.  He wrote to Desmaizeaux 
requesting that a meeting between them and another man be postponed because “I 
am at present, and shall be for some time, so much engaged in publick business, as 
Justice of Peace and Commissioner of Taxes (which are settling always during the 
months of April and May) and as Treasurer of the County (an office that I have 
accepted of at the request of the Justices met at the last quarter sessions).”148
 Nevertheless, dedication to County business did not divert Collins’ attention 
entirely from the day’s theological and political dramas.  On 1 July 1717 he 
addressed the recent dispute surrounding the Bishop of Bangor, Benjamin Hoadly 
(1676-1761).  The Bangorian controversy had begun months earlier when the 
Bishop preached a strongly erastian sermon “My Kingdom is not of this world” 
before George I.  Contained in the sermon were repudiations of the claims posed by 
any earthly institution regulating the manner of worship most pleasing towards God 
and a denial of the authority of priests as sole interpreters of Christianity.149  The 
result was a pamphlet war in which Whigs and Tories, Low and High-Churchmen 
disputed the proper relationship between church and state resulting in the closing of 
Convocation (it would not met again until 1852), the very institution many Whigs 
believed had fanned the flames of the dispute.150
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 Commenting on these events, Collins advised Desmaizeaux that the real 
question underlying the controversy was the laity, the “Calves and Sheep of the 
Priests.”  Even though Hoadly had published a strong critique of his Discourse of 
Free-Thinking, Collins applauded the Bishop’s effort to remove the burden of 
priestly authority from England.151  It pleased Collins to see the clergy involved in a 
controversy treating one another “with ye same vile” contempt that they “always 
used towards the laity.”  Drawing on arguments he had made in published works, 
Collins hoped that these priestly actions would open the eyes of those who had 
doubted the arguments of his books.  Moreover, at the very least, some people might 
be convinced “that the Priests mean nothing but wealth & power and have not the 
least notion of those qualities for wch the superstitious world admired them.”152   
On matters of politics, Collins relied somewhat on the reports, which 
Desmaizeaux sent him from London.  “I return you thanks,” Collins wrote, “for 
your detail of Political news.  In return I can send you some from hence.  The 
country does nothing but attend business for the men of London.”153  Like other 
more traditional country gentlemen of his day, Collins seems to have been 
suspicious of the new moneyed men of London who generated their wealth through 
trading of stocks and investments, rather than the ownership of land.  Despite his 
clear Whig leanings, Collins associated with Country gentlemen.  On one occasion 
in late February 1718, the discussion concerned the bill renewing the Mutiny Act, 
which was certain to pass.  For his information, Collins relied on reports from 
Desmaizeaux and Toland, who was visiting Collins at that time.154  The matter at 
hand seemed to be some uncertainty posed by the implementation of the Act.  Chief 
among Tory concerns was the number of soldiers which would comprise the 
existing standing army and that an inserted clause making desertion punishable by 
death was unnecessary during peacetime.155  From Collins’ manuscripts it appears 
that some Tories also feared that soldiers might be billeted at their estates or turn 
poachers: “I met yesterday with Some Gentlemen of the Tory Party at a certain 
Lords house; whence upon my relating to them the progress made in the bill till 
Saturday night, one of them said What! then soldiers may come into our Parks and 
steal our Deer without being liable to be prosecuted at law &c?”  Eager to alleviate 
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 such fear, Collins replied that the gentleman had misunderstood the intent of the 
legislation.  The bill, Collins assured them, “had no relation to the matter suggested, 
that it repealed no law for the securing property; and then parted the case to them.  
My Lord did me the justice to say, he must confess the matter was as I had parted 
it.”  There were other persistent rumours regarding the Act, which Collins advised 
Desmaizeaux were propagated by “Inferior people.”  Speculation was rampant that 
“it is a bill to quarter the army upon the Tory Innkeepers.”156  It is not clear if 
Collins was able to halt this rumour as well.   
 Tory and Catholic grievances again found Collins’ ear in June 1718.  With 
the nation engaged in the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-20) military 
financing relied heavily upon the Land Tax.  Inhabitants of south-eastern counties 
such as Essex felt the burden of taxation more acutely than they had under previous 
systems of taxation such as Ship Money.  The problem was that rents derived from 
land did not rise as fast as did the demands of the Land Tax.  Consequently, the 
same piece of land produced less revenue for its owner than it had done in earlier 
years.157  Collins recorded that many Catholic Tories came to him complaining that 
they believed their assessments were “double according to the value entered in” past 
registries.  Catholics were indeed taxed at twice the regular rate as a punitive 
measure for not refuting their allegiance to the Pope.  Collins described these 
frustrated landowners as ready to abandon, in protest, the label of “Honest Quiet 
Harmless Poor Papists,” to which all Catholics had sworn following the ’15.  
Collins was unsure, however, what this threat to renounce the oath would actually 
mean for the nation.158   
Divisions in the Whig Party 
 As Collins was promoting Whig policies in the countryside, Whigs in the 
Commons were becoming divided.  In 1718 the party split badly over the direction 
that George I was taking England’s foreign policy particularly in the Baltic.  Siding 
with the monarch were the Lords Stanhope and Sunderland who now sat opposed by 
a faction led by Robert Walpole and his brother-in-law Charles Townshend (1674-
1738).159  Tindal publicly supported Sunderland and those who stayed close to 
George I.  In The Defection Consider’d, and the Designs of those who divided the 
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 Friends of the Government, set in a True Light (1718), Tindal chastised the 
Walpolean Whigs.  At first Tindal claimed he was reluctant to write about these 
affairs but a “due Regard for the Publick” had forced him to comment upon the “late 
Behaviour of certain Persons, whom, before I was very much esteem’d….”  Here 
Tindal means Walpole himself.160  Prior to the split, the Whigs were well placed to 
“promote the common Good.”  However, “to see Things take a quite different Turn, 
and the Hopes of good Men miserably frustrated, must provoke the Indignation of 
all….”161  Such defection only harmed the party and provided encouragement to 
Jacobites who “began to look on their Game as lost, and think it in vain any longer 
to strive against the Stream, have Now, their Hopes reviv’d, and are wonderfully 
elated; and ev’ry where declare, that the Whiggs will do That for them….”  A 
political house divided could not withstand the danger of Jacobites.  Thus, Tindal 
asserted that the opposition Whigs harmed both the party and the nation.162  
One Party by their Principles are for a Limited Monarchy in the House of 
Hanover, for the Church and Regal Supremacy, as by Law established; for 
Tolerating the Protestant Dissenters at Home … for Encouraging Trade, 
Manufacture, Industry, and every Thing that tends to the Publick Good.  The 
other Party, being by their Principles for Absolute Power in the Popish Line, 
are of Course Enemies to Liberty, Property, and the Protestant 
Religion….163
 
Tindal submitted to his readers that since the Whigs in defection no longer wished 
to be identified as Whigs, they must then be Tories.  If the Whigs were to survive 
this crisis, they must become “happy as to have such Leaders, who are as much 
above Fear … and inspires a whole Party.”164  Tindal meant Sunderland. 
 Collins too kept abreast of these political events in London.  He correctly 
predicted the outcome that followed the resignation of William Cowper (1649?-
1723) as Lord Chancellor, who joined Walpole’s Whigs in April: “Upon the news 
… my thoughts were immediately fixd on my Lord Parker; who (as I also hear from 
good hands) will certainly succeed him … unless he insists on too high terms.”165  
In May 1718, Sir Thomas Parker (Earl of Macclesfield, 1721) did indeed become 
Lord Chancellor and Keeper of the Great Seal.  Parker had a keen interest in 
learning—he initiated closer ties between Cambridge and George I—and held a 
reputation as a patron of worthy scholars.  Accordingly, Collins urged Desmaizeaux 
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 to contact Parker and, in June, Toland requested that Collins introduce him to 
Parker, a man it had “never been my good fortune to be known to” and whom he 
understood was a “solid philosopher.”166  During this same year Collins tracked and 
approved of the tactics England had employed in the War of the Quadruple 
Alliance.  The war had England siding with France against Spain in an attempt to 
preserve the peace reached with the Treaty of Utrecht.  Collins advised 
Desmaizeaux that the Alliance was the best way to secure “a happy conclusion” to 
the threat posed by Spanish unrest.  Collins’ view is not surprising given that he saw 
in King George I a man with whom “I have always concurred in Politcks.”167  These 
are hardly the words of someone who wishes to undermine the existing political 
system. 
Continuing Jacobite Fears 
 Deists’ writings on Jacobites were timely indeed.  At the same time that 
Collins was acting in support of the government, others advanced a different 
agenda.  In a late January 1718 number of the Postman a poem appeared titled “The 
Juror” written by one “W. B. formerly of S. John’s College, Cambridge.”  
Composed with a strong Jacobite message, W. B. used the poem to attack those who 
had abandoned the Stuarts. 
 Here you may see what Hypocrites will do, 
 What various Villanies such Men run through, 
 What mighty ills from Perjury proceed, 
 What Orphans ruin’d, and what Nations bleed, 
 What Treaties broke, what Monarchies betray’d, 
 How Statesmen rise, and Tradesmens Fortune made; 
 What e’er Nonjurors teach we sadly know, 
 It is the Juror strikes the surest Blow.168
 
The Jacobite position also appeared prominently in a single sheet pamphlet, which 
purportedly contained the last words of James Shepheard (1697-1718)169 just prior 
to his being hanged for high treason in March 1718.  Shepheard’s final utterances 
were pure Jacobitism.  He accused George I of invading “the RIGHTS of a 
CHURCH, which he came chiefly on Pretence of defending,” and of being party to 
the Bangorian position.  What was more, Shepheard claimed he would die a 
member of the “CHURCH of ENGLAND, as it stood before the Revolution,” that 
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 is, as the pure and intolerant institution it had been at the Restoration.  Finally, and 
with his last breath, Shepheard requested that God “be Pleas’d to bless this Land, 
and its Rightful King, JAMES the Third; may he grant him a speedy 
Restoration….”170  We do not know if these words were a true reporting, though it 
mattered not, the content was dangerous enough that, a few days later, inquiries 
were made to determine the origin of the work.171  The government received many 
offers to root out Jacobites and the following, dated 10 April 1718, is one example 
among many.  Jacobites, the letter began, were “Villains who make it their practice 
to Spread in every place the poyson of dissaffection, Sedition & Treason….”  The 
anonymous author continued that “I mortally hate the vipors above mentioned, And 
humbly & most heartily offor my Service to Detect them.”172
The Free Thinker 
 In March 1718 a new periodical appeared which defended the concept of 
freethinking and attempted to remove it from the too frequent connotation of heresy 
and sedition, which opponents of deism sought to solidify.  Nevertheless, the Free 
Thinker and its editor Ambrose Philips (1675-1749) shared a goal with our deists: 
the removal of superstition from the nation.173  In the initial issue, Philips assured 
readers that “To Think Freely is not to Think at Random: It is not to think like a 
Fool or a Madman; but like a Philosopher….”  This concept was crucially important 
because it formed the “Foundation of all Human Liberty….”174  He argued, there 
was nothing politically dangerous in those who engage in freethinking, quite the 
contrary they are “listed into no Party, nor tied down to any Profession….”175  To 
encourage freethinking was to encourage innovation and philosophical 
advancement.  As proof, Philips cited the example of Newton who employed “the 
whole Force of his Genius to penetrate farther into the Mysteries of Natural Causes, 
than most of his Predecessours; and has made him capable to unfold some 
Perplexities in Philosophy, which were thought too intricate for the Wit of Man.”  
Newton was, however, only the first step, a prototype for others to follow.  It was 
entirely possible that future freethinkers, if given proper support and intellectual 
climate, would supersede even his genius: “[W]ho knows what amazing Discoveries 
some Second Newton may make hereafter, excited by the Example, and enlightened 
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 by the Knowledge, of the First.”176  To opponents of deism this link between natural 
philosophy and freethinking confirmed Henry Sacheverell’s claims in 1709 that 
heresy found support in the new philosophies of nature. 
Morgan and Samuel Clarke’s Unitarianism 
 Sharing this goal of removing restrictions on thought was the physician and 
deist Thomas Morgan.  He initially outlined his ideas on the nature of God during 
his participation in the Trinitarian debates among nonconformists which took place 
at Salter’s Hall in 1719.  Using the work of the Newtonian and Anglican 
Churchman Samuel Clarke as support, Morgan endorsed a unitarian position 
arguing “That God is One, or, that there is but One only Living and True God.”177  
Seven years earlier, Clarke had published Scriptural Doctrine of the Trinity (1712) 
in which he presented every New Testament reference addressing the Trinity.  He 
then outlined in fifty-five propositions the doctrine resulting from these passages.  
For Clarke, Scripture proved a singular Arian-like God.  After threats of censure 
from Convocation in 1714, Clarke “acknowledged the Eternal Generation of the 
Son, and promise[d] not to write or speak any more on the Subject.”178  Unlike 
Whiston, Clarke did not become a martyr for unitarian theology.  Like Clarke, 
Morgan urged Britons to embrace what he viewed as the biblical doctrine of the 
Trinity.  He referred readers to Deuteronomy 32.39 (I am he and there is no god 
with me….) and Isaiah 43.10 (I am he: before me there was no God formed, neither 
shall there be after me.) and 44.6 (I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me 
there is no God.)  For Morgan the notion of a three-figure God was untenable and 
unscriptural.  In his words: “The Supposition of a Duality, or Plurality of Gods, 
necessarily implies a Repugnancy or Contradiction; for these Two (or more) Gods 
would be equal or alike in all Perfection….”179  Here Morgan had in mind 
theologians such as Daniel Waterland.  To make Waterland’s Trinity a reality, 
Morgan claimed that two non-identical substances having “incommunicable 
Properties,” must come together and form one single substance, while at the same 
time retaining their original qualities.  Morgan could never accept this; it was 
unreasonable.180  What is more, Morgan wrote that “I think it must be evident to 
common Sense, that your Hypothesis is really a Contradiction.”  The greater 
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 problem with Waterland’s view, and that of other Trinitarians, was that it tended to 
“Identify all Substances, whether Finite or Infinite, with the one infinite, self-
existent Substance.”181  For Morgan, God was absolutely singular.  Those who held 
contrary views and present the truth of the Trinity as a certain fact, Morgan 
dismissed as “Tritheisticks.”182   
Like our other deists, Morgan longed for free inquiry into religion.  He saw 
“systemical Orthodoxy and Church Authority” as the chief barriers to this goal.183  
Morgan was particularly troubled by those who “came out with such an Air of 
Assurance, and apear’d to me so directly calculated to discourage all rational 
Freedom of Enquiry in Matters of great Importance….”184  Aside from the popish 
qualities that such a position assumed, Morgan chastised people who would halt 
intellectual debate and curtail the use of reason in all matters, but especially those of 
such importance.  Referring specifically to the notion of the Trinity, though no 
doubt he had in mind other issues too, Morgan stated that  
I long for a Time when … Bigotry and Enthusiasm shall give Place to 
Charity, and a rational Freedom of Enquiry; when the ordinary Ministers of 
the Gospel shall no longer be put to such poor Shifts to free themselves from 
the direct Claims of Infallibility, and when those who disclaim it in Words, 
shall do so in Reality and Truth; when Men shall no longer affront and mock 
the Almighty, by complementing his Word as the only Rule of their Faith, 
while they substitute their own Words instead of it….185
 
People ought look for notions of God in the Bible and not rely on the words of 
priests whom Morgan accused of replacing Scripture with their own mistaken 
Trinitarian conceptions.   
An undated poetical assessment of Morgan’s position was composed by one 
Dr. Williams of Cambridge, and dedicated “To The Moral Philosopher,” a reference 
to the title of Morgan’s three volume treatise.   
Receive, brave Heroe, all your due Applause! 
The Matchless Champion of a Matchless Cause. 
Both Fiends & Foes unite to raise thy Fame: 
Deists with Glee uncommon sound thy Name; 
And grateful Christians eccho back the Same. 
The Breasts of both with Joy exultant glow: 
Those, at your dreadful & dead-doing Blow: 
These, that to Morgan they a Champion owe.186
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Williams seems to support Morgan’s effort to cleanse Christianity of unfounded 
tradition and priestcraft as his description of “grateful Christians” would indicate.  
Moreover, Morgan is presented as the chief spokesman for deism, who has gained 
fame at the hands of supporters and detractors alike.  Whether one agreed or 
disagreed with Morgan, one could not ignore him.   
Conclusion: 
The decade encapsulating English theological politics during 1709-1719 was 
indeed turbulent and our deists figure prominently in these events.  They did not sit 
on the margins; rather they contributed to the discourses which analysed 
contemporary politics along with other observers.  Indeed, the politics advanced by 
our deists might well be called Whig even if the theology that underlay the deist 
position was perhaps more extreme than that with which many Whigs would have 
been comfortable.  Deist fortunes seemed on the rise in 1718 when the Stanhope and 
Sunderland ministry introduced a bill repealing the Occasional Conformity and 
Schism Acts, which had been enacted under the Tory government of 1710-1714.  
Despite opposition to the measure, including Walpole’s, the Act was passed in 
1719; however, the other Acts preventing Dissenters from holding office remained 
in effect.187  Moreover, when Walpole came to power he refused to allow religion to 
become a governmental distraction and did not promote the programme of toleration 
of the former administration.  This strategy was cemented in 1723 when Walpole 
chose Edmund Gibson as his religious advisor. 
 138
 Notes 
 
1 Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?: England 1689-1727 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
2000), 297-302. 
2 Geoffrey Holmes, The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), 
61. 
3 Holmes, The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell, 46. 
4 Henry Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church, and state (London, 
1709), 3.  
5 Bod. MS Don e 16 f. 32r-v.  Sacheverell’s copy of extracts from the book of Common 
Prayer. 
6 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, 5.  
7 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, 9, 10. 
8 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, 16; Holmes, The Trial of Doctor 
Sacheverell, 67. 
9 Holmes, The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell, 72-3, 75, 78-9, 156-76. 
10 Anonymous, The High Church Mask Pull’d off: or, Modern Addresses Anatomized. 
Designed Chiefly for the Information of the Common People (London, 1710), 3. 
11 Anonymous, The High Church Mask Pull’d off, 9.  
12 Anonymous, The High Church Mask Pull’d off, 10. 
13 LPL MS 1770 f. 90r.  Wake Diary 2 January 1710. 
14 To Mr. Leibniz, 14 February 1710, in A Collection of Several Pieces of John Toland, 
2 vols. (1729; facsimile reprint. New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1977), 2: 388. 
15 John Toland, Mr. Toland’s Reflections on Dr. Sacheverell’s Sermon Preach’d at St. 
Paul’s, Nov. 5 1709 (London, 1710), 2-3. 
16 Toland, Mr. Toland’s Reflections on Dr. Sacheverell’s Sermon, 12, 13, 15. 
17 Matthew Tindal, New High-Church Turn’d Old Presbyterian (London, 1710), 2. 
18 Tindal, New High-Church Turn’d Old Presbyterian, 3. 
19 Tindal, New High-Church Turn’d Old Presbyterian, 10, 12. 
20 Henry Sacheverell, The Speech of Henry Sacheverell, D. D. upon his Impeachment at 
the bar of the House of Lords, … March 7 1709/10 (London, 1710), 1, 5. 
21 Sacheverell, The Speech of Henry Sacheverell, 6. 
22Anthony Collins, A Vindication of Divine Attributes (London, 1710), 3, 4, 4-5.  Italics 
in original. 
23Collins, Vindication of Divine Attributes, 18, 23.  Many previous studies of deist 
natural philosophy focus exclusively on their use of the design argument.  Ray Billington, 
Religion without God (New York: Routledge, 2002), 18-20; James E. Force, “Science, Deism, 
and William Whiston’s ‘Third Way’,” Ideas and Production, A Journal in the History of Ideas, 
no. 7 (1987): 26; Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 6; John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 193; Isabel Rivers, “‘Galen’s 
Muscles’: Wilkins, Hume, and the Educational Use of the Argument from Design,” Historical 
Journal 36 (1993): 587. 
24 Byrne, Natural Religion, 3, 79; Geoffrey Cantor, “Berkeley’s the Analyst Revisited,” 
Isis 75 (1984): 671; Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World 
(London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2000), 111.  On this more generally see A. E. 
Pilkington, “‘Nature’ as Ethical Norm in the Enlightenment,” in Languages of Nature: Critical 
Essays on Science and Literature, ed. L. J. Jordanvoa (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1986). 
25 George Berkeley, A Theory of Vision Vindicated (1733) in The Works of George 
Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop vol. 1 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948), 
 139
  
254.  On Berkeley and deism see Geoffrey Cantor, “Berkeley’s the Analyst Revisited,” Isis 75 
(1984): 668-83. 
26 The Grub Street Journal, 22 April 1731; “Grub Street Journal,” in The Oxford 
Companion to English Literature, ed. Margaret Drabble, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 421. 
27 Anthony Collins, Priestcraft in Perfection (London, 1710), 3. 
28 Collins, Priestcraft in Perfection, 5. 
29 Collins, Priestcraft in Perfection, 9. 
30 Collins, Priestcraft in Perfection, 11, 12. 
31 Collins, Priestcraft in Perfection, 18, 20, 46. 
32 Collins, Priestcraft in Perfection, 47, 48-9. 
33 William Chillingworth, The Religion of Protestants, A Safe Way to Salvation 
(London, 1638), 70-1.  See also Robert Orr, Reason and Authority: The Thought of William 
Chillingworth (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967). 
34 Anthony Collins, Reflections on a Late Pamphlet, Intitled Priestcraft in Perfection 
(London, 1710), 1, 2. 
35 Collins, Reflections on a Late Pamphlet, Intitled Priestcraft, 6. 
36 James O’ Higgins provides the references for this material in his biography of Collins 
but does no more than note its existence.  See Anthony Collins: The Man and His Works (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 136-137. 
37 G. V. Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688-1730: The Career of 
Francis Atterbury Bishop of Rochester (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), 123. 
38 Mr. Bromley to Dr. Atterbury, 23 September 1710 in The Epistolary Correspondence 
, Visitation Charges , Speeches, and Miscellanies, of the Right Reverend Francis Atterbury, 
D.D. (London, 1783), 28. 
39 DNB, 8: 1200; Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State, 174. 
40 BL Add. 32096 f. 86.  Francis Atterbury to Dr. G. Harbin, n.d. 
41 BL Add. 32096 f. 88r.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
42 DNB, 19: 849. 
43 BL Add. 32096 f. 88r. 
44 DNB, 10: 734. 
45 BL Add. 32096 f. 90.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
46 BL Add. 32096 f. 92r.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
47 BL Add. 32096 ff. 93, 95r.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
48 BL Add. 32096 f. 97r.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
49 BL Add. 32096 f. 99.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
50 Henry Broxap, The Later Non-Jurors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1924), 309. 
51 BL Add. 32096 ff. 100v-101v.  Atterbury to Harbin, n.d. 
52 Mark Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603-1714 (London: Allen 
Lane The Penguin Press), 332. 
53 Toland to Harley, 22 August 1710 in Report on the Manuscripts of his Grace The 
Duke of Portland, 4: 572. 
54 Toland to the Earl of Oxford, 6 June 1711 in Report on the Manuscripts of his Grace 
The Duke of Portland, 5: 4. 
55 Toland to the Earl of Oxford, 3 December 1711 in Report on the Manuscripts of his 
Grace The Duke of Portland, 5: 120. 
56 A brief and useful account of the war is found in Jeremy Black, “Warfare, Crisis, and 
Absolutism,” in Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History, ed. Euan Cameron (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 224-5. 
57 Tim Harris, Politics under the Later Stuarts: Party Conflict in a Divided Society 
1600-1715 (London: Longman, 1993), 159; Kishlansky, Monarchy Transformed, 332. 
 140
  
58 Kishlansky, Monarchy Transformed, 333. 
59 Toland to the Earl of Oxford, 7 December 1711 in Report on the Manuscripts of his 
Grace The Duke of Portland, 5: 126. 
60 Kishlansky, Monarchy Transformed, 334. 
61 Report on the Manuscripts of his Grace The Duke of Portland, 5: 127. 
62 Robert Molesworth to Mrs. Molesworth, 8 May 1712 in Report on Manuscripts in 
Various Collections (London: The Hereford Times Limited, 1913), 3: 258; Molesworth to Mrs. 
Molesworth, 16 July 1712 in Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections, 3: 259. 
63 Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1961), 88, 91-3, 96, 98, 100. 
64 Shaftesbury to Pierre Coste, 12 January 1712, from Naples in Rex A. Barrell, 
Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and 'Le Refuge Francais'--
Correspondence (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1985), 200. 
65 Shaftesbury to Thomas Micklethwaye, 29 March 1712 in The Life, Unpublished 
Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, 479. 
66 Toland to the Earl of Oxford, c. 1712 in Report on the Manuscripts of his Grace The 
Duke of Portland, 5: 259-60, see also 258-9. 
67 Jonathan Swift, T—l—nd’s Invitation to Dismal (London, 1712). 
68 LPL MS 1770 f. 128r.  Wake Diary entry 31 December 1712. 
69 Anthony Collins, A Discourse of Free-Thinking, Occasion’d by The Rise and Growth 
of a Sect call’d Free-Thinkers (London, 1713), 27. 
70 Collins, Free-Thinking, 29, 30. 
71 Collins, Free-Thinking, 30. 
72 Collins, Free-Thinking, 76-7. 
73 Collins, Free-Thinking, 6. 
74 Collins, Free-Thinking, 37-38 
75Collins, Free-Thinking, 38. 
76William Whiston, Reflexions on an Anonymous Pamphlet, entitled, a Discourse of 
Free-Thinking (London, 1713), 23. 
77 Whiston, Reflexions on an Anonymous Pamphlet, 26, 40. 
78 Collins, Free-Thinking, 8, 46-7, 85, 109.  
79 Robert Wodrow to Prof. Hamilton, 13 April 1725 in The Correspondence of the Rev. 
Robert Wodrow, ed. Thoms M’Crie 3 vols. (Edinburgh: The Wodrow Society, 1843), 3: 190-1.  
Wodrow’s impatience with those who forced religious conformity no doubt was born during his 
role as one of the negotiators for Scotland during discussions over the Act of Union (1707).   
80 The Guardian, no. 3, 14 March 1713. 
81 Collins, Free-Thinking, 8. 
82 Collins, Free-Thinking, 14.  William Whiston too cited Galileo’s fate in his writings.  
Whiston saw himself much like Galileo persecuted by religious authorities too blind to see the 
truth that he advanced.  See Larry Stewart, “The Trouble with Newton in the Eighteenth 
Century,” in Newton and Newtonianism: New Studies, ed. James E. Force and Sarah Hutton 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 225. 
83 John Williamson to Robert Wodrow, 17 February 1713 in The Correspondence of the 
Rev. Robert Wodrow, 1: 410, 412-13.  On the meaning of alchemy in the eighteenth century see 
Lawrence M. Principe and William R. Newman. “Some Problems with the Historiography of 
Alchemy,” in Secrets of Nature: Astrology and Alchemy in Early Modern Europe ed. William R. 
Newman and Anthony Grafton (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 385-6. On Newton’s and 
Boyle’s alchemical studies see: Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of 
Alchemy in Newton's Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lawrence M. 
Principe, The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and His Alchemical Quest (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
 141
  
84 Richard Bentley, Remarks Upon a Late Discourse of Free-Thinking, 5th ed. (London, 
1716), 11. 
85 Bentley, Remarks Upon a Late Discourse of Free-Thinking, 14. 
86 CUL MS Mm.I.53 f. 210r.  See also Christian Biel to Richard Bentley, 10 July 1714; 
Christian Biel to Richard Bentley, 30 August 1714; Thomas Rud to Richard Bentley, 22 July 
1716 in Richard Bentley, The Correspondence, 2 vols. (London, 1842), 2: 482, 499-500, 515. 
87William Carroll, A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Benjamin Pratt, … Wherein the 
Dangerous Errors in a Late Book, Intitled.  An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in 
Propositions, the Evidence Whereof depends upon Human Testimony: Are Detected, 
Confuted….  (London, 1707), 4, 14.  Carroll, like Stillingfleet saw Collins as contributing to 
Socinainism as did Toland, Locke, and Tindal.  They make “Humane and Divine Reason, to be 
one and the Same Thing; that Socinianism, Deism or Atheism, as well as the most important 
Points in, the Reasonableness of Christianity, in Christianity not Mysterious, in the Rights of the 
Christian Church, and in other Books of the like Principles, are Solely grounded.” (16).  He also 
recorded with approval the thoughts of an unnamed friend who claimed: “with me, the terms, 
Socinian, Deist, Unitarian, Signifie precisely the same Thing, that the word Atheist does with 
others.” (24).  Recently, David Boyd Haycock has suggested that “In many ways Arians, deists, 
pantheists and atheists were all parcelled together by the truly orthodox, for only atheists (and 
Catholics) would wish to damage the Protestant Church.”  David Boyd Haycock, William 
Stukeley: Science, Religion and Archaeology in Eighteenth-Century England (Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, 2002), 206. 
88 There were scores of letters, but see, especially, Locke to Collins, 1 October 1703; 
Locke to Collins, 21 October 1703; Locke to Collins, 29 October 1703; Collins to Locke, 10 
November 1703 in John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. De Beer 8 vols. 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967-1989), 8: 73, 81-2, 97-8, 110-1.  
89Anthony Collins, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, 2nd ed. 
(London, 1717), 4. 
90 Collins, Philosophical Inquiry, 5-6. 
91 Collins, Philosophical Inquiry, 8. 
92 Collins, Philosophical Inquiry, 8-9. 
93 David Berman, “Anthony Collins: Aspects of His Thought and Writings,” 
Hermathena 119 (1975): 51. 
94 BL Add. 4221 ff. 329r, 330v. 
95 BL Add. 4313 ff. 69r-v.  Desmaizeaux to Thomas Birch, 20 January 1735/6. 
96 George Berkeley to John Percival, 26 January 1712/13 in The Works of George 
Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop vol. 8 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948), 
58. 
97 PRO SP 34/21/15A ff. 28-32.   
98 PRO SP 34/34 f. 122. 
99 PRO SP 34/34 f. 121. 
100 BL Add. 4282 f. 129r.  Collins to Des Maizeaux, 5 May 1717. 
101 BL Add. 4282 ff. 127v-128r.  Collins to Des Maizeaux, 26 April 1717.  Israel 
reproduces this passage in his Radical Enlightenment (98) but does not refer to the bookseller 
Baker. 
102 Frank H. Ellis, “What Swift Did to Collins’s Discourse of Free-Thinking and Why,” 
in Eighteenth-Century Contexts: Historical Inquiries in Honour of Philip Harth, ed. Howard D. 
Weinbrot, Peter J. Schakel and Stephen E. Karian (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
2001), 82-3.  On Collins and his critics see also James Dybikowski, “Anthony Collins’ Defence 
of Free-Thinking,” in Scepticism, Clandenstinity and Free Thinking, edited by G. Paganini. 
(Paris: Éditions Champion, 2002), 299-325. 
 142
  
103 Jonathan Swift, Mr. C----ns’s Discourse of Free-Thinking, put into Plain English, by 
way of Abstract for the Use of the Poor (1713) in The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D., ed. 
Temple Scott vol. 3 (London: George Bell and Sons, 1909), 169. 
104 Swift, Mr. C----ns’s Discourse of Free-Thinking, 171. 
105 Swift, Mr. C----ns’s Discourse of Free-Thinking, 172. 
106 Ellis, “What Swift Did to Collins’s Discourse of Free-Thinking and Why,” 86, 88. 
107 Swift, Mr. C----ns’s Discourse of Free-Thinking, 192. 
108 John Toland, The Grand Mystery Laid Open: Namely, by Dividing of the Protestants 
to Weaken the Hanover Succession, and by Defeating the Succession to Extirpate the Protestant 
Religion (London, 1714), 3-4. 
109 Toland, The Grand Mystery Laid Open, 16. 
110 Toland, The Grand Mystery Laid Open, 12-4, 15. 
111 John Toland, The Art of Restoring. Or, the Piety and Probity of General Monk In 
bringing about the Last Restoration (London, 1714), viii.  This was not the first time Toland 
referred to the Civil War events with praise for the anti-monarch side.  See his A Defence of the 
Parliament of 1640, and the People of England Against King Charles I and his Adherents 
(London, 1698). 
112 John F. Naylor, ed., The British Aristocracy and the Peerage Bill of 1719 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), 16; Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?, 307. 
113 Toland, The Art of Restoring, 2, 41, 38. 
114 BL Add. 28095 f. 61. 
115 BL Add. 28095 ff. 62r-63v. 
116 Keith M. Brown, Kingdom or Province?: Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603-1715 
(New York: Macmillan, 1992), 195-106; Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?, 394-6; Paul S. Fritz, “The 
Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English Ministers, 1715-1745,” Historical Journal 16 
(1973): 265-289. 
117 The Postman 17 – 19 January 1717. 
118 John Toland, The State Anatomy of Great Britain. Containing a particular account 
of its several interests and parties, their bent and genius, 4th ed. (London, 1717), 4. 
119 Toland, The State Anatomy of Great Britain, 14. 
120 Toland, The State Anatomy of Great Britain, 55. 
121 Toland, The State Anatomy of Great Britain, 32-3. 
122 Toland, The State Anatomy of Great Britain, 81. 
123 The Postman 23 – 26 February 1717. 
124 PRO SP 35/8 ff. 28r-v.  C. Maxwell to Robert Walpole, 3 February 1716/17. 
125 PRO SP 35/8 f. 34.  Letter to Stanhope on Jacobite Actions, 1716/17; f. 170.  Jn. 
Murgatroyd to Stanhope, 8 April 1717. 
126 Daniel Defoe, An Argument Proving that the Design of Employing and Enobling 
Foreigners, is a Treasonable Conspiracy … With an Appendix; Wherein an insolent Pamphlet, 
Entitled, The Anatomy of Great Britain in Anatomiz’d (London, 1717), 50; Maximillian E. 
Novak, Daniel Defoe Master of Fictions: His Life and Ideas (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
2001), 204. 
127 Defoe, The Anatomy of Great Britain in Anatomiz’d, 74; Novak, Daniel Defoe 
Master of Fictions, 495. 
128 Defoe, The Anatomy of Great Britain in Anatomiz’d, 77, 81. 
129 Defoe, The Anatomy of Great Britain in Anatomiz’d, 87, 95; Novak, Daniel Defoe 
Master of Fictions, 525, 654. 
130 The Postman 6 – 9 April 1717. 
131 John Toland, The Second Part of the State Anatomy, &c (London, 1717), 7, 8. 
132 Toland, The Second Part of the State Anatomy, 22, 23. 
133 John Toland, Tetradymus (London, 1720), xvii. 
 143
  
134 BL Add. 4295 ff. 49r, 50r-v.  Laurence Hanson published a transcription of this 
proposal without comment in 1936.  He dates the manuscript to ca. 1717 but provides no reason 
for doing so.  See Laurence Hanson, Government and the Press 1695-1763 (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1936), 135-138. 
135 Thomas Chubb, The Supremacy of the Father Asserted, 2nd ed. (London, 1718), 1; T. 
L. Bushell, The Sage of Salisbury: Thomas Chubb 1679-1747 (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1967), 17. 
136 Chubb, The Supremacy of the Father Asserted, 2, 7, 9, 18; Moshe Pelli, “The Impact 
of Deism on the Hebrew Literature in the Enlightenment in Germany,” Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 6 (1972): 39. 
137 Review of Isaac Newton, The Chronology of the Ancient Kingdoms Amended 
(London, 1728) in The Present State of the Republick of Letters vol. 1 April 1728, 254.  The 
review encompasses the entire month’s issue.   
138 Indeed, in his biography of Chubb, T. L. Bushell notes that Newton greatly 
influenced Chubb, but does not mention his use of Newton’s theological writings.  Similarly, 
Frank E. Manuel’s study of Newton’s chronology is silent about deist use of Newton’s works.  
See Bushell, The Sage of Salisbury, 19-20; Frank E. Manuel, Isaac Newton: Historian 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963). 
139 Thomas Chubb, The Posthumous Works of Mr. Thomas Chubb. 2vols (London, 
1748), 2: M2: 147.  (NB the page numbers for this section are out of sequence with the rest of 
the book.) 
140 Arthur Young, An Historical Dissertation on Idolatrous Corruptions in Religion 
From the Beginning of the World, 2 vols. (London, 1734), 2: 268. See Snobelen, “The Theology 
of Isaac Newton’s General Scholium;” Larry Stewart, “Seeing through the Scholium: Religion 
and Reading Newton in the Eighteenth Century,” History of Science 34 (1996): 123-65.  On 
contemporary reaction to Newton’s theology see Scott Mandelbrote, “Eighteenth-Century 
Reactions to Newton's Anti-Trinitarianism,” in Newton and Newtonianism: New Studies, ed. 
James E. Force and Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 93-111. 
141 Thomas Chubb, Several Inquires (London, 1718), 3, quotation on 5. 
142 DNB 12: 727; BL.Add. 32556 f. 134r.  Thomas Chubb to Dr Cox Macro, 6 October 
1718.   
143 BL Add. 32556 f. 134r. 
144 BL Add. 32556 f. 137r. 
145 BL Add. 32556 f. 140.  Thomas Chubb to Dr Cox Macro, 18 July 1719. 
146 Thomas Chubb, An Enquiry concerning the Books of the New Testament, whether 
they were written by Divine Inspiration in Four Tracts (London, 1734); Richard Parker would 
challenge Chubb by asserting that the similarity of the four Gospels proves their divine origin.  
See A Letter to Mr. Thomas Chubb: occasion’d by his late book, intitled The True Gospel of 
Jesus Christ, asserted (London, 1739), 10-11, 17-22. 
147 BL Add. 4221 f. 329r. 
148 BL Add. 4282 f. 228.  Collins to Desmaizeaux, n.d. c. 1718. 
149 J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics During 
the Ancien Regime, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 352, 352n. 123; B. 
W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debates 
from Locke to Burke (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1998), 31-3. 
150 Some critics of Hoadly believed that he was even more devious in his challenges to 
the Church than were deists such as Toland.  “Hoadly’s worse-than-Heatheness sermon (for 
even Heathens have a greater regard for religion than he) … Hoadly puts me in mind of another 
free-thinker Toland (the much abler and better writer of the two, tho of as vile principles)….”  
See Bod. Ballard MS 17 f. 66r. Michael Mattaire to Charlett, 23 May 1718. 
151 See Benjamin Hoadly, Queries Recommended to the Authors of the Late Discourse 
of Free Thinking (London, 1713). 
 144
  
152 BL Add. 4282 f. 137r.  Collins to Desmaizeaux, 1 July 1717. 
153 BL Add. 4282 f. 139r.  Collins to Desmaizeaux, 8 December 1717. 
154 BL Add. 4282 f. 141r.  Collins to Desmaizeaux, 25 February 1717/8. 
155 Jeremy Black, Parliament and Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 42; Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy: 
The Tory Party 1714-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 193-4; Brian W. 
Hill, Sir Robert Walpole: 'Sole and Prime Minister' (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 96-7.  
156 BL Add. 4282 ff. 141r-v. (underlining in original); on similar issues for country 
gentlemen and their estates see E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black 
Acts (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975). 
157 W. R. Ward, The English Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), 7, 9. 
158 BL Add. 4282 f. 149r.  Collins to Desmaizeaux, 17 June 1718.  Michael A. Mullett, 
Catholics in Britain and Ireland, 1558-1829 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 88. 
159 Hoppit, Land of Liberty?, 399-403. 
160 Kavcic, “The Case of Matthew Tindal,” 41-2. 
161 Matthew Tindal, The Defection Consider’d, and the Designs of those who divided 
the Friends of the Government, set in a True Light (London, 1718), 3, 4. 
162 Tindal, The Defection Consider’d, 5. 
163 Tindal, The Defection Consider’d, 12. 
164 Tindal, The Defection Consider’d, 61. 
165 BL Add. 4282 f. 145v.  Collins to Desmaizeaux, 23 April 1718.  For speculation on 
other candidates see Edward Harley, Jr. to Abigail Harley, 18 February 1717/8 in Report on the 
Manuscripts of his Grace The Duke of Portland, 5: 555 
166 BL Add. 4465 f. 16.  Toland to Mr. C***, June 1718.  Alan Harrison believes that 
Toland is writing to Edward Curll but provides no reason for this assertion.  Given the above 
context, I suggest Collins is the recipient.  Cf. Alan Harrison, “Notes on the Correspondence on 
John Toland” I Castelli di Yale 4 (1999): 10.  John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the 
Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from the Restoration to the French Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 92-3.  We know that Parker saw some of 
Toland’s works and was not impressed, see BL Add. 4295 f. 27r. John Chamberlayne [FRS] to 
Toland, 21 June 1718. 
167 BL Add, 4282 ff. 157r-v.  Collins to Desmaizeaux 19 December 1718. Like Collins, 
Toland too kept up on the political events of the day; he corresponded throughout 1719 with 
Robert Molesworth on such matters. See for example BL Add. 4465 f. 19.  Molesworth to 
Toland, 1 August 1719. 
168 The Postman 23 – 25 January 1718. 
169 Not to be confused with Jack Sheppard, England’s most famous criminal, and one of 
the inspirations for John Gay’s The Beggar’s Opera. See John Brewer, The Pleasure of the 
Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997), 431-7. 
170 PRO SP 35/11 f. 84. 
171 PRO SP 35/22 ff. 85f. 
172 PRO SP 35/11 f. 83.  
173 Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London: 
Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2000), 2, 80. 
174 The Free Thinker # 1, Monday March, 24 1718 in The Free-Thinker, 3 vols. 
(London, 1722-1723), 1: 5-6. 
175 The Free Thinker # 2, Friday March, 28 1718 in The Free-Thinker, 1: 11. 
176 The Free Thinker # 4, Friday April, 4 1718 in The Free-Thinker, 1: 22-3. 
177 Philalethes [Thomas Morgan], The Friendly Interposer: or, The True Scripture 
Doctrine of the Trinity, Stated.  By a Physician (London, 1719), 8.  On Morgan’s unitarian 
 145
  
writings see Jan Van den Berg, “Thomas Morgan versus William Warburton: A Conflict the 
Other Way Round,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 42 (1991): 83. 
178 Bod. Add. A. 269 f. 33r.  Thomas C. Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Dr. 
Samuel Clarke (1675-1729): Context, Sources, and Controversy (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 2, 180; J. 
P. Ferguson, An Eighteenth Century Heretic: Dr. Samuel Clarke (Kineton: The Roundwood 
Press, 1976), 51, 53-55, 83; Larry Stewart, “Samuel Clarke, Newtonianism, and the Factions of 
Post-Revolutionary England,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 56, 59; Stephen 
Snobelen, “Caution, Conscience and the Newtonian Reformation: The Public and Private 
Heresies of Newton, Clarke and Whiston,” Enlightenment and Dissent 16 (1997): 161. 
179 [Morgan], The Friendly Interposer, 8-9. 
180 Thomas Morgan, A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Waterland, occasion’d by His Late 
Writings in Defence of the Athanasian Hypothesis (London, 1722), 9-10. 
181 Morgan, A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Waterland, 11, 13;  
182 Thomas Morgan, The Nature and Consequences of Enthusiasm Consider’d, in some 
short Remarks in the Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity (London, 1719), 34. 
183 Thomas Morgan, The Moral Philosopher, 3 vols. (London, 1737-40), 1: vii. 
184 Thomas Morgan, The Nature and Consequences of Enthusiasm Defended (London, 
1720), 3; Young, Religion and Enlightenment, 188. 
185 Morgan, Consequences of Enthusiasm Defended, 11. 
186 BL Add. 5822 f. 92r. post-1737. 
187 Clark, English Society 1660-1832, 352-353; Jeremy Black, The Politics of Britain 
1688-1800 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 59. 
 146
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: 
 
Deist Politics and Theology, 1720-1741 
 
 
 
 
 
 Robert Walpole was likely the most renowned and most reviled political 
figures in England during the early eighteenth century.  Walpole seized the 
opportunity which events—and his return to government following the affair of the 
Peerage Bill (1719)—provided and charted a course through the turbulent political 
waters in the wake of the South Sea Bubble in August of 1720.  Within two years 
both of his chief rivals the Earls of Stanhope and Sunderland would be dead and 
Walpole stood alone at the helm of England’s government.1  Following the 
successful returns of the 1722 election, the Walpolean Whigs, styled by critics as 
the “Robinocracy,” turned Britain into a state dominated by a single party; for the 
next twenty years, they would rule the nation through bribery, patronage, and a 
certain amount of paranoia over Jacobitism.  This chapter outlines the theological 
and political writings of our deists, which were conceived, during a period of what 
J. H. Plumb famously described as political stability, broken only by the quickly 
crushed resurgence of Jacobite fears during 1722-3 with the Atterbury Plot and the 
Cornbury Plot in 1733-4. 
The South Sea Bubble and Politics of 1720-1 
 On the first day of April 1720, Matthew Tindal sent a letter of support to 
Lord Sunderland.  In addition to approving of Sunderland’s politics, Tindal certainly 
remembered that the peer had come to aid of the All Souls Fellows in their 
challenge with Warden Gardiner, nearly a decade earlier.  Tindal was dismayed to 
read the daily attacks on the ministry and he told Sunderland that a carefully 
considered reply ought to be forthcoming.  He even had a potential author in mind: 
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“I desire nothing but to be in such a Condition as would best enable me to do 
service for which reason presuming on your favour I have ventured to take a small 
house in the country, (the furnishing it cost more than I thought) where without 
interuption I can employ my studies in the Summer as Lordship shall direct.”  
Impressing upon Sunderland his loyalty, Tindal ended by emphasising the immense 
“regard I have for your interest” and that he would wait patiently for an answer.2  
While no explicit reply exists, Tindal did receive a summons from an unnamed 
government minister in late September.3  Clearly, Tindal wished to be involved in 
England’s government. 
As Tindal was attempting to ingratiate himself with Sunderland, John 
Toland, like many of his age, sought to participate in the frenzy of financial 
speculation which had seized England.  In June 1720 Toland urged Robert 
Molesworth to help him invest in the South Sea Company.  Toland must have been 
very self-assured when he wrote to Moleworth because four days earlier Toland had 
received a piece of fan mail in which the author commended Toland’s “heroick 
Spirit in defending ye divine Truths against the … World enchanted by Prejudices & 
Popish witchcraft.”4  At some date, approximately in mid-to-late-September, as 
Toland explained the situation to Molesworth, he had the opportunity to secure a 
subscription in the South Sea Company for £1000.  However, the Directors had just 
ruled that “none except a parliament man shou’d subscribe” for that amount.  With 
time being of the essence and knowing that Molesworth was his “honest patron,” 
Toland used Molesworth’s name in place of his “as being sure you would not take it 
ill, Since there was no time for asking your leave.”  More to the point, “there was no 
other way of Securing my Subscription but by a Parliament man’s name, and I my 
self wou’d not be shelter’d by any name but yours….”  Toland was confident that a 
profit was the certain outcome of the venture.5   
When September came, Toland was true to his word and with Jean de 
Fonvive—Huguenot refugee and since 1698 sole owner of the Post Man—as the 
active partner, he bought the stock.6  Fonvive recorded the transaction: “Whereas 
Mr. John Toland had a Subscription of one Thousand pounds in the third money 
Subscription to the South Sea, under the name of the Right Honourable Lord 
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Viscount Molesworth and that I John de Fonvive made the first payment of one 
Thousand pounds upon condition that the said Mr. Toland and I should go halves in 
the profits….”7  The optimism of the note was short lived.  Like many others, 
Toland was ruined when the bubble burst and by 30 October 1720 had lost 
everything.  However, as he explained to Barnham Goode, a former Cambridge 
Fellow, such were the fortunes of life.  Toland related that in regards to the events 
which seized the nation and threatened to topple the government, “I injoy as 
profound tranquillity, as if living in Arabia.”  The matter was best left to “the 
consideration of the Parliament, which alone can redress its own mistakes, and 
punish the miscarriages of the managers.”8  
Toland also commented upon the events leading to the South Sea fiasco in a 
letter to Molesworth sent in January 1721 which contained “an account of the rise or 
fall of stocks,” but “there has been of late so small variation, & particularly so little 
prospect of their rising, that it was not worth while to give any body the least trouble 
about them.”9  There was, however, a way in which the stock might increase.  If 
speculation had caused the crash, then public speculation might bring about a rise.  
Toland advised Molesworth, “my Lord if you think it your own or the interest of the 
Kingdom yt they should rise, let it be known (as every mans speech a vote is quickly 
made publick) that you prefer the felicity of your Country….”10   
Not waiting for others to take action, Toland conducted his own 
investigation and sent the results to Molesworth who had been “chosen one of the 
Committee to enquire into” the affair.11  The picture painted was one of knowing 
corruption among many, though not all, of the “directors of the S. S. Company.”  To 
reach his conclusion, Toland told Molesworth, he had “read over several accounts 
and papers which have been laid by the directors before the House of Commons and 
made the strictest enquiry, that I could possibly, into ye behaviour of those 
Gentlemen, especially with relation to ye several Steps they took in the execution of 
the Scheme, wch was intrusted to their management.”12  Despite his best efforts, 
however, Toland had been unable to view the personal recordings of the Directors, 
“nor yet in their minutes, any order given for selling of Stock….”  Nevertheless, an 
absence of evidence did not dissuade his speculation: “A Cabal is Suspected … and 
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Company’s money was made use of to buy their stock, I take it to be a heinous 
crime in those who were the promoters of such a design.”13  Toland ended the report 
by revealing his desire that the few innocent Directors not be charged in the 
enthusiasm to imprison the guilty ones. 
 Like Toland, Tindal too had been seduced by the lure of easy money in the 
South Sea Company.  They also shared the same fate following the burst of the 
Bubble.  Tindal sought redress from the highest levels of government and on 2 
August 1721 he once more wrote to Sunderland: “After all the Parliament had done 
for the relief of the Sufferers by the South Sea, I find I am a loser of about 900 in 
the Redemables.”  Tindal felt some reluctance in asking for assistance 
“[c]onsidering how very generous you have already been, to help me at this pinch if 
I could think of any other means.”  This is a tantalising allusion.  Does Tindal mean 
that he received a reward for, or that he wrote The Defection Consider’d—the work 
chastising the Walpolean Whigs for abandoning the government of George I—at the 
request of Sunderland?  Such an interpretation would be consistent with the 
previous letter in which Tindal again offered his service to Sunderland.  Yet, it must 
be kept in mind that following Sunderland’s death and the start of Walpole’s reign 
in the Commons, Tindal would write in support of what became known, to critics, 
as the Robinocracy.14  However, we should not make too much of this because 
Tindal’s other choice was the Tory opposition.  Not wishing an absolute handout, 
Tindal assured Sunderland that he had future means to repay any money advanced 
to him.  Tindal, however, was unsure as to when he might be able to capitalise on it: 
“I have indeed materials by me for a book which wou’d go near to make me whole, 
but I am afraid the publishing it wou’d, not be proper at this juncture, since it 
wou’d, being far bolder, make a greater noise then even the Rights of the Church 
did.”15  Although he did not mention a title for the book, we may reasonably 
speculate that Tindal meant Christianity as Old as the Creation since, of all his 
publications from this point on, it was the only one of a theological nature and the 
one which caused the anticipated stir. 
At the same time as Toland’s detective work sought the cause of his 
financial ruin and Tindal worried about recovering his losses, the political and 
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religious ideals that they, and our other deists, advocated found a new outlet.  The 
Independent Whig (January 1720—January 1721), was the brainchild of Thomas 
Gordon (d. 1750) and John Trenchard (1662-1723).  Gordon was a Scottish lawyer 
who partnered with the Irish born Trenchard in 1719.  The two men were critical of 
the direction in which the nation was being taken by the corruption of the clergy and 
of High-Churchmen who had politicised religion as a means to establish an 
exclusionary confession in England.16  William Wake, nevertheless, dismissed the 
paper’s influence in the nation: it “pose[d] a very harmless Enemy to the Clergy and 
Religion” and “is of little moment.”17  With the inaugural issue Gordon and 
Trenchard claimed a pedigree for their publication from the example of Ambrose 
Philips’ Free-Thinker, which they described as “a useful as well as a fine Paper” 
especially for its treatment of “Superstition and Enthusiasm.”18   
The Independent Whig proceeded in its short run replete with sentiments that 
might have come from the personal pens of Toland, Collins, and Tindal: “Religion 
was designed by Heaven for the Benefit of Men alone.”  Moreover, “It was most 
agreeable to the infinite Goodness and tender mercies of God, to make every Thing 
he requires of us, weak Men, obvious and clear.”  Gordon and Trenchard proposed 
further that “the Bible is so plain as to all necessary Truths, that he that runs may 
read; and a Day-Labourer cannot fail of finding Truth that searches it there.”  The 
two editors claimed that one of their goals was to demonstrate that “the All-
Powerful God is not a whimsical Being, that governs his Creatures by Caprice, and 
loads them with arbitrary and useless Burthens, which can serve no good purpose in 
Nature.”19  This was the same depiction of God found within the writings of our 
deists.  Thus, further associating deists and a Whig political programme.  It is likely 
that Collins did more than merely watch the debates: he himself may have authored 
a number of essays Independent Whig which criticised priests.20  The deist 
association did not end with Collins.  At least one contemporary believed that 
Gordon too was “surely a Deist; for I heard him, … speak very foolishly and 
wickedly against Christianity, and a future state….”21  Within a year the 
Independent Whig ceased publication, but the concerns it raised would continue to 
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be advanced by our deists.  Gordon and Trenchard maintained their criticism of 
restrictive religion in Cato’s Letters, to which we will return. 
Toland’s Death and Memorials  
 In March 1722 Molesworth wrote that it had been quite some time since he 
had received a letter from Toland.  Despite the break in their correspondence, 
Molesworth assured Toland that any request for assistance would not fall upon deaf 
ears.  Molesworth then alerted his long-time friend that “I am Embarked in a good 
affair no Less than Standing for Westminster.  I have Employed all my Friends … I 
am sorry you are not in a state of Health to do me service.  Believe me when I tell 
you shall [do] as I do….”22  Clearly, Toland still held some worth as a political 
writer.  Toland replied that he “was never a careless Correspondent” and certainly 
not to Molesworth.  Nor was his silence due to “not needing assistance of my 
friends,” but rather to his “almost incessant pains, and very extraordinary 
weakness.”  With regards to Molesworth’s decision to enter the political arena once 
more, Toland offered his best wishes: “Since you will embark once more on that 
troublesome Sea. I heartily wish you all good luck….”23  
 Toland died on 11 March 1722, though contemporary interest in his work 
did not die with him.  Within two months, the bookseller William Mears offered for 
sale a collection of Toland’s theological writings prefaced by the bookseller 
Edmund Curll’s life of the author.  Based on the biographical details, which Toland 
had included in many of his works, Curll promised a faithful account.  In contrast to 
others who wished to vilify Toland, Curll suggested that “the Reputation of our 
Author hath received so great a Brightness from his own Pen, that it needs no 
auxiliary Light to increase its Lustre; and his Character is so secure from his own 
Works….”24  Similar praise had followed the description of the Harrington edition, 
which was certainly one of Toland’s “Labours for the Good of his Country….”  Not 
all of the biography was rosy.  Curll conceded that, in regards to Christianity not 
Mysterious, the “Piece made a great Noise in the Republick of Letters, and was 
attacked by several considerable Pens.”25  The overall tone of the work is 
sympathetic.  Curll believed Toland had been unfairly criticised for advancing 
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opinion and encouraging discussion.  This continued with the inclusion of an 
anonymous letter: 
As you have often remarked, the Clamours against his Writings, were 
wholly undeserved, and proceeded chiefly from those Upstarts who envied 
his Learning, from some insolent conceited Priests, or from those bigotted 
Enthusiasts who never read them, or could not have understood them if they 
had.   
 
It ended simply: “Let him that is free from Sin, cast the first Stone.”26
 Anthony Collins too noted Toland’s death, but not with much sympathy.  
Though the two were hardly close friends, Collins’ letter to Pierre Desmaizeaux on 
15 March was cold: “I find by the Papers, that Mr Toland dyed on Saturday last at 
Putney.  If that be so, I desire the favour of you, if you have an opportunity, to 
inquire & learn if the Books which I have lent him may be got.”  These included a 
“very valuable collection of tracts, not to be met with, and what I want and must buy 
again. If I cannot recover my own.”27  Two of the works, a life of Pierre Bayle and 
Edmund Ludlow’s Memiors had been in Toland’s possession since at least 1716.28
 When Desmaizeaux released his collection of Toland’s unpublished 
manuscripts in 1726, at least one member of Robert Harley’s family paid attention.29  
William Stratford ensured that Harley’s son, Edward Harley, the second Earl of 
Oxford was aware of A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr John Toland.  Referring 
to Edward’s father, Stratford told the young Earl that in “the second volume I meet 
with someone to which I was not wholly a stranger, though I did not think it had 
gone quite so far.  I fancy your uncle could explain somewhat there to you.”  
Clearly, Toland’s efforts for Harley were not unknown, but the extent seems to have 
surprised many.  Stratford revealed his feelings clearly: “I think I own it dangerous 
as well as improper for anyone to deal with such cattle, upon any terms of any 
occasion.”  Moreover, Edward was not to believe the picture of Toland found within 
the pages of the collection, because Desmaizeaux had purposely omitted many 
documents—namely Locke’s letters to Molyneux—which tended to cast Toland in 
an unfavourable light.30  While this was likely not an uncommon view of the 
Collection, the anonymous review in The Present State of the Republick of Letters 
took a more moderate tone.  The reviewer complained that it was “the common 
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effect of prejudice against those who differ from us too widely, either in Religion or 
Politicks, to strip them at once of every commendable quality.  This seems to have 
been very much Mr. Toland’s Case.”  What was more, Toland’s writings, though 
apparently riddled with heresy and error, reveal him to “have been a Gentleman of 
great natural parts, and acquired knowledge.”  As such the posthumous anthology 
“deserve[d] the attention of the learned.”31  In death Toland received what he 
wanted in life: a fair assessment of his work which encouraged its inclusion in the 
republic of letters.   
Collins versus Whiston on Prophecy 
 In that same year, the Nonjuror Richard Coxe lamented what he viewed as 
the persistent denial of religious mysteries in England.  His chief concern was the 
rejection of the Trinity but he addressed other attempts to remove the unknowable 
from Christianity.  Coxe knew that the tone of his work was important because “the 
more shocking it may be to Hereticks, the more They will decry it.”  Only with 
reasoned arguments offered to their opponents did Nonjurors like Coxe and High-
Churchmen believe they could restore “the Church of God.”  It seems that the 
inflammatory rhetoric of Sacheverell was no longer the chosen vehicle to battle 
deists, rather the orthodox combatants chose the strategy of their antagonists and 
engaged in the learned debate that deists had always wanted.32
 Toland’s death, as Coxe’s lament indicates, did not end the efforts of deists 
to advance their views.  During the mid-1720s Collins debated William Whiston on 
providence, and prophecy.33  We begin with A Discourse of the Grounds and 
Reasons of the Christian Religion (1724), a work Collins’ friend the political 
commentator John Trenchard referred to as an entertaining “thunderstroke” in recent 
debates over religion.34  Collins stated that revelations were built upon other 
revelations and that Christianity was constructed on “prophecy as a principle.”35  
Though he did not deny that prophecy occurred, Collins stated that the only true 
meaning which could be assigned to a prophecy was a literal one fulfilled at the 
time of the original prophet and not at some date in the future.  There was no 
predictive aspect in prophecy—it could not prove a revealed Christianity.36  Only if 
the interpretation of an ancient, Old Testament, prophetic statement was done 
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allegorically did Collins believe that it could predict New Testament events.  This 
was unacceptable to Collins who stressed the “obvious and literal sense, which bear 
in the Old Testament.”37  The introduction of allegory into religion, Collins wrote, 
originated among pagans who believed religion was a mysterious thing which could 
not be plainly discussed.  Therefore, “it was never simply represented to the people, 
but was most obscurely deliver’d and valid under allegories, or parables, or 
Hierogliphicks….”  Christians who argue for such interpretation of prophecy were 
no better than ancient atheists.38   
 The second half of Collins’ book concentrated on Whiston’s strategy for 
prophetic interpretation, as did the two-volume follow-up work, The Scheme of 
Literal Prophecy Considered (1726).  Whiston is an interesting figure.  He 
succeeded to the Lucasian Chair of Mathematics at Cambridge on Newton’s 
recommendation, but then lost it after he was banned from the university in 1710 for 
publicly avowing the Arian-like theology that he shared with Newton and Clarke.  
Whiston spent the remainder of his days giving public lectures in natural philosophy 
and religion.39  Like Newton, Whiston saw prophecy as certain proof of the 
Christian religion and asserted there was also a moral element to prophecy.40  In a 
manuscript treatise on the subject Newton wrote that prophecy was to “guide & 
direct” the Church “in the right way, And is not this the End of all Prophectick 
Scripture?”41  Newton admonished those who “shall turn Scripture from the plain 
meaning to an Allegory or to any other less naturall sense…” because, “Truth is 
ever to be found in simplicity, & not in ye multiplicity & confusion of things.”42  It 
is evident that Newton took some interest in Collins’ thoughts on this matter 
because the only deist work in his library was Discourse of the Grounds and 
Reasons of the Christian Religion.43  Likewise, Whiston’s guidelines for prophetic 
interpretation stated “The obvious or literal sense of Scripture is the True and Real 
one, where no evident reason can be given to the contrary.”44   
Collins and Whiston both agreed that allegorical meanings were to be 
rejected in favour of single literal fulfilment.  Where the two differed was in the 
temporal location of this fulfilment.  Whiston believed all prophecies literally 
predicted Christ and were thus fulfilled during Jesus’ lifetime, while Collins 
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maintained that fulfilment occurred only during the life of the prophet.45  For 
Collins, Whiston’s notion of literal was merely another form of allegory.  On 
Whiston’s method, Collins commented that “It is necessary to confound the 
Prophets, and to reduce their prophecys to nothing, or to an unintelligible fate, 
before an interpretation remote from the sense of the Prophets can be introduc’d.”46  
What is more, “to confute Mr. W’s hypothesis effectually, I observe, that he is not 
able, …to restore any citations of prophecies made from the Old Testament and 
said to be fulfill’d in the New, as to make them obviously, and literally, and 
agreeably to the context where he places them, relate to the purposes, for which they 
are cited authors of the New Testament.”47  In defence of his views Whiston 
presented some 300 examples of literally fulfilled prophecy.  He claimed that of 
these “The main Aim of most of the Prophecies of the Old Testament, was the 
coming of the Messias, and the Circumstances and Characters of him and his 
Kingdom.”48  Against this assertion, Collins replied that a single real example would 
have sufficed.  Whiston further argued that the reason why Old Testament 
prophecies do not obviously foretell the coming of Christ is due to the corruption of 
the text.  Here Whiston also followed Newton who believed that the original 
religion—consisting of “two great commandments of loving the Lord our God with 
all our heart & soul & mind, & our neighbours as ourselves”—was “propagated by 
Noah to his posterity” before “they revolted” and “ceased to be his [God’s] 
people….”49  Any product of religion, including the Bible, produced since this 
deviation was inherently corrupt.  To rectify this fault Whiston proposed a new 
edition and translation of the Bible.  Collins was suspicious of the endeavour: it “is 
incredible, that the Old Testament should be so corrupted as Mr. Whiston asserts.”  
And, what is more, “a bible restor’d, according to Mr. W’s Theory, will be a mere 
WHISTONIAN BIBLE….”50  For prophecy to have any value at all, Whiston and 
Newton agreed, it must contain future predictions.  While Collins did not deny that 
prophecy occurred, he maintained that it did so in the distant past and in no way 
supported arguments in favour of a supernatural element to religion. 
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The Accession of George II 
 When the first Hanoverian monarch took the throne in 1714 protest and 
predictions of divine retribution were minor but a sense of uncertainty followed 
George I’s every step.  Thirteen years later, when his son, the Prince of Wales, 
became George II, the coronation might well be described as an expected non-
event.51  Even those who still viewed the crown as a Stuart one saw their cause as 
hopeless and resigned themselves to the facts.  No doubt typical is the following 
note, dated 1727, scribbled in the flyleaf of John Dunton, The New Practice of Piety 
(1705): “Whereas itt hath Pleased Almighty God of his Great mercy to take Unto 
himself our last Sovereign King George of Happy Memory the Imperial Crown of 
these King James is Rightfully and Sole Come to the High and Mighty Prince 
George Prince of Wales.”52   
 The same year was also a time for reflection and, perhaps, a chance to renew 
the righteousness of the nation by refuting the arguments posed by our deists.  John 
Maxwell (fl. 1715), prebendary of Connor and chaplain to Lord Carteret (1690-
1763), who had also made an early English translation of the Principia, produced a 
new edition of Richard Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae (1672) titled A Treatise 
of the Laws of Nature.  Included in the book was a political essay titled Concerning 
the City, or Kingdom of God in the Rational World, and the Defects in Heathen 
Deism.  With this short treatise Maxwell examined the politics of human existence: 
“Man Political is consider’d, as a Member of Society.  The Societies are various, of 
which a Man may at the same Time be a Member, who may, therefore, be 
considered in as many various Political Lights.”  At the head of any society was 
God, an active and providential God.  Any other conception of God, Maxwell 
argued, such as acknowledging “God, or universal Mind, considering him only 
Naturally, as the Soul of the World, and not Politically, as the supreme Governor 
thereof,” failed to provide adequate foundation for that society and could produce 
only atheism or deism.  Governors, like God, provided laws and enforced them.  In 
contrast to the views of our deists, these laws originated in the ruler, not in nature 
and the order of things, nor were they the result of contractual obligations between 
ruler and those ruled.53
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 Samuel Chandler (1693-1766) also writing in the year of George II’s 
coronation issued an admonishment to deists.  Chandler came from a Dissenting 
family and was educated at the Bridgewater Academy.  His father Henry Chandler, 
who was a Dissenting minister at Hungerford and then at Bath, had the dubious 
honour of composing the preface to the sermon preached on the occasion of Thomas 
Morgan’s ordination as a Dissenting Minister.54  Though the work was titled 
Reflections on the Conduct of the Modern Deists, In their late Writings against 
Christianity, indicating a wide net of criticism, Chandler composed it as a response 
to Collins’ Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion.  This was a calculated 
decision because Chandler believed that Collins had attempted to “set himself at the 
head of those who seem to deny the truth of Christianity, and who endeavour to 
subvert the foundations on which it is supported.”55  Not entirely critical, Chandler 
did admit that he was “firmly persuaded, as they would wish me to be, that they 
have the same right, as Christians, to think for themselves, and even to declare their 
opinions in conversations, and publish them in print….”  Moreover, “They would 
have the press open to everyone, so would I.  They would be allowed to argue 
against Christianity: I hope no one will ever attempt to hinder them.  But this is not 
all they seem to want; they would have a farther liberty to insult, and revile, as well 
as argue against Christianity.”  These concession aside, he could not accept that 
“Christianity contains some maxims and principles destructive to liberty, and is a 
religion that requires it self to be supported by violence and force.”56  Deists had 
simply gone too far in their desire for intellectual freedom and this excess had 
rendered what beneficial remarks they did make unacceptable to the majority of 
Britons. 
Chubb on Government 
 The year after George II became King, Thomas Chubb offered an 
examination of the authority of civil government in matters of religion with his 
Some Short Reflections on the Ground and Extent of Authority and Liberty, with 
Respect to Civil Government.  In contrast to Maxwell, Chubb held that much of 
morality is found in and arises from “the nature of things.”  In the case of society, its 
moral direction, or common good, is derived from the inherent nature of society.  
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Accordingly, “those who have the Reins of Government in their Hands, should 
make the common Good the governing Principle of their Actions, thro’out their 
Administration.”57  Humanity is “designed and constituted for Society” where they 
desire to be happy under natural and mutual obligation to it and to each other.  
Chubb continued that as a consequence of this constitution, society may “have no 
Demand upon any Individual, but in those Cases which it is for the publick Good; 
nor lay a Restraint upon any Individual, but in those Cases wherein the Publick is 
injured.”58  In the matter of religion, which Chubb emphasised was a personal 
relationship between believer and God, “Governors have no Authority” because 
“they have no Right to oblige or restrain any Individual” who is acting as they think 
most pleasing to God.  “The Favour of God,” he wrote, “and the Happiness of 
another World, are what Society can neither give, nor secure, nor take away from 
any Individual….”  If government claimed to be a defender of truth, especially of 
religious truth, it must “protect and defend Men in their Searches, and Enquiries 
after it….”59  To do otherwise would be to act as a tyrannical government and one 
unworthy of ruling in England.  Chubb urged George II to heed this advice. 
 Four years later, Chubb described two celebrated anniversaries from 
England’s history as a means to illustrate his theory of governance.  He could hardly 
have chosen two more charged dates: 30 January (the execution of Charles I) and 5 
November (the Gunpowder Plot and William’s arrival).  Regarding the latter, Chubb 
explained that “the publick good ought always to be preferred … as the end and 
design of Government, is not to give princes an absolute dominion over the liberties 
and properties, … but only to constitute them guardians of the societies 
happiness….”60  In the case of 1688-1689, the public was not served by a Catholic 
king, and therefore the national welfare demanded a revolution in the name of the 
common good.  As for 30 January, Chubb was sorry to see that it had “been 
generally made to serve, has been for the clergy to preach up the doctrine of 
passive-obedience and non-resistance in the most absolute and unlimited sense.”  He 
focused on the late controversy following Sacheverell’s infamous sermon.  Chubb 
noted with satisfaction that passive obedience was much less invoked since “the 
house of Hanover has been happily settled upon the British throne, than 
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heretofore.”61  Obviously, as he put it, “the two anniversaries … are founded upon 
two contradictory and incompatible principles.”  One offered light, the other 
darkness.  The one date to remember was that most compatible with the chief goal 
of government: that is, with the public good and through it “the good of each 
individual.”  The anniversary of 5 November allowed Chubb to provide his readers 
with a tangible example of “how we ought to behave under a vicious prince, who 
wickedly abuses the trust reposed in him, by attempting and endeavouring to 
undermine and destroy the common happiness … so, this anniversary point out to 
the members of society, how they ought to act, when the common happiness is in an 
apparent danger….”62  In a later work, Chubb again addressed this date and 
disassociated it from any divine act of special providence by suggesting that an 
effective English fleet had done as much to safeguard the Prince of Orange’s arrival 
as any supposed action taken by God.63
 Preserved among a collection of miscellaneous writings by Edmund Gibson, 
Bishop of London, were a few musings on government and religion, which take as 
their target positions very near, if not identical, to those published by Chubb: “No 
Government is wisely contriv’d, in which Religion is not consider’d as one branch 
of the Institution,” wrote Gibson.  In direct challenge to Chubb’s alternative view, 
Gibson continued that “[t]he Supreme Legislative Powers in every Country, have a 
Right, as that are entrusted with the Publick welfare, to Establish and Encourage 
that Religion which they believe to be true, and to appoint such Forms of Worship 
and Services, as are judg’d, upon mature deliberation, to be agreeable to the nature 
and precepts of it.”  Where Chubb saw protection of personal worship as a 
cornerstone of good government, Gibson judged a government neglectful which did 
not regulate religion as it saw fit for the betterment of the nation.  What was more, 
those who challenged the nation’s orthodoxy threatened the “civil establishment” 
and needed to be prosecuted on that account.64  For Chubb, had he ever seen these 
writings, Gibson’s views would have only confirmed the need for his. 
Collins’ Final Work and His Death 
 Collins final work, A Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing 
(1729), was a historical study of ridicule concentrating on religious writings.  
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Collins saw England as a special case where literature that ridiculed its subject 
formed part of the common discourse.  The book was a challenge to the suggestion 
that imprisonment was appropriate for those who laughed at and made fun of 
English laws.  Collins reminded his adversaries of the use made by ridicule in 
attacks on Catholicism and Popery in past ages, specifically Erasmus’ Praise of 
Folly.65  Moreover, he noted that Anglicans had often mocked Puritans and 
Dissenters.  Thus, turnabout was fair play in challenges to orthodoxy.  Besides, he 
wrote, no one complained about the rhetorical strategy except its victims.  The 
return of the monarchy to England in 1660, Collins asserted, had brought with it 
legislative limits on dissent as well as ridicule.66  He hoped the eighteenth century 
would be more tolerant of those who followed their reason, who sought truth in 
matters of religion and who challenged with farce and satire what seemed 
unreasonable.  Like Toland and Chubb, Collins saw the reign of the Hanoverians as 
an opportunity to remake England and the English Church into the bastions of 
toleration for which they desired. 
 On 13 December 1729 Collins died, after a long and painful ordeal with 
kidney stones.  However, his health had been poor since 1723 when his son (also 
Anthony) died.  The existing letters reveal the depths of Collins’ despair as his son 
fought a losing battle with the illness that finally claimed him.67  Though Collins 
had remarried in 1724 to Elizabeth Wrottesley, the daughter of Sir Walter 
Wrottesley, he “never enjoyed a good state of health….”  News of Collins’ death, 
according to Desmaizeaux, came “to the grief of all his Family but especially those 
who had been Eye Witness to most of his Actions near 30 years.”68  According to 
Zachary Pearce (1690-1774), Vicar of St. Martin-in-the-fields and future Bishop of 
Rochester, who relayed on 17 December a report of Collins’ last words to Lord 
Macclesfield “I am told that his dying words were to this effect, ‘I have 
endeavoured to serve true Religion and my, Country, and I hope that I shall go to a 
place where I shall find others that have done the same’.”69   
 Some observers agreed with Collins’ assessment of his own life.  Almost 
nine months to the day of Collins’ death, The Universal Spectator contained an 
“Essay on the Rural life.”  The author, Henry Stonecastle of Northumberland, Esq., 
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lamented the increasing absence of country gentlemen in England.  As an example 
of what was being lost with the extinction of this breed of man, Stonecastle cited 
Collins.   
Such was Collins, he had an opulent Fortune descended to him from his 
Ancestors … He lived on his own Estate in the Country … he always oblig’d 
his Family to a constant Attendance of Publick Worship; as he was himself a 
man of the strictest Morality, so he never suffer’d any Body about him who 
was deficient in that Point; he exercised a universal Charity to all sorts of 
People, without any Regard either to Sect of Party; being in the Commission 
of the Peace, he administered Justice with such Impartiality and 
Incorruptness … he was indulgent to his Children, hospitable to his 
Neighbours, and kind to his Servants…. 
 
Stonecastle was at a loss determining which of Collins’ characteristics would be 
most missed after his death: “the Parent, the Magistrate, the Gentleman, or the 
Scholar.”70  Conspicuous by their absence, however, is “deist” or “heretic.”  
Moreover, that Collins was praised as a model gentleman suggests that he acted in 
concert with, rather than opposed to, the national interests, a defining aspect of the 
English gentleman as Paul Langford reminds us.71  This is evidence that Collins 
acted for the benefit of England rather than wishing to undermine the political 
establishment as has often been suggested. 
A former servant of Collins’, Richard Dighton, wrote to Desmaizeaux in 
mid-March 1731 alerting him to this edition of The Universal Spectator.  Though 
Dighton was pleased to see such a favourable account of his late master, he 
lamented the fact that memory of Collins seemed to be vanishing: “I hope to live to 
See something come from you that will be a lasting Monument to the Character of 
that Great Man, I mean his Life which I am told you are now about to write.  I hope 
it is true, I dare day Sr. you agree with me that ‘tis pitty such an Honest & great man 
as he was should be quite forgott & no body is so able to doe it as your self.”72  
While it is unclear to which impending life of Collins Dighton referred, as no 
contemporary book-length biography exists, it is likely to have been the entry 
contained in Bayle’s Dictionary, which Desmaizeaux greatly expanded.73
Desmaizeaux knew much about Collins’ life from their friendship and from 
Collins’ manuscripts, which Desmaizeaux received by the terms of Collins’ will.  
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However, Desmaizeaux was somewhat uneasy about removing them from the 
family.  As he explained in a letter dated 6 January 1730, Collins’ widow told him 
that she “should be glad to have them, and I made them over to her, whereupon She 
was pleased to present me with 50 Guineas.”74  Some months later, Desmaizeaux 
became “persuaded that I have betray’d ye trust of a person who for 26 years has 
given me continued instances of his friendship and confidence.”  He then requested 
that his unnamed correspondent help him retrieve the manuscripts.  Collins’ widow 
ignored the request.75
Seven years later, in 1737, Desmaizeaux came to loath his decision to 
relinquish the manuscripts.  Gossip had spread throughout London that some of 
Collins’ manuscripts were now in the possession of Edmund Gibson, now Bishop of 
London.  Desmaizeaux believed the story and was free in his speculation: perhaps 
Collins’ family had inadvertently allowed it to happen even though they had 
promised to keep the papers safe.  News of this reached Collins’ daughter Elizabeth 
in early March.  She wrote directly to Desmaizeaux.  “I am determined,” she told 
him, “to trace out the Grounds of such a report and you can be no friend of Mine 
[and] no friend of Mr. Collins … if you refuse to acquaint me what foundation you 
had for such a charge.”76  In reply, Desmaizeaux explained he had been “lately with 
some honourable persons I told them it had been reported that some of Mr. C’s will 
were fallin into the hands of Strangers, and that I shou’d be glad to receive from you 
such information as might enable me to disprove that report.”  While Desmaizeaux 
did not know for certain which manuscripts had potentially found their way into 
unfriendly hands, he speculated that it was the “MS in eight volumes.”  Being no 
longer the keeper of Collins’ archive, Desmaizeaux urged Elizabeth to see whether 
he father’s papers were “entire and perfect, or whether there be any thing wanting in 
either of them.”77
Elizabeth responded on 6 April 1737 stating that she had “hoped for some 
satisfaction in relation to your charge….”  After denying that she had let any papers 
escape her, she demanded the names of anyone who had suggested that she had 
been irresponsible with her father’s documents.78  The final letter of the affair came 
from Desmaizeaux.  “I flattered myself yt my last letter wou’d have Satisfied you,” 
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he told Elizabeth, but he saw “that my hopes were in vain.”  He explained that his 
only motivation was Collins’ reputation and expressed surprise that he was now 
“represented as an enemy to you and challenged to produce proof and witnesses of a 
thing dropped in conversation….”  Desmaizeaux continued that he had not intended 
to suggest that she played am active role in the disappearance of the manuscripts, if 
indeed they were actually missing.  He ended by reminding Elizabeth “Mr. Col[lins] 
loved me, and esteemed me for my integrity, and sincerity of which he had several 
proofs, how I have been drawn in to myire him to forfite ye good opinion he had of 
me, and which, where he now alive wou’d deserved by expose me to his utmost 
contempt, is a grief of which I shall carry to ye grave.”79  In death too deists caused 
controversy even among those who were their friends.   
Tindal’s Christianity as Old as the Creation 
 In 1730, the year after Collins died, the work Tindal alluded to in his 1722 
letter to Lord Sunderland finally appeared.  Christianity as Old as the Creation 
refined Tindal’s characterisation of God who “has given Mankind sufficient Means 
of knowing what he requires of them; and what those Means are.”80  This divine gift 
had existed since the Creation but was not always acknowledged or accepted.  As 
Collins had also suggested, we know by observing the world around us “that there is 
a God; or, in other words, a Being absolutely perfect, and infinitely happy in 
himself, who is the Source of all other Beings….”  The reference to happiness 
revealed that God did not conceal His intentions from those who sought them.  
Repeating earlier conclusions, Tindal claimed that “God can require nothing of us, 
but what makes for our Happiness; so he, who can’t envy us any Happiness … can 
forbid us those Things only, which tend to our Hurt; and this we are as certain of, as 
that there is a God infinitely happy in himself, infinitely good and wise….”81  Simon 
Browne (1680-1732), one time pastor of the congregation in the Old Jewry, London, 
rebuked Tindal by asserting that “It is becoming of God to honour himself, to expect 
honour from his rational creatures, to approve those who pay it, to dislike and be 
displeased with those who do not….”82  Where Browne viewed God as jealous and 
demanding, Tindal, like Toland and Collins, argued that those things necessary for 
this life are clear and known to everyone. 
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 Like his fellow deists, Tindal accused “designing priests” of constraining the 
right of people to think freely in religion.  This imposition by men who wished to 
preserve their importance, Tindal called priestcraft and directed his critical 
comments against it.  The only priest that Tindal accepted was God, who would 
never have left the care of His religion in the hands of “a self-perpetuating, self-
regulating body of men.”83  Tindal took to task those who presented alternative 
descriptions of God and was especially critical of Catholics in this regard.   
The Popish Priests are so far from giving the People any just idea of God, 
that they represent him as an arbitrary and tyrannical Being, imposing the 
highest pain, the practice of ridiculous Ceremonies, and belief of absurd 
Doctrines … But ‘tis no wonder, that they are made to believe, that God 
requires to observing in different Things on the severest Penalties; since 
their Priests claim the same Power, in making such things necessary to the 
communicating in their Holy Church; out of which they affirm Salvation is 
not to be had.84
 
This view of God who withheld knowledge and punished with an arbitrary will any 
person who gave offence is what Tindal sought to overturn.  God was not a being to 
fear but rather admire; His desire was happiness in those who worship Him.  Those 
who suggest otherwise, that God favours a certain denomination while damning 
another, make Him a tyrant and unworthy of worship.85
Tindal Tangles with Samuel Clarke 
Tindal’s chief opponent in this argument was the late Newtonian Samuel 
Clarke (he had died in 1729) against whom is directed an entire chapter in 
Christianity as Old as the Creation.  In the second of Clarke’s Boyle Lectures, 
which secured his reputation as a Christian apologist and Newtonian populariser, he 
wrote that deists “have just and right Notions of God and of all the Divine Attributes 
in every respect; who declare they believe that there is One, Eternal, Wise Being; 
the Creator, Preserver, and Governour of all things.”  Nevertheless, these same 
deists refused to believe any revelation from an active God preferring to measure 
the divine intellect against their own.86  Contrary to such notions, Clarke stated 
“That the same God who Created all things by the Word of his Power, and upholds 
and preserves them by his continual Concourse, does also by his All-wise 
Providence perpetually govern and direct the issues and events of the World, and of 
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all, even the smallest things, that are therein.”87  This God was also unlimited in 
power and action.  As Clarke explained, “The Self-Existent and Original Cause of 
all Things, is not a necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.”88  
Clarke presented a Newtonian view of God and one he shared with Whiston who 
similarly claimed God “is a Free Agent, no way limited by any Necessity or Fate, 
but acting still by Choice, and according to his own good Pleasure.”89 Both men 
suggested that one needed only to admire the natural world to know that the image 
of God they presented was correct.90  Nature, thus, was to be interpreted within 
correct theological assumptions because deists argued that the same world also 
proved their view of a reasonable, consistent, and knowledge-sharing God.  
Theology was the lens through which nature was observed and interpreted. 
Tindal further commented on what he viewed as Clarke’s defective notion of 
God: “Can a Being be denominated merciful, and good, who is so only to a few; but 
cruel, and unmerciful to the rest?”91  For Tindal the answer clearly was no.  James 
Foster (1697-1753), a nonconformist minister at Barbican chapel, defended Clarke 
against Tindal’s assault by placing the differing reception of God’s message not 
with the divine author but with the human recipients.  Foster explained that “God 
did not design all mankind, tho of the same species of being, for equal happiness; 
because they have not the same capacities, nor the same advantages, nor an equal 
probability of obtaining the highest, that their rational nature may be capable of.”92  
Though God may indeed communicate in the clear language that Tindal supposed, 
not every person is capable to understand it.  Even if this was not the case, Foster 
argued that God might wish to communicate with some people and not with others, 
as is His right.  This was a God who engaged in “the free distribution of his favours, 
in dispensing which, he may act with what variety, and make what difference he 
pleases….”93  It is directly opposite to that advanced by Tindal whose God would 
not allow some to receive “favours” at the expense of others; divine goodness did 
not permit selective salvation.   
Daniel Waterland, Trinitarian theologian and Master of Magdalene College, 
Cambridge, also read Foster’s book with interest and told Edmund Gibson that “It is 
grave, and in the main rational.”  Waterland’s reading notes inserted into his copy of 
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Tindal’s Christianity as Old as the Creation reveal that he agreed with Foster 
regarding the disposition of God’s providence.  Some people were more able to 
comprehend divine communication than were others.  “Reason,” Waterland wrote in 
the margins, “is an excellent gift: But Sometimes bestowed upon fools: that make no 
use of it.”  However, Waterland did not approve of the concessions Foster made in 
showing the errors in Tindal’s writings, which Waterland’s notes indicate he read 
side by side with Christianity as Old as the Creation.94  Chief among Waterland’s 
concerns was that Foster gave “up the doctrine of the Trinity” but “Whether He be 
Arian or Socinian, is not certain.”  While Waterland decried the work of deists, 
some answers to them, like those by unitarian thinkers such as Clarke and Foster, 
did more harm than good.95  To win the battle against deism but lose belief in the 
Trinity was no victory.  As Waterland commented to Gibson, “defenders of 
Religion,” like Foster, “I conceive, will do us no service.  They are the men I am 
most afraid of.”96  Thus, sharp black and white lines of distinction between deists 
and their opponents are perhaps best characterised as shades of grey. 
Mathematics and Historic Revelation 
Tindal’s comments on revelation are entirely consistent with his thoughts on 
God: “We are not required to believe more of God than we can conceive of 
him….”97  As for revelation, if it took place, it did so within rules established by 
God.  Tindal described this regulation as the “Law of Reason” and stated that it 
existed “antecedent to any external Revelation, that God can’t dispense, either with 
his Creatures of himself, for not observing….”98  Revelation must conform to 
human reason, otherwise it would be useless.  Again Waterland refuted Tindal on 
this matter in another letter sent to Gibson.  No such law ever existed, Waterland 
advised Gibson, and “No absolutely perfect Law can be grafted upon any thing but 
the promise of immortality which nature knows not of, which takes not within 
natural light.”  Only God may provide unbreakable laws, any found in nature are 
entirely contingent.99   
As for reports of historic revelation, where witnesses no longer lived, Tindal 
was very suspicious.  How, Tindal asked, may we trust the stories of revelation or 
miracles from so long ago?  The “very Nature of Probability is such,” he replied 
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“that were it only left to Time itself, even that wou’d wear it quite out; at least if it 
be true what Mathematicians pretend to demonstrate, viz. That the Probability of 
Facts depending on human Testimony, must gradually lessen in proportion to the 
Distance of the Time when they were done.”100  To support this position Tindal 
turned to John Craig’s Theologiae Christianae Principia Mathematica (1699).101  A 
Scottish mathematician, Craig (d. 1731) had endeavoured to determine a likely date 
for the Second Coming by using mathematics to chart the decline in belief of 
historic testimony and thus arrive at a date when faith in Christ would no longer 
exist.  Tindal was particularly interested in the pages containing the results of 
Craig’s calculations “that after 3150 years from the birth of Christ the probability of 
his written history will vanish.”102  For Tindal this was certain proof that human 
testimony was a poor foundation for Christianity and belief in historic miracles.   
A generation earlier others anticipated the potential danger of Craig’s work.  
Edmund Gibson wrote to Hans Sloane (1660-1753), then secretary of the Royal 
Society, in October 1699 on this issue.  He urged the inclusion in the Philosophical 
Transactions of a paper that stressed the reliability and consistency of human 
testimony “by a very good friend; who was accidentally lead to satisfie himself 
about it by the Publication of a late Book.”  The anonymous author of the tract had 
also used mathematical proofs to demonstrate that human testimony would survive 
intact even over great distances of time from the original event.  Gibson believed the 
article would confute “a late wild and dangerous hypothesis that has given much 
advantage to Deists and Atheists.”103  Other observers believed that Craig’s book 
was in the same league with Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious.  In March 1701, 
the High-Church Tory Francis Atterbury advised an acquaintance that Craig’s book 
was being inspected along with Toland’s by the Lower House of Convocation.104  If 
testimony was reliable, then the miraculous events described by the Apostles could 
not be dismissed solely on the basis of temporal distance as deists maintained.   
This tactic continued to find adherents among enemies of deism.  Joseph 
Butler (1692-1752), Bishop of Durham, in his Analogy of Religion (1736) later 
commented that are many accounts “of miracles wrought in attestation of 
Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject; it lies upon 
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unbelievers to show, why this evidence is not to be credited.”  Charles Leslie 
rehearsed such arguments in A Short and Easy Method with the Deists where he 
affirmed that one must accept biblical miracles because many pagans were 
converted to Christianity “upon the Conviction of what themselves had seen, what 
had been done publickly before their Eyes, wherein it was impossible to have 
Impos’d upon them.”105  Lesilie’s fellow nonjurors approved of his approach.  A 
commonplace book with entries by Hilkiah Bedford, Fellow of St John’s College, 
Cambridge, records that, in accordance with Leslie, historical accounts contained in 
Scripture should be accepted as fact because they were composed during the 
lifetime of Christ when other witnesses would have quickly revealed any falsehoods 
in the writings.  Deists, Bedford argued, could provide no answer to this critique.106
Tindal’s image of an immutable and knowledge-sharing God provoked 
many readers.  Simon Browne contended Tindal’s presentation made God a slave to 
the Creation.  Moreover, God would be a very poor legislator if He could never 
change his mind or alter what he had previously done.107  John Leland supported 
this position when he claimed that “God may require Things afterwards, which he 
did not actually require at the Beginning, and that supposing an Alteration in the 
Circumstances of Mankind, it may by highly agreeable to his Wisdom and 
Goodness….”108  Whereas Tindal argued that this view made God an incompetent 
artist, William Law countered that He “is not an arbitrary Being, but does that 
which the incomprehensible perfections of his own nature, make it fit and 
reasonable for him to do.”109  Similarly, Foster refuted Tindal’s analogy between 
God’s government and earthly rulers.  “[T]here is,” he challenged, “no arguing from 
earthly governments to God’s government of the world; and what would be 
tyrannical in the one, may be very wise and fit in the other.”110  Such challenges had 
no effect on Tindal who held that God was consistent and predictable in his 
governance. 
Chubb on Providence and Revelation 
 Like Collins and Tindal before him, Chubb remarked on the contemporary 
acceptance of the Copernican worldview which had replaced the Ptolemaic outlook.  
When Chubb dismissed arguments against him that he claimed we based on blind 
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adherence to tradition, authority, and simple acceptance of general consensus, rather 
than careful consideration of the arguments, he suggested the following: “Suppose 
the reasons, upon which the Ptolemaick system of astronomy was grounded had 
obtained universal assent; would that system have been well grounded, because the 
reasons upon which it is grounded had been universally admitted? And ought 
universal opinion to have determined the judgement of Copernicus, against the 
strongest and most obvious reasons to the contrary?  Surely, not.”111  When people 
are permitted to use their reason to consider the reality of things, unfounded 
philosophical schemes do not survive.  The same was true in matters of religion.  
George Wightwick, minister to a congregation at Kingston upon Thames, did not 
agree that God adapted His messages to human intellects.  He claimed that Chubb’s 
position was a “piece of stupidity and folly” and that one could only “pretend to 
vindicate it.”112  Wightwick stressed that those who suggested “God reveals nothing 
to us, but what our weak and shallow reason is able perfectly to comprehend,” do a 
great disservice to the infinite wisdom of God.”113
 In Human Nature Vindicated (1736) Chubb stated, “God does not require 
Men to do what they cannot do: He is not such an unreasonable Task-Master, as to 
require Bricks when there is not Materials for making them.”114  God would never, 
Chubb continued, require the impossible from humanity.  Those who argued the 
contrary position were mistaken and perhaps motivated by personal gain.  Humanity 
was never “unfairly dealt with” and God would always provide the materials for 
correct belief.  It was an insult to the creator that He should require duties that 
humans cannot perform.115  
We know that Chubb’s work on this and other subjects found a public 
audience.  An anonymous full-page editorial in Fog’s Weekly Journal (9 January 
1731), a High-Church periodical, conceded that Chubb had made some good points 
regarding God’s relationship to humanity, nevertheless, Chubb had exaggerated the 
merits of human reason.  The author concluded that “Man, tho’ originally created 
perfect, is, by some Means or other, now become defective….”116  The literary 
paper, The Present State of the Republick of Letters also considered Chubb’s 
position on reason and religion.  The reviewer believed that Chubb had purposely 
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“taken a great deal of pains to exalt reason in opposition to revelation.”  The 
anonymous critic challenged this suggestion in an attempt to reassert the importance 
of revelation and the necessary aid of divine guidance.117
Tindal’s Death and the Controversy Over his Will 
 Matthew Tindal died on 16 August 1733.  The following month, the 
physician, and All Souls graduate, Pierce Dod (1683-1754) provided an account of 
Tindal’s last moments: “The same vanity which seduc’d him to be so much out of 
the way most part of his life continued with him to the last, and he was as proud of 
dying hard as ever he was to be reputed a Top Free Thinker.”118  Though Dod spoke 
harshly of Tindal’s final thoughts, the two had shared experiences at All Souls.  
Like Tindal, Dod too had been compelled by Warden Gardiner to take orders.  Dod, 
however, took his case directly to Archbishop Tenison and despite Gardiner’s 
protests a hearing was conducted at Lambeth Palace.  Eventually Dod avoided 
orders by taking a medical degree rather than an MA.  Tindal and Dod had some 
personal association with one another because both were present during one of the 
Fellows’ organisational meetings.119  Despite his unwillingness to become a divine, 
which he shared with Tindal, Dod believed that Tindal had gone too far in his 
theological assertions. 
Controversy that seemed Tindal’s constant companion while he lived 
continued to follow him even after his death.  Like Collins, the terms of Tindal’s 
will, and the ownership of manuscripts, caused a bitter confrontation first in private 
but then in a public dispute conducted in the Grub Street Journal for the better part 
of two years.  The episode began when the bookseller Edmund Curll published a 
copy of Tindal’s will in October 1733.120  Less than a month later, a letter was 
printed in the Grub Street Journal which challenged the legitimacy of the will in 
addition to denying the truthfulness of the will’s only heir.121  The unnamed 
beneficiary was Eustace Budgell for whom Tindal had acted as patron and at some 
point Budgell had borrowed £2,000 from Tindal.122  The disputed passage of the 
will reproduced by Curll stated that Tindal had bequeathed Budgell “the Sum of two 
thousand one hundred Pounds, … my Strong Box, my Diamond Ring, and all my 
Manuscript-Books, Papers, and Writings….”123   
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Included among the manuscripts purportedly given to Budgell was part two 
of Christianity as Old as the Creation.  Budgell was killed in 1737 the victim of a 
boat accident, and no finished second volume has ever surfaced.  Only a partial 
introduction of the book exists which circulated around 1732.124  Contemporary 
rumours alleged and generations of historians believed that Edmund Gibson, Bishop 
of London, suppressed and subsequently hid or destroyed the manuscript.  David 
Berman and Stephen Lalor dispute this claim arguing that no proof exists with 
which to convict Gibson.  However, given Gibson’s implication in the gossip 
surrounding Collins’ papers at around this same time, and his known hatred of 
deists, contemporaries might well have been right to suspect the Bishop’s 
complicity in any destruction of a deist’s manuscripts.125  Without evidence, 
however, we may only speculate. 
 Tindal’s nephew, Nicholas Tindal, refused to believe that his uncle had 
forsaken his entire family in favour of Budgell.  Nicolas raised his doubts in the 
Grub Street Journal, which recorded on 6 December 1733 that Nicolas found the 
will “contrary to what his uncle had lately told him.”  Budgell replied that the will 
was genuine.  The editor of the Grub Street Journal was also uncertain as to the 
will’s authenticity and questioned why Tindal would have misspelled his own name 
three times and why he seems to have given away £800 more than he was reportedly 
worth.  There was, the editor wrote, “some secret mystery in this affair….”126  On 
17 January 1734 the saga continued.  Nicolas had gone to Budgell’s home and 
demanded to see the will.  When Tindal’s strongbox was opened, not £2100 was 
present but only £1100.  Nicolas “who before suspected foul play, was now by this 
information and other circumstances, strongly confirmed in his suspicions.”127  
While the dispute continued into March 1734, the will was ultimately proven a 
forgery, though not before Budgell threatened to take his case directly to Robert 
Walpole.  However, with the Excise Crisis occupying his time, it is unlikely that 
Walpole would have cared very much about Budgell or his claimed inheritance.128
 The debate over the authenticity of Tindal’s will was not the only deist 
matter that found its way into the pages of the Grub Street Journal in the mid-
1730s.  In the number for 25 September 1735 an anonymous poem titled “On the 
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Deists Scheme of Fitness” satirised and refuted the deist conceptions of God and 
providence.  The unknown poet claimed “Some daring Wits have raised an impious 
scheme / To laws and rules subjecting the Supreme….”  New arguments are not 
found here.  Deists, it is claimed, attempt to destroy the picture of an all-powerful 
God who is not restrained by His Creation.  Rather, the poem continues that deists 
worship an inherent organising principle in nature, which “With obligations wou’d 
restrain their God; / Boldly assigning a superior rule, / Which God must act by, and 
must God controul.”129  While our deists never stated this position explicitly, this 
characterisation is important in that it portrays a popular understanding of deism.  
With such depictions in periodicals, there can be little wonder why deism was 
perceived as a threat.130   
Chubb on Miracles and Providence 
As did Tindal, Chubb refused to accept that God did not offer His message 
freely to all people.  “[I]t is unreasonable,” he claimed, “that God should make a 
species of creatures capable of future bliss or torment, and that he should pre-ordain 
a few of that species to a state of unspeakable and eternal happiness, and the rest of 
them to a state of extreme and eternal misery….”131  God, as conceived by Chubb, 
had no interest in propagating misery.  Caleb Fleming (1698-1779), dissenting 
minister and rumoured Socinian, responded by claiming that the fault of partial 
reception of God’s religion did not reside with God.  The divine message was 
perfectly presented; however, only the righteous received divine instruction.  Those 
who do not receive it must be wicked; the defect lies with the recipient and not 
God.132
 In his discussions of miracles in the late 1730s Chubb separated divine 
providence into two types: “particular” and “general.”  God had created the world as 
an act of particular providence.  The way God continued to act in the Creation to 
preserve its regular operation in accordance with divine laws was an example of 
general providence.  As part of the original act of particular providence, God had 
made his perpetual righteousness part of his general providence.133  Thus, once God 
established the universe, He did not alter, or interfere in its operation.  In Chubb’s 
words, “God, at the creation, put the natural world under the direction of certain 
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Laws; and that ever since he has caused it to be passively subject to those laws….”  
God maintained a steady-state universe.134  The alternative view “that God should 
be frequently and almost perpetually immediately interposing as aforesaid,” is 
Chubb argued, “a supposition that is greatly unlikely in itself.…”135  If God needed 
to interfere in the Creation he would be revealed as a defective craftsman.   
Thomas Johnson (fl. 1718), one time master of the Chigwell Grammar 
School, founded in 1629 by Samuel Harsnett, Archbishop of York, refuted this 
claim by reversing Chubb’s argument.  Johnson replied that “God is perfectly free 
as to acting or not acting at all, so to every Manner of Action; and by his being 
perfectly free I mean, that he is not determined by anything ab extra.”136  Where 
Chubb saw God as good because He would not alter the Creation or impose 
impossibilities on people, Johnson held that God was great because of His unlimited 
power of action.  Critics like Johnson might have been whom Chubb had in mind 
when he noted that orthodox thinkers were quick to tar as enemies of religion or 
atheists those who did not blindly agree with them.  In this Chubb followed the 
precedent of Toland, Collins, and Tindal.137
Chubb believed that God retained the power of particular providence, though 
divine goodness greatly restricted its use.  This theme was the focus of a letter 
Chubb sent to William Bowdoin, a Boston merchant.138  Only in extraordinary cases 
would God interpose in the normal operation of the universe and override general 
providence.  The sole example that Chubb could provide of such an event was a 
comet crossing into Earth’s atmosphere the path of which God would have to alter 
in order to save humanity.  Years earlier, William Whiston had identified this exact 
extraordinary celestial event as the physical cause of the Mosaic flood.  Chubb read 
Whiston’s account, but dismissed the comet as an actual instance of particular 
providence and concluded that “such interposition is not consonant to that method 
of providence by which the Solar System is governed.”  Chubb suggested that the 
comet must have been a naturally occurring phenomenon in a universe poorly 
understood.  Moreover,  
a universal deluge was an event that was [the] production of the greatest evil 
that has befallen the inhabitants of this globe, at least, that has come to our 
knowledg; so had the Deity by a Special application of his power prevented 
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this evil, it would, surely, have been consonant to the most perfect wisdom 
and goodness; provided such Special interposition to have been likewise 
consonant to that method of providence by which God governs and directs 
the affairs of the Solar System….  And as the Deity did not interpose in an 
extraordinary way, to prevent that universal deluge, which is supposed to 
have taken place; so this renders it greatly probable that such interposition is 
not consonant to that method of providence by which the Solar System is 
governed.139   
 
That God did not divert the comet, which resulted in the Flood, proved He will not 
intervene in the regular operation of the universe.  If God did not use special 
providence to prevent the Flood, it was unlikely that He would act in the world for 
similar concerns.  God was immutable and so were the universal laws.  The universe 
operated within the unchanging laws of nature and so too did divine providence.  
Examples of supposed miracles were, Chubb claimed, attributable to the normal 
operation of nature, which was not fully understood.140
Chubb also discussed providence in a letter he sent in 1723 to the physician 
James Jurin (1684-1750), Secretary of the Royal Society.  Jurin was an advocate of 
inoculation against smallpox and used quantitative results to support his position.  
He solicited reports of inoculation from various locations in England to compose his 
evidence.  Part of the controversy surrounding inoculation originated from the 
opinions of theologians who saw the prevention of illness as interfering with God’s 
plan.141  As one critic put it: “Let the Atheist then, and the Scoffer, the Heathen and 
the Unbeliever, disclaim a dependence upon Providence, dispute the Wisdom of 
God’s Government, and deny Obedience to his Laws: Let them Inoculate, and be 
Inoculated, whose Hope is only in, and for this Life!”142  Such a view of providence 
was exactly what Chubb hoped to discredit with his works.  Advancing this goal 
perhaps explains Chubb’s letter to Jurin.  After relating the inoculation results for 
Sarum, Chubb advised Jurin that the practise had “inflamed the angry passions, & 
sturd up the bitter … [and] bigotted high churchmen….”  Chubb continued that 
these critics  
say the practice is blashemish, and diabolical; it is distrusting providence, 
and taking the power out of Gods hand; it will draw [down] divine 
Judgement, and for the proof of this point, they are so Stupid as to urge, that 
god has begun to Show his displeasure against it & us by that great mortality 
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that is amongst us, tho not one that has been in ye practise, has fallen by it.  
This and a great deal more they Say, but reason they do not, upon the 
Subject.143
 
As Chubb would tell Bowdoin, God does not intervene in the regular operation of 
the world.  The universe ran according to order established at Creation.  Moreover, 
just as “what is Called Posesion [sic] of Devils in the new Testament was no other 
in Fact but Distraction or Madness,” Chubb hoped that a sufficient amount of 
reasoning on smallpox would prove it just another disease and not God’s direct 
punitive action.144  The letter also demonstrates that Chubb perhaps wished to 
become part of the community at the Royal Society.  Andrea Rusnock has examined 
correspondence to the Royal Society under Jurin’s term as Secretary and concludes 
that people rarely sent letters simply to communicate information.  Correspondents 
“sought to prove themselves by association with a Fellow of the Royal Society or by 
presentation of credentials signifying trustworthiness.”  Though Jurin never 
acknowledged the letter, it is likely that Chubb sent it as a means to bring himself to 
Jurin’s attention by supplying important information and siding with Jurin in the 
debates with his theological enemies.  Jurin’s silence may be explained with another 
letter in which he criticised Collins’ writings calling him a heretic; perhaps Jurin did 
not wish association with a deist like Chubb.145  
 In his published works Chubb continued to address divine providence and 
questioned whether or not all miracles came directly from God.  He believed the 
answer “must remain undetermined.”146 God had, Chubb wrote, created various 
invisible beings with powers that might seem miraculous.  The existence of these 
creatures made divine authorship of any miracle uncertain.  However, he asserted 
that any miracle tending for the good of humanity, and consistent with human 
reason, must come from God.147  Nevertheless, the most famous miracle of all, that 
of resurrection of Jesus, could not with absolute certainty be attributed to God.  
Chubb conceded, however, that was the most likely cause.  Although, he stated, “A 
skilful surgeon or physician, by a timely interposition, has sometimes prevented 
death….”148  Caleb Fleming again took issue with Chubb on this point; though he 
did not specifically answer how physicians performed seemingly miraculous feats, 
 176
  
he stated that the “raising of a dead person to life, is an effect plainly above the 
natural ability or inherent power of any creature whatsoever….”149  It was up to 
Chubb to prove to him that any other creature could produce life from death.  For 
Fleming, Chubb’s argument was an example of natural philosophy proceeding into 
areas for which it had no credentials: some things were simply a matter of faith and 
could not be accounted for in terms of natural processes.   
Chubb and Newton’s Prophetic Writings 
 Following his endorsement of the practises found at the Royal Society, 
Chubb borrowed from Newton’s Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and 
the Apocalypse of St John (1732) to further support the proposition that we do not 
know the purpose of prophecy.  Chubb noted that “Sir Isaac Newton’s valuable 
discovery of the laws of gravitation, may, perhaps, be equally as useful to 
Christianity, as his discovery of the sense of prophecies, whilst it remains 
indeterminate what is the Christian revelation.”150  Until we know the true use of 
prophetic writings, Newton’s method of simplicity ought to suffice for 
hermeneutical efforts.  As we saw with Collins, this meant that only literally 
fulfilled prophecy was to be accepted as fact.  Newton’s authority was to be 
accepted because of his success in natural philosophy.  In the same way that 
Newton’s explanation of natural phenomena sufficed to account for the workings of 
a universe that was poorly understood, his strategy of biblical interpretation was to 
be preferred to more complicated schemes.  However, Chubb admitted that “tho’ it 
may be most evident, that Sir Isaac Newton[’s] greatly superior abilities better 
qualified him to discover and ascertain the true state of the natural world; yet, that 
he was thereby better qualified to discover and ascertain the true sense and meaning 
of dark and ambiguous prophecies, may not, perhaps, be quite so apparent.”151  
Truth in the physical world was analogous to truth in the spiritual world: one could 
know divine communication with the same degree of certainty that one knew the 
underlying causes of the world.  In both cases, Newton was an excellent guide.  
What was more, Newton’s work was rendering a formerly mysterious universe 
comprehensible. 
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 “The Author’s Farewel to His Readers” which proceeded Chubb’s 
Posthumous Works contained his final thoughts on God.  He asserted that God was 
bound by the rules of right and wrong, though Chubb, like Tindal, did not reveal if 
these existed prior to God or were created by Him.  Nevertheless, these rules 
dictated God’s actions including those of the Apocalypse: “God will judge the 
world, … not by capricious humour, and according to arbitrary will; but by, or 
according to, the eternal rules of right and wrong….”152  God will act justly, not 
arbitrarily.   
Morgan’s Image of God 
 We can form a correct image of God through reason by examining 
ourselves, Thomas Morgan suggested, as he entered the theological debates of the 
1720s which our deists had done so much to stimulate.  Morgan asserted that we 
may “form an Idea of God, or a Being of infinite absolute Perfection, only by 
attributing all the limited finite Perfections we find in our selves to God in an 
infinite Degree, and removing from Him whatever we conceive as implying any 
Thing of Weakness, Defect, or Imperfection.”  Thus, Morgan eliminated all the 
apparatus of institutional religion, doing away with priests and indeed with any 
mediation between the believer and God.  Morgan found support for his views, not 
in theological writings but, like Collins, in natural philosophy.  The “Method of 
forming our Ideas of spiritual intelligent Beings, had been so clearly and 
demonstratively explain’d and accounted for by the new Philosophers, upon the 
Principles of Reason….”  Contemporary philosophical explanation, Morgan 
continued, were much preferable to any “exploded Axiom in the Pagan 
Philosophy.”153  Indeed, during his examination for ordination as a Dissenting 
minister in 1716 Morgan had specifically cited his “general Survey of this 
stupendious Fabrick of the Universe” in which the planets are “retain’d in their 
proper Orbits, and kept perpetually revolving about their respective centres,” as one 
of the chief reasons why he believed in God and wished to become a minister.154
Challenges to Morgan became increasingly bitter and personal.  The 
nonconformist minister Philip Doddridge (1702-1751) described Morgan’s work as 
“detestable, inconsistent, immoral, & insolent.”155  Similarly, in a work Doddridge 
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called “among the best Books our age has produced,”156 John Leland, 
nonconformist minister in Dublin, dismissed Morgan’s notions as “ridiculous 
Superstitions, that proceed upon an entire Ignorance, or wilful Misrepresentation…” 
by a man who had no “regard to Decency or his own Reputation….”157  Leland held 
that God might intervene in the Creation at any time, for any reason.  Only by 
equating the human mind to God’s did Leland believe that Morgan was able to 
arrive at his conclusions.  Similarly, an anonymous reviewer for the Grub Street 
Journal called Morgan’s works “most tedious, immethodical, enthusiastical jumble 
of infidel cant, false history, mirepresentations, vain repetitions, and 
impertinence.”158   
 As to the clarity of God’s message, Morgan sided with our other deists in 
arguing that God did not wrap His words in riddles.  Critics saw this too.  An 
anonymous reviewer of his work lamented that Morgan had much in common with 
the positions advanced by Chubb.159  This is confirmed by considering Morgan’s 
writings on providence and revelation.  Despite admitting that he did not know 
precisely what a revelation from God might entail, Morgan claimed that God would 
never suspend the normal and regular operation of the universe to enact it: “Such a 
Supposition would be unworthy of God, as the Creator and Governor of the World, 
and the universal Cause, Preserver, and Director of Nature.”160  If God could alter 
the Creation at His will then people could not know the order of nature with the 
certainty that Morgan demanded.  He further commented that “the Order of Nature, 
which I call the Order, Will, and continued Concurrence and Agency of God, we see 
this World has lasted, bad as it is, above 5000 Years, at least, and may last for ever, 
for any Thing we know.”161  The world operated as it had in the past and as it would 
for all eternity.  This was true because God “governs the natural and moral World, 
by his constant, uninterrupted Presence, Power, and incessant Action upon both, and 
not by such essential inherent Powers or Properties in the Things themselves….”  
God’s role is that of a preserver.162  Morgan did not wish to remove God from the 
Creation but rather to eliminate the view of God as arbitrary and reactionary.  As 
support for his position, he ironically cited Samuel Clarke as holding a 
complementary view.   
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The excellent and truly learned Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his Book of natural 
and reveal’d Religion, having clearly prov’d, that there must be an eternal, 
immutable Rule of Rectitude, natural Relation of Things, and moral Fitness 
of Actions, as founded in Nature and Reason, antecedent to all positive Will 
or Law whatever; he from hence concludes that what is thus antecedently 
right, reasonable, and fit, must likewise be the positive Will and Law of 
God, who cannot but act and will agreeable to natural Order, and moral 
Fitness.163
 
While Morgan read Clarke as a potential ally, the two differed greatly.  Clarke 
believed that human reason was too weak and corrupt to comprehend the divine 
plan, let alone know if the natural order was immutable.  What is more, while 
Clarke did claim that God’s will acted “in constant conformity to the eternal Rules 
of Justice,…” he viewed God as active and unlimited in action.  The rules to which 
Morgan referred were God’s rules and could not be comprehended by human 
reason.  The present order of things did not constrain God who is “a Being indued 
with Liberty and Choice.”164   
To those who would suggest that “the Scripture it self represents the great 
Doctrines of the Christian Revelation under the Notion of Mysteries, and 
consequently that we must believe Mysteries, or not believe the Scriptures[,]” 
Morgan replied that “a Mystery, in the Scripture Notion of it, signifies something 
that depends so intirely on a Divine Testimony, that it could never have been known 
or discovered by Humane Reason … but then, I say, that when once a Thing is 
revealed, or made known, it ceases to be a Mystery, for it cannot continue to be a 
Mystery….”165  That is, once something is revealed it is no longer a mystery.  Those 
who presented scripture as mysterious and unknowable in its entirety were mistaken 
and perpetuated falsehood upon all Christians.  They were wrong, Morgan believed, 
because “Nothing that comes from God” will be “absurd, inconsistent and 
contradictory in themselves.”  God would never “require more of us than he has 
given, tho’, perhaps, he may punish us for pretending to more.”166
 John Chapman (1704-1784), Archdeacon of Sudbury (from 1741), was not 
convinced by Morgan’s assessment of God’s providence.  He was concerned that 
Morgan’s insistence that the world operated by immutable laws diminished God’s 
power, even if God Himself enacted these laws.  Repeating Clarke’s arguments 
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against Toland and Collins, Chapman asked Morgan to consider that “the Principles 
of the best Philosophy, that the present uniform, regular Course of Nature (as it is 
commonly stiled) is every moment sustain’d by the continual Action upon Matter, 
either of God himself, or subordinate Beings appointed by Him….”167  This 
criticism is somewhat curious in that Morgan actually states the identical position.  
Chapman, however, wished Morgan to accept that God may intervene in this order 
at any time.  Morgan’s image of God could not allow this.  To further support his 
refutation, Chapman drew upon the work of another Boyle Lecturer, the Bishop of 
Norwich, John Leng (1665-1727).  In his Natural Obligations to Believe the 
Principles of Religion, and Divine Revelation, Leng concluded that the denial of 
divine revelation “is the very Point upon which those who can truly be called Deists, 
begin to divide from such, as believe a divine Revelation….”168  This denial led 
only to atheism.   
Morgan Embraces Newtonian Theology 
Like Chubb, Morgan too found support for his assertions in Newton’s 
posthumously published theological writings.  Newton, Morgan believed, had 
shown that “however dark and obscure the prophetick Parts of the [Bible] may be, 
yet the Doctrines contained in it are very clear, and cannot easily mistaken.”169  This 
was an example of the power of human understanding and proof that God did not 
hide the meaning of Scripture from those who sought it.  Waterland who, as we saw, 
composed several anti-deist and anti-unitarian tracts, believed Newton’s theological 
writings to be dangerous and Chubb’s and Morgan’s use of it likely confirmed his 
fears.  He wrote to the Cambridge don, Dr. Zachary Grey (1688-1766) complaining 
that “I have been sorry that no one yet has undertaken a just Answer to Sir Isaac 
Newton’s 14th Chapter relating to the Prophecies of Daniel … That Prophectical 
way & managing this Debate in the Side of Arianisme, is a very silly one….”170  
Grey took this call to heart and composed a rebuttal to Newton’s work the following 
year.  In his book Grey claimed that Newton’s genius in mathematics had led to a 
kind of intellectual arrogance that encouraged Newton to venture into topics for 
which he was not qualified.  Grey was particularly worried that Newton’s work 
might provide support to the deists.171   
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What is Old is New Again, John Chapman on Morgan 
In his answer to Morgan’s hermeneutical strategy, Chapman also dusted off 
the Socinian threat that had been raised against Toland.  While never mentioning the 
heresy by name, the works Chapman used against Morgan were directly from the 
dispute.  Noting, with approval, the earlier writings of Robert Boyle and John Norris 
on the subject, Chapman advised Morgan to consider that revelation might “lye 
beyond and above our Reason either to discover or comprehend, it is strictly 
demonstrable, that in that case no Objections will lye from Reason against them, 
and Revelation evinc’d by other mediums must carry it and command our 
obedience.”172 Chapman also specifically asked Morgan to read Boyle’s Things 
Above Reason to rectify his ill-conceived theology.  On the cited page Boyle 
discussed “those things I have still’d Unconceivable, our Ideas are but such as a 
moderate attention sufficies to make the mind sensible that she wants either light or 
extent enough to have a clear and full comprehension of them.”173  Though Boyle, 
linked to Anglican apologetic sermons through the Boyle Lectures, had composed 
these words a generation and a half earlier, and against a different foe, Chapman 
believed the view still had a role to play in Gregorian England.  While heresies rose 
and faded, responses to them remained consistent.174  The nature of God and His 
relationship to the Creation, and the extent of human reason, remained pressing 
issues well into eighteenth-century Enlightenment England. 
Politics in Thomas Morgan’s Physico-Theology 
 Morgan’s Physico-Theology or, A Philosophico-Moral Disquisition 
Concerning Human Nature, Free Agency, Moral Government, and Divine 
Providence (1741), which as we will see described his final theory of matter and 
motion, contained a consideration of proper government based on a notion of 
humanity who desired only “their own Preservation and Well-being.”  God 
impressed this goal within every person and provided them reason to obtain it.175  In 
tandem with reason went “Liberty of human Actions, viz. in a Power of suspending 
the Judgment and consequent Choice and Pursuit, in order to a thorough 
Examination, and till proper Evidence shall appear, and the carrying the Assent no 
farther than the Evidence, Perception of Truth.  This is moral probationary Liberty, 
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or the Liberty of a Creature under moral Government….”  Morgan argued that it 
was thus self-evident that freedom of thought was the foundation of proper religion.  
Were it not so, humanity would be “necessary beings” or “mere passive” sufferers 
who relied upon the guidance of others to think for them.176   
 Any form of government which supported these conditions and sought to 
secure the happiness and peace of the nation was desirable.  Contrarily, 
governments which did not encourage independent thought, and the arrival at truth 
through an individual’s use of reason, were to be resisted.  As Morgan put it “Men 
in Society ought to be considered either in a State of Peace or War, as having their 
Interests and Happiness mutually connected, or inconsistent with, or repugnant to 
each other.”177  One of the chief causes of conflict within a society was secular 
intrusion into matters, which concerned a believer and God.  This juxtaposition 
between “divine and human Government, or between Theocracy and Civil Polity” 
was unfounded because Morgan, like Chubb, argued that human governments 
cannot regulate a person’s heart or beliefs.178  Religion ought not to be a political 
tool; it was a matter between the believer and God.   
 Nevertheless, Morgan acknowledged his views were not widely accepted.  
He hypothesised that wrong notions of religion began in a person’s early education 
and continued into adulthood.  These persons demanded adherence to the views they 
learned and “read but one Sort of Books, and converse with but one Sort of Men, 
and all others they look upon as dangerous Intruders and Invaders of that sacred 
Deposition of Error which they receive as Truth….”  Such people did not examine 
their beliefs they simply take as granted.  They are blind followers, not of reason, 
but of prejudices.179  Party allegiances further curtail a person’s desire for total 
freedom of religion: “Should a Man make Religion a Matter of Choice and free 
Enquiry, he must be in great Danger of Apostasy from his Party, and therefore, all 
religious of Church-Parties take the most effectual Care possible to keep their 
Proselytes from all farther Enquiries or Reasonings about a Religion they have taken 
upon Trust….”  Such forced conformity was never a part of the original 
Christianity, Morgan advised his readers.  Did Christ and the Apostles describe a 
correct form of worship, regulate dress, or any “outward Modes or Forms in which 
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God was to be acceptably worshiped?”180  Religion argued Morgan, as did all our 
deists, was a personal relationship between an individual and God, who encouraged 
honest inquiry.   
Conclusion: 
 Robert Walpole’s government fell in 1742 following his refusal to support a 
European war when it seemed English prestige demanded it.  When he finally 
entered the Wars of Jenkins’s Ear and Austrian Succession (1739-48), poor 
performances initiated Commons’ inquiries.  In the face of mounting opposition, 
Walpole accepted a peerage as the earl of Orford and left the Commons for the last 
time in February 1742.181  While England dealt with yet another European war, 
deism as a perceived threat to political and theological stability faded from the 
collective mindset of the nation.  Though anti-deist writings kept the heresy alive for 
decades, it was essentially forgotten.  Indeed, while he described the early stages of 
the French Revolution, Edmund Burke (1730-1797) asserted that “Who, born within 
the last forty years, has read one word of Collins, and Toland, and Tindal, and 
Chubb, and Morgan, and that whole race who called themselves Freethinkers?”182  
Burke was right.  Though deism continued to find advocates after Morgan died in 
1743, these new followers failed to inflame passions the same way their 
predecessors had. 
From around 1750 England faced the Seven Years War, the American and 
French Revolutions, and an expanding empire.  What was more, the worrisome 
destabilising democratic spirit that would turn France upside down was finding new 
advocates in England and ensured that arguments over prophecy and human reason 
took a backseat to this new threat.  Also important were emerging changes in 
England’s character.  Peter N. Miller has recently described how in the early 
eighteenth century the notion of England’s “common good” obtained through the 
maintenance of a unified confessional state was replaced by the protection of the 
individual.  As Miller puts it, “the development of a notion of the individual that 
demanded more of governors, or rather, demanded that governors stay clear of more 
peoples’ lives, and implicitly denied the political nature of much personal belief and 
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practice…” secured a new notion of “common good.”183  Our deists would certainly 
have welcomed this transformation. 
It would, however, be wrong to ignore religious factors when attempting to 
account for the decline of deism.  James E. Herrick and others have suggested that 
orthodox Christianity had many combatants who saw skilled answers to deists as the 
key to their advancement within the Anglican Church.184  And, that sheer numbers 
simply overwhelmed deists who were drowned in a sea of pro-Anglican pamphlets 
and books.  However, one contemporary observer saw things differently and 
suggested that the reason deism faded from the radars of Churchmen was that 
another problem had challenged the English Church.  In a poetic assessment, John 
Potter (fl. 1742-1753), author of an anti-deist book, cited the rise of Methodism as 
the cause of deism’s demise.   
The Deists and the Christians / on Many knotty Questions / With Learned 
Altercations / Have long amused the Nation / And to give out we are loath / 
The Deists say the Bible / Is most absurd and Idle / Tis full of Contradiction 
/ And therefore but a fiction / And not a Rule of Truth. / The Christians say 
the Meaning Wants nothing but Explaining To make it all agree Sir / In 
perfect Harmony Sir / But How could ne’r be shown: / Now whilst this War 
was Waging / The Methodists came raging….185
 
Though this is not the place to consider this claim at any length, it is worth noting 
that one apparent religious threat replaced another and that theological concerns and 
sensibilities continued to play a role in the intellectual scene of the day.186
Some general conclusions are now apparent regarding deists’ conception of 
God and politics.  Firstly, deists clearly believed in a supreme deity or God who 
created the universe and enacted certain relationships between Himself and 
humanity.187  People could know, with certainty, what God required of them 
because He ensured that important knowledge was within the capacity of all people 
to know it.  Secondly, deists did not deny miracles or divine providence.  They did, 
however, reject that miracles would be contrary to reason.  Only Morgan seems to 
have denied the possibility of God acting in the Creation in a manner outside of its 
regular operation.  Thirdly, deists did not accept that God stepped away from the 
Creation.  Rather, His continuing predictable action in the world conformed to 
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eternal truths, which deists knew by their reason and the order of things.188  These 
consistencies existed in both the natural philosophical and political realms.   
It is true that many of those who challenged deists and their conception of 
God were Nonjurors and High-Church Tories, thus suggesting an element of 
political opposition to their refutations.  Perhaps we should not make too much of 
this.  Dissenters, and certainly Whigs, who would not have sided politically with 
Nonjurors, also challenged the conception of God advanced by deists.  What is 
more, orthodox theologians, known Socinians, and suspected Arians all composed 
refutations of deists.  Newtonians Clarke and Whiston certainly wrote against 
particular deists.  But, it is also clear that Chubb and Morgan believed Clarke’s 
tracts and Newton’s posthumous works might support their positions.  It is worth 
considering that because deists attracted rebuttals from across the political and 
religious spectrum, scholars ought to be careful in assigning categories of pro- and 
anti-deist based solely on these allegiances.  Despite the variety of their politics, 
timing of their writings, and specific targets, most critics were united in a view of 
God.  Their God was all-powerful, unrestrained by His laws, and entirely 
mysterious.  Expounded upon by the pens of the High-Churchmen and Nonjurors, 
this view of God was translated into a conception of divine-right monarchs 
demanding passive obedience, who were not bound by the very inherent laws of 
nations that the deists claimed ought to guide governments.   
Conversely, our deists argued for an accountable government which ruled by 
contractual consent given by those who were ruled.  Just as God must always act in 
accordance with the laws of nature, so too must the monarch rule within the 
boundaries of national law.  The same God who acted only for the benefit of 
humanity and not Himself provided, deists argued, the correct model of government, 
which must place the well-being of citizens before its own designs on maintaining 
power.  Deists were not alone in their views.  As our analysis of contemporary 
newspapers and periodicals has demonstrated, deist-like views were also on the 
agendas of other politically minded Britons.  Rather than viewing deists as a group 
who wished to destroy the present system of government, it is more accurate to see 
them, especially in the case of Toland, Tindal, and Collins, as desiring a place 
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within a system that needed some modification but certainly not wholesale 
destruction.   
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Chapter Six: 
 
Deists on Matter, Motion, and Newtonian Public Science: 
Early Excursions 
 
 
 
 
 
The Dangers of Newtonian Philosophy 
 “The manner, in which Sir Isaac Newton has published his philosophical 
discoveries, occasions them to lie very much concealed from all, who have not 
made the mathematics particularly their study.”1  Thus, Henry Pemberton (1694-
1771), editor to the third edition of the Principia (1726), concluded regarding the 
contents of a book he knew better than perhaps only a handful of other readers.  
Newton’s refusal to explain the Principia, and in later years the Opticks, to a public 
eager for his natural philosophy created an opportunity for others to fill this void.  
Public science was born as a response to this market demand.  Indeed, it was 
through the products of public science, coffeehouse lectures, church sermons, and 
popularised (rather than specialised) books that most interested people came to 
know Newton.2   
There was more at stake, however, than the production of accurate, yet 
commercially viable, accounts of Newton’s esoteric mathematics.  Newton himself 
explained the issue in a letter to Richard Bentley during their famed 
correspondence: “Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to 
Certain laws, but whether this agent be material or immaterial is a question I have 
left to ye consideration of my readers.”3  The workings of nature testified to the 
existence of God, but the exact being of God remained uncertain.  Despite his public 
diffidence, Newton and his close compatriots envisaged an immaterial, all-powerful, 
and active God at the head of the universe.  William Whiston, however, knew that 
others, who embraced Newtonian philosophy, might not share this conception of the 
 198
  
divine author of nature.  He feared that irreligious thinkers would appropriate 
Newton’s work to support a universe in which Newton’s God had no place.  Chief 
among those Whiston saw as capable of such a creation were our deists who 
Whiston claimed had found support from “Sir Isaac Newton’s wonderful 
Discoveries.”4  The Tory Nonjuror Roger North (1653-1734) too was sceptical of 
the conclusions that might be drawn from Newton’s philosophy.  Unlike Whiston, 
North faulted Newton and not the deists.  North believed that the Principia had 
fostered an atmosphere where “we find all our Second, third, & fourth hand 
philosophers all ways harping upon certain words….”5  Newtonian philosophy, it 
seemed, allowed heretics to advance their thoughts by attaching them to the 
credentials of a man whose work was greatly admired. 
 Contemporary attempts to understand what Newton had written in the 
Principia and in the various editions of the Opticks form the context for considering 
the writings of deists on matter and motion.  What is more, in outlining the 
philosophy of nature constructed by several deists, we see how responses to deists 
figured prominently in the advancement of public science.  It also becomes apparent 
that deists and authors of public science were not that different in their 
presentations.  Our deists were not hostile to Newtonian philosophy, as is generally 
accepted, but were critical of the conception of God which they believed served as 
its foundation.  Here politics and natural philosophy meet.  Deists viewed the 
unpredictable God of the Newtonians as the God of the Tories and High 
Churchmen.  However, deists were neither atheists nor the heralds of secular 
modernity.  They separated Newton’s laws of motion and conception of gravity 
from Newton’s active God who guided them and replaced that God with the God of 
their theology.  The Bishop of Worcester, Edward Stillingfleet, who composed one 
of the first anti-deist works in England, confirmed this when he claimed that natural 
philosophy was a potential weapon in the deist arsenal.6  He asserted that deists 
attributed “too much to the Mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion” and assigned 
an undignified role for God as mere conservator of the universe rather than its active 
ruler.7  Newtonians like Samuel Clarke, Whiston, and others, believed the deist 
separation of the Newtonian God from natural philosophy led only to atheism and, 
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what was worse, threatened to associate Newton with deism, as North asserted and 
Whiston feared.8   
Editions of Opticks and a Cause for Gravity 
Newton’s Opticks: Or, a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections 
& Colours of Light (first edition in 1704) set the tone for much of the learned 
natural philosophical discourse in eighteenth-century England.9  We are, therefore, 
well served by considering some key themes from the various editions, specifically 
those which surfaced in deist writings.  The book was an expanded version of “New 
Theory about Light,” a paper which Newton had sent the Royal Society in 1672 and 
published in the Philosophical Transactions in February of that year.  The premise 
of both works was that light had been misunderstood.  In opposition to previous 
interpretations, Newton asserted that “Light it self is a Heterogenous mixture of 
different refrangible Rays.”10  That is, light was composed of immutable coloured 
rays, which differed in their refractive indices but which, when combined, formed 
visible white light.  In the Opticks Newton asserted more confidently what he had 
stated in the Principia: namely, that matter was particulate and exceedingly rarefied.  
What was more, the component parts of matter could recombine to form any other 
piece of matter, without suffering any ill-effects from the transformation.11  At the 
end of the 1704 treatise Newton appended sixteen queries in which he suggested 
that light too might be a material body composed of very small particles, though he 
did not declare this as a fact.  He also expounded on the possible interaction of light 
and matter.12  Newton, however, was cautious in asserting conclusions: “to 
determine more absolutely, what Light is, after what manner refracted, and by what 
modes or actions it produceth in our minds the Phantasms of Colours, is not so 
easie.”13  Many future readers disregarded Newton’s hesitation.14
A Latin edition, of the Opticks, translated by Samuel Clarke, appeared in 
1706.  Appended to it were new queries (17-23, later renumbered 25-31) which 
further considered the cohesion of particles and the nature of light.  The most 
important of these queries as far as contemporaries were concerned were numbers 
twenty-one and twenty-three.15  The former speculated: “Are not the Rays of Light 
very small Bodies emitted from shining Substances?  For such Bodies will pass 
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through uniform Mediums in right Lines without bending into the Shadow, which is 
the Nature of the Rays of Light.”16  Though the particles of light were imperceptibly 
small, they were material bodies.  All reactions involving light could be interpreted 
as reactions between pieces of matter.  Light particles also possessed an active 
power by which “or [by] some other Force, stir up Vibrations in which they act 
upon, which Vibrations being swifter than the Rays, overtake them successively, 
and agitate them so as by turns to increase and decrease their Velocities, and thereby 
put them into those Fits.”17  As P. M. Heimann and J. E. McGuire have commented, 
eighteenth century readers would have interpreted a “power” in matter as what it 
may do “in virtue of its intrinsic nature” and with respect to some “extrinsic 
circumstances.”  It is therefore not unreasonable to expect some persons to have 
concluded these particles have the inherent power of motion.18  Query twenty-three, 
later renumbered as the famed thirty-first, continued the investigation: “Have not the 
small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a 
distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting, and inflecting 
them, but also upon one another for producing a great Part of the Phaenomena of 
Nature?”19  Matter, thus, seemed to many eighteenth-century readers to have an 
inherent power of attraction closely connected to the action of light.  This 
conclusion was strengthened by Newton’s further comment that “Bodies act upon 
each other by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetism, and Electricity.”20  As he had 
done previously, Newton did not speculate into the cause of the attractions.  Though 
clearly attraction had something to do with the materiality of light.  Newton, 
however, hoped to discourage materialist views of nature by reminding his readers 
that “By this Principle alone there never could have been any Motion in the World.  
Some other Principle was necessary for putting Bodies into Motion; and now they 
are in Motion, some other Principle is necessary for conserving the Motion.”21   
The second English edition of the Opticks (1717) included yet another batch 
of queries (17-24) between the previous two sets from the editions of 1704 and 
1706.  These most recent musings addressed a pervasive aether.22  Query seventeen 
theorised that light “excited” waves in the surrounding “aetherial medium.”  In turn, 
these waves might be responsible for some motions.  One might conclude therefore 
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that light imparted action to matter.23  In query eighteen Newton conjectured on the 
properties of the aether itself: “is not this medium exceedingly more rare and subtile 
than the Air, and exceedingly more elastick and Active?  And doth it not readily 
pervade all Bodies?  And is it not … expanded through all the Heavens?”24  Thus, 
during much of the eighteenth century Newton could be read as supporting a view 
of nature that was predicated on motion propagated through a material medium, 
originating with the action of light. 
Tindal and the Matter of the Trinity 
 Newton and his disciples were not the only ones concerned with these 
issues.  Among our deists Matthew Tindal first considered the properties of matter 
in his published writings on the Trinity in 1695.  Conceptions of matter had 
implications for Trinitarian and anti-Trinitarian theologies, as Stillingfleet’s 
argument against Toland and John Locke demonstrated.  In presenting what he 
viewed as the difference between God and Christ—self-existence versus created-
being—Tindal employed an analogy: “Suppose that there was some Matter self-
existent, and some other Matter not self-existent, and the Nature of the one were not 
any way different from the Nature of the other, would they not be both equally 
Perfect?”25  Matter, he posited, depended on nothing for its continued existence 
“and ha[d] subsisted ever since the Creation.”  Moreover, all matter was identical 
regardless of how it was created.  Any change in matter was not actual corruption or 
generation; rather, it was due to alteration in its motion and position.  The “Laws of 
Motion” guided matter and were responsible for its outward appearance.26  Tindal 
then claimed that his query regarding the Trinity remained indeterminate at this 
stage.  Though one may see where Tindal was headed with his reasoning: two 
deities, one created and the other self-existent, were equal; neither one depended on 
the other for continued existence.   
Tindal next examined the Trinity in terms of the Sun and the emanations of 
the Sun (i.e. light) standing in for God and Christ.  Using the universe as a template 
with which to consider the Trinity was hardly a position unique to Tindal.  The 
astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) used a similar scheme in his writings.  For 
Kepler, the Sun—the most noble body in the heavens—was indeed God who guided 
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the motion of planets from His location at the centre of Creation.  Natural 
philosophical investigations into the particulate structure of light and matter could 
also have heretical implications as Pietro Redondi’s study of Galileo has 
demonstrated.27  Tindal’s analogy followed from the earlier conclusions regarding 
matter: rays of light “no way depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance in 
Being, except the Sun by creating Power makes them” to have existence.  Even if, 
as some natural philosophers had posited, light was “parts of the Aether set in 
motion by the Sun, they no more depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance 
in Being, than the Sun does on them.”28  Once released from the Sun, light acted as 
a material body its speed and position were directed by the laws of motion.  Tindal 
then asserted that Christ’s existence was not therefore tied to God’s existence just as 
light was not tied similarly to the Sun.  With this brief exploration into natural 
philosophy, we can outline Tindal’s conception of matter and motion in the late 
1690s.  The universe contained matter, which altered its composition as a 
consequence of motion.  Nothing was created or destroyed but only moved into 
different configurations creating different appearances in a universe designed by 
God to run in accordance with the divine laws that He, as the divine craftsman, 
established. 
 Tindal continued to draw on natural philosophy and, in 1704, wrote that free 
access to contemporary natural philosophy was an example of humanity’s “natural 
Right in all matters of Learning and Knowledge.”  Information about the universe, 
its construction and operation—like important information about religion and 
God—must be freely available to those who seek it.  Tindal lamented that this 
seemed not to be the case in his day: “The more useful any Science is to Mankind, 
the greater will its Abuses be: Divinity, Law, Physick are sad instances of this.”29  
Those who controlled truth in natural philosophy, like those who controlled 
religious truth, used it to advance themselves and their initiates.  The only way to 
alter the situation, Tindal suggested, was to eliminate all restraint on publishing.  
Anyone who examined nature should be able to present the results of their free-
thinking on such matters.  
Toland’s Letters to Serena 
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 The same year as Tindal argued for an unrestricted press, John Toland 
published his theory of nature’s workings.  Though Toland had made passing 
references to the particulate structure of matter in Christianity not Mysterious, his 
first protracted thoughts on the subject appeared in the fourth and fifth chapters of 
Letters to Serena (1704).  Shortly before its publication, Anthony Collins wrote 
expectantly to Locke advising him that Toland’s book should be as entertaining as 
Newton’s Opticks.30  During his time on the Continent, Toland frequently debated 
natural philosophy with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Sophia Charlotte, Queen of 
Prussia.  Letters to Serena resulted from these discussions.31  Toland himself 
confirms this in the preface when he declared that “Serena … [was] a very real 
Person….”32  A letter in Toland’s manuscripts supports his claim.  The undated 
correspondence to an anonymous mother and daughter contained a copy of Toland’s 
Tetradymus (1720) for the daughter and details his desire for the proliferation of 
learning and of philosophy among young women of merit.33  As Sophia Charlotte 
was potentially heir to the House of Hanover that stood to succeed to the English 
throne, Toland’s desire to present his erudition must be seen as highly political.34  
The book was arranged as a response to an anonymous admirer of Spinoza’s 
philosophy. 
 Previous studies of Toland’s natural philosophy have focussed almost 
exclusively on attempting to determine the origin of his views.  The most influential 
work is by Margaret C. Jacob who claims that Toland’s worldview is a reworking of 
the mystical writings of the Renaissance scholar Giordano Bruno.35  She supports 
this hypothesis with the fact that Toland is known to have read, translated, and 
discussed in correspondence the contents of Bruno’s natural philosophy.  Since, in 
Jacob’s reading, Toland is a radical thinker and social misfit, it is natural that he 
should embrace a radical worldview.36  Scholars such as David Kubrin endorse 
Jacob’s view.  Others suggest that we remember Toland’s fascination with ancient 
authors and look for origins in the writings of the Stoics.  This is the view of Robert 
R. Evans who describes Toland’s natural philosophy as “a fusion of neo-Stoic and 
Newtonian principles.”  Gavina L. Cherchi agrees that we must look to antiquity for 
Toland’s sources, but suggests that he revived a kind of Epicureanism.37  While I 
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agree that we need to create new accounts of Toland beyond what Jacob has written, 
I maintain that much effort is being spent determining origins at the expense of the 
contemporary context for Toland’s writings.  That is, how did his conception of God 
relate to his natural philosophy and how in turn did this relate to his political 
writings?38   
Refutations of Vacuous Mathematical Space 
Toland believed that matter was homogeneous, and comprised the entire 
universe.  Individual bodies or particles of matter did not exist.  They were mental 
abstractions.39  These imagined systems of matter had created, Toland submitted, 
untenable conceptions of nature.  The most obvious of these fallacies was the 
acceptance of a vacuum, which was “one of the numberless erroneous 
Consequences of defining Matter only by Extension, of making it naturally inactive, 
and of thinking it divided into real Parts every way independent of one another.”40  
In contrast Toland postulated that space was “impenetrable, immovable, indivisible, 
the place which receives all Bodys, wherein they move and are contain’d, it self 
being void of all change or form, or figure.”41  He argued that inaccurate definitions 
of matter implied inaccurate definitions of space.  What is more, Toland charged 
some natural philosophers, specifically mathematicians, of confusing definitions 
with reality.  As an example, Toland asked his readers to consider time: “For my 
part, I can no more believe an absolute Space distinct from matter, as the place of it; 
than that there is an absolute Time, different from the things whose Duration are 
consider’d.”42  Time did not exist apart from that which was timed, in the same way 
that space did not (and could not) exist outside of what was contained in it.  The 
contrary was true only if one supposed, with these unnamed mathematicians, “Space 
without Matter, as they did Duration without Things, Points without Quantity, and 
the like.”   
Toland never mentioned any specific mathematician by name.  Nevertheless, 
we may with confidence suggest that Toland had in mind Leibniz, philosopher and 
privy counsellor at Hanover, whom Toland met during his first trip there in 1701.  
During their debates Leibniz had urged Toland to contemplate that something other 
than matter existed in the universe.  Toland refused this possibility and argued that 
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mathematicians began with faulty assumptions which, in turn, coloured their 
philosophies.43  To convince readers, Toland suggested the following thought 
experiment.  If two identical spheres be at some distance from each other there is “a 
measurable Space or Void” between them; that is, “there is a Space which is not 
body, between the other points of their Circumferences.”  However, this apparently 
self-evident fact is only such if one at the same time supposes the “very Space 
which they pretend to prove.”44  Philosophers had no difficulty in proving what they 
were predetermined to find, argued Toland, their hypotheses proceeded their facts.   
To counter such hypothetical systems, Toland directed his readers to Isaac 
Newton’s sage advice on method, which he had learned from David Gregory (1659-
1708) during his studies in Edinburgh.45  As Toland explained 
The Mathematicians compute the Quantitys and Proportions of Motion, as 
they observe Bodys to act on one another, without troubling themselves 
about the physical Reasons of what every person allows … the latter wou’d 
succeed better in their Reason, if they did more acquaint themselves before 
hand with the Observation and Facts of the former, as Mr. Newton justly 
observes.46
 
Ironically, as we will see shortly, Newton himself argued for the existence of actual 
time and space.  Nevertheless, Toland endorsed the method of the Principia: seek 
instruction from nature and not from hypotheses.  We know that Toland remained 
an adherent of this method from the notes he wrote in the margins of a copy of 
Martin Martin’s, A Description of the Western Islands of Scotland (1716).  He 
shared the book with his friend and benefactor Robert Molesworth during 1720 and 
1721.  Toland was especially critical of Martin’s tendency to relate fanciful stories 
from the history of Ireland, such as that of a whale eating three sailors from a ship’s 
crew.  He described this practise of acceptance without investigation as “unworthy a 
fellow of the Royal Society.”  What was more Martin had “five or six times relyed 
on others in things Curious enough, but which are in everyone’s power to 
experience.”  Thus, Martin was “a very poor Philosopher.”47  Only through 
observation did one act correctly in issues of natural philosophy. 
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Toland and Materialists 
Toland’s position on space was uncomfortably close to that held by Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) and Spinoza (1632-1677), the bugbears of atheism for many 
early-modern English thinkers.  A generation earlier Hobbes had claimed that time 
and space were “nothing but Ideas & Phantasms hapning internally to him [the 
philosopher] that imagineth: Yet they will appear as if they were externall and not at 
all depending upon any power of the Mind.”  Similarly, bodies were “that which 
having no dependence upon our Thought is coincident or coextended with some part 
of Space.”48  Thus, only physical bodies had real existence.  The conclusion that 
many contemporaries drew from this assertion was that God too was material.49   
Spinoza went further and claimed that “By substance, I mean that which is in 
itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can 
be formed independently of any other conception.”  The only true substance was 
God.50  During his educational sojourn in Holland in the early 1690s Toland had 
learned Spinoza’s philosophy from a group of Spinozists who possessed several of 
their master’s manuscripts.51  While Toland agreed with Spinoza that matter was 
extended and occupied all space with no parts truly separate, he believed that 
Spinoza had failed to “define Motion or Rest” and had thereby offered an 
incomplete account of matter.52  What is more, Toland found it unpardonable that 
Spinoza had not “so much as insinuated that Motion was” one of matter’s defining 
features.53  The result was an inadequate account of nature and of God: 
Spinosa then, who values himself in his Ethicks on deducing things from 
their first Causes (which the Schoolmen term a priori) Spinosa, I say, having 
given no account how Matter came to be mov’d or Motion comes to be 
continu’d, nor allowing God as first mover, neither proving nor supposing 
motion to be an Attribute (but the contrary) nor indeed explaining what 
motion is, he cou’d not possibly show how the diversity of bodies reconcible 
to the unity of Substance, or to the sameness of Matter in the whole 
Universe….54
 
This was a crucial oversight because, as Toland explained, “the perpetual Changes 
in Matter are the Effects of Motion, which produces an infinity of different Figures, 
Mixtures, and sensible Qualitys.”  Motion lay at the heart of all natural phenomena.  
Spinoza could not accommodate this fact in his philosophy because he 
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acknowledged “no Being separate or different from the substance of the universe, 
no being to give it motion, to continue or to preserve it, if it has none of its own.”  
Not even God was separate from the material of the universe; indeed, the universe 
itself was God, various perceived parts were merely modes of God.55  According to 
Toland, Spinoza then paradoxically claimed that matter was “naturally inactive.”56  
This contradiction made the system unintelligible.  The one thing for which Toland 
did praise Spinoza was his presentation of Descartes’ mechanical philosophy which 
Toland called a “Philosophical Romance” because it defined matter by extension 
alone.57   
Related to his refutation of Spinoza was Toland’s consideration of the 
Cambridge Platonists, whom he particularly challenged in the work of Ralph 
Cudworth (1617-1688), formerly Master of Christ’s College, Cambridge.58  “No 
less Romantic,” began Toland, “is the plastic life of other philosophers, which 
(according to its modern Reviver the universally learned Dr. Cudworth) is not 
material, but an inferior sort of Spirit without Sensation or Thought, yet endu’d with 
a vital Operation and Energy; these Plastics seemingly to differ with the Hylozoics 
only about words….”  Thus, Cudworth and Spinoza offered the same account of 
motion; only their words differed.  Both men assumed motion of inactive matter by 
positing unfounded mechanisms.  This was done, asserted Toland, to avoid the 
necessity of having God directly and constantly causing motion.59  While Toland 
was critical of these philosophies, he himself did not remove God entirely from the 
universe.  It was true that God created active matter, but He also directed its motions 
in accordance with an immutable design.   
This role for God appeased some of Toland’s critics.  In his Deist’s Manual, 
which appeared within six months of Letters to Serena, the reformed deist, critic of 
Alexander Pope, and in the words of one historian “a poor hack-writer,” Charles 
Gildon considered Toland natural philosophical claims.60  Gildon wrote that he was 
very apprehensive of Toland’s hypothesis of matter and motion, especially its 
potential to remove God’s activity in the world, until he had read further into 
Toland’s work.  Toland had, wrote Gildon, “remov’d the Cause of my Answering 
him, by owning its [matter’s] Creation, and supposing that God, with its other 
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Properties, endu’d Matter with this [motion] likewise; tho’ I am far from being 
satisfied with the Reasons of his Opinion….”61   
An Ally in Newton? 
 Historians of science well know that Toland sought support for his 
philosophy through claimed affiliation with Newton.  Referring to absolute time and 
space, he claimed “Mr. Newton is thought not only to believe these things, but also 
put them both on the same foot.”  Newton’s natural philosophy and theology 
necessitated the existence of absolute space and time.  In a manuscript composed 
around 1695 (“Tempus and Locus”) Newton stated that “Time and Place are 
common affections of all things without which nothing whatsoever can exist.  All 
things are in time as regards duration of existence, and in place as regards amplitude 
of presence.”62  Space and time were, therefore, consequences of being, 
characteristics of existence.  This condition applied equally to God, as Newton 
confirmed when he referred to the divine being with the Jewish term makom, or 
place: “the substance essential to all places in which we are placed and (as the 
Apostle says) in which we live [and move] and have our being.”63  Infinite space 
and eternal time, which characterised the universe, were effects of God’s eternal and 
infinite being.  Newton cautioned, however, in the “General Scholium” appended to 
the second edition of the Principia in 1713, that God “is not eternity and infinity, 
but eternal and infinite; he is not duration and space, but he endures and is present.”  
Space existed independent of human thought and material substance because, if all 
matter were destroyed, absolute space and time would continue to exist because 
God existed.64
Despite these seemingly irreconcilable differences, Toland claimed that 
Newton’s words were “capable of receiving an Interpretation favourable to my 
opinion….”65  All that was required to have his and Newton’s philosophy mesh 
together was a modification in matter’s definition by accepting what Toland knew to 
be true: matter had self-motion.66  The first step was to deny void space.  It was “to 
help sluggish Matter to Motion that this Space (as the room of its action) was 
principally devis’d; but matter not being inactive, nor wanting to have Motion 
continually impressed by an external Agent, Space may be exterminated from 
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Philosophy, as useless and imaginary.”67  Though Newton had, admitted Toland, 
argued for real space, Newton had nevertheless hinted that “perhaps no one Body is 
in absolute rest.”  What was more, Toland suggested that Newton, “who has seen 
the farthest of all Men living into the actual State of Matter; and indeed all Physicks 
ought to be denominated from the Title he has given to the first Book of his 
Principles, viz. Of the Motion of Bodies,” did not believe bodies were truly 
motionless.68  It was in these statements that Toland saw himself and Newton as not 
so different; he had been assertive where Newton had been hesitant.   
Notwithstanding Toland’s praise of Newton and citing him as a 
methodological model, scholars often see Toland, and other deists, as hostile to 
Newton.  This interpretation originated with Jacob who claimed that Toland’s 
anticlerical stance was tied to his self-moving matter which Toland supposedly used 
to challenge Low-Churchmen who had wedded their Anglican theology to Newton’s 
natural philosophy in an attempt to create a stable providential worldview in 
politics.69  But, Toland’s desire to undermine the existing political structure is far 
from certain as we saw in the previous chapters.  Moreover, his words in Letters to 
Serena are not those of a critic, but rather of an admirer of a philosopher who, as 
Pemberton commented, purposely made his works obscure.70  
Action and the Force of Motion  
 Toland next addressed the reality of a moving force: “What sort of Being it 
is; where it resides in Matter or without it; by what means it can move Matter; how 
it passes from one Body to another; or how it is divided between many Bodys while 
others are at rest, and a thousand other such Riddles.”71  When philosophers could 
not find such an entity in nature, and determine whether it be material or immaterial, 
Toland lamented that they retreated to supernatural agency.  Like Descartes, these 
scholars envisaged that God “actually concurs to every Motion in the Universe.”  
Toland found this occasionalist interpretation improbable.  It was more likely that 
God had, at the Creation, impressed motion onto matter which was “sufficient for 
the future.”  These unnamed philosophers made God an imperfect craftsman who 
had to continuously tinker in the world.72  It was ignorance that made philosophers 
take refuge in God’s activity, which was not “to explain things, but to cover their 
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own Negligence or Shortsightedness….”  Toland countered that “God was able to 
create this Matter active as well as extended, that he cou’d give it the one Property 
as well as the other, and that no reason can be assign’d why he should not endue it 
with the former as well as with the latter.”73  
 Toland then defined what he meant by motion, referring to it as local 
motion.  He also noted that philosophers ought to distinguish “motion” from the 
“moving Force or Action:” 
Local motion is only a Change of Situation, or the successive Application of 
the same Body to the respective Parts of several Bodies; so that his motion is 
nothing different from the Body it self, nor any real Being in nature, but a 
mere mode or Consideration of its Situation, and the effect of some Force or 
Action without or within the Body.74
 
Condemning the strategy of mathematicians, Toland stated that they mistakenly 
assumed the existence of a “moving Force” and accepted the reality of motion 
without considering its origins.  The practise of natural philosophy deserved better.  
Any attempt to explain the present constitution of things must begin with first 
principles.  For Toland, this meant motion because “no manner of Variety is 
included in the bare Ideas of Extension, nor any cause of Alteration; and seeing it is 
Action alone that can possibly produce any change in Extension, this Action or 
Principle of Motion must be well clear’d and established, or the system must 
quickly be found defective.”75   
 Toland believed his system of natural philosophy preserved divine dignity.  
In describing his innovation, he began by distinguishing between motion and 
“Action” which had befuddled previous systems. 
I wou’d have this motion of the Whole be call’d Action, and all local Motions, 
as direct or circular, fast or slow, simple or compounded, be still call’d Motion 
being only several changeable Determinations of the Action which is always in 
the Whole … I deny that Matter is or ever was an inactive dead Lump in 
absolute Repose, a Lazy and unweildy thing.76
 
In other words, Toland argued that the motive force, in his terminology “Action,” 
was inherent in the universal matter, which filled all the Creation.  The phenomena 
of local motions were perceptions of the alterations of matter witnessed by an 
observer.  The “Action” of the whole explained the motion of the particular.77  What 
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was more, matter could not be rightly “conceiv’d nor consequently be rightly 
defin’d without it, that nothing can be accounted for in Matter without this essential 
Action.”   
This was precisely the kind of conclusion drawn from his work that Newton 
wished to discourage.  He wrote as much to Richard Bentley, who delivered the first 
Boyle Lectures in 1692, which incorporated Newtonian mechanics to demonstrate 
the divine construction of the world.  Prior to publishing the Lectures, Bentley 
sought clarification on some key points.  “So then gravity may put ye planets into 
motion,” Newton advised him, “but without ye divine power it could never put them 
into such a Circulating motion … I am compelled to ascribe ye frame of this 
Systeme to an intelligent agent.”  More importantly, Bentley had written “of gravity 
as essential to & inherent to matter: pray do not ascribe that notion to me, for ye 
cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know….”78  For Newton, gravity was an 
aspect of divine activity in the world it could never have arisen on its own in the 
material universe Toland described. 
Following Newton’s methodology of observation, Toland claimed to have 
determined the self-motion of matter “from the nature of the thing itself.”  If he was 
successful in communicating his system for the operation of the universe, Toland 
boldly claimed, “then they may quarrel (who have a mind to it) with God or Nature, 
and not with me, who am but their humble Interpreter.”79  He was cautious, 
however, not to claim more than he believed was possible to know concerning 
motion.  This meant restricting the contents of the book to proving that matter was 
extended and active but not to speculating about the origin of its inherent action or 
the method by which it operated.  Toland did not wish to become entangled in the 
disputes for which he had admonished mathematicians.   
 To accomplish this goal, Toland returned to the epistemology which he 
advanced in Christianity not Mysterious, specifically Locke’s conception of 
essences.80  The definition of anything was a collection of observable nominal 
essences which were related to the unknown real essences.  As he explained to 
readers, “if activity ought to enter into the Definition of Matter, it ought likewise to 
express the essence of it.”  Because this was an overlooked part of matter’s 
 212
  
definition, Toland claimed that “Matter has bin hitherto but half, or rather a third 
part defin’d by Extension, from which alone many of its Modifications can follow 
by no means….”81  The correct definition of matter led to correct understanding of 
its nature: “Matter can no more be conceived without Motion than without 
Extension, and that the one is inseparable from it as the other.”82  Whereas incorrect, 
or incomplete, definitions of matter had supposed “that motion is extraneous to 
Matter.”  In the same way that priests had created mysteries in religion, 
philosophical authority prevented the acceptance of inherent motion in matter.  
Indeed, in the second edition of Christianity not Mysterious Toland concluded that 
knowledge based on the mysteries of religion led to acceptance of similar practises 
in natural philosophy: “Mysteries in religion are but ill argu’d from the pretended 
Mysteries of Nature; and that such as endeavour to support the former by the latter, 
have either a design to impose upon others, or that they have never themselves 
duely consider’d of this Matter.”83   
 To those who might not accept his assertions, Toland asked what sort of 
matter could be described without reference to constant motion?  “It must be 
something depriv’d of all Figure or Color,” answered Toland, “neither heavy nor 
light, rough or smooth, sweet or sour, hot or cold, void of all sensible Qualitys, … 
since all these depend immediately on motion….”84  In stating that discernible 
features of objects depended on the qualities of matter on which they were built, 
though departing from many on the ultimate source—namely inherent motion—
Toland followed contemporary understanding and distinguished between primary 
and secondary qualities.  Philosophers like Robert Boyle argued that things such as 
colour were secondary qualities of matter that resulted from the particular 
arrangement and movement, that is the primary qualities, of its particles to produce 
the sensation we know as colour.85   
Toland also refuted Descartes’ laws of motion, dismissing them as being 
formed from a mistaken notion of “Action” or moving force.  In “All Treatises of 
the ordinary Laws of Motion,” Toland wrote, “you meet with several degrees of 
Motion that any body loses or acquires; but those Laws concern the Quantity of the 
action of particular Bodys on one another, and not the action of Matter in 
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general….”86  Adherents to these Cartesian laws had failed to realise that individual 
motions were the result of the more general “Action” of the universal matter.  
Toland explained that this was a common mistake because “the Vulgar taking local 
motion … for a real being, have thought Rest a privation, or that Motion was 
Action, and that Rest was a Passion.”87  Local motion was “Action” of the particular 
with a different name.  What is more, these unnamed Cartesians did not accept that 
bodies of matter were mental abstractions; the motion of them could not but 
originate in the “Action” of the whole.  “I may now” Toland asserted “conclude that 
action is essential to Matter, since it must be the real Subject of all those 
Modifications which are call’d local Motions….”88
Toland on Gravity 
 In an attempt to provide a complete natural philosophy, Toland sought to 
explain gravity and planetary orbits.  In the same way that he explained local 
motion, Toland stated “there cou’d be no Levity or Gravity in the suppos’d Chaos, 
and that these Qualities wholly depend on the Constitution and Fabrick of the 
Universe.”  Gravity was the product of the entire universe as was the “Action” 
which underlay perceived motion.  To suppose that individual pieces of matter had 
gravity in themselves was the same as believing that “the Wheels, and Springs, and 
Chains of a Watch can perform all those Motions separately which they do 
together.”89  Gravity was the result of the universe in actual operation.  The 
universal matter as a whole produced the effects that we identify as gravity.  As 
Toland had claimed, actual separate particles did not exist because if they did, these 
particles would be the same as bits removed from a watch: able to do nothing until 
they were inserted back among the other pieces.  The same was true of the universe: 
it was a harmonious interconnected system.   
Local motion and gravity were the same: “Action” propelled both motions.90  
Gravity and local motion were thus nominal essences supported in some unknown 
way by the real essence of “Action,” which Toland claimed we could not know.  In 
his agnostic stance over the real cause of motion, Toland sought refuge in Newton’s 
Principia, though his active matter was certainly not Newton’s.  Despite this 
difference, he quoted from the Principia’s preface where Newton referred to 
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“Gravity, Elasticity, Resistance, Impulse, and Attraction, and of Explication of the 
mundane System by these Principles:”   
I wish adds he that we cou’d by the Same Method of reasoning be able to 
explain the other Phaenomena of Nature from mechanical Principles!  for I 
am induc’d by divers Considerations to suspect a little, that all these may 
depend on Certain Forces, wherby from Causes yet undiscover’d the 
Particles of Bodys are mutually impell’d against each other, and cohere 
accordingly to regular Figures, or whereby they recede and are driven from 
one another: which Forces being yet unknown, the Philosophers have 
hitherto attempted Nature in vain. 
 
Like Newton, Toland claimed not to know what caused these forces of motion, 
though he suspected that it was “Action.”  However, Newton had based his 
philosophy on passive matter altered from an inertial state by some force not 
inherent in matter.  Force then, as interpreted by Toland, became an observable 
aspect of “Action.”  By suggesting “Action” as the real essence of motion and 
thereby solving the problem posed by Newton, Toland rather brashly asserted “I 
would flatter my self, that I had done something towards it in this letter.”  These are 
hardly the words of one who wishes to undermine Newtonian philosophy.91
In the appropriated language of Newtonian forces, Toland described the 
orbit of the Earth.   
Notable Effects depend on these Forces the nearer they are to being equal, or 
the stronger one of ‘em is than the other; wherefore the centripetal being 
much greater than the centrifugal Force of the Parts of the Earth, taking in 
likewise the Atmosphere, is one main reason that it never loses any of its 
Matter, and that it always continues of the same Bulk or Dimensions, the 
centripetal Force of Gravity that detains the Several Bodys in their Orbit, 
being considerably stronger than the centrifugal Force of Motion, by which 
they strive to fly off in the Tangent.  Let the causes of these Forces be what 
they will, they are unanswerable arguments to my purpose of a perpetual 
Motion in all things.92
 
In good Newtonian fashion, Toland refused to speculate on the cause of “these 
Forces.”  Nevertheless, he viewed them as supporting his hypothesis of constant 
universal motion.  The fact that the centripetal force of gravity always drew the 
Earth, and all its “Matter,” into orbit around the Sun and that the centrifugal force 
was always too weak to overcome the attraction of the Sun implied that the Earth, 
and everything upon it, was never truly at rest.  Toland saw the constant motion of 
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the Earth as evidence of the constant motion of the universe and the matter of which 
it was composed.  Thus, Newton’s conception of centripetal force became for 
Toland evidence of inherent continuing motion.  Gravity, like other local motions, 
was a result of the “Action” of the universe “be their Physical Causes what you 
please….”93  Toland never attempted to determine the causes of motion.  Such 
information, like the mysteries of Scripture, was not needed for this life.  In the 
same way that action was inherent in our idea of matter, gravity was inherent in our 
idea of the material universe.  Armed with his conception of material space, which 
was the location of gravity, combined with the constant action of the centripetal 
force of universal gravitation, Toland believed he had accounted for all natural 
phenomena in the universe. 
Public Science and Reaction to Toland’s Self-Moving Matter 
 Letters to Serena was available for sale in early May 1704 and refutations 
quickly followed.  Toland’s appeal to God’s creative power in making self-moving 
matter did not satisfy all his critics as it had done for Gildon.  Humphry Ditton (d. 
1715), a nonconformist instructor in mathematics at Christ’s Hospital Mathematical 
School and public lecturer in experimental philosophy at the Marine Coffeehouse, 
used the entire preface of his The General Laws of Nature and Motion (1705), a 
popularised account of Newton’s natural philosophy, to dismantle Toland’s 
theories.94  Though he was certain Toland was joking in Letters to Serena, Ditton 
remained suspicious: “Infinite necessarily-self-moving Matter may serve to 
entertain an Atheist, as well as Almighty Space.”95  Self-moving matter allowed no 
place for the active God, whom Ditton believed governed the Creation.  The 
Astronomer Royal, John Flamsteed (1646-1719), approved of Ditton’s answer to 
Toland and commented that the preface “which is ye best wrote of any I have seen 
of a long time is a Special Answer to Mr Toland who contends in his lettre that 
motion is essential to matter which [Ditton] ridicules most judiciously.”96   
In late November 1704 Samuel Clarke’s Boyle Lectures from that year 
appeared in print.97  Toland’s natural philosophy received special attention in A 
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.  The table of contents informed 
readers that on page forty-six one may find “Mr. Toland’s pernicious Opinion of 
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Motion being essential to Matter, confuted.”98  Clarke refuted Toland’s presentation, 
of what Clarke called the “Conatus to Motion,” or matter’s endeavouring to move. 
The essential Conatus to Motion of every one or any one particle of matter in 
this Author’s imaginary infinite Plenum, must be either a Conatus to move 
from one determined way at once, or move every way at once: A Conatus to 
move some one determinate way, cannot be essential to any Particle of 
Matter, but must arise from some external cause; because there is nothing in 
the pretended necessary Nature of any Particle, to determine its motion 
necessarily and essentially.  And a Conatus equally to move every way at 
once, is either an absolute Contradiction, or at least could produce nothing in 
Matter but an External Rest of all and every one of its Parts.99
 
Motion must be imparted by an external force because Clarke argued that self-
moving matter resulted in a contradiction.  Without some guidance, the inherent 
motion of matter would have no plan of movement and would, therefore, be 
paralysed.  For Clarke, the only external cause that he would entertain was God: the 
self-existing original creator of all things.  Deists, like Toland, who denied this truth 
held inaccurate pictures of God.100  The motivation behind Clarke’s answer to 
Toland was his use—in Clarke’s mind misuse—of Newton’s natural philosophy.  
Both Newton and Clarke understood space as the location of God, a consequence of 
His being.101  Their shared theology developed while Clarke translated the Opticks 
into Latin at Newton’s request.  In latter years, Whiston recollected that Clarke’s 
theological positions were “generally no other than Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy; 
tho’ frequently applied by Dr. Clarke, with great Sagacity, and to excellent 
purposes, upon many Occasions.”102  For Clarke, Toland’s notion of space bordered 
on atheism.  This conception had to be quickly refuted lest others see Newton as an 
advocate for a material Godless universe.  This was not an unfounded fear.  The 
High-Church Anglican, John Hutchinson (1674-1737) was suspicious of Newton’s 
conception of immaterial forces which Hutchinson suggested reduced God to the 
soul of the world.  After discussing Newtonian philosophy personally with Toland, 
Hutchinson was convinced that Newton’s work was compatible with, and provided 
support for, deism by reducing God to a mere enactor of motion.103  
 Less than a month after Clarke’s Boyle Lecture appeared William Wotton, 
FRS, spokesperson for the “moderns” in the famed Battle of the Books, answered 
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Toland.104  Wotton presented his work in epistolary form titled: A Letter to Eusebia: 
Occasioned by Mr. Toland’s Letters to Serena.  Wotton, like Clarke, was uneasy 
about Toland’s attempt to apparently remove God from the operation of the universe 
and to “root the Belief of all Religion out of the World.”105  Wotton, however, was 
no enemy to natural philosophy; properly understood it served as a testament to 
God’s power.  In Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1694), Wotton 
had extolled the merits and achievements of the modern philosophers.  He stated 
that one could not deny the improvement of star charts accomplished by Tycho 
Brahe and the excellence of Kelper’s description of planetary orbits.  Kepler’s 
account had since been proved by “Mr. Newton, viz. That all the Planets move in 
Elliptick Orbs about the Sun, at Whose Centre, being placed in one Focus of the 
Eclipse, they describe equal Area’s in equal times.”106   
 In addition to dismissing Toland’s notions as the ramblings of an atheist, 
Wotton considered the presentation of matter’s attributes found in Letters to Serena.  
Where Toland argued that one could not think of matter without also immediately 
thinking of extension and motion, Wotton replied that “For God’s sake what do’s 
the Man mean?  Have not you and I, madam, an Idea of Rest as well as of Motion?  
Can we conceive a Body to lye Still in a place as well as to shift it?”107  Wotton then 
moved to a personal attack on his adversary: “I can conceive of Mr. Toland without 
thinking of Learning or Christianity, but I cannot conceive of thinking that he is a 
Man.”  He continued that one “can mentally Separate Motion from Matter; 
consequently unless other Arguments be produced, it will not be evident that 
Motion is Essential to it….”108  If matter was everywhere infinite and identical as 
Toland claimed, Wotton drew his readers to the ludicrous implications of the 
assertion: “There is no real Difference between one Man and another, between Mr. 
Newton and Mr. Toland.”109  Should anyone not be convinced by his refutation, 
Wotton directed them to Clarke’s A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God, a work that “is so full towards my purpose, … that I shou’d do my self an 
injury, and you too, should I omit it.”110  Years later when Toland reflected on 
Wotton’s characterisation of him, he dismissed the approach: “certain men will 
neither allow themselves nor others to commend any thing in one from whom they 
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differ; and that they do not stick at saying any thing to his prejudice, be it ever so 
improbable or ever false.”  Because Wotton disagreed with some of his 
philosophical notions, Toland accused Wotton of refusing to see anything of merit 
in Letters to Serena because prejudice unfairly coloured Wotton’s reading.111
 Clarke delivered the Boyle Lectures again in 1705 and published them as A 
Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the 
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation.  The divine origin of gravity and 
motion maintained pride of place.112  The universe, Clarke stated, proved the 
existence of an active Newtonian God.  In more explicit terms, “All things that are 
Done in the World, are done either immediately by God himself, or by created 
Intelligent Beings: Matter being evidently not at all capable of any Laws or Powers 
whatsoever, any more than it is capable of Intelligence; excepting only this One 
Negative Power,” or Newton’s inertia.  Writers like Toland, and later Collins, who 
ascribed the effects of nature to nature itself or some inherent power were simply 
wrong.  As Clarke put it “all those things which we commonly say are the effects of 
the Natural Powers of Matter, and Laws of Motions; of Gravitation, Attraction, or 
the like; are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the effects of Gods acting 
upon Matter continually and every moment.”113   
This belief underlay many subsequent defences of Newtonian natural 
philosophy in the face of increasing deist writings on the topic, as George Cheyne 
(c.1673-1743) illustrates.  A Scottish born physician, who learned Newtonian 
philosophy from his fellow Scot, Archibald Pitcairne (1652-1713), Cheyne was an 
imposing man who weighed some 450 pounds.  He is best known as the author of 
the English Malady (1733), a study of cures for melancholy.114  In Philosophical 
Principles of Religion: Natural and Revealed, he followed Clarke’s example and 
declared that the universe as described by Newton revealed the presence of a wise 
and active creator.115  As Cheyne put it, “nature” meant nothing less than “the 
Perfect and Wise Production of Almighty God.”116  Addressing writers like Toland, 
he referred to Newtonian inertia: 
[I]t is evident that no Particle of Matter, nor any Combination of Particles, 
that is, no Body, can either move of themselves or of themselves alter the 
Direction of their Motion; Matter is not endowed with Self-motion, nor with 
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a Power to alter the Course in which it is put, it is meerly passive and must 
for ever of it self continue in that State and that Course that it is settled 
in….117
 
Passive matter demonstrated the need for an external cause of creation and 
movement.  Cheyne saw his book as “a plain Demonstration of the Existence of a 
Deity.”118  It was important, however, that one demonstrated the correct picture of 
God.   
The period of 1704-1706 saw several Newtonian tracts both by Newton 
himself, as in the second English edition of the Opticks, and by his followers.  One 
of the most well known of these works was initiated in October 1703 when an 
advertisement in the Post Man solicited subscribers “for Printing Lexicon 
Technicum Magnum: Or an Universal English Dictionary of Sciences.”119  Its 
author, John Harris (1666-1719), DD, had delivered the Boyle Lectures in 1698 and 
served as secretary to the Royal Society in 1709-10.  He was also a well-known 
public lecturer in natural philosophy, specifically those facets dealing with 
mathematics, which he conducted at Session House, St Margarets Hill before 
moving to the Marine Coffeehouse in late 1701.120
Lexicon Technicum was based on the work of “that prodigious 
Mathematician Mr. Isaac Newton.”  Harris, however, lamented the fact that the 
release of the Opticks coincided too close to the publication of his book and 
therefore he was unable to incorporate material from that “Excellent Book….”121  
Under the heading of “Attraction” Harris wrote the following.   
ATTRACTION, is the drawing of one thing to another.  Whether among the 
Operations of Natural Bodies one upon another, there be any such thing as 
Attraction, properly so speaking, is a Question that hath been much debated 
amongst Philosophers … However the word is retained by good Naturalists, 
and in particular, by the Excellent Mr. Isaac Newton in his Principia; but 
without determining any thing of the Quale of it, for he doth not consider 
things so much Physically as Mathematically.122
 
Harris’ uncertainty mimics Newton’s: we know that bodies attract one another; we 
do not, however, know how this is done.  As Harris notes, Newton satisfied himself 
with a mathematical description of the force.  Referring to “Bodies” Harris 
suggested that they were “usually defined to be a Substance impenetrably extended; 
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or which having Partes extra Partes, cannot be in the same place with, or penetrate 
the Dimensions of any other Body.  And this Property Mr. Is. Newton expresses by 
the word Solidity; and according to his excellent Philosophy the Ideas of a Body is, 
that which is extended, solid and moveable.”123  Toland had stated a similar 
definition himself.  Where Toland differed, and it was no trivial difference, was in 
his notion of “moveable.”  He saw the third aspect of matter as the ability to obtain 
self-motion, whereas Harris agreed with Newton and claimed that “moveable” 
referred to the ability of matter to be acted upon in an alteration of its inertial state.  
Harris followed this book with a second volume in 1710, which we will consider 
shortly.   
Collins Challenges Newtonian Mechanics 
The contents of Anthony Collins’ library testify to his keen interest in 
natural philosophy.  After he died, Collins’ thousands of volumes were auctioned 
off, over several nights in 1731, at St. Paul’s Coffeehouse.124  Among the books 
listed for sale were Boyle’s Works, twenty-five volumes from the Paris Academy of 
Sciences, a complete set of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society for 
1665-1727, Newton’s Opticks and Principia, Francis Bacon’s Works, Robert 
Hooke’s Micrographia, Pierre Gassendi’s Philosophia, and many others.125  Collins 
also subscribed to a number of contemporary attempts to popularise Newtonian 
philosophy: Henry Pemberton’s A View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy (1728), 
both volumes of Harris’ Lexicon Technicum (1704, 1710), and other similar 
books.126  Collins admired Newton’s philosophy and eagerly anticipated the release 
of the first edition of Opticks in 1704.  He and Locke exchanged letters in which 
Collins related his enthusiasm for this new work by Newton.127   
 Collins’ first public foray in natural philosophy occurred between 1706-8 in 
an extended dispute with Samuel Clarke, fresh from his two Boyle Lectures in 
which he had rebuked Toland’s excursion in natural philosophy.  Collins and Clarke 
were drawn into their protracted pamphleteering by the nonjuring-divine Henry 
Dodwell who had suggested in print that the soul was naturally mortal.128  We will 
address conceptions of the soul in Chapter Eight.  At present we are concerned with 
what these writings tell us about Collins’ views on matter, motion, and gravity.  
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Nevertheless, as questions of the soul were intimately related to questions about 
matter, we must examine very briefly some of Clarke’s initial exchange with 
Dodwell.  Clarke feared that the suggestion of a mortal human soul would lead 
some people to think it was material because only material substances perished.  As 
he had advised Toland, ordinary matter was brute, passive, and could never have 
any inherent power such as thought.129  Collins replied by defending Dodwell’s 
right to advance any notion of the soul he wished.  Moreover, Collins suggested, as 
had Toland, that a system of matter might have certain powers that its individual 
pieces did not.130   
Clarke replied that it was “impossible and a direct Contradiction in the 
Nature of the Thing itself, that any Power whatsoever should inhere or reside in, 
any System or Composition of Matter, different from the Powers residing in the 
single Parts.”  For Clarke this was true because the motion of a system of matter 
was “nothing but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts.”131  If a collection of 
matter had the power of motion, there would be as many different motions as there 
were particles.  Clarke hoped Collins would see the absurdity in claiming otherwise.  
Concerning the specific power of gravity Clarke stated explicitly that “Gravitation 
itself, is not a Quality inhering in Matter, … but only an Effect of the continual and 
regular Operation of some other Being upon it.”132  Following the same Newtonian 
line in his refutation of Toland, Clarke maintained that gravity proved divine action 
in the universe. 
Collins replied that Clarke must prove that matter possessed the same 
powers, or lack thereof, separately that it had as a system, otherwise the entire 
objection would be rendered impotent.133  If one considered the entire material 
world, it was evident that all the particles of matter contributed to the overall power 
of the system.  Collins then stated that: “By Power I understand, in the Question 
between us, An actual Ability to make or receive any Change, to act or be acted 
upon.  The Question then will be, whether there is in any System of Matter a Power 
to make or receive a Change, to act or be acted on, that is not the Sum or Aggregate 
of Powers of the same kind.”134  A “power” then was the ability to be enacted upon.  
Collins believed that Clarke must accept this definition as granted between them.  
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Where he and Clarke were certain to part was in their respective conceptions of 
gravity.  Like Toland, Collins saw gravity as inherent in matter.  He explained that 
“Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally placed in it by God, and is now left 
to itself to act by those Original Powers.  And it is as conceivable that Matter should 
act by virtue of those Original Powers, as that an Immaterial Being should originally 
put it into Motion, or continue it in Motion.”135  Collins described God as a skilled 
craftsman who did not need to perpetually attend to gravity in a universe that was 
unable to run on its own.  Just as God did not miraculously intervene in matters of 
religion, He did not do so in matters of natural philosophy.   
Clarke’s next pamphlet stated his position that a system of matter can have 
only those powers that the particles have separately: extension, mass, inertia, and 
nothing more.  Regarding Collins’ notion of gravity, Clarke took tremendous 
exception.  It was “a great Mistake in your Philosophy.”  Clarke explained that  
when a stone that was at Rest, does of itself, upon its Support being 
removed, begin to fall downward; what is it that causes the Stone to begin to 
move?  Is it possible to be an Effect produced without a Cause?  Is it 
impelled without any Impeller?  Or can a Law or Power, that is to say, a 
mere abstract Name or complex Notion, and not any real Being, impel a 
Stone and cause it to begin to move?136
 
Things cannot move by themselves.  He wished Collins to contemplate this and 
realise the futility of his position. 
 While Collins did not deny the visual evidence of gravity, he suggested that 
it might not explain things so clearly.  The real question was, he claimed, not 
whether a stone moves when its support is removed; rather: 
whether another Being, or a Being distinct from Matter, does continually 
impel it, either immediately or mediately, (for I deny not the Necessity of a 
Being impelling another, in order to cause that Mode of Motion called 
Gravitation) and therefore Mr. Clarke changes the Question, when he 
introduces some real Being as necessary to impel a Stone, or cause it to 
begin to move upon its support being removed….137
 
Matter moved due to the action of some other being, but whereas Clarke claimed 
this being was immaterial, Collins asserted that one could not make that assumption.  
In a further similarity to Toland, Collins claimed that all matter was in physical 
contact; there was no void.  Consequently, gravity required the continual connection 
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of matter.138  Surrounding bodies passed gravity to those particles they encircled in 
the system of the universe.  For Collins this was a certain example of a power 
residing in a system of matter when it did not exist in individual pieces.   
 Collins then asked why this explanation of gravity was not more widely 
known to natural philosophers.  “I have,” wrote Collins, “often admired that 
Gravitation should be esteemed a Matter of such Difficulty among Philosophers; for 
when Motion is supposed, and that all Matter is in constant Motion, and perpetually 
striking one Part against another, as I think no body doubts, one Part of Matter must 
be determined one way, and another Part another way.”  Perpetual motion of matter 
caused gravity.  Matter moved because the particles surrounding it moved.  Where 
Toland employed “Action” to account for gravity, Collins suggested that gravity be 
thought of as one specific aspect of matter’s constant motion.139  Also, like Toland, 
Collins sought authority for his position in the writing of Newton and quoted from 
the Principia.   
[T]he Incomparable Sir Isaac Newton is of Opinion, That Several 
Phenomena of Nature may depend on certain Forces, whereby from Causes 
(or Powers) yet undiscovered, the Particles of Bodies are mutually impelled 
against each other, and cohere according to regular Figures, or whereby the 
recede or are driven from one another; which Forces or Powers being yet 
unknown, the Philosopher hitherto have attempted Nature in Vain.140
 
If Newton himself did not know the cause of forces in nature, such as gravity, then 
Collins felt justified in offering whatever description he believed best accounted for 
the observed phenomenon.  
 Clarke saw things differently and chastised his adversary for not being “well 
acquainted with Natural Philosophy.”  If it had been otherwise, Collins would surely 
have known that “it has been demonstrated even Mathematically, that Gravitation 
cannot arise from the Configuration and Texture of the Parts of Matter, and from 
the circumambient impelling Bodies.141  Clarke the directed Collins to consider “Sir 
Isaac Newton’s Principia throughout; and the Queries at the End of the Latin 
Edition of his Opticks.”  He also believed that Collins’ arrogance had exceeded his 
intellect.  How could it be otherwise as Collins had, in one brief passage, “set aside 
all the Propositions in that most excellent Book [Principia].”  In an attempt to 
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demonstrate to Collins the error of his hypothesis, Clarke noted that it was 
“established by Experiments, and from the Phenomena of the Heavenly Bodies; that 
the present Operations of Nature, depending upon Gravitation, cannot possibly be 
Mechanical Effects of Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part 
against another.”142   
 Collins’ mistaken notions of gravity, like Toland’s, were bad enough, but 
more troubling was the co-opting of Newton’s name into the enterprise.  Clarke 
accused Collins of insinuating to readers that “this great Man is of your Opinion in 
the present Question.”  Furthermore, Clarke charged Collins with purposefully 
misrepresenting Newton who had specifically refuted conceptions of gravity like 
Collins’.  Clarke further noted that what Newton meant by “force” and “power” was 
not what Collins believed.  Such words did “not mean (as you did by Powers 
originally placed in Matter by God) to signify the Efficient Cause of certain 
determinate Motions of Matter, but only to express the Action itself by which the 
Effect is regularly produced, without determining the immediate Agent or 
Cause….”143  Newton described the effect of gravity, he did not attempt to 
determine its cause.  In a final attempt to reveal Collins’ mistakes, Clarke described 
Newtonian space of which matter occupied only a tiny fraction.  As a result, “the 
great Phenomena of Nature cannot possibly depend upon any Mechanical Powers of 
Matter and Motion, but must be produced by the Force and Action of some higher 
Principle: and so leading us even with Mathematical Certainty, to immaterial 
Powers; and finally to the Author of all Power, the Great Creator and Governor of 
the World.”144  Vacuous space and a paucity of matter necessitated that motion and 
gravity resulted from something other than matter.  For Clarke and Newton this 
extra-cause was God.   
 During the dispute Collins wrote to John Trenchard, Whig propagandist and 
with Thomas Gordon co-editor of the Independent Whig and Cato’s Letter.  The 
date of the letter (9 May 1707) was between Clarke’s last pamphlet and prior to 
Collins’ next reply.  The contents reveal Collins’ private thoughts towards the 
current disagreement with Clarke and natural philosophy more generally.  Collins 
advised Trenchard that “If [Clarke] means only to tell me as he argues with me, 
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That my reasoning is false, absurd, inconclusive, inconsistent &, for whosoever 
writes agt another must by writing agt him suppose him in the wrong & must 
consequently use such expressions without intrenching on ye rules of decency & 
civility.”145  That is, Clarke did not have to agree with Collins so long as Clarke 
maintained a civil tone.  Free-thinking encouraged these debates.  Collins was, 
however, disappointed in Clarke’s actions prior to the latest pamphlet, specifically 
the “boasts beforehand, and talking of his having caught me at an advantage now 
that the dispute turns upon points of Mathematicks and Natural Philosophy.”  
Despite Clarke’s claims to the contrary, Collins felt confident in his understanding 
of the material.  Indeed, he suggested that he and Clarke did not differ very much: 
“But what Question in Mathematicks are there in dispute between us?  As for 
Gravitation I doubt not to defend what I have said which amount to no more than 
this: That matter can only move but when [it] is impelled.”146  The only apparent 
difference was whether the impeller was material or immaterial, inherent or 
external.  To Clarke this difference could not have been more important. 
 Collins responded to Clarke’s latest pamphlet by stating that he understood 
space differently than Clarke.  Perhaps space was the place of matter and the one 
could not be considered apart from the other; moreover, one could have a vacuum 
without describing it as space without matter.  In this view, real space did not exist, 
but was only abstractly considered.  Contrarily, for Clarke as for Newton, space was 
the place of God’s being.147  To defend his alternative view, Collins turned to the 
writings of Robert Boyle.  It is evident that Collins held Boyle’s work in high 
regard, his library held thirty-two books by Boyle.148  Based on his reading of the 
air-pump experiments, Collins believed Boyle defined a vacuum as “a vessel out of 
which the air is exhausted, … by which he understands not a space wherein there is 
no Body at all, but such as is either altogether, or almost devoid of air....”  Collins 
then explained to Clarke that he used “the term vacuum in the aforesaid” Boylean 
sense.149  Thus, Collins maintained that gravity might be caused by a system of 
matter, even in a vacuum.  Collins concluded by stating that until Clarke was able to 
demonstrate that a total vacuum existed in nature, “he will not be able to prove, that 
material Impulse is not the Cause of Gravitation,” Collins believed he was free to 
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write as he wished.  Clarke did respond to this final challenge but only to restate his 
views.   
Newtonian Philosophy Gets More Materialistic 
Views of motion and gravity similar to those suggested by Collins became 
less controversial as the eighteenth century advanced.  In late May of 1710 John 
Harris released the second volume of the Lexicon Technicum.150  A comparison of 
the explanation given to terms like “Attraction” and “Body” reveals the alteration in 
contemporary understandings of Newton’s natural philosophy over a period of six 
years between the first and second volumes.  One important difference was the pride 
of place given to the term “Attraction.”  Harris wrote that he had provided readers 
“a further Account of that most amazing Property, the Attraction of the Particles of 
Matter one towards another, first discover’d by that Incomparable Mathematician 
and Philosopher Sir Isaac Newton….”151  Harris then reported how Newton had 
long considered the question of particulate attraction and that the Latin edition of 
Opticks included several important queries on this subject, which would reshape 
current views in natural philosophy.  After relating Newton’s discovery that the 
force of attraction among the particles, which form observable bodies, varies 
inversely with respect to the size of the body, Harris considered the attractive power 
of light. 
Wherefore the Rays of Light, being the least of all Bodies we know, must 
needs have the greatest and strongest Attracting Force; and how very 
strongly those Particles do Attract … Now such a prodigious Force of 
Attraction in the Rays of Light cannot but have wonderful Effects in those 
Particles of Matter, with which they are joyned in the Composition of 
Bodies; and must cause that those particles Attract one another, and that they 
are moved variously among themselves.152
 
These material bodies of light contained certain powers of attraction, which could 
be transferred to other bodies and in turn cause them to be attracted to one another.  
Light seemingly held the key to many mysteries in natural philosophy.  Unlike 
volume one, which contained an entry on “body,” volume two has no such heading.  
Rather, “body” is replaced by “particles.”  Particles of matter are hard, solid, and in 
possession of an attractive power.  Thus, by 1710 Newtonians seemed to be 
concerned with particles of matter and the power of a material light.  Indeed, 
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Geoffrey Cantor argues that based on Harris’ work, the materiality of light became 
an accepted fact.153
In 1713, the same year as Collins’ Discourse of Free-thinking, William 
Derham’s Boyle Lectures for 1711 and 1712 were published as Physico-Theology.  
Derham, FRS (1657-1735), was a graduate of Trinity College, Oxford and was 
ordained in 1682 prior to becoming Rector of Upminster in Essex (1689-1735).  He 
was a friend of Newton and John Ray (1628-1705), the famed author of the The 
Wisdom of God as Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691), which served as 
a kind of template for Derham’s own catalogue of natural wonders that might prove 
a divine artificer.  In addition to natural history, Derham published several articles 
in the Philosophical Transactions on astronomical and meteorological topics.154  
Physico-Theology was widely reprinted with a fifth edition appearing within seven 
years of its initial publication.155  Derham followed in the footsteps of Ray and more 
recently of Clarke by asserting that natural philosophy might well serve theology.   
We are, however, concerned with Derham’s thoughts on light and gravity.  
Following the interpretation found in Harris, he stated: “I take Light to consist of 
material Particles, propagated from the Sun, and other luminous Bodies….”156  He 
cited both Newton and Boyle as holders of this view.  Turning to gravity, Derham 
described it as “the Tendency which Bodies have to the Center of the Earth.”  Like 
others of his age, Derham used Newton as his guide: “According to the principles of 
the Newtonian (the most rational of any) Philosophy, the cause of Gravity, is that 
universal Law of Matter, imprinted on it at it’s Creation by the infinite Creator, 
namely Attraction: Which is congenial with all the Matter in the Universe; to Bodies 
and Compound, Solid and Fluid, in the Heavens, and the Earth.”157  In language, 
which might have come from Toland, Tindal, or Collins, gravity is seen to operate 
in terms of a “Law,” which was “imprinted” on all matter at Creation.  Where 
Derham and the deists deviated is seen most readily in Astro-Theology, the third set 
of Boyle Lectures Derham delivered in 1714 and published the following year.  
After advising readers that Newton “doth not pretend to assign” a cause to gravity, 
Derham concluded that we find answers in “the Wisdom and Power of the GREAT 
AUTHOR of All Things….”  However, this was not the predictable knowledge-
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sharing God of the deists.  As Derham explained, our duty to God is to “revere and 
fear him at all Times….”158  No deist would have characterised God this way. 
Conclusion: 
By juxtaposing the writings of our deists on natural philosophy with those of 
more known Newtonian popularisers, we are able to see that the two were not vastly 
different.  Where Toland, Tindal, and Collins differed from Ditton, Harris, and 
others was in their conception of God as governor of the universe.  However, as the 
next chapter demonstrates the difference between deist and non-deist presentation of 
contemporary natural philosophy becomes nearly indistinguishable as we near the 
middle of the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter Seven: 
 
Deists on Matter, Motion, and Newtonian Public Science: 
From Deviation to Indistinctness  
 
 
 
 
 
By the time Sir Isaac Newton died in 1727 contemporary enthusiasm for 
natural philosophy ensured that it had crossed the threshold of the rooms at the 
Royal Society to become firmly established as part of a national discourse.  We 
need only look at the day’s newspapers to see how much natural philosophy had 
captured imaginations and created a market niche.  Newspaper advertisements 
offered consumers the opportunity to literally hold the world in their hands.  Pocket 
globes and larger models contained “the newest Observations, communicated to the 
Royal Society at London, and the Royal Academy.”1  Such natural philosophical 
instruments also became popular decorations in fashionable London homes.  One 
advertisement ran throughout 1717 offering  
Cheap, curious, useful and instructive Ornaments for Rooms, Stair-cases, 
&c. being 19 new Maps neatly and correctly done … including the latest 
Discoveries and Observations of the Royal Societies in London and Paris … 
each map handsomly colour’d and Illustrated … where is also Sold the very 
best … Telescopes, Perspective Glasses, Reading Glasses, and many other 
Useful Curiosities, all of which no Person hath better Goods, better Choice.2   
 
Even if one could not afford these latest items, they were not barred from the 
knowledge of new discoveries in natural philosophy.  A curious notice for 22 
September 1705 alerted readers on a budget that there was “Just Published, and is 
Given Gratis to any one that will but ask for it.  A Philosophical Essay upon Actions 
on distant Subjects, wherein are clearly explicated, according to the Principles of the 
New Philosophy, and Sir Isaac Newton’s Laws of Motion, all those Actions usually 
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attributed to Sympathy and Antipathy….”3  Interested parties simply had to visit the 
Sugar Loaf (a bakery) and request the book.   
 Of course, natural philosophical books written for a general audience 
continued to see many printings.  Those who were excluded from Royal Society 
meetings could purchase, through subscription for twenty-five shillings, an abridged 
set of the Philosophical Transactions for the years 1700 to 1720.  For readers with a 
continental eye, Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris Epitomized 
allowed a glimpse at developments across the Channel.4  We may note the 
enormous popularity of these kinds of works from notices placed around 1720 for 
auctions of libraries of deceased persons which made specific references to the 
natural philosophical books contained in them.5  Public lecturers continued to 
compete for patrons.  By 1718 three distinct sets of lectures delivered by William 
Whiston and Francis Hauksbee, by John T. Desaguliers, and by Benjamin Worster 
with his partner Thomas Watts all offered instruction in “Mechanical, Hydrostatical, 
Pneumatical, and Optical Experiments.”6  In addition, various courses on chymistry, 
anatomy, and lectures in Gresham College ensured that any interested party with the 
means to do so had ample opportunity to immerse themselves in natural philosophy.  
It is into this arena of public science that I have sought to place deists’ writings on 
natural philosophy and will continue to do so as we move towards the middle of the 
eighteenth-century. 
Toland’s Pantheisticon 
 Pantheisticon: or the Form of Celebrating the Socratic-Society (Latin ed. 
1720; English ed. 1751) was Toland’s second attempt at composing a natural 
philosophy and contains his final view of God and providence.7  Recently, historians 
have demonstrated that Toland appropriated the term “pantheist” from the work of 
Joseph Raphson (1648-1715), mathematician and fellow of the Royal Society, using 
it to refer to God’s relationship with the Creation.  In De spatio reali (1697) 
Raphson had claimed that space was an attribute of the divine first cause of 
Creation; thus anything in space was within God.  According to Raphson, Jewish 
theologians “maintained a certain universal substance, material as well as 
intelligent, fashioning all things that exist out of its own essence, whence they have 
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received the name pantheists.”  This “universal substance” penetrated everything, 
but was different from ordinary matter.8
Toland embraced Raphson’s characterisation of Pantheists and added they 
also believed that “the Force and Energy of the Whole, the Creator and Ruler of All, 
and always tending to the best End, is GOD, whom you may call the Mind, if you 
please, and Soul of the Universe; and hence it is, … this Force, according to them, 
being not separated from the Universe itself, but a Distinction of Reason alone.”9  
Toland still maintained the image of God as one who operated for the best ends of 
humanity and not for Himself: God is an ally in humanity’s search for obtainable 
knowledge.  God is eternal and everlasting, He is the author of all things, and 
humanity exists in His presence.  This was not a particularly unique nor radical 
position; William Whiston and Newton himself also believed that “in God we 
properly live, move, and have our being.”  So too did the infamous preacher Henry 
Sacheverell.10  However, the similarities ended there.  Whereas Toland’s God might 
be material that of his challengers was pure spirit.  In 1720 Toland’s conception of 
God had reached its final stage: God placed all meaningful truths about the universe 
and himself within the capacity of the human intellect.   
Some years earlier during one of his visits to Hanover, Toland had discussed 
his changing notions of God with Leibniz who responded with caution: “You 
frequently refer, Sir, to the opinion of those who think that there is no other God or 
Eternal Being than the World itself, … But this opinion, which you yourself profess 
to reject, is as pernicious as it is unfounded….”11  Though he would direct his 
criticism specifically at Newton’s claim that space was God’s sensorium, opinions 
such as Toland’s may also have been what Leibniz had in mind during his famed 
correspondence with Clarke when he wrote “Natural religion itself, seems to decay 
(in England) very much.  Many will have human souls to be material: others make 
God himself a corporeal being.”12  
By the time he composed Pantheisticon, Toland’s attempts at an English 
political appointment had come to nought.  Moreover, he was destitute following his 
ill-fated investment in the South Sea Company.  He was living in a tiny rented room 
with his books stacked on chairs.13  Because it was one of Toland’s final 
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publications, historians have been keen to see it as the ultimate formulation of his 
philosophy and have spent much effort seeking anticipation of Pantheisticon’s 
contents in Toland’s earlier writings.  Margaret C. Jacob has claimed that the work 
was a handbook for a secret society, a kind of Masonic lodge.  Similarly, Stephen 
Daniel argued that Toland wrote the book for a small “group of true believers.”  
However, the attempts to link Toland to a secret society of Masons have been 
convincingly refuted.  Justin Champion has also denied the existence of any 
pantheist society.  Champion further claimed that when Toland identified himself as 
a pantheist it meant one who enjoyed intellectual debates; and, as we saw, 
demonstrated a particular view of providence.  Pantheism is perhaps best viewed as 
a strategy of open intellectual exchange, not the foundation of a radical subculture 
of followers.14
The conception of matter and motion contained in Pantheisticon is both 
similar and different to that described in Letters to Serena.  Toland continued in his 
belief that the universe was an infinite whole with no void space.  Individual bodies 
were seen as such by “their peculiar Attributes, although, with Regard to the Whole, 
there were no Parts really separate.”  There was also a guiding principle that created 
“Harmony of the infinite Whole” and ensured the “most perfect Order” regulating 
“all Things in the Universe.”15  This guiding principle was God, not “separated from 
the Universe itself, but a Distinction of Reason alone,” whom Toland further 
described as the “Force and Energy of the Whole, the Creator and Ruler of All, and 
always tending to the best End….”16  
 Unlike Letters to Serena, where he noted that individual pieces of matter 
were mental abstractions of the universal matter, Toland here suggested that matter 
was composed of individual particles packed closely together.  These particles were 
“most simple, and actually indivisible, infinite too in Number and Species, and that 
all Things are made out of their Composition, Separation, and various Mixture, but 
with proper Measures, Weights, and Motions.”17  Matter existed everywhere; there 
was no void.  Moreover, Toland claimed that by denying a void, he escaped the fault 
of Epicurus who had to invoke chance and fortune to account for the coming 
together into substances of atoms in an absolute vacuum.  Toland also referred to 
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Newton in this vein.  Whereas he once saw Newton’s work as complimenting his 
own natural philosophy, Toland now viewed Newton as the most able spokesperson 
for those philosophers who maintained the existence of a real void space: “Whoever 
feeds his Fancy with these Notions, let him consult the great Newton.”18   
As he had done earlier, Toland argued that “universal Action” was the 
“chiefest of all Motions.”  Motion was transmitted from one body to another never 
decreasing.19  While there were individual motions, these were aspects of Action.  
Toland explained, that everything was “in Motion, and all Diversities whatsoever 
[were] so many Names for particular Motions,” however, “not one single Point in 
Nature being absolutely at rest, but only with regard to other Things….”20  Thus, for 
Toland motion was the true state of matter and rest existed in a relative sense only.   
 After outlining his mechanism for thought, which we will address in the next 
chapter, Toland considered the origin of material things.  He found the Peripatetic 
notion of the four elements (earth-air-fire-water) “neither simple nor sufficient” to 
explain the initial constitution of the universe.  Toland argued that an infinite 
universe must be eternal “as nothing could be made out of nothing.”  What is more, 
and considering the construction of trees, “the organic Structure of Seeds could not 
be formed out of any Course of Atoms, or any Species of Motion whatsoever.”21  
Seeds contained, in Aristotelian language, the potentia of becoming a tree.  Toland 
saw this as fulfilment of purpose.  He also stated that the same principle applied to 
animals.22  Things resulted from a kind of organic growth from first principles, or 
seeds, into their end product and would later be combined to form visible objects. 
Toland again contradicts what he had stated in Letters to Serena, notably that bodies 
appear different to observers due to the motion of their identical particles and the 
sensations this motion causes in us.  In Pantheisticon he posited that things were 
built up from dissimilar substances.  He explained that “Chymists demonstrate, that 
such Bodies are cemented by a manifold growing together of several Substances; for 
which Reason, from Gold, than which nothing seems to be more similar, they 
extract Sulphur, Quick-silver, Earth and other Things, that go to the Composition of 
this noble Metal….”23  That these diverse substances grow together to form gold is 
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evident when the same substances can be disentangled from their heterogeneous 
mixture.   
Toland, Gibson, and the Geology of a Living World  
 Because Toland incorporated geology and natural history concepts into 
Pantheisticon, it is worth pausing to consider his experience with these subjects.  
Edmund Gibson and Toland had a greater association than might be imagined.  
During June and July 1694 they spent much time discussing natural history.  As is 
well known, in 1695 Gibson issued a new edition of William Camden’s Britannia, a 
sixteenth-century geographical and historical account of Britain.  To accomplish this 
task, Gibson relied upon the talents of many scholars including Toland, who was to 
guide the section of the book concerning Ireland.24  Arthur Charlett later 
remembered that Toland “courted” Gibson who “very little valued his Learning to 
which [Toland] so much pretended.”25  The two unlikely partners did not remain 
together for very long.  Gibson was irritated with Toland’s suggestion that they 
revise a manuscript catalogue of English historians owned by Gibson.  The final 
break between them occurred when Toland apparently uttered unfavourable 
comments regarding Camden which he unsuccessfully retracted.26  The loss to 
Gibson’s work was perhaps not a great one.  When he initially arrived in Oxford 
Toland met and befriended Edward Lhwyd (1660-1709), antiquarian and Keeper of 
the Ashmolean.  The two men had many conversations about geology, but Lhwyd 
confessed to a friend that Toland was “not conversant in these studies, and 
endeavours to perswade us” as to his abilities.27  Like others who met him, Lhwyd 
described Toland’s behaviour in mid-June 1695 with displeasure: he was “eminent 
for railing in coffee houses against all communities in religion, and monarch.…”28  
Despite sharing intellectual interests with men such as Gibson and Lhwyd, Toland 
ruined these relationships with unrestrained vanity and self-promotion.   
Pantheisticon was finally the proper venue for Toland to integrate his 
Oxford geological studies with his modified natural philosophy.  He noted that veins 
of a sort are evident in stones through which an “Aliment” moves to provide “the 
Nutriment, and finally, an Exhalation passes through thin and hidden Pores.”  In the 
same way that the flow of blood provides nourishment for living creatures, 
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“Aliment” does the same for less obviously living matter.  Indeed, the same 
“Aliment” was also present in blood.29  Noting the variety of minerals and gems, 
Toland stated “there’s no Reason” to “believe, they were less actuated with Life, 
than the Teeth and Bones of Animals.”  To those who would scoff at his notion of 
minute pores and a vitalising “Aliment” in nature, Toland requested that they 
consider their bones, which grow and are brought nutrients via “imperceptible 
Conduits.”30  Toland explained the presence of certain materials in some locations 
and not in others by the amount of nourishment available in a particular place: 
“Marble grows here, Diamonds there; one Stone puts on its due Form sooner, 
another Stone later; this Seed generates Pebbles, that Rocks.”  Toland’s universe 
was an organic one in which all components of it grew and lived; it was an infinite 
animal.31   
Toland argued that his conception of an organic universe explained the 
observed phenomena better than did competing theories, specifically Descartes’ 
view of matter, defined by extension alone.  In contrast, Toland argued that 
“Infinite, simple, and dissimilar Substances, or the primary Bodies of infinite 
Species, moveable and indivisible, make all the Mixtures of all Things, of which 
they themselves are the eternal, unexhausted, and immutable Matter.”  These bodies 
can only be what they are.  Things are what they are for all eternity.  Sulphur seeds 
can only produce sulphur, bone seeds can only become bones.  That is, “there can be 
no Division, much less Permutation of the first Bodies.”  Toland concluded that 
there could not be any true destruction in the universe.  Particles only change places 
in new configurations.32   
Some years after the publication of Pantheisticon an anonymous assessment 
appeared in the History of the Works of the Learned, a periodical which addressed 
“eminent writers in all Branches of polite Literature.”  The reviewer referred to it as 
“a ridiculous Latin Piece … by that despicable Knight-Errant in the Cause of 
Infidelity, John Toland.”33  In an assessment reminiscent of that offered by William 
Wotton against Letters to Serena, the reviewer claimed, Toland’s purpose was “in 
Words only to say there is a Deity, but in fact it is destroying his Existence.”  The 
fear was that these writings might corrupt “the unwary and the Half-learned.”  There 
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was more at stake than wrong-minded conceptions of matter and motion: it was a 
battle to place the proper view of God in the hearts of Britons.34
Debated Sources for Pantheisticon 
 Gavina Cherchi has recently suggested that the natural philosophy of 
Pantheisticon was modified Epicureanism.  This interpretation forms part of her 
larger thesis that Toland was a radical heretic who paid only lip-service to Christian 
beliefs.  The problem with this view is that the philosophy and the description of 
matter in Pantheisticon were vastly different from that advanced by Epicurus.  
Where the Hellenistic philosopher described identical atoms in a void moving by 
chance and fate,35 Toland envisaged organic seeds of potential becoming their final 
product and then combining to form other complex bodies.  Rather than Epicurean 
atoms, we ought to look for a philosophy based on seeds of uncreated matter.  
Toland’s works suggest we contemplate the Pre-Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras 
(500-428 BC).  We know that Toland read and was familiar with Anaxagoras’ work; 
he referred Sophia Charlotte to it in Letters to Serena.  Anaxagoras is known only 
through the surviving twenty fragments of his philosophy, which were preserved 
chiefly by Simplicius in his commentaries on Aristotle.  The basic assumptions that 
underlay his philosophy are as follows: all which exists did not come into being, nor 
will anything come to an end.  Everything is made of many parts, and is not 
singular; it is inseparable.36  If we consider Anaxagoras’ fragments in more detail, 
the parallels with the philosophy of Pantheisticon are striking.  For example, 
fragment B4 states: 
Before these things were separated off, when all things were together, no 
colour was evident; for the mingling together of all things prevented it—of 
the wet and the dry and the hot and the cold and the bright and the dark, 
much earth being in there also, and seeds infinite in number, in no way like 
each other, for of the other no one is at all like the other.37
 
Moreover, fragment B6 claims, “And since the features of the great and the small 
are equal in number, for this reason, too, all (things) will be in everything.  Nor is it 
possible to exist apart, but all (things) share a feature of everything.”38  The world is 
built out of infinite seeds, which combine to make the matter of all things.  These 
seeds are not destroyed, only recombined.  The universe, however, was not purely 
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materialistic.  A “cosmic mind” interacted with matter “governing all motion of all 
objects, and perceiving and knowing all the physical changes occurring in different 
parts of the world….”  We know that this mind exists not from direct experience but 
from its effects on matter.  Because the universe was joined in matter and by the 
cosmic mind, it was a kind of organism, which breathed and performed all the 
functions of life.  To readers of Pantheisticon all this sounded familiar.39   
Cherchi also suggests that Toland’s supposed Epicurean-like matter was a 
last stab at the establishment that denied him a place by demonstrating that atheism 
could find support in the same doctrines of matter and motion that men like Boyle 
and Newton believed demonstrated divine providence.40  Where those two 
philosophers saw God’s direct and continuing handiwork in the operation of the 
universe, Cherchi argues that Toland presented self-moving matter, which existed in 
accordance with Newtonian physics, as a godless alternative.  Toland himself, 
however, offered a different view consistent with the interpretation in our previous 
chapters.  In the only extant explication of the Pantheisticon, Toland wrote to a 
former Cambridge fellow Barnham Goode in October 1720.  After referring to his 
losses in the South Sea Company, Toland wrote “I think it the wisest course, at least 
the most becoming a Pantheist (who ought to be prepared for every caprice and 
reverse of fortune) to leave this national affair to the consideration of the 
Parliament, which alone can redress its own mistakes, and punish the miscarriages 
of the managers.”41  He had not lost faith in established politics or its institutions.  
His attitude was also consistent with the philosophy of Pantheisticon: things are 
built, broken, and built again, nothing is truly destroyed.  The same might be said of 
Toland’s fortune: it was gone now, but perhaps it would be restored.  This is also 
consistent with his letters to Molesworth on the South Sea Company.  Toland 
further advised Goode that “as to F. P. in the Epistle before the Pantheisticon, let 
him know that it Signifies no more than Felicitatem precatur.”42  That is, one prays 
for happiness or success.  This would seem to cast doubt on Cherchi’s hypothesis of 
Toland’s atheism and support Champion, who claims it is unlikely that we can 
dismiss Toland’s public assertions of Christian belief as “insincere and contrived.”43   
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The uniqueness of the worldview Toland advanced in Pantheisticon is 
minimised when we consider the 31 December 1720 number of John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon’s Independent Whig.  Like Toland’s natural philosophy, Trenchard 
and Gordon suggested that  
Every Thing in the Universe is in constant Motion, and where-ever we move 
we are surrounded with Bodies, everyone of which must, in a certain degree, 
operate upon themselves and us; and it cannot be otherwise, that in the 
Variety of Actions and Events, which happen in all Nature, but some must 
appear very extraordinary to those who know not their true Causes: Men 
naturally admire what they cannot apprehend, and seem to do some of Credit 
to their Understanding, in believing whatever is out of their reach to be 
Supernatural.44
 
This description is strikingly similar to Toland’s: all of nature operated by the 
interaction of matter moving in accordance with established rules.  As Toland had 
also claimed, ignorance of these rules forced some philosophers to find explanations 
in direct divine guidance.  Finally, a proper knowledge of natural philosophy 
allowed formerly extraordinary events to be understood in terms of the rules of 
motion.  By casting a wide net for the context of deist writings we see that they 
engaged with topics of interests and offered solutions that did not differ greatly from 
those of their contemporaries. 
Collins, Whiston, and Deist Support of Public Science 
Collins admired public lecturers on natural philosophy.  Though he was 
debating William Whiston at great length over the meaning of prophecy in 1724, 
Collins appreciated Whiston’s efforts to disseminate Newtonian philosophy.  He 
also praised Whiston as an accomplished scholar with “great designs for the 
improvement of philosophy, and for the welfare and trade of his country: as appears 
by his attempts to explain the philosophy of Sir Isaac Newton, and by his other 
works in mathematicks and physicks, but above all, by his attempts to discover the 
longitude….”45  Whiston did more than promote Newton’s work in such 
publications as New Theory of the Earth (1696) and Newton’s Mathematick 
Philosophy More Easily Demonstrated (1716); he encouraged participation in the 
endeavour.  After he had been banned from Cambridge for Arianism, Whiston 
began a career as a public lecturer in mathematical philosophy in 1712.  His lectures 
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were very popular and attracted large audiences.  For example, the solar eclipse of 
1715 provided Whiston one excellent opportunity to generate income by offering 
instruction on how best to observe the phenomenon and understand it.46  The Post 
Man carried Whiston’s advertisements, which alerted interested parties that he had 
created a “universal Astronomical Instrument for the easy Calculation and 
Exhibition of Eclipses, and of all the Celestial Motions.”  As the date for the eclipse 
neared, advertisements reminded readers that Whiston intended “to observe the 
great Eclipse next Friday over the North West Piazza in Covent Garden.  Tickets are 
delivered out at his own house in Crosstreet near Covent Garden.”  Of course, in the 
week leading up to the event, Whiston adjusted the contents of his lectures to focus 
on eclipses.47   
Whiston’s attempts to find a method to determine longitude at sea, which 
Collins also admired, were similarly a public exercise.  Whiston and his partner, 
Humphrey Ditton, petitioned Parliament on 19 April 1714 to create a reward for the 
successful method of finding longitude.  Ditton and Whiston believed that observing 
the difference between the flash of cannon shots and the resulting sound would 
allow ships at sea to accurately determine their location.  Newspaper advertisements 
told Londoners that “there will be every Saturday Night that is tollerably clear, a 
Ball of Fire thrown up from Black Heath about a Mile high, and that the time will be 
exactly at 8 a clock” and would observers please “make and communicate their 
Observations as to its Azymuth, Altitude and the time it is visible every where, and 
to avoid, as far as they can, looking thro the thick Air of London.”  These 
experiments, though ultimately unsuccessful, carried on from1714 to 1717.48   
Collins saw advances in public understanding of natural philosophy, 
Newton’s specifically, as benefiting all Britons.  Moreover, free-thinking 
encouraged the open discussion of natural philosophy.  As a result, it was also 
advantageous for the nation.  Some writers agreed with Collins but were less 
enthusiastic for the link because they claimed that lecturers like Whiston 
encouraged deism and other such heresies.  As we have seen, deists accepted a 
unitarian view of God, as did Whiston, who proudly shouted-out his adherence to 
the heresy.  For some, natural philosophy and heresy became one in Whiston.  To 
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contemporaries Whiston also seemed to support deism, though he would have 
denied the connection.  In 1742 the anonymous A Dissertation on Deistical and 
Arian Corruption identified the threats to Christianity as “Arian, Socinian, and other 
Deists.”  The author claimed that because Arians and Socinians both denied articles 
of Scripture and “in so doing, invalidate all Revelation … the difference between 
them and avowed Deists, is rather verbal than real; and therefore I rank them all 
under the same common Name Deist.”49   
Morgan’s Medical Principles 
 The year after Collins and Whiston disputed the merits of prophecy Thomas 
Morgan joined the growing ranks of Newtonian enthusiasts.  Morgan’s initial 
publication on natural philosophy in 1725 centred on a theory of medicine.  The 
title, Philosophical Principles of Medicine, was an allusion to Newton’s 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.  Like our other deists, Morgan saw 
a correct understanding of motion as essential for any scheme of natural philosophy.  
Next “to the Knowledge of God, of our Duty to him, and the means of obtaining the 
divine Favour; the Knowledge of the Principles and Laws of Motion … is doubtless 
the most excellent and useful.”50  The similarity of titles was not the only affinity 
that Morgan’s book bore to Newton’s.  Morgan began by outlining the known 
Newtonian laws of motion: “Law 1: All Bodys will for ever continue in their State 
of Rest, or of uniform direct Motion, unless they are compell’d to change that State 
by some external impress’d Force.  Law 2: The Alteration of Motion is ever 
proportional to, and in the same given Direction with the impress’d Force that cause 
it.  Law 3: Re-Action is ever equal, and contrary to Action; or the mutual Actions of 
any two Bodys upon each other are always equal, and in contrary Directions.”51  No 
one could have mistaken Newton’s influence.   
Motion, as Morgan described it, could be accounted for by the action of 
certain forces, the strength of which would be as the square of the time, proportional 
as the quantity of matter, and decrease as the reciprocal square of distances between 
bodies.52  Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation also found a place in Morgan’s 
book.  There “is in all Bodys, … a mutual Attraction, … we call Gravity or Weight, 
by which Bodys tend to the Centre of the Earth.”53  Like Newton, Morgan denied 
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that the force of motion, or gravity, referred to any physical cause.  Rather, it 
described “the Quantity and Direction of the Motion generated and produced by 
them.”  Mistakes in this concept, argued Morgan, accounted for much of the 
misunderstanding of Newton’s work.  It was the fault of “people pretending to 
Philosophy” that gravity was thought to be “an essential and intrinsick Power” in 
matter.54  It is interesting that Morgan, though he was a deist and shared both 
theological and political opinions with Toland and Collins, here criticises their 
interpretation of gravity as a power inherent in matter—calling the proponents of 
these views “mechanical Gentlemen, who seem unwilling to admit any thing but 
Matter and Motion in the World.”  Morgan explained that his depiction of gravity 
and motion ought to be accepted because of its source: “The wonderful and 
incomparable Author of the Principia….”55   
Having relayed the cause of motion as an immaterial force, Morgan 
proceeded, as had Newton, to describe its physical effects.  The motion in the 
oceans and the atmosphere, Morgan assigned to the action of the Sun and Moon by 
means of “Perturbations.”  In the same way that these perturbations enacted change 
in the ocean, they “must necessarily be impress’d upon the Blood and animal Fluids, 
and produce very sensible and considerable Effects in animals Bodys.”56  This effect 
resulted from motion being impressed through the action of gaseous “aethereal 
Fluids,” which interacted with fluids, both bodily and oceanic, by means of the 
“Pores and Interstices” which all fluids have.  These pores allowed a “continual 
Communication between the Atmosphere or external Air, and the Air included or 
contain’d in such Fluids….”57  Morgan concluded that physicians cannot therefore, 
be ignorant of the laws of motion and the construction of matter.  Since the human 
body operated by means of fluids, Morgan suggested that the cure to any disease 
must begin with knowledge of motion.  He then considered the nature of the aether.  
Using Book II of the Principia as his source, Morgan stated that ordinary air “is a 
compressible and expansive Fluid; whose Density is ever proportional to its 
Compression….”  From this analogy Morgan concluded that aether must act in a 
similar manner.58  Motion was therefore caused by a force interacting with the all-
pervasive aether. 
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Newtonianism of the Late 1720s 
In addition to those by our deists, the 1720s saw many new popular natural 
philosophical writings concerning Newton.  A reviewer for the Republick of Letters 
commented, in 1728, that despite Newton’s lack of interest in making his Principia 
easily read, “as it is now translated, [it] may be very useful to a great many who 
understand neither Latin nor Mathematicks well enough to read the other.”  
Contemporary enthusiasm for Newton fuelled such translations, as the reviewer 
explained.  Public science and popularised books would “satisfy the general 
impatience to see whatever came from the hand of so great a Master….”59   
That same year Henry Pemberton, physician and editor of the third edition of 
the Principia (1726), produced A View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy, one of the 
most popular accounts of Newtonian philosophy; owners included the diarist 
Thomas Hearne, and the author Henry Fielding.  Newton himself approved of the 
work and had subscribed to twelve copies.60  Pemberton noted that the manner in 
which Newton had published “his philosophical discoveries, occasions them to lie 
very much concealed from all, who have not made the mathematics particularly 
their study.”61  Past controversies had made Newton uneasy about being too 
simplistic in presenting the contents of the Principia.  As Derham related, Newton 
was a man “who abhorred all Contests, … And for this reason, namely to avoid 
being baited by little Smatterers in Mathematicks, he has told me, he designedly 
made his Principia abtruse; but yet so as to be understood by able Mathematicians, 
who [he] imagined, by comprehending his Demonstrations, would concur w[i]th 
him in his Theory.”62  Admirers of Newton were left to themselves to understand 
the Principia.  To aid the task, Pemberton submitted that works such as his, and 
those by Harris, Derham, and others, were the best way to disseminate Newton’s 
discoveries. 
Pemberton nevertheless cautioned that reading books and reflecting on them 
was not a sufficient method in natural philosophy.  This was because “we can 
conclude nothing concerning matter by any reasoning upon its nature and essence, 
but that we owe all the knowledge, we have thereof, to experience.”63  That is, we 
must observe and inquire, refusing tradition and authority as guiding principles.  
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Pemberton stated that matter might appear “to lie at rest, [though] it really preserves 
without change the motion, which it has common with our selves: and when we put 
it into visible motion, and we see it continue that motion; this proves, that the body 
retains that degree of its absolute motion, into which it is put by our acting upon 
it….”64  All things are in motion, even if we do not perceive it as such.  Newton, 
who had “discovered that the celestial motions are performed by a force extended 
from the sun and primary planets, follows this power into the deepest recesses of 
those bodies themselves, and proves the same to accompany the smallest particle, of 
which they are composed.”65  A force, within light emanating from the Sun, caused 
planetary motion and also allowed particles of matter to adhere to one another.  
While Newton had refused to speculate on the manner of this interaction, he did 
state that light was a material substance.  It was possible to infer that gravity might 
likewise have a material cause.66
Samuel Clarke’s younger brother, John Clarke, DD (1682-1757), Chaplain 
to the King, Boyle Lecturer for 1719 and 1720, and Dean of Sarum (1728-57), 
produced his own lay-account of Newtonian philosophy: A Demonstration of Some 
of the Principle Sections of Sir Isaac Newton’s Principles of Natural Philosophy 
(1730).67  John Clarke greatly admired Newton, who, he claimed, composed “the 
most compleat Piece that ever was wrote upon” natural philosophy.68  He then 
presented the known qualities of matter.  It is “impenetrable, [as] we gather by our 
Senses, and not by Reasoning; for all those that we feel upon, we find by 
Experience are impenetrable, and from thence we conclude that Impenetrability is 
the Property of all Bodies whatsoever.”  Moreover, “all Bodies are moveable, and 
continue of themselves, either in that State of Rest or Motion which they are once 
in, by some sort of Powers.…”  Knowledge of the properties of matter—extension, 
hardness and mobility—were inseparable and “the Foundation of all Philosophy.”69   
Tindal on Light and Motion 
The same year as John Clarke described Newton’s conception of matter for 
general readers, Tindal again addressed the natural world in Christianity as Old as 
the Creation (1730).70  Like Collins, Tindal noted the accepted view that the Sun 
remained stationary while the Earth and other planets circled it.  For Tindal this was 
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yet another example of his belief that “Scriptural and Philosophical Account of 
natural things seldom agree.”71  If people wished true pictures of the world they 
must adopt a Newtonian method and examine for themselves the wonders of nature 
and not permit their understanding to be determined by some outside authority, be it 
secular or sacred.  The order of things in the universe revealed human nature, “the 
relation we stand in to” God and, therefore, “the Religion of Nature takes in every 
thing that is founded on Reason and the Nature of Things.” 72  The natural order 
was, as Tindal noted in his previous writings, composed of matter and motion.  
Moreover, nature also  
teaches Men to unite for their mutual Defence and Happiness, and 
Government was instituted solely for this End; so to make this more 
effectual, was Religion, which reaches the Thoughts, wholly ordain’d; it 
being impossible for God, in governing the World, to propose to himself any 
other End than the Good of the Governed: and consequently, whoever does 
his best for the Good of his Fellow-Creatures, does all that either God or 
Man require.73
 
This view compliments his political views.  Just as God acted for the common good 
of Christians and did not impose Himself on them, governments too must act for the 
collective good. 
Chubb’s Laws of Nature 
 A year after Tindal’s magnum opus, Thomas Chubb described the laws he 
believed guided both nature and humanity.  These natural and immutable laws were 
“founded in the Reasons and Fitness of Things,” which comprised the Creation.  
Their substance was obedience to God combined with correct behaviour to one 
another.  By fulfilling this divine request, Chubb suggested that we did what was 
necessary to satisfy the “Law of Nature.”74  Key to the maintenance of the natural 
order was the proper motion of all the parts found in this order.  Just as a machine 
needed correct motion to function properly, a nation needed the right motion of all 
its citizens: that is, people achieved correct motion within society when they act for 
the common good with their government ensuring this took place.75  We know the 
law of nature through an examination of the Creation, a study of the divine design of 
the world.  As Chubb put it “While the Heavens declare the Glory and Wisdom on 
God, they [also] shew the Rectitude of his Nature….”76   
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 Like Collins and Tindal before him, Chubb addressed the acceptance of 
heliocentric worldviews at the expense of geocentric models.  In response to his 
critics Chubb replied: “Suppose the reasons, upon which the Ptolemaick system of 
astronomy was grounded had obtained universal assent; would that system have 
been well grounded, because the reasons upon which it is grounded had been 
universally admitted? And ought universal opinion to have determined the 
judgement of Copernicus, against the strongest and most obvious reasons to the 
contrary?  Surely, not.”77  When people are permitted to use their reason to consider 
the reality of things, unfounded philosophical schemes do not survive.  Chubb 
suggested that the same was true in matters of religion.  Once more, natural 
philosophy provided a proper method for religion. 
Morgan’s Mechanical Principles of Physick 
 Conceptions of matter and motion in relation to God’s plan continued to 
attract Morgan’s interest.  A decade after he published Philosophical Principles of 
Medicine, Morgan issued a revised account of matter and motion in The Mechanical 
Practice of Physick (1735).  An anonymous reviewer of the work, noted that this “is 
not the first book which we owe Dr. Morgan: he has already made himself known 
by several pieces, in the way of religious controversy: he also obliged the publick 
with a former work in the physical way; but, we know not how it happens, Dr. 
Morgan is more read as a divine, than as a physician.”78  Though previous 
generations had used “Physick” as interchangeable with “natural philosophy,” 
Morgan used the term in the modern sense of physician and as a synonym for the 
practise of medicine.79  He began by advising those who investigate such matters to 
seek “right Information” from people they think most qualified and not blindly 
accept dictates from supposed authorities or from books.80  Indeed, Morgan 
suggested that it was lack of clarity in physick that had prevented its practitioners 
from realising the reality of certain substances like a Newtonian aether.  In assigning 
blame, Morgan pointed an accusatory finger at the “enthusiastick Chymists, such as 
Paracelsus, Van Helmont, and others,” who had, “carried the Art of Healing beyond 
all human Judgement and Comprehension….”  To remedy this defect, Morgan 
summoned his readers to throw off “incomprehensible Jargon, and to reduce the 
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Practice of Physick to the known Laws of Motion and Mechanism.”81  Motion was 
the foundation of natural philosophy and the operation of human bodies.   
 Morgan believed that increased knowledge of the action of disease, which he 
described as its motion, was greatly important in physick.  The key task in this quest 
was determining the movement of diseases inside the body and then finding the 
corrective motion of the curative agent.82  Previous attempts to advance a theory of 
cures were, Morgan asserted, based on occult qualities “without any regard to the 
known establish’d Laws of Matter and Motion….”  As Newton had demonstrated, 
matter, motion, and the action of forces described the operation of the world, there 
was no place for hidden occult properties in a true account of physick.  Morgan, 
however, conceded that these sub-par physicians had provided entertainment for 
Britons by “furnishing every English Family with Books to quack upon….”83   
 Morgan advanced his theory by again aping the format of the Principia in 
listing various propositions, their proofs, and finally the conclusions that may be 
drawn from them.  He also borrowed from the queries to the Opticks in a manner 
similar to Pemberton and Derham.  Substances, which act to cure disease, he 
believed, may enter the body only as fluids once they had been “reduced to an 
exceedingly fine and imperceptible Vapour.”  While Morgan admitted that this may 
seem strange to some readers, he assured them that “it is certain, that Fluids are 
capable of being rarefy’d, effuviated or volatiliz’d into any assignable Degree of 
Tenuity….”84  Once a medicine was ingested it entered the stomach where the 
natural heat therein began a process of rarefaction.  Chymists and experimental 
philosophers, noted Morgan, had proved that heat was capable of dissolving, 
resolving, and diffusing materials that were formerly solid.  Thus, both the operation 
of the stomach and the initial process of cures could be known by observable 
experimentation.85  
A correct understanding of fluids and their motion was essential in physick.  
Morgan described the pressure of fluids as “an active Force, propagated 
instantaneously through the whole Column or Canal in which the Fluid is 
continued, and is not generated in time, like the accelerating Force of Gravity….”86  
That is, the force exerted by fluids in a confined vessel was constant, regardless of 
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the duration of the containment.  This being so, he concluded that the “Pressure in 
Fluids is a very different and distinct Law of Nature or Principle of Motion….”87  
This was a difficult theory, because, as Morgan explained, even Newton himself had 
been mistaken in this regard.  The “great and incomparable Newton, tho’ he 
discovered this Law of Fluidity, and the Effects of it, yet did not at least plainly and 
expressly distinguish it from the general Law of Gravity; which Obscurity, or want 
of more Expressness in this one single Point, has led many if his Mathematical 
Followers into a Difficulty….”88  Morgan, however, conceded that Newton’s 
gravity did account for the pressure of fluids, but one had to ensure the correct 
implementation of gravity.  As Morgan explained,  
the uniform and instantaneous Velocities produced by Pressure, are the same 
with the accelerated Velocities last acquired by the perpendicular Descent of 
Bodies from the same Heights, through which such Pressure is propagated; 
and consequently, that the Law of Gravity, and all its Effects, so far agree 
with the Law of Pressure in Fluids….89   
 
Morgan then returned to specific bodily functions, chiefly the circulation of 
blood.  He argued that the velocity of blood was continually decreasing as distance 
from the heart increased.  Conversely, the nearer the blood got to the heart, the 
greater its motion.  Such a pattern was modelled on the planets, which move faster 
at perihelion rather than aphelion.  The opposite view, Morgan claimed, was held by 
the physician James Jurin.  According to Morgan, Jurin presented this conclusion as 
an unresolvable paradox.  Morgan was not so lenient with the hypothesis, calling it 
“not true in Fact.”90  In advancing his criticism, Morgan asked readers to consider a 
cone.  Taking the heart as the narrow end, he asked how the pressure of a fluid 
which originates at the smaller end can possibly have the greatest pressure at the end 
with the largest area.  It was, Morgan concluded, a fact that “the Impetus or 
Momentum of the Fluid must be as the Velocities, or as the Sections inversely.”91  
He submitted that Jurin’s notion was proven false.   
As for the motion of animal bodies, including humans, Morgan suggested 
that “the original active Force is intrinsically in the Solids, and the Fluids only act 
as they are acted upon.”  The solids are made vaporous by the heat of the stomach.  
The vapour acts like the aether and initiates motion in the body by means of pores in 
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the fluids, such as blood.  How these forces operate, Morgan claimed not to know.  
Indeed, he noted that much of the problem with previous schemes of physick 
resulted from fruitless searches for such causes.  A true physician ought to be 
satisfied with observable facts and relate these to known laws of nature, such as 
Newton’s law of gravity, and to known phenomena, such as matter and motion.92  
As Newton had claimed “hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on 
occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.”93  Not 
all of Morgan’s readers were convinced of his commitment to this strategy, 
however.  An anonymous reviewer described the work as an unproven hypothesis: 
“I hope better of Dr. Morgan; but this he may be assured of, the publick will pay 
little regard to his inferences, unless the facts from which they are drawn be 
specified.”94
Morgan and Bryan Robinson on Interpreting Newton 
Morgan was following the well-established footsteps of Stephen Hales, DD, 
FRS (1677-1761) whose Hæmasticks (1733) had adopted the experimental style of 
Newton’s Opticks in an analysis of blood’s motion in which Hales revealed an 
active immaterial energy in blood as its vitalising agent.95  In spite of this 
unacknowledged pedigree, Morgan’s account of fluid dynamics drew a strong 
rebuttal from Bryan Robinson (1680-1754), anatomical lecturer at Trinity College, 
Dublin.  Robinson believed it was Morgan and not Newton who was mistaken when 
it came to the description fluid motion.96  He issued the challenge in a published 
letter to the physician and populariser of Newtonian philosophy, George Cheyne, a 
man he described as a “Person of Candour and Judgment, and throughly acquainted 
with Philosophical Subjects.”97  Robinson advised Cheyne that the mistakes in 
Morgan’s treatise could be attributed to “his not having duly attended to what Sir 
Isaac and I delivered concerning these Motions.”98  Thus, Morgan’s thesis could be 
dismissed with little difficulty.   
What could not be as easily written off were Morgan’s suggestions regarding 
the interaction of air with blood.  Robinson was particularly aggravated over 
Morgan’s comments regarding the twenty-fourth proposition of his Animal 
Oeconomy, which had been published the previous year.  That work had also begun 
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with a discourse on the motion of fluids through cylinders in which, Robinson, like 
Newton, claimed to have “avoided Hypotheses, and explained the Laws which 
obtain in human Bodies by Reason and Experiment.”99  The passage in question 
stated: “The Life of Animals is preserved by acid Parts of the Air mixing with the 
Blood in the Lungs.”  Rather than Morgan’s subtle substance of air (aether) 
interacting with the pores in the blood as the impetus to motion, Robinson advanced 
the notion of acid particles combining with blood as the correct explanation. 
Robinson claimed to have extrapolated his conclusion from a “series of 
Experiments taken from Sir Isaac Newton….”100  We may be certain to which 
experiments Robinson referred.  In 1692 the Scottish physician Archibald Pitcairne 
had visited Newton prior to taking up his post as medical lecturer at Leyden, where 
his students included Cheyne.  Newton gave Pitcairne a short treatise entitled “De 
natura acidorum” which demonstrated the action of acid particles.101  The work was 
subsequently published in 1710 as a preface to the second volume of Harris’ 
Lexicon Technicum.  Harris stressed the importance of the document by claiming 
that “it contains in it the Reason and of the Ways and Manner of all Chymical 
Operations, and indeed of almost all the Physical Qualities, by which Natural 
Bodies, by their small Particles, act one upon another.”102  Newton argued that 
particles of acid contained “a great Attractive Force; in which Force their Activity 
consists,” and that “By their Attractive Force also, by which they rush towards the 
Particles of Bodies, they move the Fluid and excite Heat; and they [brake] asunder 
some Particles, so much as turn them into Air, and generate Bubbles….”103  
Robinson seems to have concluded that acid, as Newton demonstrated and Harris 
encouraged, activated other substances to motion. 
Robinson outlined his theory, beginning “first, that a constant Supply of 
fresh Air is necessary to preserve the Life of Animals; secondly, that fresh Air 
preserves Life … by the very same Power … whereby it preserves Fire and Flame 
… and thirdly, that Air preserves Fire and Flame … and consequently the Life of 
Animals, by its acid Particles.”104  While much of what Robinson advanced was 
compatible with Morgan’s writings, the last premise is where they deviated.  One 
could produce flame without air, Robinson claimed as he informed readers that a 
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mixture of Sprit of Nitre (an acid) and various oils could ignite.  Furthermore, it was 
possible to maintain the flame “in a Mixture of common Sulphur and Nitre.”  Thus, 
Robinson concluded that air must “preserve Fire” “by means of its acid Particles.  
There is no way of proving this Inference to be false, but by proving there are no 
acid Particles in the Air.”105  Morgan’s response, according to Robinson, was to 
claim that “Acids will check and extinguish Fire sooner than common Water….”106  
Robinson did not acknowledge this as a worthy rebuttal.  He concluded by stating 
that he “wish’d Dr. Morgan had considered my Animal Oeconomy with a little more 
Temper and Care….”  There Robinson explained that “When Animals are deprived 
of the Acid of the Air,” their pulse decreases rapidly.107  However, Robinson did not 
demonstrate how he was able to differentiate the lack of air from the lack of acid 
particles. 
As had Robinson, Morgan formed his response as a letter to Cheyne, whom 
he called a “very proper and competent judge of the matter in debate.”108  The 
question at hand was, as Morgan explained to Cheyne, whether he or Robinson had 
“most mistaken Sir Isaac Newton.”  Morgan was not the only Newtonian expositor 
concerned with these issues.  In using Newtonian philosophy to describe the 
workings of machines (in this case a human machine), Morgan was following the 
example of John T. Desaguliers who was deeply immersed in demonstrating the 
empirical reality of Newton’s mathematics.  Desaguliers too was interested in 
calculating depictions of fluids in pipes, specifically those he undertook at the 
behest of his patron the duke of Chandos who in 1721 sponsored an unsuccessful 
scheme to redirect Uxbridge Water near London.109  Repeating his previous 
arguments for the flow of water, Morgan advised Cheyne that: 
[T]here seems to be something in this case that Dr. Robinson, as great a 
master as he is of Sir Isaac Newton, has not sufficiently considered.  It is 
certain, that when water flows in canals or pipes, and runs out of a greater 
section into a less … the velocities must be every where reciprocally as the 
sections, or equal quantities must flow through every section in the same 
time … it is evident that water thus communicating and flowing through 
pipes … does not observe the law of accelerating gravity, since that has no 
regard at all to any sections or communication of fluids, but an accelerating 
perpendicular descent only.110
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It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that Cheyne had written against Toland’s 
interpretation of Newton.  Nevertheless, Morgan felt him the appropriate mediator 
for his dispute with Robinson even though Morgan, as we saw, agreed with much of 
Toland’s theology.  This example demonstrates, if only in this one case, that we 
ought to be careful in drawing sharp distinctions between Newtonians and their 
perceived enemies.  Robinson did not responded to Morgan’s latest challenge and 
Cheyne never reacted to either man’s attempt to draw him into their dispute.  It 
seems clear that, by 1738, Morgan believed motion resulted from the interaction of 
the subtle substance of air (aether) and matter. 
Natural Philosophy and The Moral Philosopher 
 Following his Mechanical Practise of Physick, Morgan considered the laws 
of nature in the first volume of his Moral Philosopher (1737).  He stated that all 
persons contained knowledge of these laws, which were imprinted upon their 
wisdom and reason.111  However, access to this latent knowledge required 
assistance.  Some, who were vain and full of conceit for their own abilities, denied 
the necessity of this condition.  Morgan claimed that we must have divine 
guidance—which is never refused—to determine religious truths.  The same held 
for natural truths.  The guide Morgan chose to lead people to correct understanding 
of the law of nature was, not surprisingly, Newton’s Principia which, he 
maintained, contained “no doubt, natural Truths, and such as are necessarily 
founded in the Reason of Things; and yet, I think, none but a Fool or a Madman 
would say, that he could have informed himself in these Matters as well without [it], 
and that he is not at all obliged to such Master or Teacher.”112  Correct conceptions 
of nature were within the capacity of all people; one needed only the right 
instruction. 
 Morgan described the material world as a system of bodies void of all 
thought and intelligence.  Matter had no powers in itself, only the ability to be acted 
upon.  As Morgan denied God the will to intervene in the ordinary workings of the 
Creation, the world must operate by means of immutable laws.  However, the moral 
world—the world of human actions—was “capable of Intelligence, Will, and 
Choice” and therefore it was “impossible to govern the moral World by the Laws of 
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necessary, extrinsick Force, as it would be to govern the natural world, or System of 
Bodies, by the Laws of intelligent Self-Motion.”  God governed both worlds by 
means of His “constant, uninterrupted Presence, Power, and incessant Action upon 
both….”113
 Morgan also hoped to refute those who might suggest that matter, once it 
had been created and put into its natural order, no longer required “any farther 
Presence, Power, or Operation of the first Cause.”114  Here he further deviates from 
deists like Toland and Collins who had stated and hinted, respectively, that matter 
has no need of outside guidance.  Morgan drew out the logical implications of such 
views: “But if these natural, inherent and essential Principles, Properties, or general 
Laws, can sustain and govern the World without God, or without the continued 
Agency of the first Cause; I would fain know why they might not have created the 
World at first, or why they may not be as well supposed to have been eternal, 
necessary, and independent of any Cause at all.”115  By denying an external cause of 
motion, philosophers potentially eliminated God from Creation, as Morgan desired 
to show.  Morgan himself believed that God acted in strict conformity with the laws 
of nature.  As he explained, “Preservation therefore, or the Support and 
Continuation of Existence and Motion, is as necessary an Effect of God’s presence, 
Power, and Action, as Creation itself….”116  By removing God from a universe 
operating by chance and impact, Morgan claimed that these thinkers could never 
answer the following questions: “What are the Laws of Nature?  What is the Law of 
Gravity, the Law of communicating Motion from one Body to another by Impulse, 
and the Law of the Vis Intertiae of Bodies?  Are these natural, essential and inherent 
Properties of the Bodies themselves, or are they the regular Effects of some 
universal, extrinsick Cause acting incessantly upon the whole material System by 
such and such general Laws and Conditions of Agency?”117  Any due consideration 
of these issues would reveal the impossibility of purely materialist accounts of the 
Creation and reveal the truth of Newton’s philosophy and the immaterial forces on 
which it was built.  
 In the third volume of The Moral Philosopher (1740), Morgan noted with 
approval the widespread knowledge and acceptance of Newton’s natural 
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philosophy: “There are few thinking inquisitive Persons, now among us, but 
knowing something of the Newtonian Philosophy, and the Laws of Nature 
demonstrated by that great Philosopher.”  The best means to learn this work was 
from direct engagement with the Principia itself.  Morgan acknowledged that this 
was not easy.  Therefore, the majority of interested parties knew Newton’s work 
through the efforts of others who explained the dense mathematics in a more 
accessible way.  As did Collins, Morgan praised those who diffused Newton’s 
philosophy throughout the nation.  However, this was not the most efficient way to 
learn, as “It must be own’d, that this Way of receiving Truth from Authority has its 
Use, and may be of great Advantage to the Bulk of Mankind.  But then it must be 
allow’d too, that this is a more imperfect Ground of Truth….”118  One placed great 
trust in those who popularised the original philosophy.  This explained Morgan’s 
earlier caution in choosing one’s teachers.  
The Active Matter of Morgan’s Physico-Theology 
 In 1741 Morgan advanced his latest theory concerning motion and its origin 
in Physico-theology: or, a Philosophico-moral Disquisition Concerning Human 
Nature, Free Agency, Moral Government, and Divine Providence.  He began by 
describing the “mechanical Powers and Properties of Bodies, as distinct from the 
essential Attributes and Properties of mere passive Matter.”  Matter could do 
nothing except be acted upon by “some universal, intelligent, designing Cause.”  As 
he continued his investigation in natural philosophy, Morgan found that light (“the 
visive Element”) was a material substance not “endued with Gravity, Resistance, 
Pressure, or any other mechanical Power,” and yet it “actuated and exerted all the 
mechanical Powers of Bodies, and was the … immechanical Principle of all … 
Motion.”119  Thus, light, which pervaded all Creation, might be the active aethereal 
medium responsible for motion.   
In one of the only other studies of Morgan’s natural philosophical writings, 
Robert E. Schofield approached Physico-theology with some confusion: he could 
not account for this new exposition of matter and motion, but suggested it reflected 
changes in contemporary Newtonianism.120  Schofield is partially correct; however, 
he is mistaken to suggest that the contents of Physico-theology were a puzzle.  The 
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action of light that Morgan employed is prefigured in his earlier work on fluids and 
aether.  Schofield perhaps overlooks this fact because he appears not to have been 
aware of Morgan’s 1735 book or of the dispute with Robinson. 
 Matter, according to Morgan in Physico-theology, was extended, solid, 
infinitely divisible, and moveable.  Accepting Newtonian inertia, as he had done in 
previous works, he posited that “Matter is perfectly indifferent, and purely passive” 
with respect to motion or rest; “it must for ever continue in that State of Rest or 
Inaction, it is put out of it, or moved by some extrinsic Cause.”121  In language 
reminiscent of Toland Morgan continued,  
Rest is no Action, and requires no Cause, but Motion is Action, and we 
know of no Action without Motion.  As Motion is Action or active Force, 
the continuation of Motion is continued Action of active Force; and 
therefore, to say that Motion may continue without continued Action or 
active Force and Causality, the same Thing in Effect, as saying that it may 
begin without any active Force or Cause at all.122
 
Therefore motion as the cause of all occurrences in nature, was “owing to some 
extrinsic active Power or Energy.”  Established laws regulated motion, which 
Morgan called “mechanical Powers, Forces or Actions of Bodies.”  Chief among 
these properties of motion was gravity.  Morgan’s Newtonianism is again evident 
when he described gravity as the action by which all matter is “drawn or urged 
towards one another by Forces proportional to their Quantity of Matter directly, and 
the Squares of their Distances reciprocally … [this] Power of Gravity is not 
essential to, or inherent in the Matter itself….”  Gravity acts according to the “Laws 
of the strictest Harmony and Proportion.”  Its cause is “no other but the supreme, 
universal Agent, Author, Governor and Director of all Nature, or God himself.”123   
 Morgan reported that the pressure of fluids is related to, and analogous with, 
the power of gravity.  The pressure which enacts motion in fluids is itself caused by 
some determinable “Weight or Force of Gravity.”  Moreover, since the force of 
gravity and fluid pressure may be described by a “subduplicate” (square-root) ratio 
they must have the same cause.  Where the forces differ is in their direction of 
action, gravity in the rectilinear versus pressure in all directions simultaneously.124  
Additionally, two other properties existed: a force by which fluids endeavour to 
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retain “their Æquilibrium or equal pressure,” and a “restitutive Force” or elasticity 
by which bodies restore themselves once they have been compressed.  In the case of 
air, it is “condensed in Proportion to its Compressure or the Action of Gravity, and 
rarify’d in Proportion to its Heat or the Action of Fire upon it.”125  Morgan then 
concluded that all the mechanical powers he had related depended upon the action 
of gravity which, as he noted earlier, was a power not inherent in bodies but which 
affects them with respect to their situation in the Creation and their proximity to 
other bodies.126  Gravity, therefore, must be “continually exerted thro’ the whole 
Creation.”  This would, Morgan assured his readers, seem clear “if it can be prov’d, 
that there is actually in Nature a material Substance or elementary Fluid, which is 
not affected with any of these mechanical Properties….”127
 Morgan then revealed the existence of such a fluid, namely light.  He 
regarded the investigation of light as a difficult, yet crucial, topic.  While Morgan 
followed the lead of Newton, whom he praised as a “Man of the most elevated and 
uncommon Genius,” he believed that Newton had not exhausted the topic.  Indeed, 
Newton had “left enough for the farther Disquisition and Investigation of future 
Ages.”  What Newton had proved, with certainty, was that “Light is corporeal, or a 
material Substance.”128  From this premise, Morgan suggested that “Fire and Light 
are essentially … the same, and that Fire is nothing else but condensed Light.”129  
This conclusion was important because Morgan described fire (along with air) as 
one of the two “Counterforces” in nature.  Thus, light was an active force. 
 Morgan outlined the sensible properties of light focusing particular attention 
on the fact that the “luminous Rays are in a continual vibrating Motion,” as all “Sir 
Isaac Newton’s Observations and Experiments upon Light evince….”130  What was 
more, Newton’s work demonstrated that light rays might be reflected in one 
instance, refracted in the next, finally bouncing off some material body to begin the 
sequence again.  The “General Scholium” added to the second edition of the 
Principia (1713) supported Morgan’s statements.131  In it Newton had repeated that 
all bodies move freely in space without resistance.  He also concluded that “A Few 
things could now be added concerning a very subtle spirit pervading gross bodies 
and lying hidden in them; by its force and actions, the particles of bodies attract one 
 264
  
another at very small distances and cohere when they become contiguous … and 
light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is 
excited….”132  Despite this motion, neither light nor the material with which it 
interacted were adversely affected.  “Any one but moderately acquainted with the 
Newtonian Theory of Light,” Morgan confidently claimed, “must see the Reason 
and Necessity of what I have observed and advanced.”133  As Anita Guerrini has 
suggested, Morgan presents himself as the one true expositor of Newtonian 
philosophy.134  Morgan believed he knew what Newton did not: the nature of the 
unnamed subtle substance. 
 This medium was evenly spread through all nature and was composed of 
“extremely subtle and minute, [matter] and, perhaps, [even consisted] of the very 
smallest and last Divisions of Matter.”  From this assertion, Morgan concluded, 
“that all other Bodies or material Substances whatever are immersed in this 
universal Fluid as the common Medium and Vehicle of all their Actions….”135  To 
demonstrate this claim, Morgan presented the results of an experiment performed 
with a magnifying glass, which he believed demonstrated the motive power of light.  
He focused light from the Sun into a beam which possessed the power to cause 
combustion in items such as “light Tobacco” and “dead Oak” or, if sufficiently 
intense, to melt gold.  This proved that fire was “nothing else, but elementary 
Light;” it was “an Element sui Generis, and not subject to the mechanical Laws and 
Properties of other Bodies, or Material Fluids.”  It moved through space suffering 
no resistance and operating in “a purely immechanical” manner.136   
 Schofield suggested that Morgan’s understanding of light might have been 
due to trends in contemporary views of Newton, though he could provide no 
definitive example.  We may be more exact.  Morgan, as we noted with Collins, 
subscribed to Henry Pemberton’s View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy (1728) 
where Pemberton extolled the merits of Newton’s Opticks stating that “whenever 
mankind shall be blessed with this improvement of their knowledge, it will be 
derived so directly from the principles laid down by our author in this book.”  Later 
he wrote concerning the power of nature, that “Sir Isaac Newton has in general 
hinted at his opinion concerning it; that probably it is owing to some very subtle and 
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elastic substance diffused through the universe, in which such vibrations may be 
excited by the rays of light….”137  Is it surprising that Morgan proposed motion to 
be the provenance of light?  What is more, Pemberton’s demonstration of the motive 
power of light and fire as seen through the use of a magnifying glass is exactly the 
aforementioned one employed by Morgan himself.138   
Contemporary reviewers of Physico-Theology confirm Schofield’s 
interpretation that little novelty could be found in Morgan’s pages.  One complained 
that, “Our Author has taken Care to say very few Things in this Book, which may 
not be found in others.”139  The reviewer did, however, note that Morgan’s purpose 
had been to “Defend the cause of God” for which he could expect “ no Thanks or 
Favour.”  Morgan’s critics, as we saw with John Chapman, would “make him (alas 
poor Man) an Atheist, for demonstrating the Being, Providence, continual Presence, 
incessant Agency and Concurrence of the Deity in all the Works and Ways of 
Nature; and an Infidel, for not believing what they themselves could never 
understand and explain….”140  The editor of the Works of the Learned concluded 
that “we cannot but approve of Dr. Morgan’s Impartiality, and take a Pleasure in 
Obliging him, so long as he maintains the Character (as we hope he always will) of 
a genteel and candid Disputant.”141
 Having demonstrated the existence of a medium (active light) that 
propagated motion throughout the Creation, Morgan followed Newton’s example in 
claiming that he did not know “How this immechanical Fluid acts upon other 
Bodies, and exerts and determines their mechanical Powers.”  Though Morgan 
refused to speculate, he did know that it was not “done by Weight, Pressure, 
Resistance, Impulse, or any mechanical Power or Property whatever.”142  He could, 
however, articulate the laws that governed its action and by which “an intelligent 
Being, who is a Governor and Director of Things, has determined and declared, he 
will act.”143  That is, one could observe the physical results—the movement of 
material bodies in accordance with the laws of motion—of the actions performed by 
the immaterial medium or elemental light.  This was the correct method in which to 
proceed because it was the method followed by the “great Philosopher, Newton.”144  
Morgan cautioned against concluding that the existence of such laws meant that 
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God does not act in the universe or that he gave “Bodies an independent Power of 
acting without him.”145  Morgan hoped to impart to his readers an admiration for the 
direction of nature “by general Laws, such as being constantly and steadily acted 
upon and kept to, may obtain and secure the best Order and Constitution of Things.”  
This unalterable picture of Creation was more worthy of God, Morgan argued, than 
contrary views that required the “Author of Nature, to suspend his Laws, or alter his 
prescribed Rules and Measures of Actions, by frequently interposing on particular 
Incidents and Emergencies.”146  God never suspended the laws of motion or nature.  
The world would continue to operate as it always had.  Any other conclusion 
“would be unworthy of God, as the Creator and Governor of the World, and the 
universal Cause, Preserver, and Director of Nature.”147  Toland, Collins, Tindal, and 
Chubb could not have said it more clearly and they would certainly have readily 
agreed. 
Conclusion 
By 1741 deists were no longer distinct in contemporary understanding of 
Newtonian philosophy.  Indeed, they were helping to create this understanding.148  
Morgan’s work incorporates and anticipates contemporary views of Newton.  A 
material aether received considerable attention in the years after Physico Theology.  
In his History of the Royal Society (1744), Thomas Birch included two letters by 
Newton to Boyle and Henry Oldenburg, then secretary to the Royal Society, written 
in 1679 and 1676 respectively, which described Newton’s early researches into 
aether.  In these letters Newton suggested to Oldenburg that the “frame of nature” 
“may be nothing but various contextures of some certain aetherial spirits of vapours 
condensed, as it were, by præcipitation, much after the manner, that vapours are 
condensed.”  Newton then advised Boyle that aether may cause gravity because 
bodies will “get out and give way to the finer parts of aether below, which cannot be 
without the bodies descending to make room above for it to go out into.”149  
Moreover, in 1743 Robinson published A Dissertation on the Aether of Sir Isaac 
Newton in which he argued that the phenomena of nature were caused by a spiritual 
aether, which filled the universe and had both “Activity and Power.”150  This 
position bears striking resemblance to that advanced by Morgan, though Robinson’s 
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aether was spirit and Morgan’s was the material light of the Opticks.  
Notwithstanding this difference, eighteenth-century Newtonianism was shaped by 
appeals to aethers and material fluids and predicated upon the materiality of light.151  
This was posited by Morgan and to a different extent by Toland; both built upon the 
observation and experimentation championed by all our deists.   
Links like the ones our deists forged between politics, theology, and natural 
philosophy continued to trouble those who supported traditional power structures in 
England even as the eighteenth century drew to a close.  Although Edmund Burke 
could state with relief in 1790 that our deists were no longer a political danger, he 
remained worried over the implications of experimental philosophy, championed by 
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), as a factor undermining the established society.  A 
Unitarian minister, Priestley’s endorsement of the democratic spirit driving 
revolution in America and France, which was joined to his open and accessible style 
of chemical experimentation, solidified in the minds of many observers the 
association between experiment and destabilising political agendas.  As Priestley 
put it, the “rapid progress of knowledge … will, I doubt not, be the means, under 
God, of extirpating all error and prejudice, and of putting an end to all undue and 
usurped authority in the business of religion as well as of science.”  Experiments 
conducted with the active power of electricity revealed to Priestley and to his 
disciples that a similar active principle within the human spirit was being restrained 
by England’s government.  However, events across the Channel and across the 
Atlantic demonstrated that this condition was not perpetual.  The fears conservatives 
had for such views were thus manifested in strong suspicion of heretical religion, 
political activism, explanations of nature deduced by experiment, and on personal 
investigation rather than acceptance of tradition.  Distrust of events in France, and 
those who supported them, peaked when a mob burned Priestley’s home and 
laboratory in July 1791 after he had planned to celebrate the anniversary of the 
Bastille’s destruction.152  As he stood in the glow of the flames consuming his 
belongings, Priestley would have taken little comfort knowing that these reactions 
had a long history. 
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Chapter Eight: 
 
Deists on the Soul, Immaterial Matter, and the Human Body 
 
 
 
 
 
 Our deists and their critics often clashed over questions of matter and spirit.  
This is not surprising.  For Christians, an immaterial soul was the foundation for 
morality and, indeed, the very basis of organised religion, which placed great 
emphasis on the fate and (in the case of Catholics) posthumous care of the soul.  
Likewise, studies of the human body and its operation were really examinations of 
the spirit which animated it and, by extension, of religion itself.1  Continuing into 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, uncertainty over the nature and 
composition of the soul inflamed passions.2  Two examples from the margins of the 
deist controversy illustrate the phenomenon.  Nathanael Taylor (d. 1702), a London 
minister, in A Preservative against Deism (1698) suggested that deists advocated the 
existence of no “such thing as a pure Spirit, independent of all Body and Matter; 
and that they that advance the Opinion of pure and Immaterial Substances, trust to 
Fancy and meer Conjectures.”  If this was true, Taylor concluded, deists must hold 
that God Himself is a material being and not worthy of worship.  This position was 
heresy to anyone who argued that acceptance of the immaterial Christ was a 
necessary condition of salvation.3  Over sixty years later, in 1759, Edward Goldney 
considered deists’ views of the soul in Epistles to Deists and Jews, in Order to 
Convert Them to the Christian Religion, which he had dedicated to George II.  He 
and Thomas Secker (1693-1768), Archbishop of Canterbury, wished to convert 
Jews and deists back to Christianity by proving that Jesus was the true Messiah.4  
Goldney criticised the apparent arrogance displayed in deists’ writings when they 
claimed that nothing in religion was mysterious.  “Can you comprehend,” he asked, 
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“how spirit and matter, your soul and body is united, and what your soul is, and in 
what way and manner it now exists, and how it possibly can exist when departed out 
of the body?”  These questions were, as Goldney hoped to demonstrate, true 
mysteries.  Only God knew how matter and immaterial spirit united to form every 
person.  Thus, deists must accept their own limitations and not tread into heresy 
taking unsuspecting readers with them by inquiring into things they could never 
know.  As Goldney phrased it in a couplet: “Know then this Truth, ye Deists, this 
believe, / In disbelieving, you yourselves deceive.”5  These themes figure 
prominently in our discussion of deist’s writings on the soul, the body, and 
immaterial matter.  Though critics painted with wide brushstrokes a picture of deism 
and its opinions concerning the soul, a close examination reveals that these strokes 
obscure, rather than make a clear portrait, of deists.   
Toland and the Matter of the Soul 
 John Toland initially considered the soul in the discussion of reason found in 
Christianity not Mysterious.  He chastised thinkers who confuted the soul with 
reason.  Reason, Toland stated, was merely one aspect of a multifaceted soul.  As he 
had described motion as a specific mode of Action, Toland used the example of 
“Gold is not a Guinea, but a piece determined to a particular Stamp,” to suggest that 
a similar relationship held for reason and the soul.  We know, he argued, “as much 
of the Soul as we do of any other thing else, if not more … [but] we are strangers to 
the Subject wherein these Operations exist.”6  Thus, the soul, be it what it may, was 
the location of a person’s mental impulses, including reason, and this was known 
with the same certainty that accompanied knowledge of God and of motion.7
 Critics of Christianity not Mysterious sought to refute the arrogance of these 
brief passages.  Edmund Elys (f. 1707), Nonjuror, accused his adversary of “Self-
conceit” because if Toland had truly contemplated his soul he would have reflected 
“upon the true IDEA OF GOD in his own Soul, and in the Soul of all Men….”  
Knowledge of the soul was more than finding the location of thought; it was proof 
of God’s existence.  He claimed that Toland hid behind descriptions of the soul’s 
function by refusing to accept the deeper theological implication of contemplating 
one’s soul.  Elys worried that Toland’s words could corrupt those who read the book 
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and believed that that soul was nothing more than the location of reason among 
other mental faculties.8  Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, answered 
Toland in a point-by-point refutation, concluding that Toland’s description lacked 
substance and must be dismissed.  How could it be otherwise from the pen of a man, 
who was, Stillingfleet believed, intent on spreading heresy in England?9
 A few years later, in 1700, Toland published some further thoughts on the 
soul in Clito: A Poem on the Force of Eloquence which also addressed an array of 
topics including planetary motions and the processes of life.  It is divided into two 
parts.  The first is attributed to Clito “a certain eminent Man,” and the second to 
Adeisidaemon.10  Clito asked the following questions. 
Who form’d the Universe, and when and why, 
Or if all things were from Eternity; 
What Laws to Nature were prescrib’d by Jove;  
Where lys his chiefest residence above;  
Or if he’s only but the World’s great Soul;  
Or parts the Creatures are, and God the whole  
From whence all Beings their Existence have; 
And into which resolv’d they find a Grave;  
How nothing’s lost, tho all things change their Form,  
As that’s a Fly which was but now a Worm; 
And Death is only to begin to be  
Som other thing, which endless change shall see;  
(Then why should me to dy have so great fear?  
Tho nought’s Immortal, all Eternal are.)11
 
The soul might be the source of life and the universal soul, if one existed, was the 
cause of all Creation.  What is more, individual souls—those found in creatures—
are not immortal.  While the soul provided life, it did not exist beyond the death of 
that which it animated.  The components of life, matter and soul, are temporarily 
joined into one being and then rearranged to form another life.   
 Toland’s correspondence with the natural philosopher Leibniz in March 
1702 conducted through the Queen of Prussia, Sophia Charlotte, contains his most 
detailed accounting of thought, the soul, and immaterial matter.12  During their 
discussions Toland maintained his commitment to Lockean epistemology and stated 
that the basic question at hand was whether there existed “anything in our thoughts 
which does not at all come from the senses.”13  He agreed that there was a faculty in 
 277
  
the mind upon which “sensible things act” though what this faculty might be we 
cannot know.  The only way to determine the answer was to consider “the nature of 
the soul itself, but this is entirely impracticable.”  To demonstrate this paradoxical 
response, Toland referred to Descartes who had been unable to inquire into his own 
soul, but had to begin with his body.  The French philosopher was, Toland asserted, 
“obliged to have recourse to the body, and has had knowledge of his soul, Cartesian 
as it is, only by means of the sense and sensible things….”  From this Toland 
concluded  
that one does not in the least know the soul by itself, but only by the body, 
and consequently by the senses and sensible things.  Because all his 
demonstrations on the nature of the soul consists in this, that finding nothing 
in the properties of bodies, in figures not the movements of which it is 
susceptible, which has the least rapport or correspondence to thought, he has 
concluded that the soul is not corporeal.  I do not at present examine if this 
consequence is just, … I only draw from it this consequence, that one does 
not in the least know the soul by itself, but only by the body, and 
consequently by the senses and sensible things.14
 
Toland then claimed that we have no certain proof “that the soul and the body are 
two substances.”  When the body died, Toland argued that the soul did not continue: 
“if after my death, I am a soul, this will no more be me, since I am a soul and a 
body, that is to say, a man, which one cannot say of a soul….”15  Such a conclusion 
was rehearsed in Clito and repeated in Toland’s own epitaph, which read, in part: 
His spirit is join’d with the aithereal father 
From whom it originally proceeded, 
His body yielding likewise to nature 
Is laid against in the Lap of its Mother. 
But he’s frequently to rise to himself again, 
Yet never to be the same Toland more.16
 
While he lived Toland believed he was both matter and spirit, but once he died he 
ceased to be either. 
 Leibniz took little time to compose his rebuttal—“What is Independent of 
Sense and of Matter”—and dispatched it immediately to Sophia Charlotte.17  The 
Princess enjoyed the philosophical debates between Toland and Leibniz, first in 
person then in correspondence, and requested that Leibniz respond to Toland’s 
views.  There was more at stake for Leibniz than answering this royal desire.  
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Leibniz hoped to accompany the Hanoverians to England should they succeed to the 
throne and, what is more, he desired to maintain his position as court philosopher.  
Should Sophia Charlotte or her mother believe what Toland was telling them, which 
was the antithesis of Leibniz’s own views, then Leibniz would have no role in a 
future English court.18  Perhaps with this in mind, Leibniz advised the Queen that “I 
found the letter truly ingenious and beautiful.”  Nevertheless, he did “not entirely 
share the opinion of its author.”19  The business at hand was, as Toland had stated, 
whether anything other than matter existed in the universe and did it alone act on the 
senses.  Regarding the latter part of the query, Leibniz asserted that numbers and 
shapes are compared and considered in the soul in a manner entirely different from 
that employed by the external senses.  He referred to this internal sense as 
imagination and as the place where clear and distinct ideas such as those found in 
mathematics take place.  This faculty was part of a larger immaterial sense, which 
Leibniz identified as the “natural light.”20  “It is by this natural light,” Leibniz told 
Toland, “that one may recognise also the axioms of mathematics; for example, that 
if the same quantity is taken away from two equals the remainders are equal and 
likewise that if both sides of balance are equal neither will sink, a fact which we can 
foresee without ever having tried it.”21   
 In response to the second part of his dispute with Toland—that is, does an 
immaterial substance, i.e. the soul, exist?—Leibniz began with his explanation of 
matter.   
Heretofore matter has been understood to mean that which includes only 
purely passive and indifferent concepts, such as extension and 
impenetrability, which need to be given determinate form or activity by 
something else.  Thus when it is said that there are immaterial substances, 
one means by this that there are substances which include other concepts, 
namely, perception and the principle of action or of change, which cannot be 
explained either by extension or by impenetrability.  When these have 
feeling, they are called souls, and when they are capable of reason, they are 
called spirits.  Hence if anyone says that force and perception are essential to 
matter, he is taking matter for the complete corporeal substance which 
includes form and matter, or the soul along with the organs. 
 
It followed naturally that “there is some substance separate from matter.”  Matter 
alone could not account for the present state of Creation, nor could it explain our 
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ability to reason and think mathematically.  An immaterial God must have guided 
matter to form the universe just as the soul directed human thought.  Leibniz further 
claimed that one cannot conceive of matter without immediately thinking of its 
immaterial companion.22  Like critics of Toland’s theory of matter, Leibniz 
chastised him for advancing incomplete and inadequate definitions.  There was 
more at stake than an incompetent natural philosophy.  Toland’s account threatened 
to challenge the place of God and the eternal salvation of those who accepted his 
heretical writings.  Leibniz hoped to make this clear to Sophia Charlotte.   
 As we have seen, the public result of Toland and Leibniz’s discussions with 
the Prussian Queen was Letters to Serena (1704).  In the second letter, which 
Toland claimed was “written at SERENA’s Request,” he presented a history of the 
soul’s immortality.  The belief in an immaterial and immortal soul had a history, 
though Toland conceded that this would be a strange conclusion for many to 
accept.23  He began by relating how Aristotle and the other ancient philosophers did 
not “dream of any Principle or actuating Spirit in the Universe itself … but 
explain’d all the Phaenomena of Nature by Matter and local Motion, Levity and 
Gravity….”24  No doubt Toland approved of this approach, as it matches that 
adopted by him in the final two letters.  The introduction of a mind as the 
immaterial director of the universal matter, Toland revealed, originated with 
Anaxagoras, the Pre-Socratic philosopher, whom we met previously.25  From him, 
“PLATO and the rest greedily imbrac’d this Doctrine; and we know how widely the 
Grecians cou’d spread it by their numberless Colonys….”26  From Anaxagoras, 
immaterial souls became popular among the Egyptians via Pythagoras’ travels.  The 
Egyptians were among the first who “particularly asserted the Immortality of the 
Soul, with all that depends on it, as Heaven, [and] Hell….”  As his source Toland 
cited the father of history himself, Herodotus.  Toland approved of Herodotus’ 
method of personal investigation rather than accepting hearsay and second-hand 
reports.27   
 Having thus demonstrated to Serena how the view of an immortal soul was 
propagated, Toland revealed why the notion gained acceptance.  It was popular, he 
asserted, because it “flatter’d Men with the Hopes of what they wish above all 
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things whatsoever, namely, to continue their Existence beyond the Grave….”  It was 
the vanity of men that brought life to immortal souls.28  Toland continued that some 
philosophers believed that the soul had a separate perpetual existence from that of 
the material body.  What was more, these philosophers “conceiv’d their own 
Thoughts or Ideas to be immaterial, and to have nothing in common with 
Extension.”29  This was Leibniz’s position.  As Toland wrote to Sophia Charlotte, 
ideas came only from sensory experience and matter only interacts with matter, all 
thoughts must be the result of these interactions.  Toland developed this further in 
Pantheisticon where he described the workings of thought in a manner similar to the 
operation of the universe.  Thinking was, he claimed,  
a peculiar Motion of the Brain, the proper Organ of this Faculty; or rather a 
certain Part of the Brain continued in the Spinal Marrow, and in the Nerves 
with their Membranes, constitutes the principle Seat of the Soul, and 
performs the Motion of both Thought and Sensation; which very 
wonderfully, according to the different structure of the Brain, in all kinds of 
Animals.30   
 
 In a satirical prayer, preserved in an undated manuscript, Toland further 
addressed those who believed in immaterial immortal souls.   
O sacred Folly!  
O sacred Ignorance! 
O pious Devotion!  
Which respects souls so very wise and holy,  
[A]s not to improve by any humane notion! 
 
The soul was something, but whatever it was, it did not conform to human notions.  
Souls may be immortal, but they are not so because philosophers and theologians 
assert it.  Moreover, 
What Nature is, or in what way She operates?  
If the refulgent Starrs be Earth, or Sea, or Fire?  
Such things Asininity as vain and useless, rates. 
The onley needful Rule she evermore commands,  
For getting God’s favour, and the Soul’s sure Repose,  
Is this; with lolo-bent knees & high-uplifted hands to expect Eternal Rest,  
wch on Death follows Close.31
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Wishing for an immortal existence, one that persisted after bodily death, did not 
make it a fact of nature.  Religious expectations did not impress themselves on the 
reality of things. 
Illness Meets Philosophy: Toland’s Care of his Body  
 Toland’s beliefs regarding the body are further revealed in the final 
correspondence with his benefactor and fellow Irishman, Robert Molesworth, in 
early 1722.32  “I received yours … which gives me such a dismal account of your ill 
state of health, that I was extremely concern’d at the condition you were in…,” 
Molesworth wrote to Toland.  As for the prospects of improvement in Toland’s 
condition, he lamented that Toland was not “in town, for I doubt you cannot easily 
get such broths and bits of easy digestion as I shou’d take care to procure for you.”  
He then mentioned a tract (“Physic without Physicians”) which Toland had sent 
him, regarding available cures: “Your reflexions upon the Physicians, and the 
Injustice of the World are very right; but you must not indulge melancholy thoughts 
at such a time.”33  Though little exists to reveal Toland’s specific experience with 
physicians, the one prescription we do have which was given to him by one John 
Wallace MD, is for the use of an enema.34  In “Physic without Physicians” Toland 
complained that “[I] have no great strength; nor have I been once out of doors, since 
last abroad with yourself.  This is the effect of Physic, taken against judgment, and 
given without any.”  He believed that if he had listened to nature and retired from 
the unhealthy atmosphere of London, he might have avoided physicians.35  As 
priests had done to religion, physicians “who, by endeavouring to be always very 
cunning for others, by making everything a mystery, are frequently too cunning for 
themselves.”  Cures were simply a matter of understanding the relations, which 
existed in nature between all things, as he outlined in Pantheisticon.  A true 
physician would know that the most effective cures are found in “a regular Diet, 
moderate Exercise” and not in constructed systems and unfounded hypotheses 
whereby charlatans set “up immediately for an able Physicians, and [are] by others 
so deem’d….”36  One did not therefore need a physician to care for one’s body just 
as one did not need priests in religion. 
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The letters between Molesworth and Toland continued.  His health not 
improving, Toland decried the physicians who had attempted to restore his 
constitution.  In melodramatic exaggeration, he told Molesworth that “the Doctor 
that was call’d to me, made me twenty times worse, if possible.  All acknowledge 
that he had [tried] to kill me.”37  Molesworth replied with understanding and a 
recommendation for a veal and barley broth: “I am sorry to find you continue so ill, 
and yet dare not prescribe any thing for you: no sort of Quacks have credit with you, 
and I can recommend nothing to you but your own kitchen Physic.”38  A little more 
than a week later Molesworth again wrote to Toland advising him to stay the course: 
“The return of the spring, and your keeping to kitchen Physic, will restore you to 
health.”39  These letters indicated that Toland did more than write about natural 
philosophy and the relationships existing among the parts of the universe; he used 
the knowledge in an attempt to cure himself.   
As his death neared, however, Toland lost the force of his convictions.  He 
deteriorated in early March and wrote such to Molesworth: “When I seem’d to be in 
a fair way of mending, my old pains in my thighs, veins, and stomach, seiz’d me 
violently two days ago, with a total loss of appetite, hourly releasing, & very high-
color’d water.”40 On 2 March Toland described his condition for the last time: 
I have been so long silent; but by reason of almost incessant pains, and very 
extraordinary weakness.  Two of three days before your servt called here 
last, I grew much worse than I was; & from a mending State (the vigor of 
my mind increasing, the wits little influenced on the infirmity of my Body) I 
relapsed again into all my former Symptoms, more frequent and Malignant 
than ever.  This has obliged me to put my self into ye Hands of a physician, 
who I believe to be an honest man, prepares his own medicines, and explains 
every thing he does to me.41
 
It is unclear if Toland changed his mind with respect to the abilities of physicians or 
if staring at his own mortality forced a change upon him.  Nevertheless, he did not 
recover from this last illness and died on 11 March 1722. 
A Fan of Deism and the Reception of Toland’s Views 
We know that Toland’s work attracted interest.  Indeed, among his 
manuscripts exists a letter that may be called a piece of fan mail: “Sir I am a 
Freethinker, and I glory in the Character.”  What was more, “I neither regard 
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custom, nor fashion, authority nor power; Truth & reason are the only things that 
determine me.”42  Thus, George Turnbull (1698-1748), professor of philosophy at 
New College, Aberdeen, began his letter of 3 November 1718 to Toland in which he 
proudly presented his views on the soul to a man who, he hoped, would approve of 
them.  The “only difficult[ies], that I can see, are out of the immortality of the Soul, 
arises from the principles of the Theists themselves.”  From an immaterial soul, 
Turnbull stated that the following paradox existed: 
To suppose a God at the tops of an Infinite Scheme, that sees all his designs 
at once, is in reality to suppose a thing finite & infinite at the same time.  For 
that which is seen must be finite; so that if God see all his works, his works 
must have an end.  Infinite knowledge, or an Infinite scheme perceived, is 
the most glaring contradiction imaginable.  A succession of things may be 
vastly long, but end it must if it be perceived.43
 
Toland seems not to have responded to Turnbull’s invitation to begin a regular 
correspondence.   
Turnbull then attempted to initiate literary relationships with Molesworth 
and, through him, Anthony Collins.  On 3 August 1722 Turnbull wrote Molesworth 
to introduce himself and to relate that he had used his position at Aberdeen to 
“promote the interests of liberty and virtue and to reform the taste of the young 
generation.”44  Such actions were the fears of orthodox scholars who saw in deism a 
subversive and corrupting pursuit.  Turnbull hoped to reform university learning to 
be compatible with freethinking and the unimpeded investigations of deism.  He 
described the current university curriculum as “mere romance and enthusiasm.  For 
how can it be so, while our colleges are under the inspection of proud domineering 
pedantic priests, whose interest it is to train up the youth in a profound veneration to 
their senseless metaphysical creeds and catechisms … and to beget an early 
antipathy against all freethought….”45  In his last letter to Molesworth, Turnbull 
related his enthusiasm for Collins’ work on freethinking: “I should be glad to know 
if he is still alive and what is become of him.  Toland, who was said to have been of 
his club, I know, is gone.”  He reiterated that “My Lord, … I [am a] sincere and 
hearty lover of freethinking.”46  In conclusion, Turnbull stated his wish to begin 
corresponding with Molesworth, but Molesworth did not reply. 
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Locke, Collins, and the Souls of Brutes 
Collins, the other author Turnbull admired, addressed the soul, thought, and 
immaterial matter in both his public writings and private correspondence.  In early 
1704 John Norris, who had been very critical of Toland’s writings, released the 
second volume of a two volume work titled An Essay Towards the Theory of the 
Ideal or Intelligible World.  Both Collins and his friend John Locke were intrigued 
with the book.  Collins wrote to Locke that he was annoyed with Norris’s 
conclusion “that Brutes are meer machines,” calling it an unfounded hypothesis.  
The proper question, Collins told Locke, was “whether God can supperadd to matter 
a power of thinking.”  Collins, however, agreed with Norris that animals were 
material, but claimed that they had thoughts.  Indeed, he was as certain of this fact 
as he was “of Mr: N[orris’]s thinking….”47   
In the third week of March 1704, Collins again wrote Locke alerting him 
that the relationship between thought and matter continued to occupy his time.48  
Locke replied that men like Norris “seem to me to decree rather than to argue.”  
They insisted that animals were material and devoid of thought because their 
hypothesis that thinking was the providence of an immaterial substance demanded 
it.  Moreover, thought was not evident in the known properties of matter, extension, 
and solidity.  Locke cautioned that men like Norris did not draw the correct 
conclusion from this premise, namely that thought did not belong to extension or 
solidity.  This was not the same as stating matter cannot possibly have a power to 
think.49  Collins replied with thanks for the assessment of Norris’ book and claimed 
that Locke had “made me understand my own thoughts better then I did before….”50  
This understanding would play a prominent role in Collins’ coming quarrel with 
Samuel Clarke.51
Henry Dodwell and Mortal Souls 
 In 1688 the divine and scholar Henry Dodwell became Camden Professor of 
History at Oxford University.  He held the post until 1691, when his refusal to swear 
allegiance to William and Mary made him a Nonjuror.  This new status did not 
tarnish Dodwell’s reputation as an intellectual of great learning.52  However, praise 
turned to disbelief when, in 1706, Dodwell published his views on the nature of 
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soul.  The uniqueness of Dodwell’s position sent stunned readers to their desks, with 
pen in hand, to refute him.  The full title of the book reveals much of its contents: 
An Epistolary Discourse, proving from the Scriptures and the First Fathers, that the 
soul is a principle Naturally Mortal, but Immortalized actually by the Pleasure of 
God to Punish or Reward, by its union with the Divine Baptismal Spirit, wherein is 
proved that none have the power of giving this Divine Immortalizing Spirit since the 
Apostles but only the Bishops.  Briefly, Dodwell believed that at Creation, God gave 
Adam Afflatus—the breath of life—which provided humanity with a living soul.  
God also added pnoe—his divine breath——which qualified this soul for 
immortality.  After the Fall, God removed Afflatus making humanity and the soul 
mortal.  God allowed pnoe to remain at his discretion.  Thus, at death the soul still 
qualified for immortality, but, without the breath of life, the soul was continued only 
by the desire of God; it had no natural tendency to immortality.  However, one 
could escape the inevitable destruction of the soul through baptism conducted by a 
priest who was ordained within an episcopal church.53   
 For Dodwell the question was not one of the soul, but rather the power of 
God.  An analogy between the soul and the body demonstrates the point: 
Who doubts but that our Bodies are naturally Mortal?  Yet who does 
therefore believe them actually Mortal after the Resurrection and the General 
Judgment? And what can hinder but that the same Divine Power which can 
and shall then Immortalize the Mortal Body, so as to qualifie it for eternal 
Punishment of which it had not otherwise been capable, may expose a 
mortal Soul to Immortal never ending punishment, as easily as themselves 
believe it preformed in the Case of the body?54
 
Anticipating problems with his proposition, Dodwell reminded readers that he did 
not think the soul dependent on the body for its existence.  Rather, he claimed the 
soul was continued “from the Divine Flation,” and not out of any “necessity of the 
Divine Nature….”  Dodwell continued that it was “God’s pleasure to continue all 
Souls to the Day of Judgement.”55  God may indeed do so but He is in no way 
bound to do it.  Moving away from arguments based on God’s power, Dodwell 
supported his position by examining the soul as a created substance.  As a creation 
of God, the soul depended entirely upon God for its existence, as did all other 
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created entities.  In Dodwell’s view: “There can be no punishment but of created 
beings.  Nor has any created being a Right or Power to last for ever independent of 
the Divine arbitrary pleasure.”56  Thus, Dodwell viewed his book as a testimony to 
the absolute power of God.   
 Reception of Dodwell’s initial book and the following defence was mixed.  
Not surprisingly, Dodwell’s fellow Nonjurors embraced the special powers he 
reserved for bishops.57  Others were not impressed.  The Archbishop of Dublin 
commented that “I have read Mr Dodwell’s Preliminary defence, & am a little out 
of patience wth it.”  He observed that the only reason Dodwell offered in defence of 
his curious theory of the soul was  
to call it naturally mortall … because God can wth draw his consurving 
power, & then it may relapse into nothing, at wch rate there neither is, nor 
can be any immortall creatures, for there is no being but must be annihilated 
if God wth draws his influence yt preserves it.  He therefore mistook ye Title 
of his Epistolary discourse, & ought to have said that ye Soul is naturally 
immortal, but will be destroyed by ye displeasure of God.58
 
The Archbishop delighted in the fact that Dodwell seemingly did not see his own 
contradictions.   
 Samuel Clarke expressed his concerns over the book directly to its author in 
a published pamphlet.  This was not Clarke’s first exposure to Dodwell; he had seen 
the name before in the work of Toland.  In 1699, Toland had turned to Dodwell to 
support his view that since the doctrines of the Church were established in AD 360 
at the Council of Laodicea, they were not divine.  Clarke’s response made special 
mention of Dodwell.59  Perhaps Clarke identified Dodwell as sympathetic to the 
deist cause because Dodwell’s position on the soul closely paralleled one of the 
types of deists—those who denied the immortal soul—a view Clarke advanced in 
his second Boyle Lecture.60  The pamphlet to Dodwell began “Sir, It is a Thing of 
very ill Consequence, when Men of great Reputation in the World for Learning, … 
allow themselves to advance new and crude Notions, and extravagant 
Hypotheses….”  Though he admitted that Dodwell had never claimed so, Clarke 
feared that people of “loose Principles and vicious Lives” would see the title and 
draw the erroneous conclusion that “you suppose the Soul to perish at the 
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dissolution of the Body….”61  Clarke further advised Dodwell that only material 
substances were mortal and that the soul was certainly not material.  Moreover, 
since matter was a conglomerate of particles and thought was an individual power 
resulting in an individual consciousness, it must be located within an indivisible 
immaterial substance such as the soul.  Clarke ended with some free advice to 
Dodwell.  The book “which you have put into the hands of sceptical and profane 
Men, to confirm them in their Prejudices against the Belief of the Immortality of the 
Soul” would require him to “think of some means of making satisfaction to the 
Church, to whom you have given so great Offence….”62
 Clarke ensured that Dodwell saw the pamphlet by leaving a complimentary 
copy at a bookshop frequented by Dodwell, who wrote in thanks for the unexpected 
gift:63 “Sir, I did not know that the Copy of your book against me was a Present 
from the Author … I had no reason to Expect that favour from a Stranger….”  
Dispensing with the pleasantries, Dodwell took exception to Clarke’s critique telling 
him that he knew of “no Atheist in England, that can take advantage from the 
primitive Doctrine of Natural Mortality….”  He admonished Clarke for 
misunderstanding the intent of the book and tossing his name among those 
belonging to heretics.  “I like all your zeal for Religion,” Dodwell told Clarke, “in 
an age of so little zeal, and should not have been sorry for being the Object of it, if I 
had deserved it….”64  Despite the fact that Dodwell had concluded his Epistolary 
Discourse by claiming that “I am willing to hear what … any other friend can say to 
convince me, if I should prove mistaken,” it seems he was not prepared for the 
ensuing backlash.65
 In reply, Clarke attempted to deflect Dodwell’s displeasure: “The Occasion 
of my Publishing an Answer to your Discourse … was not (I assure you) out of any 
disrespect to your Person, whose great Learning is well known to the World….”  
However, “this last Book of your’s, was Judged by all Serious men of all Parties, … 
to be of dangerous Consequences.”  Thus, even if Dodwell had never intended the 
book to be a danger to religion, it might become so in the hands of the irreligious.  
Clarke continued his reply upon this theme: 
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You say indeed, you know no atheist in England, that can take advantage of 
the Doctrine of Natural Mortality.  If I had assured him, that you allow none 
the benefit of actual Mortality I never Supposed, Sr, that you did allow them 
the benefit of Actual Mortality, you can never persuade them that they shall 
not have the benefit of Actual Immortality to Punishment [which] has 
always been made use of by unbelievers, as an Objection against Religion.66
 
Clarke’s chief concern lay in his belief that Dodwell’s seeming denial of an afterlife 
would be the justification of lives lived with no fear of divine retribution or reward 
for actions on earth.67
Maybe Material Souls, Clarke and Collins 
 Clarke’s fears over the potential dangers of Dodwell’s book were soon 
confirmed.  In a public pamphlet Collins defended Dodwell’s right to publish any 
description of the soul that Dodwell thought fit.  Why Collins chose to defend the 
writings of a High Churchman is uncertain, though his desire to encourage 
uncensored debate on important intellectual topics must have played a role.68  
Drawing on his letters with Locke, Collins told readers that the “principal Argument 
for the Natural Immortality of the Soul is founded on the Supposition of its 
Immateriality….”  If the soul was immaterial, it must be immortal.  The problem 
was, Collins pointed out to Clarke, that one needed to prove absolutely that the soul 
was immaterial otherwise the above premise must be discarded.  “By Soul,” Collins 
wrote, “I suppose Mr. Clarke means a Substance with a Power of Thinking, or, as 
he expresses himself, with an Individual Consciousness.  By saying the Soul cannot 
possibly be Material, I conceive is meant, that the Substance which hath Solidity 
added to it, cannot have the Power of Thinking.”69  A suitable answer could be 
given to Clarke, therefore, if one could demonstrate that the power of thought may 
be present in material matter.  What was more, a specific power, in this case 
thought, might inhabit a system of matter even though it did not exist in the 
individual parts.70   
 Clarke replied that “it is both absolutely false in Fact, and impossible and a 
direct Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing itself, that any Power whatsoever 
should inhere or reside in, any System or Composition of Matter, different from the 
Powers residing in the single Parts.”71  If a material system did think, what 
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happened if it came apart?  Would there then be as many thoughts as there were 
pieces?  Only in the indivisible, immaterial soul could thought reside.72  Collins’ 
subsequent rejoinder reminded Clarke that they lived in England, a nation which 
allowed people to examine “the Grounds and Reasons of prevailing Opinions.”73  
Therefore, important questions, such as the nature of the soul, were suitable topics 
for public debate and not to be curtailed.  Collins then considered Clarke’s position 
and related all the condition that must be met prior to accepting it.  One had to prove 
not only that “Consciousness is an Individual Power” but also that “Consciousness 
is not … [a] Power resulting from an Union of different kinds of Powers….”74  By 
demonstrating what he viewed as the unfounded premises of Clarke’s view, Collins 
believed he was participating in an intellectual debate, the kind he endorsed in his 
other writings.  For Clarke to be able to state with certainty the nature of the soul, he 
must know all the powers and properties of matter.  Collins countered that until we 
knew the entire workings of nature, the being of the soul and thought must remain 
indeterminate.  
 Clarke’s next pamphlet dismissed Collins’ objections which were “wide of 
the main Question.  For if the foregoing Proof, that Matter is incapable of Thinking, 
cannot be shown to be defective; it follows necessarily that the Soul must be an 
immaterial indiscernible Substance.”75  Until Collins could prove with certainty that 
matter can think, Clarke believed the debate settled in his favour.  In what he hoped 
would be his final argument, Clarke outlined fifteen points addressing both material 
and immaterial matter.  The key statements are as follows: 
I. Every System of Matter consists of a Multitude of distinct Parts.” 
 
IV. “Every real simple Quality that resides in any whole material System, 
resides in all the Parts of that System.” 
 
V. “Every real compound Quality, that resides in any whole material 
System, is a Number of such simple Qualities residing in all the Parts of that 
System; some in one part, some in another.” 
 
X “Consciousness, therefore, being a real Quality, (Prop. VIII) and of a kind 
specifically different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, 
which are themselves acknowledged to be void of Consciousness, can never 
possibly result from any Composition of such Qualities.” 
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XIII “The Conscious that a Man has at one and the same time, is one 
Consciousness, and not a Multitude of Consciousnesses; as the Soldity, 
Motion or Colour of any piece of Matter, is a multitude of distinct Soldities, 
Motions or Colours.” 
 
XIV “Consciousness, therefore, cannot at all reside in the Substance of the 
Brain or Spirits, or in any material System, as its Subject, but must be a 
Quality of some immaterial Substance.”76
 
These facts, Clarke believed, would silence his adversary.   
 Despite Clarke’s fervent hope, Collins penned yet another pamphlet which 
restated his positions.77  Clarke responded with exacerbation: “In my last Reply I 
persuaded myself I had set the Question between us in so clear a Light, that there 
would have been no need of any new Debates, or of giving our Readers any further 
trouble in this Matter.”78  Like Collins, Clarke offered no new evidence to readers.   
In his final work of the controversy, Collins described how thought might 
result from material action: “I observe, that Thinking is an Action that begins not in 
us, till we are operated on by external material Objects, that act on us by Motion and 
Contact; no more than a Windmill begins to go till the Air or some other Body 
strikes against the Sails.”  As Toland had suggested to Leibniz and Sophia 
Charlotte, Collins argued that we have no ideas until we encounter them through the 
senses and then reflect upon them.  Therefore, thought must be the result of matter 
and motion.79  Collins stated that it was well known that all matter was the same and 
that our perceptions of “Smells, Tastes and Sounds, &c.” result from the interactions 
of matter in our mind to produce the phenomena of these secondary qualities.  Why 
could the same process not cause thought?  Clarke’s reply contained no new 
arguments but simply restated his position.  Collins did not respond and the debate 
of 400 pages came to an end.80   
The Fallout From Collins’ Defence of Dodwell 
 Observers identified Collins’ pamphlets as epitomising what was thought to 
be the deist position on the soul.  This is seen in The First Principles of Modern 
Deism confuted, in a demonstration of the Immateriality, Natural Eternity, and 
Immortality of Thinking Substance in general and in Particular of Human Souls, 
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even upon the Supposition that we are entirely Ignorant of the Intrinsick Nature of 
the Essence of Things (1707).81  The author, John Witty, Rector of Lockington, 
composed the book as a reaction against the views Collins advanced—a fact he 
acknowledged in the preface—because “the Doctrin[e] of the Immortality of the 
Soul [was] one of the strongest Bases of Religion….”  To deny this, was to deny 
religion itself.  What was more, he identified Collins as one of the same club that 
had produced The Rights of the Christian Church (by Matthew Tindal).82  Shortly 
after Francis Higgins had refuted Toland’s theology and Dodwell’s description of 
the soul in the sermon we considered in Chapter Three, the Tory political newspaper 
The Rehearsal—edited by Charles Leslie, scourge to heretics—also contemplated 
the deist account of the soul.83  The date (24 May 1707) suggests an attack on 
Collins.  After telling readers that deists are “too many now among us,” the editorial 
claimed “[i]t is the Common Opinion of the Deists … and which they make their 
Comfort, That the Soul of Man Dies with the Body, like the Flame of a Candle 
when it is put out, and that there is no Future Account, nor any Rewards or 
Punishments.”  With no fear of eternal damnation, Leslie claimed that deists had no 
secure foundation for morality.  While neglecting their personal salvation was bad 
enough, what was worse was that their immorality threatened to undermine the 
English nation, or so the paper suggested following Higgins’ assessment earlier the 
same year.  Deists, The Rehearsal wrote, knew that they acted contrarily to the rest 
of Britons.  Nevertheless, they delighted in the difference.  A deist “when he came 
to Die … had this Ejaculation, and said, If there be a God, a Heaven or a Hell, I am 
a Miserable Creature—But I much Doubt it.  Behold here the utmost Hopes and 
Expectations of a Deist!”84  This Tory characterisation of deists was certainly a 
motivating factor in Henry Sacherevell’s famed sermon of 1709. 
 Despite Clarke and Collins ceasing their polemical pamphlets, the effect of 
their respective works was long lasting.  Newtonian populariser and mathematical 
instructor, Humphry Ditton, who had challenged Toland’s notion of matter found in 
Letters to Serena, nearly a decade earlier, appended a specific refutation of deists’ 
conception of material souls in A Discourse Concerning the Resurrection of Jesus 
Christ (1712).  Regarding the notion of thinking matter, Ditton claimed that to 
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accept it, one must accept self-moving matter which “at once destroys all, that the 
world has ever call’d by the name of NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.”85  His reasons 
were those of Clarke: Newtonian philosophy prohibited both material souls and self-
moving matter.  What was more, Ditton proposed that acceptance of thinking matter 
was the first link in the chain of heresy and unbelief.   
In 1727, nearly twenty years after Collins first defended Dodwell, John 
Maxwell, Newtonian populariser and chaplain to the peer Lord Carteret, produced A 
Treatise of the Laws of Nature, a new translation of Richard Cumberland’s De 
Legibus Naturae (1672).86  We know that both Collins and Clarke saw this edition 
because they, along with Isaac Newton, are listed as subscribers.  As an appendix, 
Maxwell included an account of the Collins and Clarke dispute in which he argued 
that the soul was an immaterial substance entirely different from the material body.  
This fact, he advised readers, had “been set in a clear light by Dr. Samuel Clark.”87  
The work followed the path established by Clarke’s pamphlets.  Even the main 
reasons levelled against Collins found a new home in Maxwell’s appendix: “The 
Soul, therefore, whose Power of thinking is undeniably one individual 
Consciousness, cannot possibly be a material Substance.”  Maxwell also reprinted 
the list of fifteen propositions that Clarke hoped would silence Collins.88  In The 
Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, the book identified by many historians 
as signalling the philosophical death-knell of deism, Joseph Butler, Bishop of 
Derham, reprinted selections from the Clarke and Collins controversy.  Butler sided 
with Clarke and stated that “Consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it 
should seem that the Subject in which it resides, must be so too.”89  His reasons 
were Clarke’s: matter is divisible, and thus cannot be the location of an indivisible 
power, such as thought. 
Some of Clarke’s associates, even though they actively encouraged his 
Arian-like pronouncements, differed from him in defining the soul.  This was the 
case of John Jackson (1686-1763), Rector of Rossington, who had written to Clarke 
in 1714 and 1715 to tell him that he had converted to Arian theology.  In 1735 
Jackson published A Dissertation on Matter and Spirit which began with Collins’ 
plea that the nature of the soul was a subject that ought “to be freely enquir’d into 
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and seriously attended to.”90  Though he decried as atheists those who held that 
matter was inherently active, Jackson admitted that we knew nothing concerning the 
internal structural essence of matter or spirit because this knowledge did not come 
from the senses.  He then came very near to what Collins had offered to Clarke: “we 
cannot know that Matter cannot think; or that Spirit may not be meerly passive and 
solid; that is, whether the Substance or Substratum of what we call Matter is not in 
any respect or any possible Mode of Existence capable … of Consciousness and 
Intelligence….”  What was more, Jackson seemed to refute the argument that lay at 
the centre of Clarke’s work.  If it could be proved that the soul had no extension or 
parts “it wou’d, I confess, prove it to be not material; but then this wou’d not prove 
it to be positively immaterial, or a positive acting Substance, not material.”  
Jackson’s underlying assumption was that God was the only purely immaterial 
entity.  The soul, therefore, was some unknown combination of material and 
immaterial substance.91
A review of Jackson’s work appeared in The Present State of the Republick 
of Letters (January 1735): “The Publication of this Treatise is a great Surprise to 
many, who are known to entertain a very high Esteem of the Writer of it.  Deism has 
been so generally connected with a Disbelief of the Immateriality of the Soul, that 
the barely supposing that it may be material, will be look’d upon by a multitude of 
well-meaning people, as a dangerous wounding of Christianity.” It had been 
assumed that both Jackson and Clarke shared the same view on the soul since they 
agreed in so many other facets of theology.  The cause of the reviewer’s identifying 
Jackson with deism was Jackson’s comment that “if the human Soul could be 
prov’d to be material, that would have no ill Influence on Religion, or in the least 
weaken the natural or reveal’d Evidence of a future State.”  Material souls were the 
calling card of deists.  The reviewer ended by urging Jackson to rethink his position 
by reading the work of the very man whom he admired, that is Samuel Clarke.92   
Exploration of a Deist’s Mind 
 Perhaps the most unique writings on deists and the soul to be born in 
reaction to Collins, and deists generally, were those which appeared in Richard 
Steele’s Guardian during 1713, its only year of existence.  Steele, essayist, play-
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write, promoter of public science, and future MP, had started the Guardian as an 
organ of Whig political polemic to counter the various Tory papers.  The editor was 
Steele himself in the guise of Nestor Ironside, “an old man who gives sound advice 
to people; indeed he is the guardian of this people, though not their leader.”93  
Steele, it will be remembered, refuted Collins’ Discourse of Free-Thinking in the 
Guardian.  He received gratitude from a reader who claimed to have been present at 
a meeting of free-thinkers and was much disturbed by what he heard.94  Steele’s 
stance regarding deists may explain why he composed the following astonishing 
fictional tale in the Guardian on 21 and 25 April.   
The story was purportedly narrated by a man who had spent much time 
travelling on the Continent before finally settling in France.  Before returning to 
England a friend of the man showed him a “little Amber Box of Snuff” and “made 
me a present of it, telling me at the same time, that he knew no readier way to 
furnish and adorn a Mind with Knowledge in the Arts and Sciences, than the same 
Snuff rightly applied.”  His friend told the author that Descartes had rightly 
discovered that “the Pineal Gland, to be the immediate Receptacle of the Soul” 
where it acts on the body through nerves.95  Then the story turned bizarre.  The snuff 
possessed the ability to separate “the Soul for some time from the Body, without 
any Injury to the latter.”  Once a person was a disembodied soul, they might enter 
the mind of any other person, through the pineal gland, in order to learn the 
knowledge contained there.  After telling Steele of his immaterial adventures, the 
correspondent claimed that during one particular excursion he happened to be 
present during the initial planning “of a certain Book in the Mind of a Free-thinker,” 
which had taken place at the coffeehouse frequented by our deists and by fellows of 
the Royal Society.96  The tale continued a few days later: 
On the 11th Day of October in the Year 1712, having left my Body locked up 
safe in my Study, I repaired to the Grecian Coffee-house, where entering the 
Pineal Gland of a certain eminent Free-thinker, I made directly to the 
highest part of it, which is the Seat of Understanding, expecting to find there 
a comprehensive Knowledge of all things Humane and Divine; but, to my no 
small Astonishment, I found the Place narrower than ordinary, insomuch that 
there was not any room for a Miracle, Prophecies, or Separate Spirit. 
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This was satirically composed physical proof of what theologians could only 
hint at, namely that the understanding of a deist was smaller than that of orthodox 
thinkers.  Perhaps if their minds could be sufficiently expanded, deists would see 
their mistakes and recant their heresy.  The investigation of the deist interior 
continued, as the correspondent moved to the imagination.  There resided 
“Prejudice in the Figure of a Woman standing in a Corner with her Eyes close shut, 
and her Fore-fingers stuck in her Ears; many Words in a confused Order, but spoken 
with great Emphasis, issued from her Mouth.”  Deists refused to employ their 
imaginations to consider things, which might expand their understandings.  Such 
things included divine providence and religious mysteries.  Before ending the letter, 
the man submitted that these conditions were not present in just one deist because he 
had gone “round the Table, but could not find a Wit or Mathematician among 
them.”  Steele thanked the man for the unusual account and suggested tongue-in-
cheek to his readers that a potential medical cure to the disease of deism existed.97
The Liberty of the Soul, Clarke and Collins Once More 
 A decade after his initial debate with Clarke, Collins again addressed the 
operation of the mind in 1714.98  In A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human 
Liberty, Collins presented his argument that people are governed by necessity.  That 
is, a person “who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determin’d by his reason 
and his senses;” however, Collins was quick to assure readers that he did not 
suggest that people had the mechanical action of clocks.  Collins then attempted to 
prove this assertion through “experience and by reason.” 99
 Humans are necessary agents if the actions they take are determined by a 
sequence of causes, each of which was required to have the known action be the 
result, Collins suggested.  What was more, those who argued contrarily for a 
complete liberty of action did not understand the nature of cause.100  A person was a 
necessary agent “because all his actions have a beginning.  For what ever has a 
beginning must have a cause; and every cause is a necessary cause.”  If something 
could originate without a cause then, Collins claimed, the world could have come 
into being without any cause, an atheistical conclusion to be sure.  All known action 
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in the universe, celestial and terrestrial, plant and animal, was determined by some 
immutable sequence of causes.101   
Through an investigation of the natural order and an acceptance of the 
necessity of causes, one acted in a moral way.  Since only matter acts upon matter, 
and as he demonstrated in the previous exchange with Clarke, the operation of 
thought was material, the causes which enact our necessity of action must be 
material too.  Humanity is determined to act in such a way as to increase happiness 
and avoid pain.  If this were not true, then “there would be no foundation for 
rewards and punishments, which are the essential supports of society.”102  
Consequently, the interaction of material causes on the human mind made us 
necessary agents predisposed to act for the common good.   
Not surprisingly, Clarke rejected Collins’ ideas in their entirety.  Clarke was 
sure he had seen the views before “in the Papers which lately passed between Me 
and the Learned Mr. Leibniz.”  During their famed correspondence, Leibniz claimed 
that “God has forseen everything; he has provided a remedy for everything before-
hand; there is in his works a harmony, a beauty, already pre-established.”  In other 
words, there was perpetual unaided operation in the universe, as God had 
established all causes at the Creation.  Clarke replied that the Creation operated by 
“the mere will of God.”  Any other interpretation “would tend to take away all 
power and choosing, and to introduce fatality.”103  In this threat to correct 
conceptions of God’s unlimited power, Clarke acknowledged that Collins presented 
the material in “such a Light, as may possibly deceive unwary Persons, whose 
Thoughts have not been much conversant upon so nice a subject.”104  The same 
reason also underlay Clarke’s rebuttal to Dodwell and his previous exchange with 
Collins.  It was not soundness of the arguments that worried Clarke: it was the 
conclusion that might be drawn from them.  
Clarke believed that Collins began his work with a contradiction.  To 
suggest that humans were necessary agents was to suggest an impossibility.  If 
people were acted upon by immutable and necessary causes, then they would cease 
to be agents because only agents possessed the ability to initiate motion.  Despite 
Collins’ claim to the contrary, Clarke submitted that a necessary being acting by 
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mere necessity was no better than a clock.105  A passive entity cannot be the “Cause 
of an Effect more considerable than itself.”  Thus, a necessary agent could never do 
the things that Collins advocated.106  The question, as Clarke advised readers and 
cautioned Collins, was whether the cause of motion “must either finally be resolved 
into a First Mover, in whom consequently there is a Liberty of Action; or else into 
an infinite and eternal Chain of Effects without any Cause at all.”107  Motion, or the 
ability to act or not act, originated in God who gave it to humanity.   
Clarke then considered his adversary’s definition of liberty as “a power in 
Man, to do as he wills or pleases.”  He paid special attention to the word “do,” 
which Clarke suggested “has no Signification.”  Moreover, he claimed that Collins 
misunderstood his terms.  It was not that “Man acts or does any Thing: But the 
Liberty, or Power in Man, to do as he wills or please, is, with him, exactly and only 
the same, as the Liberty or Power in a Balance would be, to move as it wills or 
pleases….”108  What was more, Collins made the distinction between people and 
timepieces to be only “Sensation and Intelligence” and not in action.  Clarke defined 
an agent as such precisely because of the ability to act.  Indeed for Clarke, freedom 
of action was the basis of religion.  During his examinations for Doctor of Divinity 
in 1709, one of his theses was that “all religion supposes the freedom of human 
actions.”  People must have the freedom to responsibly choose religion because 
forced religion would not have the ability to encourage moral actions.109  Clarke 
ended his rebuttal to a familiar adversary with a warning for Collins to consider the 
implications of his theories: 
I cannot make an End, without earnestly desiring this Author seriously to 
consider with himself, what it is that he has all this Time been pleading for.  
For though it might be supposed possible, that, among Necessary Agents, a 
sort of a Machine of Government might be carried on, by such Weights and 
Springs of Rewards and Punishments, as Clocks and Watches (supposing 
them to feel what is done to them) are rewarded and punished withal; yet in 
Truth and Reality, according to this Supposition, there is nothing 
intrinsically good or evil, there is nothing personally just or unjust, there is 
no Behaviour of rational Creatures in any Degree acceptable or 
unacceptable to God Almighty.  Consider the Consequence of this.110
 
Collins discussed the criticism offered by Clarke, with his close friend Pierre 
Desmaizeaux.  “You make a right judgement of Dr. C’s book,” Collins told him, “It 
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is very peevish & haughty; and full of misrepresentations from one end to the 
other.”  This was the same assessment he had given Trenchard regarding Clarke’s 
tone in the Dodwell dispute.  Collins seemed genuinely surprised that a learned 
discussion would take on such a personal note.  He would not, however, be drawn 
into a mudslinging contest: “I will take no hasty measures in this matter, and will 
most certainly outdo him in civility & good manners.”111  Collins, however, was 
contemplating a reply, which he planned to present Clarke as a gift.  Preferring not 
to discuss the matter in correspondence but rather in person with Desmaizeaux, 
Collins nevertheless offered the following assessment of Clarke’s arguments: “Does 
he [Clarke] not make liberty to consist in a Power Physical Power (never put in 
practice) of acting contrary to the will a Power of acting agreeably or contrary to the 
determination of the Will, tho the power of acting contrary & never put in practice!  
But no more of this, till we come together.”112  For Collins, a potential power left 
unused was no power at all.  The unfulfilled potential to act contrary to the 
necessary will was no argument against his position.  Clarke was, Collins asserted, 
grasping at straws. 
A few days later Collins again contacted Desmaizeaux about a similar 
theme: writers who “maintain’d the soul to have in it a principle of action.”  Collins 
had in mind Clarke as a prime example of this group: “Action, according to Dr. 
C[larke], is ever concomitant with, & consequent to the will.”113  What was more, 
Clarke seemed to argue that “there must be a determination of the motive Power in 
man to the action or motion otherwise the motive power by being equally disposed 
to all actions or motions can begin none, and is like a body at rest incapable of 
beginning a particular motion.”114  The matter of the body must be brought to 
motion by something other than itself.  For Clarke, this was the human will 
contained in the immaterial soul.  Alternatively, Collins viewed this cause of human 
action as both necessary and material.  But, this difference was not what raised 
Collins’ ire. 
Little more than a year later Collins wrote to Desmaizeaux in June 1718 and 
expressed continued frustration with his treatment by Clarke.  The impetus for the 
letter was a forthcoming natural philosophical collection of writings by Leibniz, 
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Clarke, and Newton, which Desmaizeaux was editing.  Desmaizeaux had asked 
Collins if he would like to include a rebuttal to Clarke in the book.  Despite the fact 
that he had been composing the work since July 1717 and had a “reply to Dr C in 
loose papers” Collins declined and replied, “Let not the collection of Leibniz & 
Clarke Papers &c. now printing in Holland wait for my reply to Dr. Clark.  If I do 
any thing more, it shall be by way of addition to my Inquiry, in a third edition of 
it.”115  It was ironic, Collins mused, that though Clarke had brought religion into 
their debates and made Collins “an enemy & himself a friend to it,” when Clarke 
himself was deemed by many to be “an Enemy to Religion.”116  This was likely a 
reference to Clarke’s supposed heretical writings on the Trinity.  Collins could 
forgive this blind-spot in Clarke’s arguments, but he continued to be irritated by the 
tone of the writings.  This uneasiness was the real reason why Collins was reluctant 
to answer Clarke.  He would not provide his adversary a readymade platform to “act 
the bigot against me; for what he says in the close of his Remarks shows that he will 
act the bigot to serve his purpose, as much as his other writings sho[w] that he does 
but act that part there….”117  Freethinking welcomed intellectual debates, but shrank 
from petty bickering. 
The reply to Clarke eventually came, despite Collins’ initial diffidence.  He 
was confident of success because prior to publishing, Collins had “had a dispute 
with an Ingenious [but unidentified] man & a great friend of Dr. Clarke on the 
Subject and had little effect upon him from concentration.”  However, after 
“showing him my Paper, which he took with him out of my Library,” Collins 
claimed that he was unable to engage the man in debate, because his former 
opponent had abandoned all objections in light of the material he read.118  Collins’ 
timing was impeccable.  A Dissertation upon Liberty and Necessity was published 
in 1729 the same year both he and Clarke died.  He began by suggesting that the 
question of whether humanity was “an Agent or Patient?” remained unanswered: 
neither Clarke nor he had been able to settle the issue.  Still skating around the issue 
of explicit material souls, Collins tellingly wrote “the Soul is so constituted, as to be 
affect by Material Objects.”  However, he cautioned, we know not the qualities of 
matter, material or immaterial.  But we do know, he conceded, that “the Soul is 
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Acted upon by Ideas as Matter is by Matter” and this unbroken sequence of causes 
negates complete human liberty, as he had originally argued.119   
The Present State of the Republick of Letters carried a eulogy for Clarke 
which asserted that it was his excellence in natural philosophy “which enables us to 
determine the questions concerning Liberty and Necessity: It is that, which teaches 
us the Extent of the Powers of Matter and Motion: It is that which gives us the 
strongest evidence of God’s continual Government of the World.”120  Correct 
knowledge of matter, motion, the soul and liberty, was thus essential in religion.  
The same issue of the periodical also contained a review of Collins’ Dissertation 
upon Liberty and Necessity.  The reviewer wondered why a subject so long 
discussed should have had “no demonstration convincing enough, to gain universal 
assent to either side of the question” of whether people be necessary agents.  Collins 
was commended for his clear presentation of material which he had originally 
published some ten years previously, but his arguments would only convince 
readers who could not “readily discern the Truth.”121  In spite of Collins’ arguments 
to the contrary, the reviewer claimed that it is “impossible for [people] to pay any 
proper Worship to God, without doing it by Intention, Choice and Will….”  Collins’ 
failure to accept this axiom revealed that he was “greatly blinded with prejudice” in 
the matter.  In a closing remark, the reviewer urged Collins to carefully and once 
more consider the writings of Clarke, “the greatest Master of Reason that ever 
liv’d….”122  We do not know whether Collins took this advice or even saw the 
review. 
Public Reaction to Another Round of Clarke vs. Collins 
In spite of Collins’ initial reluctance to answer Clarke’s criticism of A 
Philosophical Inquiry, others had no such restraint.  John Trenchard—to whom 
Collins had expressed his frustration during the Dodwell dispute—and his partner 
Thomas Gordon considered Clarke’s reply to Collins notion of liberty and necessity 
in their Cato’s Letters: or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and other 
important Subjects.123  The publications had originated as a critique of the 
government following the South Sea debacle of 1720.  The number in question 
appeared on 12 January 1722 and was titled “Of Liberty and Necessity.”124  
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Trenchard and Gordon suggested that the real issue between Clarke and Collins was 
“If a Man can do a voluntary Action without a Design to do it, and without any 
Reason or Motive for doing it, then Matter without Understanding has a self-
moving Power; which is Atheism….”  They further argued that, perhaps Collins had 
been partially correct in arguing for a necessary component to human actions.  This 
was true because “the Mind of Man can be only a secondary Cause, [and] must be 
acted upon by other Causes; that God alone is the first Cause or Principle of all 
Motion; and that the Actions of all other Beings are necessarily dependent upon 
Him.”125   
They then noted that Clarke, who was identified as a “very great and justly 
celebrated Author,” had advocated the position that “Man has Self-moving Power.”  
Though Clarke had only supposed this to be the case, nevertheless, he had insisted 
that Collins accounted “for what no Man yet has accounted for, and yet every Man 
sees to be true,” namely, that matter and soul are distinct substances.  Clarke should 
“kindly to have let us into that Secret himself,” Cato’s authors suggested.  Like 
Collins, they urged Clarke not to be so quick in his criticism of others because, 
while he was correct that the soul and thought put a body into motion, “how these 
Effects are produced, we are wholly in the dark.”126  Trenchard and Gordon 
admonished Clarke for demanding of others what he could not do himself: 
“Methinks this truly and learned Author should not call upon another to solve what 
no Man is more capable of solving than himself.”127  Collins himself could not have 
made a better demand upon Clarke for civility. 
 Other respondents restricted their criticism of Clarke’s latest answer to 
Collins directly to Clarke himself.  John Clarke (1687-1734), Master of the 
Grammar School at Hull, and no relation, wrote to Samuel Clarke on 29 May 1717.  
This was not the first comment that John Clarke had offered on a Newtonian 
response to Collins.  In his copy of William Whiston’s Reflexions on an anonymous 
pamphlet, entitulated, A discourse of free thinking he criticised the treatment of 
Collins.  Whiston had paradoxically endorsed “the justness of the anonymous 
author’s definition of the subject, and also the correctness of his mode of treating it; 
yet you say that his pamphlet contains some indirect censures on the conduct of 
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Priests.”  Perhaps if priests “in all ages were a little more careful of their conduct, 
they need not feel much anxiety for what the world may say of them.”  He ended by 
suggesting a better answer to writers like Collins was silence rather than 
provocation.128   
In this latest reaction to a rebuttal of Collins, John Clarke wrote to Samuel 
Clarke to engage in a “fair and impartial Enquiry” on the subject of human freedom.  
He then proceeded to side with Collins’ view that some necessity exists in human 
actions.   
It does not appear to me so absurd a Supposition, that pleasure or pains, 
Reasons, motives, and Arguments, tho’ mere abstract notions, should in 
some Cases be the physical, necessary, and Efficient Causes of Actions: for 
that they are the physical, necessary, and Efficient Causes of Passions, that is 
to say, Inclination of Aversions, I think you, as well as anybody Else, must 
grant.129
 
He argued that passions might result in both physical action and impressions upon 
the mind.  That is, passions cause action by necessary relations, though John Clarke 
did not elaborate his theory and Samuel Clarke did not respond.  
The Providence of Everyone: Tindal and the Soul 
Unlike our other deists who considered the nature and construction of the 
soul, Matthew Tindal took a different line in his works.  Tindal used the soul to 
demonstrate how priests imposed themselves on matters of religion over which they 
had no claim.  Like Collins who argued that all people were necessitated to act for 
the common good, Tindal suggested that everyone is “bound to do all he can for 
saving another’s Soul, and therefore most things which the Clergy are oblig’d to 
perform are the duty of every Man….”130  By making the care of the soul something 
which was only their providence, priests assured themselves a privileged place in 
society.131  Whereas, in reality, the soul was indeed an important aspect of life, but 
its care was entrusted to all people.132  For Tindal, descriptions of the nature of spirit 
were another way in which priestcraft showed itself.  To William Law, who, as we 
saw, composed a lengthy response to Christianity as Old as Creation, Tindal’s view 
was yet another example of deistical vanity because mere reason cannot know 
anything about the soul, its operation, nor how it becomes united to the body.  Such 
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information resided in God who acted in accordance with “the incomprehensible 
perfections of his own nature….”133
Chubb and the Freedom of the Soul 
Thomas Chubb too considered the relation in which the soul stood with 
respect to organised religion.  He suggested that a person “contains a Body fitly 
organised, and formed in the general, as all our Bodies are, and that this Body is 
actuated by a Mind, whose principal Faculties are Intelligence and Activity.”  The 
mind thus possessed a power of self-motion, which “directs the Body.”  Though he 
did not explicitly identify the mind as an aspect of the soul, Chubb seemed to have 
held it as such.  The idea of humanity originated in our idea of its composition, 
which came from our senses.  It was thus, “the Effect or Produce of Nature, and not 
of a supernatural Influence; that is, it is the Produce of those Laws by which the 
natural World is governed, and not the Effect of a supernatural Influence, which 
operates above, or contrary to those Laws.”134  We knew the body and, by 
extension, the mind and soul in the same way that we knew any other aspect of the 
Creation—without divine assistance.  What was more, our soul was not harmed by a 
careful and honest investigation into the present state of Christianity.  This inquiry, 
even if it led to a rejection of institutionalised religion, could not mean the “Death of 
their Souls” because, as Chubb had stated in previous works, God encouraged all 
people to think for themselves.135   
Daniel Waterland, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, was greatly 
troubled by Chubb’s notions.  Writing to Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, he 
claimed that Chubb had clearly composed this latest work so that it was “fitted to 
deceive” readers.  Waterland described how its “first part is extremely confident, 
and irreverent, and indeed profane, to talk so freely of [G]od, and to make his own 
Imaginations the measure of divine wisdom.  His other part about positive duties is 
loose and fallacious all the way.”  However, the problem lay in that Chubb knew 
just enough philosophy to write books containing some level of sophistication 
which made quick responses difficult.  As Waterland lamented to Gibson, it would 
take “something of a metaphysical Head to unravel him clearly and distinctly.  He 
should be answered, and well answered.”  Though Waterland was too busy to 
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undertake a rebuttal personally, he hoped one would be forthcoming.136  A little 
more than a month later, and with no reply to Chubb yet in print, Waterland wrote 
again to Gibson.  He suggested that when one replied to deists care needed to be 
taken because “It is impossible to do any good against them but by confuting them, 
or to confute them without exposing them, or to expose them without making them 
angry, as they are very … conceited.”137
Unlike Collins, whom he once characterised as a “a good sort of man, but an 
absolute fatalist,”138 Chubb believed in complete human liberty.  He described 
agency in people as the same thing as the “active Faculty or Power of Self-motion, 
and the same intellectual Faculty which excites to and directs that Motion….”139  
The mind was the source of liberty.  People were entirely free and might act in any 
way they wish in response to their experience.  Chubb, however, reminded his 
readers that God might impart wisdom to humans through a revelation.  Though, 
“this does not affect his Liberty, nor give him any new Agency; he is just the same 
Creature as he was before….”140  Not even God Himself can detract from human 
freedom.  In a later publication, Chubb repeated that humanity was “capable of 
Motion or Action” and that this ability led them to be a moral creatures.141  For 
Chubb, people were moral because their freedom allowed them another choice other 
than a moral one.  Because people use their freedom to make moral choices for the 
betterment of humanity, they are indeed moral.142   
The Immaterial Soul of a Physician 
Like Toland and Collins, Thomas Morgan addressed the soul and immaterial 
matter in several publications.  In his rebuttal of Waterland’s writings on 
Trinitarianism, Morgan considered the properties of matter and spirit.  The soul and 
body were “Two Substances, distinguished by some essential and incommunicable 
Attributes, as suppose intelligent Agency and Solidity.”  Unlike Toland, Collins, 
and, perhaps, Tindal, Morgan drew a sharp distinction between intelligence—hence 
thought—and the solidity of matter.  Morgan advised Waterland that these two 
substances must be “united as closely, intimately, and inseparably as you please; let 
them mutually inhabit, and pervade, and penetrate each other, or what you will; yet 
still while they retain their really distinct, essential, and incommunicable 
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Properties.”143  This conclusion was intended to remind Waterland that God, Jesus, 
and the Holy Spirit might be united but remain distinct substances and, therefore, 
the Trinity was a falsehood.  There was, Morgan continued, “a real, vital Union, for 
Instance, between the Soul and Body,” and the “mutual Communication” between 
them.144   
Future writings on the Trinity provided Morgan more opportunities to 
publish his description of the soul.  He considered the views of authors—like 
Collins and Tindal—who had posited that the soul “has no Ideas or Perceptions but 
those of Sensation only; such as are excited in the Mind, by the Impression of 
material Objects upon the Sensories of material Organs, as the Ideas of Extension, 
Solidity, Figure, Motion, Colour, Sound, &c.”145  Thus, these thinkers submitted that 
we have no idea of anything, which we do not experience via our senses.  In 
contrast, and deviating once more from our other deists, Morgan responded that any 
ideas coming from the senses “are certainly immaterial.”  Despite that the ideas 
provide properties of material objects, such as extension and solidity, the “Ideas 
themselves I suppose are not Matter, or any Thing Corporeal.”  Therefore, Morgan 
submitted that we know as much about matter as we do about spirit.146  Both come 
to reside in our mind or rational soul from immaterial ideas.   
Regarding the manner in which the soul operates on the body, Morgan 
offered some preliminary conclusions.  The soul must communicate through the 
“organical Senses” because if these were disabled the soul “could not act upon the 
Body, nor be acted upon by it, or give any sensible Proof of its Union and real 
Presence.”147  The soul must be permitted the power of “reflecting upon its own real 
Existence, [and] upon the Existence of first independent Cause, and of forming all 
those Ideas which concern the natural or moral Relation of such a Cause to its 
Effects.”  To deny the soul the ability to know itself and its creator was to deny the 
soul existence distinct from the body.  What was more, this view would mean 
“subjecting all the Powers and Operations of the Mind to the Laws of Mechanism; 
… and Ideas to be nothing else, but the different Modifications, or at least the 
necessary Physical Effects of Matter and Motion.”  This was the conclusion offered 
by Collins and Toland.  Clearly, not every deist held identical notions on all topics.  
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Morgan continued that while Aristotelian philosophers might hold the position he 
challenged, a “Christian Philosopher and Divine should not maintain this….”148  
Matter cannot possibly think. 
As we saw, Morgan wrote much on the operation of the human body.  
Presently, we will consider these with respect to immaterial substances.  Blood 
circulated in the body through arteries and even the imperceptible vessels of the 
bones by the same laws of motion found in other natural philosophical operations.  
The material of blood, the “Globules”, was dissolved in exceedingly thin “pellucid 
Water.”  The two substances were united through “the Heat and Motion of the 
Blood, and continued Action of the expansive Element,” or aether.149  The 
constitution of humans was “subject to very considerable Alterations and Changes, 
with respect to the diffus’d Heat and Efflatus of the Blood, and the Life, Vigor, and 
Briskness of Thought and Motion.”  When the heat in blood is raised a person is 
much disposed to thought and motion.  Thus, once more following the example of 
Stephen Hales, Morgan believed it sufficiently evident that all muscular Motion is 
“preform’d by the intrinsick elastick Force of the nervous Fibrillae, contracting and 
restoring themselves against the stretching distending Force or Impetus of the 
refluent Blood….”150  Motion originated in an immaterial desire, which began in the 
mind, and “the quantity of Motion impress’d upon the Pathetick Nerves in any 
Passion, is always proportional to the strength of the Desire.”  The force to move 
travelled from the mind through the nerves to the object of the desire, such as a hand 
or leg.151  Motion and thought were thus the result of an interaction between 
material body and immaterial desire.  However, Morgan was not willing to 
speculate on the exact manner in which this occurred: “How this immechanical 
Fluid acts upon other Bodies, and exerts and determines their mechanical Powers, I 
no more pretend to explain, than how the Soul acts upon the Body, or the Mind 
upon Matter: But we are sure, that this is not done by Weight, Pressure, Resistance, 
Impulse, or any mechanical Power or Property whatever.”152
Morgan also attempted to explain the way disease and cures operated on the 
body.  Illness was the “Effect of a Stimulus,” and “always signifies Pain, whether it 
begins in the Body or Mind; for tho the Causes here may be very different, the 
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Effects are much the same, and the Method of Cure the very same precisely….”  
The physician’s goal was to alter “with the various Degrees and Modifications of 
Motion in the animated sensitive Organs … I would say, That excessive or violent 
Motion is Pain: Absolute Rest is perfect Insensibility: The Transition from one 
Extream to the other, is Pleasure….”153  Therefore, a correct knowledge of motion, 
as we saw in chapter seven, was tremendously important for medicine.  In a healthy 
body “a due Balance and Æquilibrium” existed between all the organs and fluids.  
When this balance is achieved no disease can affect the body.154  One obtained a 
balance, much in the same manner offered by Toland, through proper ingestion of 
food, which is transformed in the stomach “into the same common Nature and 
Qualities of Flesh, Blood, Lymph, &c….”  Though one ought to use moderation 
with food, because the “most general Causes of this Over growth of Fat with us in 
England, are Indolence, or Want of Exercise, attended with too free and plentiful 
Use of Ale, and a Flesh Diet.”155  It seems that old problems are new again.   
Conclusion 
As we saw with matter and motion, the views of the soul and immaterial 
matter advanced by our deists are not reducible to one representative example.  
Though Toland and Collins suggested that the soul might be material and that only 
material matter acts in the world, Chubb and Morgan embraced an immaterial soul.  
Tindal seems not to have explicitly adopted one position or the other.  He did, 
however, see unfounded appropriation of the soul’s care as a defining aspect of 
priestcraft.  Collins believed that humanity was necessitated in their actions by an 
immutable sequence of causes acting upon the mind.  Alternatively, his fellow deists 
proposed that total human freedom was the basis for the liberty enjoyed by all 
Britons.  In spite of the fact that Chubb and Morgan would not have agreed with 
Collins, many critics saw Collins’ writings as emblematic of deism.  As we have 
seen, it is not the case that he spoke for all his heretical brethren in this matter.156  
Any accurate picture of deism or deists, therefore, is found not in the writings of 
theological and political opponents but in those of the deists themselves even if this 
means that seamless histories of deism must be replaced by detailed accounts of 
individual deists.157   
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Chapter Nine: 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Just Abstract Philosophical Issues:  
Tinkler Ducket’s Trial for Atheism 
 
Several of the issues raised in this study—human necessity, materialism, and 
their implication for religion—did not remain literary abstractions disputed in party 
newspapers, theological pamphlets, and from Anglican pulpits.  They were the focal 
point in a trial for atheism at Cambridge University in 1739.  Tinkler Ducket was a 
Fellow of Caius College who had been much intrigued with the materialism found 
in Samuel Strutt’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Physical Spring of Human 
Actions and the Immediate Cause of Thinking (1732).  In his book Strutt, about 
whom we know next to nothing, hoped to refute the “unphilosophical notion” that 
humanity was composed of both matter and spirit.  To bolster his argument that 
people were only a material substance with a peculiar motion, Strutt referred readers 
to “what has been already so successfully offer’d on that Head by the learn’d Mr. 
Toland” in Letters to Serena.  Because philosophers did not know the exact nature 
of matter, Strutt suggested—and used Anthony Collins’ arguments against Samuel 
Clarke as support—it could not be concluded exactly what properties matter 
possessed.  Continuing to cite Collins, Strutt wrote that no reason could be offered 
against the notion that a system of matter, such as that which made up a human 
body, was capable of thought.1
To his future detriment, Ducket had written an enthusiastic letter on Strutt’s 
book to an acquaintance, the reverend Stephen Gibbs in October 1734.2  The letter 
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 found its way to Cambridge authorities and was later published in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine.  In part Ducket advised Gibbs that, 
as to any farther Progress in Atheism I was arriv’d at the Top, the Ne plus 
ultra, before … being fixed and immoveable in the Knowledge of the Truth, 
to which I attained by means of that infallible Guide the Philosophical 
Enquiry; and I am glad to hear, what I did not at all doubt of, that it would 
equally enlighten your Understanding; … If any material Objection should 
arise (which is barely a possible Supposition) I beg you will consult Me, or 
some other Able Minister of the Word of Truth, to the quieting of your 
Conscience, and avoiding all Scruple and Doubt.3
 
The clear pronouncement of atheism and, what was worse, atheism caused by a 
philosophical search after truth based on the works of Toland and Collins, was cause 
for great concern at Cambridge and only confirmed the fears of those who had 
predicted such consequences of free-thinking and deism.   
 The trial to strip Ducket of his Fellowship and expel him from the university 
began in February 1739.4  It took place at Richard Bentley’s Master’s Lodge at 
Trinity College because Bentley was too ill to travel to another location.  His 
presence at the trial and the testimony that would be offered provides another link to 
concerns regarding deism and its influence.  Indeed, Bentley saw materialism as one 
of the key aspects of deism, the result of “truly idiot evangelists” and as the first 
step on the path to atheism.5  Once the proceedings were underway, Ducket readily 
acknowledged that the letter to Gibbs was indeed in his hand.6  He did, however, 
deny a related charged that he had attempted “to seduce one Mary Richards, by 
telling Her, That all Religion was a Forgery of People in power &c.”  The court 
further alleged “That upon Her telling him He should be damn’d for such practices, 
without Matrimony, … He reply’d, That Matrimony was only Priestcraft, That to 
avoid any ill Consequences, Such as Child Bearing &c. He had a soverign Remedy 
which were drops to avoid Child Bearing….”  In a final attempt to woo the young 
woman, Ducket apparently told her that the “Favour he ask’d was an act of 
Benevolence.”  He did admit that he believed “Matrimony was Priestcraft,” but 
conceded nothing else.7  Corrupting women in the name of combating priestcraft 
was seen as yet another example of the immorality of those who claimed 
participation in such a fight.   
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  When the questioning returned to the contents of the Gibbs letter, Ducket 
denied that he was “Intent [on] Seducing [Gibbs] to Atheism, which he Submit[ed] 
to the Judgement of the Court.”  Furthermore, Ducket refuted the charge “That he 
ever attempted to seduce others into Atheism and into any wicked or Erroneous 
opinion, by Prophane and Blasphemous Writings and Speeches….”  Rebuttal 
witnesses painted a different picture.  One confirmed that while Ducket had never 
specifically called himself an atheist, nevertheless, he “express’d Himself a 
Favourer of Materialism, that about Three quarters of a Year ago….”  On cross-
examination Ducket did recall making the statements, but some four years 
previously.8  The time of the utterances did not save Ducket when the Court 
reconvened on 16 March and produced another witness who recalled that some five 
years earlier, Ducket had also expressed “the Principles of Atheism.”  The witness 
also reported that Ducket had frequently praised Strutt’s book and its contents.9  
Thus, a link between materialistic writings of deists, atheism and immorality 
seemed to be firmly established.   
The sentence, delivered on 23 March 1739, came as no surprise.  The Bench 
began by commenting upon the “Heinousness of the Crime Destruction of all 
Religion.…”  What was more, he “was of opinion, that the charges of Atheism as 
laid in the Articles, had been fully proved against Tinkler Duckett MA….”  Thus, 
expulsion was the correct punishment for a man who seemed determined to spread 
heresy, and likely atheism, amongst the Cambridge community.10  Ducket made a 
futile attempt to persuade the Court to reconsider its verdict.  He “spoke with a good 
grace” that “Reason was the Sovereign Guide of all Mankind: That Freedom of 
Thought and Private judgement were the Right of Every one….”  The echo of 
Collins could not have been lost on Bentley and others who sat in judgement.  As to 
atheism, Ducket confessed he had indeed been “involved in the Error of Atheism, 
but that upon recollecting his Thoughts He soon declared against That Unhappy 
Opinion Delusion….”11  The impassioned plea fell on deaf ears and the sentence 
stood as delivered.  While our deists survived in the turbulent eighteenth century 
unscathed and unpunished, the same cannot be said for at least one of their devotees.   
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 Radical Science From Radical Thinkers? 
In a classic article Steven Shapin described the interlocking spheres of 
intellectual inquiry in eighteenth-century England: “theology, politics, and natural 
philosophy overlapped because they were connected in legitimations, justifications, 
and criticisms, especially in the use of conceptions of God and nature to comment 
upon political order.”12  It is these relationships that I have sought to present in this 
study by reconstructing the intertwined erudite endeavours of John Toland, Anthony 
Collins, Matthew Tindal, Thomas Chubb, and Thomas Morgan.  These were the 
deists named by William Whiston as men who “have proceeded in their grosser 
Degrees of Infidelity” by appropriating Newtonian natural philosophy.  Edmund 
Burke also repeated this same list of men when he wrote that deism was no longer a 
problem in late-eighteenth-century England even though it had once been a major 
political concern.13  While there were undoubtedly other persons whom we may call 
“deist,” that both Whiston and Burke identified the same men is a signal that the 
writings of these five were particularly important.  What is more, they were active 
from the beginning of the deist controversy when Toland published Christianity not 
Mysterious in 1696 until Morgan published Physico-theology in 1741.  At this point 
the perceived threat of deism is acknowledge to have declined in Britain. 
Too often when historians have addressed deism in England, Toland is 
presented as the archetypal example.14  As did Toland so did the deists.  I hope to 
have complicated these stories.  By examining deists through the lenses of post-
1689 politics and post-Principia natural philosophy, we see that they were more 
than the characteristics demonstrated by Toland.  Deists were individuals, who, 
though sharing important tenets of theology, need to be treated as such and not 
subsumed into the persona of Toland.  Otherwise, we lose the diversity of these 
thinkers whom many contemporaries saw as a real threat to the stability of English 
society in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.   
To create my account it was necessary to proceed as constructing a puzzle: 
each piece was firmly positioned before we placed its neighbour.  We began with 
the theological outline of the puzzle, proceeded to the interior and set the political 
pieces, which form the bulk of deist tracts, and finished with natural philosophy.  I 
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 hope it is apparent, as Shapin has reminded us, that no piece fits without those 
surrounding it.  The construction of this picture forces a reconsideration of the 
pervasive view that deists were critical opponents of Newtonian philosophy.15  
Toland at no point wrote negatively regarding Newton.  He did, however, suggest 
that Newton’s work might support a materialist worldview.  In Pantheisticon, 
Toland presented Newton as a worthy foil.  Collins used Newton as support for his 
claim that so long as the cause of gravity remained unknown one could create other 
explanations that seemed reasonable.  He also actively supported public lectures and 
popular books of Newtonian philosophy.  Tindal, on the other hand, never 
mentioned Newton in his works, at all, though his writings reveal a strong similarity 
to those composed by promoters of public science.  Yet, Chubb, for his part, clearly 
endorsed Newton’s theological tracts.  Morgan was undeniably favourable to 
Newton’s philosophy and strategy of prophetic interpretation.  A collective study of 
deists, rather than some ubiquitous “deism,” reveals that generalisations about their 
use of natural philosophy must be reconsidered.  Where we may usefully speak in 
generalisations is in the conception of a predictable and immutable God that formed 
the basis for the positions advanced by our deists.16  They accepted Newtonian 
mechanics but not the active and unpredictable God that Newton and his closest 
followers believed ruled the universe.  Our deists held that God ensured important 
truths about the world—namely its continuing predictable action—and that a 
detailed understanding of its parts and workings was entirely knowable to those who 
sought it, which in turn allowed them to claim a level of certainty in their natural 
philosophy absent from that of their critics.  This was a direct outcome of deists’ 
theological assumptions and cannot be explained any other way.  The same theology 
also guided their political positions. 
It is time to return to the query posed by Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey.  
How did audiences use and understand the knowledge they gained from 
participation in the phenomena of public science?17  Regarding our deists their 
providential assumptions coloured how they understood and then presented natural 
philosophy.  I suspect that this is also true of other consumers of public science.  As 
one historian asked recently “What was God doing in the eighteenth century?”18  
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 From this study, it is evident that notions of God continued to provide the same 
foundation for the learned investigations of the day as had been the case for 
previous generations.19  This is even true for our deists.  Though auditors heard the 
same contemporary accounts of nature, they listened with different ears.  Despite the 
best hope of Colin Maclaurin, who argued that correct natural philosophy led to a 
correct image of God, one could absorb all Newton’s philosophy and still arrive at 
conclusions that Newton would not have recognised based on political and 
theological assumptions.   
As I have attempted to demonstrate, this does not make deists who read 
natural philosophy, such as the five examined here, subversive radicals bent on 
destroying existing governmental institutions, as suggested by Margaret C. Jacob.  
However, deists did certainly wish to remake the Church of England without the 
priestly corruption they believed was flourishing in the institution.  This is not the 
same as wanting its wholesale destruction.  Regarding politics, the evidence 
demonstrates that Toland courted a government position from Robert Harley, as did 
Tindal from Lord Sunderland.  What is more, Toland was a constant supporter of 
both Harley’s country platform and the Hanoverian monarchs.  Collins agreed with 
many royal policies and was a popular and successful County Treasurer and Justice 
of the Peace, positions that were just as political as sitting in Parliament.  Chubb and 
Morgan similarly wrote in favour of the newly secured Protestant succession and 
urged government to comply with a deist theological outlook.   
Our deists were not secular atheists.  It is true, however, that French 
philosophes and generations of Enlightenment historians, took deists as such.20  But, 
just as we no longer credit Newton with the active encouragement of deism, the 
same reasoning should extend to English deists and remove them from the position 
of founding fathers of what has been traditionally defined as the movement leading 
to the French Revolution and modernity.21  At the very least, the supposed 
inevitable aspect of this relationship ought to be questioned.  Each group—deists in 
England and philosophes in France—applied their learning to solve problems and 
concerns of immediate relevance to them.  It is unlikely the case that either 
anticipated how their works would be used by others.  We need only look to the 
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 reaction of Newtonians like William Whiston and Samuel Clarke—to the use of 
their master’s natural philosophy by our deists—to see that what a philosopher 
thought was the message of their work was not always how it was read.   
Deists were full participants in the political and natural philosophical 
discourses of eighteenth-century Britain.  As recent scholarship demonstrates, these 
discourses birthed “Enlightenment” in Britain before it was exported to the 
Continent.  If my presentation of deists is accepted, then a reassessment of what 
deism in England meant to deists is necessary—especially in light of the recent 
characterisations of the English Enlightenment as clerical and strongly religious.22  
Deists must be seen as part of this movement, and not only as sideline critics, even 
if latter day interpreters take them as promoters of atheism.23  Thus, I suggest that 
deists be viewed as integral (not tangential) figures in accounts of eighteenth-
century Britain and English Enlightenment alongside their contemporaries and no 
longer relegated to works titled Radical Enlightenment.24  Rather, deists were part of 
the promotion of Newtonian philosophy, a key factor in any account of the 
Enlightenment, wishing to stand shoulder to shoulder with those figures we 
traditionally associate with the movement.   
What is more, the radical disposition of deists’ worldviews is lessened when 
we look at their contributions to natural philosophy in conjunction with those 
produced by their contemporaries.  By contemporaries, I mean neither Newton nor 
Robert Boyle, but rather people like themselves who sought to understand the new 
philosophies and then share that understanding with an eager public.25  This is why 
we focussed on purveyors of public science.  It is deists’ unfortunate happenstance 
to have composed accounts of nature that conflicted in various ways with that 
offered by Newton.  This same fate befell Robert Hooke, who is emerging only now 
from the historical shadow cast by Newton as the hero of the Scientific Revolution.  
Writers who provided alternative theories and explanations to those of Newton 
were, by their very disagreement with Newton, often viewed as radical, or so some 
scholars would have us believe.  Looking backwards we know which natural 
philosophical system had staying power.  At the time, however, things were not so 
clear cut.  In an age of public science, national and international political intrigues, 
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 and increasing—if begrudging—religious tolerance, deists sought to have their 
voices heard in a nation that they hoped to make better for having listened.   
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